Wednesday, June 29, 2011 - 2:30 PM

To
say that the peace process in Afghanistan was hardly running smoothly before
Tuesday's audacious attack on Kabul's Intercontinental Hotel would be an
understatement. As one State Department official said earlier this month at a private
meeting with Afghan leaders, "There is no peace process yet."
Tuesday evening's attack just raised the stakes even further for the nascent negotiations
process. And if talks looked tenuous before, they are downright fragile now.
The Intercontinental is a Kabul standby that has borne witness to the Afghan capital's shifting fortunes over the past several decades. In the 1960s it was a stylish hangout with hilltop views and a lovely look at the nearby mountains. By 2001 all the hotel's windows had been blown out, and the hulking husk of a frame stood as a testament to a city that had seen too much. In recent years the Intercontinental has won back some of its former glory. Although it plays second-string to the glamorous, four-star Serena Hotel, with its marble floors and hushed garden, the former has come to be seen as a safer, sturdier option for meetings, with better security because of its hilltop vantage point and less flashy scene. A mix of weddings, handicrafts fairs, dignitaries' meetings, and women's conferences regularly takes place there. And I, personally, have always been a fan of the gift shop, which offers sodas and cheerful service.
It is, in other words, a place where normal life goes on. And by hitting it with a spectacular attack on an unspectacular evening, the Taliban have made their point: They can strike anywhere they please, when they please, in a big way. The attack demonstrated that even the capital isn't safe. The security transition to Afghan forces is a fine idea in theory, but NATO backup was still necessary in reality against a foe that proved to be resourceful, fearless, and welcoming of as many casualties as achievable.
On Tuesday morning I spoke with an American official in Kabul who said he believed in a transition plan, but feared that the United States was pulling troops out too quickly with too vague a road map for what would come next in the country. He reminded me that former U.S. and NATO commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal often said that at some point the fight would reach a tipping point in the minds of Afghans, and they would decide one way or the other which way events would go -- and then things would go quickly. The official's fear was that things had the potential to unravel swiftly if the public did not pick one side or the other before a disintegrating security environment decided for them.
And then the Intercontinental attack happened. One more high-profile attack on a once lower-profile target less than a week after President Barack Obama argued for a political settlement in Afghanistan. The questions lurk and grow louder: Exactly whom will the United States negotiate with when it comes to reconciliation, and do they speak for all insurgents? Is there a road map that leads to a peaceful end to America's longest-ever war? Does the Taliban see a need to talk when they can take their message on the road and to the people any time they choose? And will the next Bonn conference see a political settlement start to take shape or disintegrate into a could-have-been?
From the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) side, officials in Kabul say that Afghan security forces performed admirably in the mayhem and bloodshed of the Intercontinental attack. Afghan forces took control of the hotel and pushed the attackers up floor by floor to the roof so that they could not escape, where they were then cut down by NATO helicopters. And they say the Afghan forces only needed NATO backup because their own helicopters don't have night vision and the building's power had been cut off so as to blind the attackers.
The fact remains, however, that the Taliban struck in a fortified hotel in a fortified capital city in a way that made their message unmistakable. The United States is now in the awkward position once again of pushing for talks with men who fight their way through hotel checkpoints with suicide bombs, so that they can fire unencumbered on unarmed civilians in the Afghan capital. The tide of war may be receding, as Obama said last week, but it is hardly clear whether it will lead to the negotiation table, a lasting peace, or more chaos. Only the coming months will tell.
Gayle Tzemach Lemmon is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The Dressmaker of Khair Khana.
MASSOUD HOSSAINI/AFP/Getty Images
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U. S. deserves to be duped by Pakistan
The seeds of the ‘current Afghan tragedy’ were sowed in Washington when Bush administration decided to allow Musharraf to spirit away by airlift hundreds, if not thousands, of Taliban operatives cornered by the advancing Northern Alliance in Kunduz in November, 2001. Pakistan relocated those Taliban cadres including Mullah Mohammed Omar in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan (now relocated to Karachi by Pakistani ISI to protect them from possible US drone attacks) and Haqqani network (HQN) in North Waziristan from where Mullah Omar’s QST and Haqqani’s HQN have been planning raids in Afghanistan ever since.
Duplicitous Pakistan has poor U. S. over the barrel of a gun. US can NOT use its aid leverage to force Pakistan to stop supporting terrorist groups who kill US/NATO troops in Afghanistan day in and day out because US needs Pakistan’s help in ferrying supplies to those very US/NATO troops.
And previous US ambassador Anne Patterson to Pakistan, wrote in a secret review in 2009 that ‘Pakistan's Army and ISI are covertly sponsoring four militant groups - Haqqani‘s HQN, Mullah Omar‘s QST, Al Qaeda and LeT - and will not abandon them for any amount of US money, diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show.
However US has been deliberately ignoring Taliban’s Pakistani connections in fueling and sustaining Afghan insurgency as reported by Matt Waldman in ‘The sun in the sky‘ on 6/13/2010, corroborated by WikiLeaks leaks on 7/25/2010 and then further corroborated by Chris Alexander, Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 and Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan from 2005 until 2009 in his article on 7/30/2010 titled ‘The huge scale of Pakistan‘s complicity‘.
American soldiers are dieing in Afghanistan because of their own government’s misguided policies. For deliberately ignoring Taliban’s Pakistani connections, US deserves to be duped by Pakistan.
pakistan's nukes are the only reason why this whole issue exists, and are the reason why the game there will never change. we can't take out the beehive. taking out the bees that buzz too far away doesn't do anything.
the US has the watch, the afghani's have the time, and he paki's have the nukes.
unless the nukes disappear overnight, the taliban and their ISI overlords win.
we lost afghanistan the minute we invaded it. bin laden won. he bankrupted the US.
you can thank that senile ol' codger, Reagan for that beauty...
Some choice quotes from Peter Dickson, former CIA analyst and specialist on nucular non-proliferation:
"the most glaring omission in the film is the fateful trade-off accepted by President Ronald Reagan when he agreed not to complain about Pakistan’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability in exchange for Pakistani cooperation in helping the Afghan rebels.
On page 463 of his book, Crile characterizes this deal or understanding as “the dirty little secret of the Afghan war” –- General Zia al-Haq’s ability to extract not only “massive aid” from Washington but also to secure Reagan’s acquiescence in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program via a congressional waiver of U.S. nonproliferation laws in December 1981.
This bargain may have been dirty but it certainly was no secret. Indeed, Washington’s acquiescence via the congressional waiver was the subject of continuing press coverage throughout the 1980s.
But this history remains a taboo topic for many within the Washington Establishment, especially those who look back favorably on the Reagan presidency.
Bob Woodward in his 1987 book Veil about the notorious CIA director of the era (William Casey) and Joseph Persico in his voluminous Casey biography published in 1990 discuss the aid program for the Afghan mujaheddin.
But these authors don’t mention the Reagan-Zia bargain and how the congressional exemption granted to Islamabad in late 1981 effectively negated any intelligence reporting about the Pakistani nuclear weapons program from that point on.
Likewise, Tim Weiner in his recent best-selling work, Legacy of Ashes – The History of the CIA, is silent about how policy completely trumped intelligence on this crucial security issue.
Robert Gates, Casey’s longtime deputy, provided rich detail on the covert military aid to the Afghan rebels and even discusses Wilson’s pivotal role on pages 320-321 in his own CIA-cleared memoir, From the Shadows. But Gates also doesn’t mention the waiver for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program."
"Will political instability enable terrorist groups to gain access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons?
This question first troubled the U.S. government nearly 30 years ago, when it learned of Pakistan’s effort to acquire a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1970s.
Press reports about Pakistani nuclear activities led President Jimmy Carter to cut off all aid to Islamabad on April 6, 1979, as required by U.S. counter-proliferation laws.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter and his National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski tried to restore some aid to Pakistan, but their efforts were overtaken by the hostage crisis with Iran and the political distractions of the 1980 presidential campaign.
During that campaign, Reagan made it clear that he had little use for existing U.S. nonproliferation policy. “I just don’t think it’s any of our business,” the Republican presidential candidate said.
In the wake of his landslide victory in 1980, Reagan pressured Congress to resume military aid to Pakistan through a waiver of U.S. nonproliferation laws.
Some congressional Democrats worried about the risks of looking the other way concerning Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. But Charlie Wilson wasn’t one of them.
One might have thought that the neo-conservatives, such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, who were emerging as influential voices during the early Reagan years, would have objected to American indifference toward an Islamic nuclear weapons program that could threaten Israel.
But there is no record of any protest from them, either."
Read the rest of the gory details here:
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/021010b.html
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