The
successful U.S. SEAL strike against Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, just blocks
from the Pakistan's West Point, raises questions about whether the Pakistani
military and intelligence are part of the solution or part of the problem of
international terrorism. Not only does the U.S. need to learn what the
Pakistani military high command and ISI knew and when they knew it, but the
U.S. also has to ask a series of questions about bin Laden's heavily fortified
compound, such as:
- How long was
Osama bin Laden there?
- Who knew and
protected him?
- Who owned the
land, how was it acquired, and from whom? Who designed the compound?
- Who installed
the security systems? Are they commercially available or specialized?
- Given the
multitude of military checkpoints in this military town, who did they stop and
who did they allow to continue on their way into the compound?
To
answer these questions and others, Pakistan's government needs to convene a
special independent civilian parliamentary public inquiry, like the Watergate
hearings or the 9/11 Commission.
The commission's representation should reflect the parliament's party makeup,
including both opposition and government parties, and ideally be chaired by a
member of the opposition. It should have subpoena powers for the appearance of
military and civilian government officials, and well as all bin Laden-related government
documents from the military and ISI. Its findings should be made public. This is
the only way to enable greater civilian authority over the country's
counterterrorism efforts, drive more effective and transparent programs, and
keep spoilers from undermining the cause.
The
United States also needs to demand accountability from Pakistan's military. Pakistani
action against national and international terrorist groups is vital to U.S. and
Pakistan security, but it also is clear that the Pakistani military has seen
action or inaction against those groups through an anti-India lens rather than
through a counterterrorism commitment.
Contrast that with Pakistan's civilian government, which, despite getting
little credit, has been making some progress. For example, after the 2008
Mumbai attacks, the civilian government investigated, issued indictments and
made several arrests which, had the military had its way, wouldn't have
happened at all. Putting more eggs into the civilian law enforcement and
civilian police intelligence basket, as called for under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman
law, is even more important now.
Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari has also fought to extend constitutional
rights to the citizens of Pakistan's tribal areas, and provide them both the
full rights and civilian law enforcement protection of the Pakistani
Constitution. The military has stymied these efforts, but the civilian
government has countered by establishing a joint commission with all the political
parties to find a way to move forward in the country's most dangerous region.
The parliament also adopted the novel idea of having oversight accountability
committees chaired by the opposition so that investigations into Administration
conduct are free of conflict of interest.
Even though the civilian government has been criticized, the truth is, it has
stumbled when the military has stood it its way. The U.S. should build
upon the Pakistani government's successes by strengthening its civilian institutions.
It should offer a more
significant assistance package to strengthen law enforcement, policy, civil
services, and the judiciary's capabilities. It should also form a more
collaborative partnership with civilian leaders at the provincial and district
levels to help target U.S. economic assistance.
This strengthening starts with conditioning military
support on demonstrable steps to combat violent extremists and ending its
longstanding policy of support and sanctuary to such elements, Pakistan or
foreign. The U.S. should continue to require, but also provide additional
oversight of, on the State Department certification of Pakistani cooperation on
a variety of security issues.
The U.S. should also continue to insist
that the "security agencies of Pakistan are not materially or substantively
subverting the political and judicial processes of Pakistan" and provide
stronger support for civilian law enforcement agencies in combating jihadi
groups, including prosecuting the small percentage of madrassas that engage in
jihadi terrorist training.
The answers to the myriad questions about the Abbottabad compound will
eventually emerge. But regardless of what we learn about the Pakistan military's
role in the operation -- from incompetence to complicity -- the details
surrounding Osama bin Laden's death further illustrate the need to hold that
military accountable and to work with and empower Pakistan's civilian
government.
Mark Schneider is Senior Vice President
at the International Crisis Group.
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