Is reconciliation finished in Afghanistan?
By Michael Wahid Hanna
Monday, September 26, 2011 - 4:37 PM
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In the rush to judgment following the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Tajik head of the Afghan High PeaceCouncil and a former president of Afghanistan, opponents of pursuing apolitical settlement with the Taliban presented the spectacularattack as proof of the Taliban's perfidy and the misguided naïveté ofproponents of reconciliation. This sentiment was aided by theconfusion surrounding responsibility for the attack, following an initialclaim of responsibility by the Taliban that was retractedthe very next day. Rabbani's killing hasexposed the frailties and vulnerabilities of the incipient Afghan politicalprocess, but the logic of pursuing a political settlement, even if only withfactions within the insurgency, remains. And if this admittedly fraught processfails, the United States, the Afghan government, and their allies will have atthe very least clarified whether a political settlement is practical, and providedclearer guidance as to the futureboundaries of strategic planning in Afghanistan as American and allied forcesaccelerate the transition and withdrawal process.
It has often been repeated, tothe point of cliché, that there is nopurely military solution to the ongoing war. As the conflict settles into aform of military stalemate, this truism is being borne out by the realities ofthe war we are fighting. With the recent series of spectacular attacks in Kabul, Wardak and Kandahar, the insurgency has again demonstrated its resiliencyin spite of the surge of troops and increased tempo of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations, which have taken a serious toll ontheir war-fighting capacity. While a political settlement might not be apossible outcome, all other options represent decidedly sub-optimaleventualities, with unfettered civil war representing a worst-case scenario.Most other alternative strategies also have the distinct disadvantage ofrelying upon two critical factors that will not be satisfied: first, afundamental transformation of the Afghan political order and, second, adefinitive break of the Pakistani security establishment's longstanding ties toAfghan militants.
Beyond the polemics of public rhetoric, some amongthe Taliban view themselves principally as a political movement and they mustbe accepted as a legitimate Afghan actor if a political settlement is to bereached. Recent developments indicate that there are, however, obvious divisionswithin the insurgency regarding the advisability of engaging in political dialogue as a means to achieve the Taliban's political goals.
For a political process to continuethere is now a great deal of pressure on the Taliban and their centralleadership to heighten their level of engagement with the process to reassurethose on all sides who favor a political resolution. The apparent Taliban retraction of the claim of responsibility was a necessary first step todistance the Quetta Shura from an action that would, if definitively linked tothem, undermine any purported claims about Taliban interest in a negotiatedsettlement. If the attack represents a fracturing of the centralized leadership,then the fundamental shape of political outreach would have to adaptaccordingly, with an emphasis on cooptation of portions of the insurgency.
As the weaker party, the Taliban haveoften placed the onus on the United States and its allies in terms of initiatingconfidence-building steps. In light of the current, tenuous circumstances,however, the initiation by the Taliban of appropriate and far-reaching confidence-building measures is also likely a pre-requisite to the continuationof a peace process.
Recent developments, including high-level contacts between U.S. officials and Tayyab Agha, a confidante of Mullah Omar, indicate a serious interest on the part of the Taliban leadership toexplore the parameters of a political settlement. Exemplary among recent developments was the August 2011 statement issued in the name of Mullah Omar commemoratingthe end of Ramadan. While the statement portrayed past contacts with the Afghan government or United States as tactical in nature, it explicitly recognized those contacts and endorsed the possibility for adopting political means to achievethe Taliban's goals. The statement was partly the product of ongoing backchannel talks with the Taliban with various intermediaries who have urgedsuch public signaling. As such, it represented an important indicator regarding the understanding among some Taliban as to the necessity of enunciating theirintent to their enemies and preparing their supporters.
This context, however, raisesimportant questions about the ability of the Quetta Shura to speak for theinsurgency and bind the rank-and-file to any political agreement and cessationof hostilities. This is particularly the case if, in fact, the Rabbani assassination was an unsanctioned military action carried about insurgentsseeking to derail any political process. Michael Semple has describedthe nature of this growing divide within the insurgency, which is largely anoutgrowth of the divergent trajectory of Waziristan-based militants. Even themost optimistic rendering of a political resolution to the conflict should notbe seen as ending all violence and instability in the country. However, theQuetta Shura and Mullah Omar still represent the central node of authoritywithin the insurgency, and Mullah Omar himself still retains substantial moralauthority among Afghan fighters and militants. Of course, it also possible thatthe Shura itself is divided and that the assassination was an unsanctionedreaction by hard-liners among the leadership to recent openings.
Questions about fragmentation and radicalization within the Taliban's ranks, however, cannot be answered intheoretical terms, and require actual testing that can only come through anactive political process. Such a process might result in further fracturing. But, such fracturing would also provide clarity as to the limitations ofpolitical engagement and channel political efforts toward a factional approach tothe insurgency.
Any viable peace process willalso require unanimity of purpose among the Afghan government and its loyalopposition. Despite its manifest limitations, the High Peace Council played animportant role in the delicate task of constructing broad-based politicalsupport for talks. In the wake of Rabbani's assassination, many of those Afghanleaders hostile to the very possibility of a political settlement with theTaliban escalated their rhetoric, with the possibility of civil war lurking not far behind.
The leaders of the formerNorthern Alliance secured their positions of power and influence when theAmericans joined them to oust the Taliban, and their dominance was ratifiedthrough the Bonn process by which the Afghan constitution was written and thecountry's current government structure put in place. However, their position is at present precarious, reflecting the brittleness of the Afghan government and the expansion of the insurgency. The military campaign by the Taliban threatenstheir personal security and, while unlikely, the specter of the Talibanoverthrowing the current regime represents the ultimate threat to their security,authority, and networks of patronage.
The death of Rabbani was also coupled with the political death of M. Masoom Stanekzai, who was seriouslyinjured in the attack. Stanekzai, the director of the Council's secretariat, wasone of the few Afghan advisors trusted by both President Hamid Karzai and theinternational community, and had played a key role in recent attempts toestablish consistent channels of communication with the Taliban, including thecontact that nearly cost him his life. In the wake of the attack, Stanekzai'scredibility is likely damaged beyond repair and the weak leadership guiding thepolitical process has now been further eroded. This growing leadership vacuum highlightsthe continued need for an internationally-designated facilitator to coordinatethe political process. The upcoming December 2011 Bonn conference wouldrepresent the logical forum to announce such an appointment, which could serveto refocus currently faltering efforts.
A peaceful resolutionaccommodating the Taliban within the Afghan state remains the most durable pathfor security and stability for Afghanistan, the region, and the internationalcommunity. A political settlement is a route for limiting the ambitions of theTaliban and securing a sustainable and enduring framework for Afghangovernance. With ongoing discussions regarding a U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership agreement that would entail a post-2014 U.S. military presence inthe country, such a settlement increasingly appears to also be the only avenueby which the Taliban could rid themselves and Afghanistan of foreign forces ontheir soil. As recent events have demonstrated, however, the prospects forreaching such an end-of-conflict political settlement are uncertain. If apolitical settlement is to be attained, it will now require heightened efforton the part of all interested parties, including the Taliban.
Michael Wahid Hanna is a fellowand program officer at the Century Foundation.
SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images
EXPLORE:AFPAK, AFPAK POSTER 3, AFGHANISTAN, AFPAK CHANNEL, AL QAEDA, PAKISTAN, TALIBAN, TERRORISM, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
I think it is high time for this war to end because we can't support constant killing of people who appear to have nothing in common with the Talibans!
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US Never Wanted Reconciliation in the First Place
Ironically, the assassination removed a friend of Pakistan and served the interests of Pentagon, CIA and their Afghan allies. While avoiding confrontation, Pakistan needs to speak up and not let disinformation dominate the air waves. Here are key points that weaken American propaganda.
AHMED QURAISHI | Monday | 26 September 2011
PakNationalists.com
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan—There is a reason why the United States has ignored the cold-blooded murder of ex-Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani and focused all its energies instead on the attacks on US embassy and NATO offices in Kabul.
The assassination neatly fits in with the interests of three parties: US military, CIA and their Afghan warlord allies. It might well be the first planned murder of a senior Afghan government official opposed to US meddling in Afghan reconciliation.
This is the work of the same American lobbies opposed to President Barrack Obama’s Afghan pullout plan and his defense budget cuts.
There is no credible confirmation yet on who exactly eliminated the man who served as President Karzai’s key manager of reconciliation with Afghan Taliban and someone who recently converted into a friend of Pakistan.
After the assassination, the United States military and intelligence tried to create a wedge between Kabul and Islamabad by invoking an alleged Pakistani hand. But this was effectively countered by Pakistani officials, who have become accustomed to American games. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s quick dash to Kabul to offer condolences and support and later army chief’s cool and calm response to Leon Panetta and Mike Mullen’s anti-Pakistan outbursts helped counter the attempt to poison Karzai’s newfound understandings with Islamabad.
Rabbani wanted to see Afghan Taliban sharing power and entering government. He was suspected by of being a closet Taliban sympathizer who was hatching conspiracies with Karzai and Pakistan behind the back of the United States and its Afghan warlord allies. The assassination took care of this emerging threat. Blaming Pakistan for his murder – and for other major attacks – built pressure on Karzai to sever ties with Islamabad. Such a move would have destroyed Pakistan’s strategy of working closely with Karzai – and Rabbani – to reach a deal with Afghan Taliban and re-empower the Pashtuns despite American opposition.
In short, it is Pakistan that should be raising questions about the mystery of who killed Mr. Rabbani and not vice versa, especially when the list of suspects and motives points toward foreign forces and their local proxies.
The only party that was well prepared to make the most out of Rabbani’s murder was Pentagon and CIA. Both of them moved quickly on two fronts: domestic politics and Pakistan. Domestically, the Panetta-Mullen duo organized a joint anti-Pakistan briefing on 22 September and later Mullen appeared before US Senate armed services committee.
The domestic objectives of Pentagon and CIA from this anti-Pakistan campaign are:
Save the skin of US military and intelligence officials responsible for security lapses in Afghanistan
Dodge accountability
Send a message that major cuts in defense budget won’t be acceptable, and
Underline that Afghanistan continues to require foreign military and intelligence presence
Afghanistan today is CIA’s largest base of operations anywhere in the world. The agency is loath to abandon an outpost that gives it direct access to the backyards of several strategic nations at once: Iran, Pakistan, China and Russia. No sane strategist would let go of such an opportunity. Mr. Rabbani’s peace mission may not have shown initial signs of success but it had already upset the policy direction favored by US military, intelligence and their Afghan warlord allies. India was also skeptical about the Rabbani-Karzai plans. Ending the isolation of the Pakhtun and incorporating them into Afghan power structure has never appealed to these parties. Another common denominator among these parties is their expressed anti-Pakistanism.
In fact, whoever assassinated Mr. Rabbani was also aiming at ensuring that Afghanistan remains an anti-Pakistan outpost. Islamabad has advocated ending the policy of isolating the Pashtun and worked hard to convince Mr. Karzai that friendship and respect for the legitimate interests of both Afghanistan and Pakistan is in both nations’ interests and would benefit stability in the region. Mr. Rabbani had made several overtures to Pakistan in recent months. In January he used the platform of Geo television to address Pakistanis. He spoke in Urdu as a special gesture.
PAKISTAN’S RESPONSE
Pakistan is pursuing the right policy with regards to American provocations. What is lacking in this policy is the media edge. For example, several Pakistani officials have sent strong direct and indirect messages to Washington recently. The list includes the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Interior Minister, Chief of Army Staff and ISI director. But Pakistan faces a sweeping campaign of demonizing the country. This American policy continues since 2004. Both political and military establishments have failed to counter the American narrative. The danger in the massive American campaign is that it paves the way for stronger future actions and limits global support for Pakistani positions. An example is the intense propagandist reporting on Iraq’s WMD in 2002 which helped Washington invade that country on fake evidence.
We need to become more overt in questioning US positions with regards to several key issues. This includes:
CIA support and safe havens for terrorists meddling in Balochistan
TTP’s easy access to US weapons
The freedom of movement granted to anti-Pakistan terrorists inside US-controlled Afghan territory
The intense demonization of Pakistan primarily and largely in mainstream US media as part of an undeclared American policy
Transforming US-controlled Afghanistan into a hub for anti-Pakistan forces in the region
Meddling in Pakistani politics
Buying out Pakistani media and attempts to plant mouthpieces in print and TV.
We should also review the argument that we can’t abandon America’s war on terror to ensure US aid flow and to fight domestic extremism. Washington will keep Pakistan afloat but will continue to drag its feet on key strategic issues such as energy generation and access for Pakistani textiles to US market. The US won’t sign any written agreements on CIA’s illegal activities inside Pakistani territory and airspace. As for domestic extremism, apart from TTP terror group that is linked to the Afghan mess, all other forms of domestic extremism are an internal Pakistani issue and should be delinked from America’s Afghan war.
All of this strengthens the argument that we need to declare an end to our direct participation in America’s Afghan war, known as the war on terror. Bilateral Pak-US cooperation to find an end solution in Afghanistan can continue. The move will give us a chance to redesign our relations with Washington and get rid of the verbal commitments made earlier.
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@esoul: Rabbani was not a friend of Pakistan's
This is nonsense, esoul. Rabbani was never a friend of Pakistan's. His outfit, Jamiat-e-Islami, of which Ahmed Shah Massoud was the most famous commander, was HQ'd in Peshawar during the Soviet occupation, but was never much liked by the Pakistani leadership, who preferred Hikmatyar's Pashtun-dominated Hizb-e-Islami, and then later on the Taliban. Rabbani always was an avowed enemy of the Taliban, and was angry at them for dislodging him from the Presidency in the mid-90's. He hoped to become president after the Taliban were vanquished in 2001, but was not regarded as a unifying figure (and he is not a Pashtun). He was very skeptical of this reconciliation process with Pakistan, but also saw it as a way to make himself politically relevant again. Pakistan did not much like Rabbani spearheading this reconciliation process, given his history. They are shedding no tears now that he is gone, and can hope that a more Pakistan-friendly individual may be appointed to succeed him.
"A peaceful resolutionaccommodating the Taliban within the Afghan state remains the most durable pathfor security and stability for Afghanistan, the region, and the internationalcommunity. "
This is the smart way to go - and that's probably why we have not tried it yet. The US will usually try all the alternatives before they finally go with the most sensible and least costly method, or so it seems. As we could not defeat the Viet Cong 40 years ago, we cannot hope to defeat the Taliban now. Many in the west confuse them with the real enemy - it's still al Qaeda and fundamentalist Islam - of the Saudi type. The Taliban are an indigenous population, mainly from Afghanistan’s Pashtun tribes, and they dominate large areas of Afghanistan and much of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). They have always been hostile to democracy, so what we are selling, they won't buy! They have always rejected forms of Islam that are different from their own very fundamentalist versions, and they will never accept any form of democratic government that would permit the types of religious or ethnic pluralism which they have rejected. Finally, they are more than willing to fight us for the next hundred years to defend their form of Islam. We don't have enough troops or money to defeat a force like them with the types of conventional warfare we are prepared to wage.
We have killed bin Laden and almost eliminated al Qaeda in Afghanistan. That's enough. While we were preoccupied with our misadventure in Iraq, the Taliban reconstituted their forces and - it is fair to say - they control large areas of Afghanistan. With their sanctuaries in Pakistan, they can continue to fight resist our occupation of their country for a long time. It would be a serious mistake to expand the war into Pakistan, a nation that neither needs nor wants us to invade them. Those who argue that we should go after the Haqqani in Pakistan's tribal areas have forgotten the bitter lessons of Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam conflict.
It is time to cash in our chips, declare our goals met, and leave these backward peoples to their fate. They will be increasingly marginalized as the rest of the world marches forward. Al Qaeda is now franchised to many other countries, and it does not take the invasion and occupation of entire nations to contain their anti-western threats.
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