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The new Mullah Omar?

By Omar Samad Share

In a lengthy message on the occasion of the Eid al-Fitr holiday released last week under Mullah Mohammad Omar's name, the fugitive Taliban leader used a mix of "jihad-light" bravado and toned-down political rhetoric to express his group's position on key issues, as part of a push to influence public opinion that has garnered a variety of reactions from different Western and South Asian quarters.

Yet despite the hype among AfPak watchers, the message is more a reflection of an emerging dual-track strategy that promotes Omar as a credible interlocutor while masking his flaws, and is directly tied to the NATO decision to end its military engagement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

The new narrative, most certainly inspired by the various covert layers of mentoring (including non-Afghan) enjoyed by Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura, not only provides insight into Mullah Omar's public-relations strategy, but also aims to deflect attention from Taliban weaknesses, all while trying to bolster the group's possible future negotiating position. One specific objective is to force a full U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan by disrupting the establishment of a limited multi-year U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after the current 2104 drawdown date -- a subject of the "strategic partnership" talks now underway between Kabul and Washington.

By claiming that "the Afghan nation is not ready to accept establishment of American permanent bases," Mullah Omar conveyed a key demand at a crucial time when several regional countries, including Pakistan, Iran and Russia, have publicly expressed varying degrees of skepticism about the U.S.-Afghan talks (with China preferring to express its concerns through diplomatic channels).

Afghan diplomats believe that if and when the two sides reach an agreement on "strategic partnership," the deal would limit the use of Afghan bases by the United States to counter-terrorism support, and would call for international funding of Afghan security and development priorities, so avoiding the impression of American power projection in the region.

Afghan president Hamid Karzai, feeling the heat from different quarters, insists that the agreement should "serve Afghanistan's national interests," while a close advisor to President Hamid Karzai said publicly last week that most Afghans support an enduring U.S. military presence in the country, but warned that "some in the Afghan Government are trying to sabotage it."

Acknowledging, but not owning, secret talks (reportedly broken up by insider leaks by Afghan officials unhappy with being kept in the dark) held between American emissaries and the Taliban reported to have taken place earlier this year under German and Qatari auspices, Mullah Omar stressed that the meetings solely addressed the release of prisoners. He rejected the notion of "comprehensive negotiations," unless his group's agenda is taken into account. Omar also called for the immediate and full withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan as a pre-condition for a settlement. The American side, unsurprisingly, promptly dismissed the pre-condition of withdrawal for peace talks.

As a sign of the shifting winds, Mullah Omar carefully avoided giving any overt sign of association with al-Qaeda and transnational jihadism in his Eid message. As a possible sign of growing rifts developing between pragmatists and dogmatists within the Taliban conglomerate, he also informed his followers that "the jihadic chiefs nominated by us in all parts of the country are your Sharia-based leaders," and gives an explicit order, "you should obey them." This is an indication that regional Taliban emissaries appointed by the Quetta Shura are facing insubordination challenges on the ground.

This may also be an attempt to give the impression that he is distancing his faction from the more lethal Haqqani network, known to have strong ties to al-Qaeda and openly operating from bases in Pakistan's tribal regions in Waziristan. Yet Omar fails to explain how he intends to rein in the various international jihadist outfits based in Pakistan and active across Afghanistan, given the outfits' 15-year links with his organization and the fragmented nature of the insurgency.

While Mullah Omar's message calls on ground forces to extend their sphere of influence to new areas (the central highlands being a new target for instability), it also provides a glimpse of the internal schisms and compliance challenges felt by the Pakistan-based leadership of the Taliban. Cracks are appearing in the façade of Taliban unity as more runaway militias, some led by foreign fighters, are resorting to assassinations, extortion and civilian abuse. Compliance with the orders and rules of conduct set by the "Leader of the Faithful" Mullah Omar appears to be weakening across the country. Local people in a village in Helmand province recently beat to death two Taliban fighters in reprisal for the killing of an innocent local elder. This type of reaction by desperate civilians is likely to increase over time.

For most Afghans though, the biggest concern remains Taliban ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), long accused of interference in Afghan affairs through different proxies. It is difficult to imagine a change in the widespread Afghan mistrust towards Pakistan's ruling apparatus as long as the ISI continues to provide sanctuary and logistical support to militants, and exercise command-and-control authority through rogue elements over key militant networks.

It is also inconceivable that terms such as "change in the status quo" and "gunboat diplomacy" both used in Mullah Omar's Eid message, and unheard of from a former village mullah, would come from his personal lexicon (especially considering that Omar was born in a landlocked country!), pointing to his continued mentoring by non-Afghans.

Pakistani author Ahmed Rashid has called the Eid message a "forward-looking political message," while British special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Mark Sedwill tweeted that the letter marks a "a shift of tone"; but for most Afghans, angered by domestic inertia and tired of unabated violence (Taliban and affiliated networks are alleged to be responsible for approximately 80% of all civilian deaths, according to the United Nations), actions speak louder than words.

Despite attempts at selling his strategy to Afghan and Western audiences, and contrary to previous Taliban pronouncements calling for the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate, the Taliban leader admitted for the first time in his message that his group does not seek to "monopolize power." Instead, he calls for the establishment of a "real" Islamic government based on Islamic interests, going as far as accepting a role for other ethnic groups -- a novel idea shunned during the regime's power-grab in 1996.

For Mullah Omar's vision of an Islamic government to become reality, though, either the current Afghan Constitution (which guarantees basic human and democratic rights) would have to be scrapped, or the current system modified through top-down Taliban-style implementation of shariah. However, such concepts do not seem acceptable to most poverty-stricken Afghans and a devout but forward-looking population, the majority of whom, including women, are under 30 years of age. And such radical social re-engineering could further weaken the Afghan government's hold on power, paving the way for further civil strife.

Public opinion polls taken in the country since 2005 show that support for the Taliban and their style of governance garners no more than 10 percent approval at the most. This is why the Taliban and the networks that support them are opting for a more moderate tone. Some analysts view this change as progress, but it may not amount to much in the long term, as long as the use of violence against not only foreign forces but also Afghans is justified as "jihad."

Finally, in an era of mass protests against dictatorships in various parts of the Islamic world, and Twitter and Facebook generational activism, Mullah Omar seems uneasy about his group's oppressive reputation. He uses a misplaced anti-colonial narrative to target dissatisfied Afghans and skeptical Muslim masses to change existing perceptions of the Taliban, and solicits financial and moral support for his increasingly less popular fight.

Fully aware that his association with al-Qaeda is now seen as a liability, Omar blames the U.S. and NATO presence as the main cause of conflict in Afghanistan. However, he fails to appreciate the non-violent nature of most mass protests in the Muslim world and also fails to mention that prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, his forces and those of allied foreign jihadists, including al-Qaeda, were actively promoting warfare, mass murder and oppression in Afghanistan, long before Western forces appeared on the scene.

While trying to stay a step ahead of his political adversaries, the Taliban leader and his resourceful mentors are trying to enter the world of realpolitik, by boasting about their military-political prowess on one hand, and showing a pragmatic face on the other. Perceptions of the Taliban may differ across the various time-zones of the world, but in war-torn Afghanistan, realities inked on the pages of history have a powerful voice of their own.

Given the Afghan experiences of the last three decades, it will take a lot more than just an adjustment in tone and rhetoric on the part of Mullah Omar to move the so-called reconciliation process forward, and end the current round of conflict in Afghanistan.

Omar Samad is the former ambassador of Afghanistan to France (2009-2011) and Canada (2004-2009) and former spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001-2004).

 

FLYINGONE

1:22 PM ET

September 7, 2011

?

People read what they want to read. People wish what they want to wish, but at the end of the day the narrative never really matters.

Between the lines, what you are trying to say without appearing wholly foolish is that Afghans from antiquity to the present fight and die for outside nations.

The US presence is the obstacle to peace in Afghanistan and the region. Thats all, and every Afghan as well as everyone in the region understands this much.

It is hard to say any other way because historically and currently we see that Afghans will not stop fighting until the US withdraws.

 

CSABISZTIKUS

1:27 PM ET

September 7, 2011

Mistake

There is a mistake in the text:
"One specific objective is to force a full U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan by disrupting the establishment of a limited multi-year U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after the current 2104 drawdown date"

2104 drawdown date

 

FLYINGONE

1:28 PM ET

September 7, 2011

Afghans, opposed to Western

Afghans, opposed to Western installed Afghan government and the US occupation, are doing this out of their own aspirations for freedom, not out of servitude to Iran or Pakistan.

Suggesting that Afghans fight for Pakistan, or Iran is beyond madness. It is a false story that has been beaten to death.

It also betrays history. Vietnamese did not fight for China or Russia, and nor did anti-Soviet Afghans fight for US or Pakistan. They fought for their own people, their own land.

When you fail to understand your enemy, and you do it on purpose, a proper solution to this conflict will never be reached. We will only follow the failure of the Soviets till we realize that the Afghans oppose our occupation of their country, and that is all.

Either way, it does not end on our terms as you foolishly suggest.

 

FLYINGONE

2:11 PM ET

September 7, 2011

facts

"while a close advisor to President Hamid Karzai said publicly last week that most Afghans support an enduring U.S. military presence in the country"

contrast with this http://www.worldbulletin.net/index.php?aType=haber&ArticleID=57807

and this http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/08/07/119797/valley-where-us-troops-died-supports.html

This dishonesty would have worked a decade ago, maybe, but even then. Now, these comments by Karzai's aides (not himself because he is afraid to say it) just reflect their desperation and stupidity. It also reflects the Kabul governments inconsideration to the Afghan opposition and resentment against the US occupation and war. It will not get them anywhere, only further blemish their pathetic tenure which is ending.

Well, of course, the UNPOPULAR, hated Kabul government supports the US occupation of the country in contrast to the Afghan resentment for it.

Who works in the Kabul government? A bunch of Western-educated expats, who were failures in the West, so brought this complex on the back of a foreign invasion of Afghanistan. These same expatriots like Karzai and Spanta ran away from their country during the Soviet invasion, and have come back to support the US war and occupation against the Afghan people. What credibility?

Again, get the facts straight. The Afghan population militates against not only the US occupation, but the Kabul government. To say so, or suggest otherwise is smack insincerity and stupidity in the face of the last decade unrest. Ample US reports show that the Taliban have considerable support in Afghanistan.

 

FLYINGONE

2:15 PM ET

September 7, 2011

look

After you realize that this article is written by a former (perhaps current representative) or the Kabul regime, you then understand the ridiculousness of the assertions being made. Most of the people working in the Kabul regime are discredited expatriots who were failures in the West, and hence, brought this inferiority complex to support the US invasion, war, and occupation of Afghanistan against the Afghan people.

These people do not care for Afghanistan, and are only hated there.

 

KUNINO

6:49 PM ET

September 7, 2011

Possibly sneaky writing

When Omar Samad writes that "As a sign of the shifting winds, Mullah Omar carefully avoided giving any overt sign of association with al-Qaeda", he certainly wants to suggest that there is such association, while not claiming it outright. And perhaps there is none.

The nature of associations between al-Qaeda and the Taliban government of Afghanistan pre-9/11 is controversial. Less controversial is the virtual certainty that the US military drove al-Qaeda out of the nation in November 2011. War dispatches from overheated military flacks suggested for several months thereafter than anybody opening fire on Coation forces was an al-Qaeda member, a claim of ever-diminishing value. Better, perhaps it seemed, to claim that such insurgents were foreign members of some non-Afghan organization rather than Afghans thinking of themselves as patriots fighting off a foreign invasion and occupation.

Is al-Qaeda linked with Mullah Omar today? Or anybody else in Afghanistan? What's the evidence?

 

MARTY MARTEL

2:57 PM ET

September 8, 2011

Vietnam-style PEACE is coming to Afghanistan

Adm. Mullen, a close friend of Pakistan, had following to say about America’s primary ally in its fight against terrorism, to the foreign news media on 1/13/2011: “I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again, it [Pakistan] is the epicenter of terrorism in the world right now. It is absolutely critical that the safe havens in Pakistan get shut down. We cannot succeed in Afghanistan without that. It’s not just Haqqani Network anymore, or Al Qaeda or TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), the Afghan Taliban, or LeT (Lashkar-e-Tayyeba), it’s all of them working together.”

Previous US ambassador Anne Patterson to Pakistan, wrote in a secret review in 2009 that ‘Pakistan's Army and ISI are covertly SPONSORING four militant groups - Haqqani‘s HQN, Mullah Omar‘s QST, Al Qaeda and LeT - and will not abandon them for any amount of US money‘, as diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show.

Ambassador Patterson had NO reason to mislead her own State Department and U. S. government.

And there is NO reason why Pakistani Army and ISI will stop supporting their proxies fighting war against US/NATO troops in Afghanistan from their safe shelters in Pakistan at this point when U. S. is ready to leave. Ambassador Patterson has clearly told us that much.

At this stage in the game after the death of Osama bin Laden and ten long years of war, as far as the US is concerned, the war on terror is over; feeble clarifications by the State Department, that the larger war on Al Qaeda shall continue, are inconsequential. Pakistan knows that by skillfully holding out till now, it is close to getting its proxy regime in place in Kabul. Pakistani and American interests, both short-term and medium-term, converge at this point; a broke and tired America can not afford to look at long-term interests, not at this moment.

And thereby hangs a tale — of Pakistani and American perfidy. The US has been, and shall always remain mindful of the “paranoia of Pakistan”; Islamabad’s sensitivities, its faux victimhood, will always take precedence over Afghanistan in Washington.

Obama administration is already asking Pakistan to provide access to Afghan Taliban leaders safely ensconced under Pakistani ISI/Army's protection. A facade of peace deal as dictated by Pakistan will be reached with Afghan Taliban leaders chosen by Pakistan. US will begin its drawdown and finally exit the theater of a war it is desperate not to be seen as having lost, not so much to the Taliban and Al Qaeda as to the wily Generals of Rawalpindi who have proved to be smarter than the Americans.

That facade of peace will crumble within few years after the departure of US troops and Pakistan will bring Afghanistan under its suzerainty with reimposition of Taliban rule just as it did in 1996 while Uncle Sam will helplessly look the other way.

 

SABABA03

4:54 PM ET

September 8, 2011

One can imagine

With only one eye. look how much trouble is causing. It could have been far worse with two eyes. (LOL)

 

OLD BLUE

11:06 AM ET

September 12, 2011

Amazing

Here you have an article written by an Afghan, one with his own point of view, offering an analysis of the rhetoric of Mullah Omar. The man who wrote it lists as his credentials his representation of GIRoA. So we know it is not a viewpoint sympathetic to the insurgency. It is one man's viewpoint; but it is coherent and it is Afghan (unlike any of the commenters).

I'm generally disappointed with the quality of comments on Foreign Policy. Most are written with the strident tones and verbiage normally reserved for propagandists, and reflect little or no understanding of reality on the ground in Afghanistan (although many claim to have real insight into the true heart of Afghanistan). Almost never do they reflect anything other than self-serving agendas which fail to recognize any significance Afghanistan has to the security interests of the United States or any other country. Serial commenters endlessly repost references to diplomatic cables from years past as if we couldn't read them the first few dozen times.

Mr. Samad has offered an interesting bit of analysis from his unique point of view, and he makes some interesting observations. The tone is reasonable and reflects more of my experience in Afghanistan than any of the commenting "pundits" who proceed to rail and repost their graffiti following the article. Thank you for the effort, Mr. Samad, and I'm sure that your analysis was actualy valuable to people who had no interest in stridently propagandizing your comments section. The shift in Taliban rhetoric and tone is significant, and your take on what that means bears some thought and (coherent) discussion. Too bad that doesn't happen in FP comments. Perhaps it will in offices and classrooms where serious thought actually occurs.

It's a real shame that the comments section on FP is not one of those forums.

 

OLD BLUE

11:14 AM ET

September 12, 2011

exemption

Sababa03, please do not include yourself in the criticism above. Your proverb sounds exactly like what one might hear over chai on any given day in Afghanistan... and it would be followed by laughter there as well. Apologies for failing to exempt you in my original post.

 

TERENCE

12:20 PM ET

October 4, 2011

Who works in the Kabul

Who works in the Kabul government? A bunch of Western-educated expats, who were failures in the West, so brought this best microwave complex on the back of a foreign invasion of Afghanistan. These same expatriots like Karzai and Spanta ran away from their country during the Soviet invasion, and have come back to support the US war and occupation against the Afghan people. What credibility?