The Afghan trust deficit
By Douglas A. Ollivant
Wednesday, March 7, 2012 - 12:44 PM
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*UPDATE* 3/12/2012
In the first version of this piece, the "Trust Deficit" of the title referred to only the lack of trust between U.S. forces and their Afghan military trainees. In light of yesterday's events it is important to note that the trust gap runs both ways. The appalling events of yesterday, coming on the heels of earlier incidents have reinforced a host of existing negative perceptions about the behavior and intentions of the Western powers in Afghanistan. The negative atmosphere will make it even more difficult for our Afghan allies in Kabul to make the necessary compromises to accommodate a long-term NATO and U.S. presence. Meanwhile, domestic political opinion appears to be shaky, with Republican presidential candidates now openly opining about a more rapid withdrawal. Presidential leadership was needed last week. It is even more critical now. Something must be done to arrest this downward spiral in Afghanistan, which the Taliban are no doubt watching with glee.
***
This past week's wave of killings in Afghanistan of U.S. military personnel by their nominal Afghan allies has exposed a key weakness in the NATO and U.S. transition "train and advise" strategy that will allow the large NATO units to disengage. Simply put, the tactic of putting small groups of experienced, seasoned soldiers with Afghan security forces to both train and provide access to NATO resource-such as intelligence and airpower-assumes that the two sides have enough mutual trust and respect to work together. It also assumes that the fratricidal violence between these two allied groups (Afghan and NATO) will be sufficiently low-preferably zero-that domestic support can be maintained in Washington and other capitals long enough for real changes to take root. Both of these assumptions are now questionable.
While some of these killings may be the work of Taliban infiltrators, defense officials privately say that well over half appear instead to be in response to a perceived personal insult or-as in at least some of last week's incidents-in response to an insult to Islam. Upon reflection, this should not surprise us. This is a society in which Afghan males occasionally kill their own daughters and sisters in order to maintain personal and family honor. How much easier to kill a Western trainer for similar reasons?
American and other NATO forces react as one would expect in this situation; they become risk averse. They spend less time with Afghans, avoid being alone with Afghans, and retreat to their compatriots. This understandable behavior makes the situation worse, further isolating the Westerners from the contact that might permit cultural understanding and reduce the friction between the two sides.
While markedly worse of late, the risk to trainers from their Afghan colleagues is not a new phenomenon in Afghanistan. Yet the advisory strategy has moved forward despite the clear vulnerability of the people asked to undertake it. It is not clear whether anyone identified this vulnerability and senior leaders decided it was an acceptable risk, or whether the influx of Iraq veterans bringing their "lessons learned" skewed the perception of what was possible, as there were very few of these "green on blue" incidents with trainers in the much more developed Iraq. This vulnerability has been discussed sotte vocce among the Afghan policy community for several months now, with no one wanting to expose the weaknesses in the plan or the long-term difficulties of this latest variant of the counter insurgency strategy. There is clearly no longer any secret to keep.
Regardless of how we arrived at this point, we now have a stubborn problem. The President, administration officials, and senior military leaders are saying the diplomatic things they have to say, but all realize the severity of the situation. No doubt measures are being put in place to try to alleviate the most obvious vulnerabilities and increase "force protection" throughout Afghanistan, even though this is completely at odds with the concept of an advisory mission. But the bottom line is that throughout the country, the NATO and Afghan forces are intertwined. To try to deny all opportunities for future attacks is simply not possible.
The issue is that no one appears to have a viable Plan B at this point. One can lament the set of circumstances that has brought us to this point, but that changes the facts not at all. The current strategy no longer appears workable, given the lack of trust now made apparent, not to mention domestic support. And yet the only easily discernible alternative-a rapid disengagement from Afghanistan-appears even worse, or at least an explicit admission of failure, without any fig leaf of "transition" as NATO departs, not to mention humanitarian concerns for the Afghans.
The American people appear to be demanding real answers to hard questions. What are our interests in Afghanistan? Why are we still there now that Osama bin Laden is dead? Why do our Afghan allies hate us enough to kill us when we are there to help them? Why are we supporting a government that can't keep its agents from killing ours and which appears to be corrupt? To date, the answers coming from the Administration and the war's supporters in Congress do not appear to be answering these questions, instead maintaining that the fratricide issue is manageable and that we can stay the course.
Unfortunately, Afghanistan is a "wicked problem" that appears to be getting more tangled by the day. Our presence is not simply a part of the solution but part of the problem, creating an inexorable spiral from which we are struggling to escape with both our dignity and our strategy intact. The refusal to acknowledge the recalculation of risk at both the senior and individual levels in Afghanistan refuses to acknowledge the diminishing likelihood that the "train and advise" plan will work. The Afghans will notice when senior mentors show up with their security detail or when more junior ones keep their weapons closer and their guard up.
The President owes the American people a clear, concise explanation of our policy and why the costs are worth paying; the buck does stop with him. If the President believes that trust can be restored between the Afghans trying to make a country and the people of good will we have asked to help them, then he must say so and be willing to risk the political storms that will follow if the costs-fiscal and human-increase. If he instead believes the new situation requires adjusting the policy, then so be it. When the assumptions on which plans are based turn out to be false, this is the logical next step. This may be politically inopportune, risking accusation either of giving up our allies and/or interests in Afghanistan or of selling out our dead.
In short, the "train and advise" strategy that is the current U.S. and NATO policy no longer appears feasible. The Commander in Chief, after serious deliberations with Congress, needs to posit a workable strategy the properly weights national interests and then plan to follow it through as a responsible party rather than turning to demagoguery. There are soldiers dying in Afghanistan executing an unclear policy and we all owe them more than that.
Douglas A. Ollivant, a Senior National Security Studies Fellow at New America Foundation, was the Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to the Commander, Regional Command East, 2010-2011.
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Another reason why US will abandon Afghanistan
After ten long years of war and counting, American people have run out of patience with this unending war.
That is why US will abandon Afghanistan to the mercy of Pakistan. Of course US will have substantial presence in the beginning after the end of combat role and withdrawal, but Karzai government won’t be able to withstand the Taliban insurgency supported from across the border in Pakistan in the absence of US/NATO troops. Couple of devastating attacks on some US installations and US will pack the bags in a hurry as it did in Lebanon in 1982.
If Obama wins which seems more likely with each passing day, US will conclude a Vietnam-style peace deal as dictated by Pakistan with Afghan Taliban leaders chosen by Pakistan. US will force Afghan government to accept that mirage of a peace deal so that US can begin its drawdown and finally exit the theater of a war it is desperate not to be seen as having lost, not so much to the Taliban and Al Qaeda as to the wily Generals of Rawalpindi who have proved to be smarter than the Americans.
That facade of peace will crumble within few years after the departure of US troops and Pakistan will bring Afghanistan under its suzerainty with reimposition of Taliban rule just as it did in 1996 while tired and financially broke Uncle Sam will helplessly look the other way just as it did in 1975 in Vietnam.
has ruined the stability of the the region.
Its only strategic interest there is to de-stabilise Pakistan through Afghanistan. Sophisticated arms have been recovered by Pakistani authorities from the captured India sponsored terrorist groups.
Failure to act on the evidence-backed information provided to US ISAF and NATO of Indian involvement in terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, only leads to suspicions that in the command echelon of western forces there is a tacit approval of Indian's villainous role.
There is a huge network of Indian terrorist-training camps in Afghanistan.
With the start of a new massive military exercise along Pakistan border India on Sunday, moved its second BrahMos supersonic cruise missile regiment in Rajasthan sector close to Sindh frontier.
With overbearing pride in its latest weaponry India is pushing Pakistan for another war to test its new war strategy.
SOLUTION
To solve much of the issues facing the region India must leave Afghanistan and stop its support to the terrorists reeking havoc in the Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Western powers need to publicly acknowledge the existence of the networks of India's terrorist training camps and must be seen to be acting to remove those networks.
This will ensure there is peace in the region post withdrawal in 2013 and 2014.
The pot calling the kettle black :-)
For Pakistan to accuse ANY other country of terrorism is a travesty.
In this case, there have been meetings in which the Paki PM has claimed to have provided "proof" and it turned out that absolutely nothing of the kind was provided.
If there is any support by NATO for terrorism in Pakistan in response to the Pakis providing safe havens for the Taliban, it's too little too late if anything.
...until January 2013 at the earliest. Come on, you know Obama is not jeopardizing his re-election campaign, not now that he's so close. If he has to sign a few more condolence letters, then so be it.
If he gets re-elected, he's probably going to pull out as quickly as possible. In fact, I think that Pannetta gave away the future strategy when he let slip that troop withdrawals would be accelerated through 2013. That's probably what Barry is planning, but he would be a political fool to admit to it before November; best to take it easy, cruise to re-election, let some time pass so it doesn't look so obvious, form a task force or a committee or whatever, and announce that by 4Q 2013 we'll have our main battle force out of Afghanistan.
(the bean counters can then put OEF 2001-2013 down as a write-off; one big, bloody, ill-conceived, miserable fucking write-off)
for another Hollywood blockbuster;
script provided curtsey of Delta Command;
There is going to be another spectacular raid in AfPak, by the elite force.
Its not the pulling out of troops that's going to win him the election but another Al-Qaida head. Its anybody's guess who it will be.
Of course they will run out of patience, how could they proceed to be that way! I don't think this situation is normal, it is everything but normal! Estate Agents
Arne Strand*
When travelling with NGOs in Afghanistan in recent years I have often questioned why things have changed so dramatically. Why have NGOs become military targets and why has their reputation declined compared to the situation in the 1980s and 1990s. Why were people not coming out to greet us when upon arrival in a village, as they always did in the past?
Perceptions of the international community
There may be a number of reasons, but much derives from perceptions held amongst ordinary Afghans of the various international players to which they are exposed. Certainly, they are disappointed by the international community in general as expectations of a better and more secure life have not yet materialised. Much of the attention has been focused on inadequate delivery of humanitarian assistance, but research has demonstrated that the cooptation of former warlords and a significantly deteriorated security environment are important contributing factors to the increasingly negative attitude of the Afghans.[i] From a human security viewpoint the situation is especially grave for women. Large numbers of cases of self-immolation are being recorded at hospitals in Herat, while violence and rape are reported mainly to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). The principal reason for the lack of reported cases as explained in an interview in Kandahar in 2005 is that: '...there is no use reporting to the police, they don't care; the AIHRC is at least willing to take note of our case'.[ii] As recently documented in northern Afghanistan, many find the police to be a threat to their security rather than a force of protection. Likewise, people find many governmental officials to be deeply corrupt and involved in a range of illegal activities. They then wonder why this is allowed to happen when there are numerous foreign advisers training and working with the Afghan National Police, the Afghan Army and the ministries.
Blurring of lines
Another reason for Afghans to take a more cautious attitude towards humanitarian agencies is that the lines between humanitarian and military interventions have been blurred. In November 2002, the US military introduced Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the notion of 'winning hearts and minds' as a military strategy through implementation of humanitarian projects in areas under their control. To support these plans and as a means of force protection US troops tried to associate themselves closely with any humanitarian and development activity under way. One such way was the use of white cars to capitalise on the humanitarian profile of NGOs and UN agencies.
This has turned NGOs into targets for military groups opposing the international military presence and portrayed projects such as new school buildings as symbols of foreign interference, not unlike how they were perceived during the Soviet invasion. While some NGOs capitalised on this new funding opportunity, the majority protested on grounds of principle. Out of fear for their security they advocated a clear separation between humanitarian and military interventions.[iii] While the US continued its dual strategy in the south, other nations that were part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) opted for a clearer separation between their military and humanitarian engagements, following the example of British troops in Northern Afghanistan. However, due to the lack of a common ISAF policy, each PRT nation was left to develop its own approach subject to its military and humanitarian strategy and depending on the funds it had available.[iv]
Regaining trust
Research undertaken in different parts of Afghanistan over recent years has allowed a comparison of attitudes towards the international forces and NGOs. A doctor asked rhetorically: '...are the forces here to protect us or themselves?', representing a common scepticism in southern Afghanistan about the aggressive military intervention they have experienced. In the north, by contrast, interviews revealed that ordinary Afghans regarded the international troops as a guarantee against renewed warlordism and warfare, and a sign of continued international engagement. While most experienced NGOs operating in the south have avoided contact with military forces, the separation that has been established between the military and humanitarian agendas in the north has reduced this tension considerably.[v]
Thus, if humanitarian agencies are to regain the trust of the Afghans it remains of crucial importance that they continue to demonstrate their distance from the military forces. For their part, the military forces need to understand and respect this strategy and refrain from using humanitarian symbols and projects. However, there is more to be done. Other findings make it equally clear that the NGOs have a major job to do in informing Afghans of their intentions and their programmes, and to stick to the promises they make. All the signs indicate that they need to reflect critically on their own position. On the one hand, they need to decide whether they just wish to capitalise on available funds and limit themselves to project implementation. On the other, they may choose to side with the Afghan population and voice their concerns against aggressively performed military operations, oppressive and corrupt government officials, humanitarian agencies failing to live up to people's expectations and the violence that particularly affects women. The latter strategy might result in less funding but warmer welcomes in Afghan villages and townships.
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I think he is riding this America's Mayor thing as far as he can. If 9/11 never happened, he would not have received as much exposure and might be running for senator, as would be a logical next step, rather than president. And I think that is shameful, as is any politician who uses this tragedy, which I watched from my window, to their advantage. Many "less well off" New Yorkers remember him as a brutal mayor who was extrememly racist and caused much suffering. I do not think he is qualified, and the very fact that he is milking the suffering of the 9/11 families out to be some sort of crime..
"Is rio orange war always forfait mobile blackberry inevitable ?"
MaximB
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