A new kind of Taliban: An interview with Maulvi Qalamuddin
By Shanthie Mariet D'Souza
Thursday, March 8, 2012 - 1:49 PM
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In September 2010 Afghan President Hamid Karzai named Maulvi Qalamuddin to the High Peace Council, an Afghan organization set up to negotiate with the Taliban-led insurgency. Qalamuddin has a notorious past as the former deputy minister for the General Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Elimination of Vice (Amr-e-Bil M'arouf wa Nahi Anil Munkar) during the Taliban regime. He oversaw the implementation of the extreme and strict Islamic laws through religious police squads who ran surveillance on the Afghan populace. Activities included public beatings of women who were deemed to be dressed or behaving inappropriately, banning women from working in public space, smashing televisions, and forcing men to grow beards and spend more time in mosques.
Maulvi Qalamuddin is among the most controversial of the five Taliban members who have been appointed to the HPC as part of the Afghan government's efforts to include more hardliners into the peace process. He is considered to be among the few of Taliban members who still have significant clout and connections among insurgents, including the Taliban leadership. Qalamuddin is a product of the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania madrassa in the town of Akora Khattak, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, the same madrassa that produced Mullah Omar and other Taliban ministers and commanders, including Jalaluddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani Network and one of the most dreaded insurgent leaders in Afghanistan. In an effort to build trust with insurgent leaders, Afghan government has petitioned the U.N. Security Council to remove Qalamuddin and 19 other former Taliban members from a sanctions list that has prevented them from travelling or sending money abroad since 1999.
As the rush towards withdrawal gathers momentum, and the search for political solution intensifies, the urge to portray a moderate face of the Taliban is gaining traction. While those who have joined the peace process appear to have moderated their views, the key question of whether there has been a genuine change of heart or whether nominal moderation represents mere opportunism remains unanswered.
Afghans who have been fatigued by the unending war and uncertainty of the international presence are broadly supportive of the peace and reintegration processes, but they, too, remain sceptical about the motives and intent of the former Taliban leaders who are eyeing a return through political negotiations. Concerns remain over how the Taliban might behave once they are allowed into some kind of power sharing arrangement. Moreover, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Omar, remains elusive, with little or no real indication of his thoughts on the peace processes.
Through my discussions with the members of the High Peace Council, as well as the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), it was interesting to observe the various strands of thinking on reintegration, reconciliation and peace processes. The HPC and APRP members were optimistic about the reintegration process, though they expressed concerns about the reliability of guarantees from the government of protection, compensation and employment opportunities to prevent the militants from re-joining the insurgency. As for the reconciliation and peace process, members lamented the lack of clarity on the role and powers of HPC with the U.S. having set up the parallel Qatar process. Most feel that this should be an Afghan-led negotiation, and any parallel process should be in consultation with the Afghans, and needs to be gradually integrated into the Afghan effort. They perceive the present U.S. effort at negotiation as a face saving formula rather than a serious stake holder in the negotiation process. However, some concede that the Qatar track may also take the heat off of the Afghans to find a political solution, given that the HPC had lost a lot of steam after the assassination of HPC head Burhanuddin Rabbani last year. Concerns remain over the potential spoiler role that could be played by Pakistan, and the belief that the Pakistani establishment has control over the Quetta Shura or at least continue to provide sanctuary to Taliban militants.
During a conversation with Maulvi Qalamuddin in Kabul, I had a rare opportunity to get a glimpse into his personal views on the various issues that have confounded the Afghans and the international community, and threatened the viability of the peace process. He paints a very optimistic picture of the prospects of reintegration and reconciliation, though he remains wary of the role of the United States and neighbouring countries.
Below are Maulvi Qalamuddin's responses to my questions.
Shanthie D'Souza: Why do you think peace and reconciliation is important? Do you think the Afghan government can bring peace?
Maulvi Qalamuddin: Reconciliation and peace are important to bring an end to the war. The people of Afgahnistan are tired of war and violence and want peace. So it is important to work with the government to bring peace. The Afghan government by working through the provincial offices of the High Peace Council has been able to reach out to large segment of tribal elders that has helped gain grass root support.
SD: Why didn't you support or join the government earlier?
MQ: By direct political negotiations, there were many like Maulvi Qalamuddin who were ready to join the government but were arrested in 2002. There were many like him who wanted to join the government earlier but were captured or killed. This created a trust deficit.
SD: Why did you join the Taliban and why are you supporting the Afghan government now?
MQ: The rationale for joining the Taliban was to put an end to the conflict caused by the incessant infighting among the mujahideen in the 1990's. The Taliban were the only ones who were able to being security and justice to Afghanistan. Likewise, my present decision to join the government is to help bring peace to the country. Eleven years of war has worked to no one's advantage. I will support any government that has and serves the interest of the Afghan people.
SD: Was the Taliban regime better or more effective than the present government?
MQ: The Taliban regime was good because there was a security, justice in Afghanistan and it was a pure Islamic state. The present Afghan government is good because it has money, professional cadre and international support. In the time of the Taliban, one could not visualise offices with young people working on computers that one sees today. That is a good sign. I have three television sets at home and I watch Televison programs[The Taliban during its rule and under Qalamuddin's direction had carried out public executions of TV sets as it was considered as ‘idolatry']. For a man averse to photography, he was open to being photographed.
SD: Are the Taliban ready for talks? Who should be included in the talks and negotiations?
MQ: Taliban has shown inclination for talks. Not all Taliban are useful and they do not depict the Afghan culture. The present excesses of the Taliban like beheadings and suicide bombing are unacceptable. There is a need to separate the criminalised networks from the real Taliban.
SD: What are the challenges to the reconciliation process?
MQ: The presence of criminal groups who function under the name of Taliban are a main challenge. There are also issues of night raids [by the international forces], torture, detention centres, black listing of Taliban member and role of neighbouring countries. More importantly, there is lack of trust and confidence between the government, international community and the Taliban
SD: How do you think these challenges can be addressed?
MQ: For reconciliation to work there is a need for change in the constitution, provide guarantees, build trust and international community's support.
SD: What do you think of the Qatar Process? Do you think it will help establish contact and official address for the Taliban?
MQ: The Qatar process is an informal dialogue and not an official channel. Thus, it has its limitations. Taliban had only a presence in Qatar, not an office. This window has opened on to a path that might lead eventually to peace negotiations. [His emphasis was on the Afghan process].
SD: What should be done after 2014 in case of international withdrawal?
MQ: There is a need to work together with the Afghan government and the international community.
SD: If the Taliban were to come back to power in some form, would women's rights be protected?
MQ: The west does not understand the Afghan society. I am not against women working in offices or going out in public alone. Look, you are a foreigner. If you can cover your head and respect our culture, we appreciate and expect the same from Afghan women. The present breed of Afghan women appearing on TV without head scarves is not acceptable. Women need to adhere to the sharia laws in consonance with the Afghan culture.
***
When I asked other HPC officials about women's rights, they were adamant that the respect and protection of women rights would not be compromised by reconciliation with the Taliban. Based on my own observations in Afghanistan, there appears to have been a marginal (or tactical) shift in letting women in public space, but not letting them dress the way they want to, for example . While most Afghan women would like to wear the traditional attire or cover their head, there are others who believe they should have the freedom to make that choice themselves. Interestingly, Qalamuddin let me photograph him, but declined to have his picture taken with me, presumably because I am a woman. I perceive this as a marginal change, and not a full, attitudinal change.
The Afghan women leaders with whom I have had discussions, such as Fawzia Koofi, Sima Samar, Shukriya Barakzai and others in Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Nangahar, are very apprehensive. They feel that once back in power, the Taliban will resort to old ways. Unless the international community ensures some guarantees on women and human rights, Afghanistan risks reverting to its pre-2001 ways.
Do Qalamuddin's views signify a dramatic shift in thinking among the Taliban? Are these early signs of transformation or tactics of opportunism? It is important for the United States and its allies, who are pushing for hasty deals through multiple negotiation channels, to sieve through these strands of thinking to prepare for eventualities when the Taliban are back in some form in the Afghan society and polity. Obviously, these attempts at peace making and negotiations should not fritter away a decade-long achievements in areas of democracy, human and women rights.
Shanthie Mariet D'Souza is a research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). She can be reached at shanthied@gmail.com. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institute.
Shanthie Mariet D'Souza
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Leopards cannot change their spots
Leopards cannot change their spots. Once in Riyadh a young taxi driver explained how he used to police the Afghan women. This driver was from Punjab. His duties with the Taliban were in Afghanistan and his stay was a minimum of two months. His duties included carrying a whip with which he used to whip women who were not properly dressed. As per him an exposed ankle was not properly dressed. Yes he whipped many women. Yes he and his brothers and cousins from Punjab used to go to Afghanistan. They were paid for all this. This was before 9/11. After 9/11 they were no jobs in Afghanistan and hence many shifted to Riyadh.
Sometimes it is really hard for me to understand these people. Of course there ismotive behind any action, but I can't see how their motives could serve as excuse for the actions they take. I mean there should be more dialogues like this one in order to be able to to figure out what are their intentions indeed.
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Commerce: Brzezinski wrote, “the most immediate task is to make certain that no state or combination of states gains the capacity to expel the United States from Eurasia or even to diminish significantly its decisive arbitration role.” (The Grand Chessboard)
The Soviet Union collapse in 1991 created several new nations around the Caspian Sea. Major US oil companies, including Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Unocal, BP Amoco, Shell and Enron, invested billions in these Central Asian nations, bribing heads of state to secure equity rights in the huge oil reserves. US companies owned approximately 75% of the rights. However, Russia owned the pipelines and could control the quantity and price of transporting the oil. (New Yorker 7/9/01, Asia Times 1/26/02)
The natural route for pipelines would be across Iran but the US had a muddled history with Iran. In 1946, the Soviet presence in Iran convinced Truman that the Soviets planned to use Iran for expansion and asked the UN to intervene. “Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making,” Truman wrote. March 1947, Truman stated to Congress, “I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” The policy came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. (PBS The American Experience; www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/doctrine.htm
Eisenhower gave Iran its first nuclear materials and encouraged Iran to develop nuclear energy as part of his “Atoms for Peace” project. Eisenhower also undermined Iran’s democratically elected president and installed the Shah on the throne. It was that last act that was remembered by the rebels who overthrew the tyrannical Shah and took those in the US Embassy hostage. Carter attempted to negotiate the release of the hostages but refused to sell Iran weapons because it was illegal; Iran had been declared a state sponsor of terror. Reagan agreed to the arms sale through Israel but also supplied Iraq, that had attacked Iran, with weapons including agents necessary for making Weapons of Mass Destruction. Iraq used WMD created from agents supplied by the US to kill Iranian soldiers and Iraqi Kurds. (New York Times, 8/18/02; 1994 Report by the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; General Accounting Office, 2/7/94; Washington Post 12/30/02; National Security Archive, 2003).
Many of the arms to Iran went to Hezbollah that subsequently blew up the US Embassy in Beirut and a former hotel housing Marines killing more than 240 of them, the highest one day death toll of Marines since Iwo Jima. Hezbollah was also linked to kidnappings, the bombing of the Embassy annex, and hijacking of a TWA airliner in Beirut. Those acts and Hezbollah attacks on Israel exacerbated relations between the US and Iran. Iran’s grievance, beyond the overthrow of its government, was Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorism inside Iran.Some of those terrorists had been recruited, trained and equipped by Reagan.
The story of two US corporations, Enron and Unocal. both with offices in Texas, will illustrate the difficulty of dealing with the Taliban.
The Indian government approved construction of Enron’s Dabhol liquified natural gas power plant, near Mumbai on the coast of India. Enron’s $3 billion was the largest single foreign investment in India’s history and bought 65% of the world’s largest power plant, intended to provide one-fifth of India’s energy needs by 1997. (India Express 2/27/00; Asia Times 1/18/00) The World Bank believed the plant was “not economically viable” and refused to invest in it. (New York Times 3/20/01)
1996, Uzbekistan signed a deal with Enron “that could lead to joint development of the Central Asian nation’s potentially rich natural gas fields.” (Houston Chronicle, 6/25/96) The $1.3 billion venture teamed Enron and the state companies of Russia and Uzbekistan. (Houston Chronicle, 6/30/96) The US government gave $400 million to help Enron develop the natural gas fields. (Oil & Gas Journal, 7/8/96)
In 1995 the Indian government temporarily cancelled the Dahbol agreement. Kenneth Lay and US Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown went to India backed with lobbying by other US officials. Summer 2001, the National Security Council formed a “Dabhol Working Group” with officials from various cabinet agencies to get the plant completed and functioning. US pressure on India intensified until shortly before Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001. US officials claimed their lobbying supported the $640 million the US government had already invested in the project. Critics claimed that the plant received unusually strong support from both Clinton and Bush. (New York Daily News, 1/18/02); Washington Post (1/19/02)
1998, Enron’s agreement to develop natural gas with Uzbekistan was not renewed. Enron closed its office there. The reason for the “failure of Enron’s flagship project” was an inability to get the natural gas out of the region. “Uzbekistan is extremely concerned at the growing strength of the Taliban and its potential impact on stability in Uzbekistan, making any future cooperation on a pipeline project which benefits the Taliban unlikely.” (Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections 10/12/98)
12/2/01 Enron filed for bankruptcy—the biggest bankruptcy in history at that time, (BBC 1/10/02) and in 2002 reorganized as a pipeline company that would continue work on its controversial Dabhol power plant. (Houston Business Journal, 3/15/02) Associated Press reported that Enron bribed Taliban officials for a pipeline deal in Afghanistan.” Atul Davda, a senior director in Enron’s International Division stated, “Enron had intimate contact with Taliban officials.” In 1997, Enron executives met with Taliban officials in Texas. They were “given the red-carpet treatment and promised a fortune if the deal (went) through.” According to a CIA source, “Enron proposed to pay the Taliban large sums of money in a ‘tax’ on every cubic foot of gas and oil shipped through a pipeline they planned to build.” This source claimed Enron paid more than $400 million for a feasibility study on the pipeline and “a large portion of that cost was pay-offs to the Taliban.” Enron continued to court the Taliban even after Unocal officially gave up on the pipeline in the wake of the African embassy bombings. An investigation after Enron’s collapse in 2001 determined that some of this pay-off money ended up funding al-Qaeda. (AP, 3/7/02)
Unocal:
In 1996, Unocal was given permission by Taliban for the pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Other interested companies were Amoco, BP, Chevron, Exxon and Mobile. (Frankfurter Rundschau 10/96)Unocal was hopeful that the Taliban would stabilize Afghanistan and allow its pipeline plans to go forward. According to some reports, “preliminary agreement (on the pipeline) was reached between the (Taliban and Unocal) long before the fall of Kabul .… Oil industry insiders say the dream of securing a pipeline across Afghanistan is the main reason why Pakistan, a close political ally of America’s, has been so supportive of the Taliban, and why America has quietly acquiesced in its conquest of Afghanistan.” (Daily Telegraph UK,10/11/96)
The Wall Street Journal reported (5/23/97), “Like them or not the Taliban are the players most capable of achieving peace in Afghanistan.” The New York Times reported (5/26/97), “The Clinton Administration has taken the view that a Taliban victory…would offer the possibility of new trade routes that could weaken Russian and Iranian influence in the region.”
Halliburton, a company headed by future Vice President Dick Cheney, announced a new agreement to provide technical services and drilling for Turkmenistan. The press release stated, “Halliburton has been providing a variety of services in Turkmenistan for the past five years.” On the same day, a consortium to build a pipeline through Afghanistan was formed. Called CentGas, the two main partners were Unocal and Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia. (Halliburton, 10/27/97; Centgas, 10/17/97)
December 1997, representatives of the Taliban came to the Texas headquarters of Unocal to negotiate their support for the pipeline. The Taliban seemed to agree to a $2 billion pipeline deal, but only if the US officially recognized the Taliban regime. According to the Daily Telegraph UK(12/2/01) “the US government, which in the past has branded the Taliban’s policies against women and children ‘despicable,’ appears anxious to please the fundamentalists to clinch the lucrative pipeline contract.” A BBC reporter said that “the proposal to build a pipeline across Afghanistan is part of an international scramble to profit from developing the rich energy resources of the Caspian Sea.” (BBC,12/4/97) The 9/11 Commission concluded that some State Department diplomats were willing to “give the Taliban a chance” because it might bring stability to Afghanistan and allow the pipeline to be built.
Henry Kissinger, a Unocal consultant, called the agreement “a triumph of hope over experience.” (Washington Post, 10/5/98) Taliban hired Leili Helms, niece of Richard Helms former director of the CIA, as their PR representative in Washington. (Inter Press Service 11/16/ 01) Another Unocal adviser, Zalmay Khalilzad, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post supporting the Taliban regime. “It is time for the United States to reengage.…The Taliban does not practice the anti-US style of fundamentalism practiced by Iran-it is closer to the Saudi model.” The US should help the Taliban “put Afghanistan on a path toward peace.” Violence “has been a source of regional instability and an obstacle to building pipelines to bring Central Asian oil and gas to Pakistan and the world markets.” (Washington Post, 10/7/96) Khalilzad was an official in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, worked under Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and was a member of the Project for the New American Century. Other members were Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld.
The Asia Times noted (12/25/03), “It was Khalilzad-when he was a huge Taliban fan-who conducted the risk analysis for Unocal” regarding the pipeline. Khalilzad later turned against the Taliban and after 9/11 was appointed as special envoy to Afghanistan, and US ambassador to Afghanistan. A London Times article (10/5/04) was titled: “US Envoy Accused of Being the Power Pulling Karzai’s Strings.” BBC reported (4/6/05) that Khalilzad was accused of “frequently overshadowing President Karzai… No major decisions by the Afghan government (are) made without his involvement.”
Unocal Vice President of International Relations John J. Maresca (later to become a Special Ambassador to Afghanistan) testified before the House of Representatives that Unocal’s pipeline would extend across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean and suggested that with the pipeline the Caspian basin could produce 20 percent of all the non-OPEC oil in the world by 2010. However, he warned, “It’s not going to be built until there is a single Afghanistan Government.” (US Congress, 2/12/98)
August 1998, The Northern Alliance capital was captured by the Taliban with the support of Pakistan’s ISI. An intercepted message of an ISI officer stated, “My boys and I are riding into Mazar-i-Sharif.” (New York Times/12/8/01) Taliban controlled 90% of Afghanistan, including the proposed pipeline route. However, the pipeline could not be financed unless the Taliban government was officially recognized. “Diplomatic sources said the Taliban’s offensive was well prepared and deliberately scheduled two months ahead of the next UN meeting” where members were to decide whether the Taliban should be recognized. (Daily Telegraph UK, 8/13/98.) Pakistan, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia recognized the regime. Clinton refused diplomatic recognition to the Taliban, making business there legally problematic. (New York Times, 12/5/98)
Major sources for this report are: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Yale University Press, 2000, by Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Daily Telegraph UK, and The War on Freedom, Tree of Life Publication, 2002, by Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development UK.
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U.S. Foreign policy decisions of the post-Cold War era were in some cases identical to the blindness and the failure of the Foreign policy decisions during the Cold War. One only has to look at the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq to see this. The reason for this is twofold: first, Smithsonianism (after former Secretary of State Henry Stimson) and its idea of "collective security;" second, the U.S. saving mission to the world, rekindled by former President Woodrow Wilson, and extended through Presidents Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson into a global "New Dealism.".
"Is rio orange war always forfait sans engagement inevitable ?"
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