Monday, April 4, 2011 - 3:24 PM

When news of Kabul Bank's imminent
collapse broke early last fall, some likened the crisis to a slow motion train
wreck. Six months later,
the failure of Afghanistan's
largest commercial bank now looks more like a bullet-train in danger of running
the country's precarious reconstruction efforts off the rails.
As further details of Kabul Bank's profligate lending practices and its nearly
$1 billion in unresolved debts leaked early last week, it became clear that
Afghanistan's Central Bank would have to move quickly to prevent full-on
implosion. But it is not at all certain that the Afghan government will act
quickly enough on the International Monetary Fund's recommendation
that Kabul Bank enter into receivership-a move the international lending
institution hopes will prevent collapse of the economy. Nor is it a given that
the Afghan government will deliver on its promise to launch criminal
investigations against Kabul Bank's politically connected shareholders,
including President Hamid Karzai's brother, Mahmoud, who according to recent
news reports received $18 million in no strings attached loans.
What is clear is that with a number of other large-scale Afghan commercial
banks also buckling
under the pressure of bad loans and risky investment strategies more aggressive
international intervention is not only likely but necessary. Without it the
Afghan economy could plunge into a freefall, reversing the fragile gains the
country has made since 2001.
At the start of the U.S.
military engagement in 2001, Afghanistan's
banking sector was comprised of six defunct state-owned commercial banks. When
the Kabul Bank scandal first broke in September 2010, 17 commercial
banks were operating in the country with total assets valued at roughly
$2.6 billion. This is up from $300 million in total assets in 2004. Kabul Bank
and its next closest competitor Azizi Bank have for years dominated the
industry, with both banks' holdings representing about 50 percent of the
overall commercial market.
Given the tight knit relations between Afghan business elites' interests it
should come as no surprise then that Azizi Bank is now also facing scrutiny.
Indeed, in addition to Azizi Bank, reviews and full-scale audits are underway
at several politically connected Afghan banks, including the United Afghan
Bank, whose chairman owns
a substantial stake in Mahmoud Karzai's sprawling upscale real estate development
in the southern province
of Kandahar.
Despite its impressive growth, Afghanistan's
banking sector has been under-regulated for years with the vast majority of
banks posting very
low ratings. On an industry standard scale of 1 to 5 where a rating of five
is the lowest, five of Afghanistan's banks were reported to be rated at four in
a 2009 IMF report, indicating a troubling imbalance between capital, asset
quality, management performance, earnings and liquidity. Though most of the
cash slushing through Afghan banks consists of taxpayer dollars drawn from NATO
countries, international donors have never showed much interest in pushing for
genuine reform. Promoting an agenda of regulatory reform, fiscal responsibility
and insisting on accountability and transparency in international assistance is
just not as sexy as arming Afghan militias, building up national security
forces or shelling out millions to reintegrate insurgents.
Luckily, a few international donors have finally gotten a clue and taken
decisive action. In response to the Kabul Bank crisis, the United Kingdom's Department for International
Development opted in early March to freeze
$137.6 million in contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund,
the main conduit for international assistance to Afghanistan. The British aid agency
said that it was loathe to continue assistance to the fund as long as it
remained unclear whether the International Monetary Fund would withdraw its
support for aid to Afghanistan.
After visiting Kabul
in early February, IMF officials said the only way it will continue its
assistance is if Kabul Bank is swiftly
liquidated. As the Central Bank continues to dither over whether and how to
initiate a sell-off of Kabul Bank's assets, other major European donors are now
also considering following the United Kingdom's lead. It is unfortunate that it
took international donors so long to use what little leverage they have left to
push the Afghan government to do the right thing. Hopefully, Kabul officials
will, nonetheless, get the message: clean up, or else.
Given that the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund finances salaries for
almost all of the government's civil service workers, some might argue that
withholding contributions to Afghanistan's largest source of cash could pose a
threat to stability and the success of the counterinsurgency campaign. How, it
likely will be asked, can the Afghan government deliver much needed services in
insecure places like Helmand and Kandahar if it can't even pay its civil
servants? In the long-term, however, the real question is: How will U.S.
European and Japanese donors be able to justify continued spending in
Afghanistan to their financially strapped constituents if Kabul continues to
allow commercial banks to finance the lifestyles of Afghanistan's filthy rich
and ignominious? The answer is blindingly simple. International donors must do
more to ensure greater oversight of their assistance to Afghanistan. Kabul
likewise must move aggressively to close regulatory loopholes that foster
corruption and allow politically connected high-flyers to profit from the
government's failure to do its job.
Several Kabul Bank shareholders have said publicly that they are in the process
of paying back the millions in loans they took out to buy luxury estates in Dubai. Let's hope that's
the case. But no one should count on it. If donors hope to reap peace
dividends from the billions in aid poured into Afghanistan
they would do well adopt more transparency in their assistance programs and to
keep the pressure on Kabul
until action is finally taken to clean up the Afghan banking sector.
Candace Rondeaux is Senior Analyst for Afghanistan at the International
Crisis Group. She is based in Kabul.
We all know that the sexy development paper the international community has been pumping through Afghanistan has done more harm than good. And most all the occupation-enabled 'humanitarian' assistance is usually headed back out the door anyways; the international 'do-gooders' funnel aid capital in, while the contractors—be they Afghan or American or Turkish—scoop the same hard currency back out, in the forms of payments, fees, bribes, etc. And then they park that hard-earned USD in Dubai, or Geneva, or whatever other tax haven happens to be de rigueur among the locusts and vultures that are 'developing' and 'securing' Afghanistan.
Shamghanistan today is essentially a money laundering operation. Western taxpayer dollars come in; sweet 'bunga bunga' villas and fat bank accounts for all the politically savvy top dogs and major players of the region come out.
If this were my first time at the rodeo, I'd be worried. But I've been to the mountaintop; and I've done seen how sausage gets made; so, I recognize that this is how things get done in a shit-zone like Afghanistan.
Financial shenaniganry in a military occupation/war zone is but par for the course, little lady.
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