Last May I asked Major General Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak, the Deputy Director of the
ISI, Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, about his organization's links
with the Haqqani Network. "If you always focus on the mosaic," he said,
pointing to the Afghan rug in his sumptuous office, "that's all you'll see."
Today it doesn't matter how Washington looks at this mosaic - as transnational
terrorism or as Pakistan's anti-India partner in Afghanistan - one thing is
certain: elements within the ISI help fighters belonging to the Haqqani Network
who kill American soldiers. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is a tinderbox, one
spark - U.S. soldiers on Pakistani territory or the Haqqanis killing dozens of
American troops - could ignite war.
That spark may be more plausible than we think.
Recent détente is encouraging but only a Band-Aid over a gaping wound. Last
week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked the ISI to facilitate talks
between Washington and reconcilable Haqqanis, and yet warned of "dire
consequences" for Islamabad if the Pakistani military did not take action
against the Haqqanis who are unwilling to negotiate. The Pakistani response was
"yes" to talks, but "no" to military operations. Today, thousands of American
troops are in the Haqqani Network's crosshairs in eastern Afghanistan during
efforts to root out Haqqani militants, such as Operation
Steel Rain in Khowst. Unless Pakistani generals act against the Haqqani
Network's sanctuary in North Waziristan, which they
have refused to do so far, American casualties will increase. In that case,
there will be tremendous pressure on Congress and the White House to act
unilaterally, quite possibly by putting
boots on the ground.
What will happen if helicopters carrying American Seals are
shot down in North Waziristan? How will America respond to a major attack that
kills 100 troops in Afghanistan, like the September attack that wounded 77 soldiers in east
Kabul? What if the perpetrators escape to Karachi, beyond the range of
drones? What if American boots trigger a mutiny in the Pakistani army, leading
to civil war? How will Washington secure Pakistani nuclear weapons?
Unfortunately, many of these dangerous scenarios are increasingly likely.
A Pakistani official has told me that American-supplied Pakistani F-16 fighters
are on high alert against a probable US raid. In March, Pakistani
Air Force had orders to shoot down US predator and reaper drones. Last year,
Islamabad
shut down NATO's largest supply line for days, and three years ago, General
Ashfaq Kayani, head of the Pakistani military, ordered
fire on a US helicopter carrying U.S. Special Forces that had crossed into
North Waziristan. The Pakistani parliament, political parties and the media are
supportive of the army's sentiments against the United States, but not against
the Haqqanis. Anti-Americanism, always high, has reached unprecedented levels
within the military's ranks, especially amongst junior officers. This is
because most young officers are unaware of the past deals their generals have
made with the Americans, and some may act independently in the name of national
pride against an American incursion into Pakistan to target militants.
The United States is failing
to change Pakistani public opinion because many Pakistanis are oblivious to
American good will, and ambivalent about American aid as well as reconciliation
with the insurgents. They hear about aid cuts and Americans
talking to the same insurgents Pakistanis are asked to kill. Pakistani generals
and politicians support such public confusion and often blame Washington for
Pakistan's problems in order to cover up their own incompetence and corruption.
More than 10 years and $20 billion worth of military and civilian aid has
bought Washington the heads of top al-Qaeda leaders, the elimination of
critical safe havens (Swat valley and South Waziristan), but not the Quetta
Shura in Balochistan or the Haqqanis in North Waziristan.
At the same time, since 9/11 more than 30,000 Pakistanis have
been victims of terrorism, of which 6,000 were soldiers and policemen. The city
of Karachi, which contributes half of Pakistan's national income, is home to a
brutal ethnic war, and resurgent Balochi militants and Sindhi flood victims are
overstretching the military and an incompetent civilian government.
Hyperinflation of food and energy prices, water shortages, massive floods,
proliferating terrorists groups, and a fast-growing nuclear program are fast
making Pakistan a threat to itself and the world.
To make matters worse, the Pakistan-based Haqqanis are
killing American soldiers and disrupting the Afghan peace process, with what
the United States says is support from the ISI. Clearly, US military aid cuts
have done little to alter the ISI's support for the Haqqanis. Instead, General Kayani
is rallying
troops and political parties against expected U.S. raids into North Waziristan.
He is pressing Washington's weakest point: threatening to close crucial supply
routes to Afghanistan, without which there would be massive NATO fuel and
ammunition shortages. It would take months, and improbable negotiations with
the Russians, to get a viable alternative to the "Northern Supply Network."
It is not just a matter of Pakistani will, but also
Pakistani capabilities. There is great need for American helicopters and
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and yes, some American boots on the ground in the form of trainers and
advisers. Even if Pakistani generals decide to attack the Haqqanis, they no
longer have resources to clear and hold North Waziristan, and contain the
blowback that could come in the form of a national suicide bombing wave.
In 2009, suicide attacks increased by 220 percent from the
previous year (from ten to 32), targeting major cities: Peshawar, Islamabad,
Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi. This placed massive strains on poorly equipped
national police forces. The same year, riding on an anti-insurgent public opinion
wave, Pakistani commandoes, Frontier Scouts and 11th Corps
infantry men - many trained and equipped by the United States - broke
the insurgents' back in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan. Today the Pakistani
Army has no public support for a military operation against the Haqqanis.
Furthermore, the population's opposition to the Pakistani Taliban - public enemy
no. 1 in 2009 - is fading.
That was not always the case. In the summer of 2010, Pakistan's
Commanding General for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, told
me, "like Swat and South Waziristan [in 2009] with the help of the Pakistani
public we will clean out North Waziristan this winter [2010]." However,
Pakistani intransigence regarding the Haqqanis, devastating floods, the U.S. raid
that killed Osama bin Laden, and the killing of two Pakistanis in Lahore by an
American spy made the operation in North Waziristan impossible.
To renew ties we must start by replicating the 2009
conditions. American development dollars, weapons and trainers were flying in
and al-Qaeda members were flying out or shot dead. U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen,
who rightly chides
Pakistan today, said referring to the Pakistani
surge against Pakistani Taliban that he "couldn't
give the Pakistani Army anything but an 'A'." But absent a national
narrative against the Haqqanis that unites Pakistanis, carved out of a
transparent partnership with the United States, both countries may slip into
war. Time is running out.
Haider Ali
Hussein Mullick is the author of Pakistan's Security Paradox: Countering &
Fomenting Insurgencies. Mullick advised General (r) David H. Petraeus on
Pakistan in 2009 and 2010. He is currently pursuing graduate studies at Georgetown
University's Security Studies Program.(www.haidermullick.com)
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