The Pentagon has just quietly released the redacted results
of an inquiry into allegations of human rights abuses by U.S.-sponsored armed
groups in Afghanistan. They were investigating allegations made in a report I
co-authored while working for Human Rights Watch, about the Afghan Local Police
(ALP) and other government-backed security forces, Just
Don't Call it a Militia, published this past September. It's unusual
for NGOs to elicit such a response -- 21 officials spending five weeks in 45
locations -- and tempting to think it signals how seriously they took the
report.
Gen. John R. Allen, the Commander of U.S. and NATO forces in
Afghanistan, does appear to be committed to greater transparency and a more
constructive relationship with NGOs. But the Pentagon's concern with our report
is probably more reflective of the centrality of ALP to its strategy in the
country, particularly its exit strategy. Last week, the head of U.S. Special
Operations Command, Adm. William McRaven, said he wanted to expand ALP from 10,000
to 30,000 men, and extend it beyond its stated shelf life of 2015. A more
cynical explanation for the investigation could be the need to avert triggering
the Leahy
law, under which U.S. assistance to military units is cut when there is
credible information of gross human rights abuses.
Human rights abuses are almost inevitable when injecting
lightly trained forces into fractured communities that tend to lie at the edge
of government control, where impunity is rampant. Significant efforts have been
made to safeguard against the risk of creating lawless militias, but what
compounds this risk is that it's not just the ALP that the U.S. and Afghan
governments are backing. There's also the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), the Critical
Infrastructure Program (CIP),
the Interim Security Infrastructure (ISCI),
Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS),
and the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3).
And these are just the groups with acronyms. Beyond them are a myriad of
informal militias supported by Afghan intelligence forces, provincial
officials, warlords, and unregistered private security forces, as well as the
reintegrated former insurgents who are allowed to keep their arms.
Nobody is counting. And there is no demobilization strategy
for these groups.
As these groups have expanded, there has been an increase in
reports of abuse, including killings, rapes, unauthorized raids, and extortion.
The recent investigation by the U.S. military largely focused on abuses by the
ALP, and wholly or partially confirmed many of the allegations made in the
Human Rights Watch report. It dismissed a significant number of allegations as "not
credible," without providing evidence. These
include rejecting claims that a notorious militia of Nur-ul-Haq working with U.S.
Special Forces in Baghlan is associated with the insurgent Hezb-i Islami, or with criminality.
(Haq is described as an ALP commander by
provincial officials, though his group may not be an official one). They also
rejected the suggestion that Special Operations Forces "have a poor reputation
in Herat province," where they were responsible for one of the bloodiest
mistakes by U.S. airstrikes, in August 2008, partly caused by their alleged
alliance with abusive
and rival criminal elements. Other allegations are dismissed as
unverifiable because Human Rights Watch would not breach the confidentiality of
witnesses' names and contacts.
More encouragingly, the investigation makes some welcome
recommendations, including introducing procedures for disciplining and firing
ALP officers, exercising greater precautions when placing ALP units in
faction-riven areas, and suggesting that Gen. Allen lead a quarterly review of
ALP to assess problem units and abuse allegations.
Fundamentally though, the investigating team concludes that
ALP works, and that its critics do not appreciate the security dividends
generated by the militias' presence. However, this depends on your definition
of security. The U.S. military measures security through its daily data stream
of attack levels. By this metric, ALP and groups like it may improve security.
Some communities agree, and welcome local security forces as the most immediate
way of holding back Taliban incursions. But in many parts of the country there
is alarm about the rapid reactivation of old commander networks, and concern
about the potential for civil
war. These fears are fueled by the looming withdrawal of the bulk of
international forces by the end of 2014, the prospect of economic
collapse as the foreign funds dry out, increasing ethnic tensions, deep
divisions over the prospect of talks with the Taliban, and uncertainty about
the interest of the Taliban leadership in a political settlement.
Sadly, Afghanistan only seems to have a series of bad
choices ahead. In this context, ALP may be a flawed but necessary tool, at
least in some areas. But partnering with notoriously abusive commanders is a
dangerous strategy. Since U.S. forces began closely partnering with the
Kandahari Police Commander Abdul Raziq, whom they described as an "Afghan folk
hero," his star has risen. Raziq's crimes have been well reported,
and may include extra-judicial executions. Several U.S. officials have
privately told me they'd like to see him removed, but President Karzai
appears to resent the volte-face. Recently a notorious private militia
commander linked to U.S. Special Forces, Azizullah,
was made head of ALP in Paktika. There will be many more like Raziq and
Azizullah with track records of abuse, whose power in the coming months and
years will become more and more entrenched, beyond the point of return.
The United States should respect its own regulations about
not supporting known rights abusers, curb the relentless drive to expand armed
groups in Afghanistan, and instead focus on increasing quality and capacity. In
addition to reining in the chaotic proliferation of armed groups, Afghanistan
and its allies should develop demobilization plans before
the 2014 transition. Otherwise, by the time the U.S. military has mostly
withdrawn, it could leave behind tens of thousands of armed men that most
Afghans can't identify, who can abuse their authority with impunity, and whose
allegiances are often to their own commanders, not to their communities or the
state.
The proliferation of abusive militias is not most Afghans'
definition of security, even when threatened by the brutality of the Taliban. But
with more patience and precaution from the Afghan government and the U.S.
military, the choices may not yet be so grim.
Rachel Reid is the
co-author of "Just
Don't Call it a Militia: Impunity, Militias, and the ‘Afghan Local Police.'"
She is now the Senior Policy Advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan for the Open
Society Foundations.
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