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A response on the training of Afghan Forces

By Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, IV, March 29, 2011 Share

It has been my honor to defend democracy and the foreign policy of the United States for more than 35 years in the U.S. Army. The vast majority of the time, I am humbled by the extraordinary professionalism of journalists even when the articles written are difficult for the military and our civilian leadership. The key component of those articles is up-to-date, accurately presented information. However, a piece written last week by Dr. Thomas H. Johnson and Matthew DuPee on the AfPak Channel featured out-of-date information and lacked appropriate context.

Undoubtedly, the challenges the international community faces in Afghanistan are large. From 2003-2009, the international community built an Afghan security apparatus that faced many challenges and some of those are reflected in the article. Towards the end of that time, the international community assessed that something had to change; the result of the assessment was the creation of the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) in Nov. 2009. NTM-A subsumed several separate training endeavors and synchronized those efforts across both the Ministry of Defense (building the Afghan National Army, or ANA) and the Ministry of Interior (building the Afghan National Police, or ANP).

The road has been long and winding. There have been numerous potholes along the way. Today, we look back at that journey and take pride in the fact that all those who continue to serve the nation of Afghanistan are volunteers with no consideration of conscription. The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) grows more literate by the day and will double the national literacy rate by the end of 2011. The graduates of basic training, officer candidate school, and the National Military Academy of Afghanistan speak of serving Allah, their Nation, and their families.

While initial build-up of forces was infantry-centric in order to have an immediate impact against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, in 2010, we built branch schools (for the engineer, logistics, and signal corps), a mandatory literacy program, and an aviation school, all to build a modern security force capable of securing Afghanistan from aggression. By the end of 2011, there will be more than 100,000 students in literacy training each day - all taught by Afghan instructors. Starting this summer, the first four female officers to be selected as pilots will attend flight training at the U.S. Army Flight Training school at Fort Rucker, AL.

There are still challenges to overcome. Although the piece by Dr. Johnson and Mr. DuPee highlights recent comments regarding attrition, it failed to cite the plan to rectify that challenge. The plan is in place and focused in three key areas: pay, predictability, and partnering. Pay was increased to a living wage. The ANSF instituted organizational predictability which provides a regulated deployment cycle and leave time for soldiers and police to go home. Partnering is about leadership and instilling an ethos of stewardship, stewardship of their soldiers and police, their equipment, and their funds.

The attrition issue today, while difficult, must be viewed within the context of Sept. 2009.  That month, the ANA had a net decrease of 1200 because more people left than were willing to enter. Since Nov. 2009, ANSF has averaged just under 7,000 recruits with an average net growth of 5,300 per month, when attrition is taken into account. And while there are undoubtedly attempts by the Taliban to infiltrate the Army, we have a strong vetting program that starts the day the individuals enter the security force and continues through initial training and into the fielded force. None of that vetting includes any query as to ethnicity, another example of Afghan leadership ensuring an open, transparent, and equal opportunity for all Afghans to serve their nation if they choose.

Leadership is the key element to fixing the attrition issue, and the Afghans are working on that each day. Leaders ensure soldiers and police have an opportunity to visit family, receive their proper pay, and have basic necessities. Some leaders spend time daily reading with their troops. Leaders who learn to steward both their troops and their equipment will solve the attrition problem, and we already see the attrition trend diminishing in most of the units of the ANSF. Where leadership issues appear to have a negative effect on attrition, the ANA and ANP assess the situation and make appropriate corrective actions.

In sum, the piece by Dr. Johnson and Mr. DuPee highlights many issues that were causing the international community concern in 2008-2009. Those concerns forced a re-assessment of the situation and resulted in the establishment of NTM-A. Today, there are 33 nations contributing to this effort - that's fully one-sixth of the world's countries who recognize the need to prevent Afghanistan from falling into the hands of extremists. Today, the international community works with the ANSF to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As President Karzai announced at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan graduation on March 22, 2011, the Afghan security forces will assume responsibility for securing seven areas of the country starting this July. By the end of 2014, the Afghan Army and Police will take full responsibility for securing their nation and its people.

As of March 29, 2011, the Afghan National Army has over 159,000 of its 171,600 authorized end-strength, and the Afghan National Police has over 122,000 of its 134,000 authorized end-strength. Both are on-track to achieve their combined end-strength of 305,600 by November of this year.

I personally extend an invitation to both of the authors to visit Afghanistan and NTM-A when their schedules permit. I am certain their experience will demonstrate the great strides the international community has made over the past 17 months. More importantly, I am secure in my unequivocal belief that they will be truly impressed with the pride, professionalism, and passion of Afghanistan's growing security services.

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, is the commander of the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan.

SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images

 

ABBOTT

3:56 PM ET

March 29, 2011

What a Complete Load of Rubbish

So now the U.S. Army's ANSF training element is carrying out Pysops on the American People. Not content with carrying out Pysops on visiting U.S. Congressmen, it is now taking to the pages of Foreign Policy with its disinformation campaign about Afghan forces. This entire response is nothing but a pack of lies and misinformation. 10 years and 18 billion dollars into the creation of the ANA and the ANP, and the truth is that both forces are a bad joke.

One third of the ANA disappears every year through attrition and non-re-enlistment. The author of this Information Operations article has admitted it publicly. 70 percent of the ANA enlisted element is Tajik, and 80 percent of the officers are Tajik. The ethnic balance numbers are pre-cooked bullshit. General Caldwell could not tell a Tajik from a Pashtun to save his own lfe, and the fact that half the ANA has lied to and bribed the recruiters by claiming to be "Pashtun" has not even occured to him.

About one-half the ANA and three-fourths of the ANP use drugs daily. The TRUE literacy rate of the ANA, defined as being able to read a field manual in any Afghan language, is perhaps 5 percent. The ANA has zero capability to move, communicate and sustain. General Caldwell repeats the standard Pentagon misrepresentaiton of the force size using the notorious TRAINED AND EQUIPPED figure, a meaningless nonsense number, instead of the PRESENT FOR DUTY number, which is perhaps, on a good day, 70,000 men. The men in the force are the absolute dregs of society, the scrapping of the gutter, drug addicts and homeless boys thrown out of their villages with nowhere else to go. Fragging incidents are on the rise.

The ANP is worse. It gives half its weapons, ammunition and vehicles to the Taliban annually. Enemy shell casings analized after firefights with our soldiers and Marines routinely show stampings of ammunition lots issued to the ANP. The ANP is an organized crime syndicate, the most hated institution in the country. The Taliban has a higher approval rating than the ANP, and yet the US Army continues to pour billions of taxpayer dollars into this broken institution which is totally corrupt from the top to the bottom.

In short, the "ANSF" is a train wreck, and no amount of information operations like this will ultimately keep the truth from the American people. To put this disaster into perspective, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was 1,100,000 men strong, (not including the 400,000 RF-PF armed regional militia forces) but including a modern Air Force equipped with hundreds of modern jets and pilots trained in the US. The ARVN was trained, equipped and mentored with the latest US equipment for 25 years, and in comparison made the ANSF look like the bad joke it is.............and in a country 1/4th the size of Afghanistan, the1.1 million man ARVN collapsed in less than 72 hours in the summer of 1976. Like the ANA, they had nothing but a totally corrupt, illigitimate and incompetent government to fight for. As Bing West recently wrote in "The Wrong War," the ANA has neither professionalism nor ideology, and it will collapse the day we leave.

As a taxpaying citizen of the United States, I resent the US Army conducting this kind of Psyops against the American people, lying about the reality of the ANSF, and deliberately concealling numbers like the MONTHLY ATTRITION RATE, the PRESENT FOR DUTY numbers, the RECRUIT GRADUATION RATE numbers, and the MONTHLY RECRUITMENT NUMBERS BY PROVINCE from the public and even the rest of the United States government for the last eight years. This rebuttal is complete nonsense, and quite possibly illegal in the Iran-Contra sense of the word.

 

MORTIMUS

11:37 PM ET

March 29, 2011

and a hairy load of bollocks, too...

As Senator Clay Davis would say...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9OEDU7yrTTQ

I would pile on, but what's the point? It's clear that the LTG is desperately seeking his fourth star, and no amount of reality is going to get in the way, dadgum it!

By golly, I tell ya! The Triple Pee Plan to Prosperity is gonna work! Pay! Predictability! Partnering! You should see how it looks on a powerpoint slide! Powerful! And Pretty, too!

Abbott is right. The minute we pull the rug from under Karzai is the minute the ANA/ANP go 'POOF!' Once the security subsidy stops—and Ares calls 'time-in'—the civil war game clock resumes and the warring factions go right back to hacking each other (and civilians, unfortunately) to pieces. The only thing our presence has done is to guarantee that the impending resumption of civil war is going to be extra-bloody and extra-shrapnel-y.

 

KASEMAN

10:32 AM ET

April 5, 2011

blame game

Why no mention of Khalilzad? He is to Afghansitan what AIPAC is to Israel.
Ms. Christine's whine about Karzai's ingratitude its typical of the Beltway Likudist mentality. She is barking up the wrong bush in the weed patch.

The US military, still led by the stoopidest white men in uniform, stayed in Afghanistan after 1/1/02 to get cheap glory, medals, etc. There was no need for US forces numbering 150,000 = air power galore to go blundering en masse up and down every peak in the Afghan Hindu Kush looking for a few hundred (CIA estimate) wahabis that then made up Al Qaeda. Now numbering 50 and all in Pustoonistan east of the Durand Line.

Calculate the various cost: benefit ratios. And the devastating impact that post 10/11 Afghanistan has had on Pakistan, sending it into a terminal break up..

 

JJACKSON

4:41 PM ET

March 29, 2011

Who pays?

Lets assume for a moment that Lt. Gen. Caldwell is correct and the US has minted a model army and police force. How is Afghanistan supposed to support these institutions? I am British and can see no way our government could sell funding these institutions in perpetuity, can the US sell it to congress or are we to assume Afghanistan is now going to become a financial success story and self finance its on going civil war?
Just asking.
Hypotheticals aside I suspect ABBOTT's reality is closer to the truth than the General's.

 

MARTY MARTEL

7:02 PM ET

March 29, 2011

Obama's 'Afghanization' = Nixon's 'Vietnamization'

Lt. Gen. Caldwell countered Johnson’Dupee’s article by writing about the positive side of US military’s efforts at ‘Afghanization of the conflict there. He wrote that ‘While initial build-up of forces was infantry-centric in order to have an immediate impact against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, in 2010, we built branch schools (for the engineer, logistics, and signal corps), a mandatory literacy program, and an aviation school, all to build a modern security force capable of securing Afghanistan from aggression‘.

‘Securing Afghanistan from aggression by who’? Is it from Taliban?

Hello! Has Lt. Gen. Caldwell read what Adm Mullen said and former ambassador Patterson wrote? Let me repeat:

Adm. Mullen had following to say to the foreign news media on 1/13/2011 about America’s primary ally in its fight against terrorism: “I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again, it [Pakistan] is the epicenter of terrorism in the world right now. It is absolutely critical that the safe havens in Pakistan get shut down. We cannot succeed in Afghanistan without that. It’s not just Haqqani Network anymore, or Al Qaeda or TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), the Afghan Taliban, or LeT (Lashkar-e-Tayyeba), it’s all of them working together.”

Previous US ambassador Anne Patterson to Pakistan, wrote in a secret review in 2009, ‘Pakistan's Army and ISI are covertly sponsoring four militant groups - Haqqani‘s HQN, Mullah Omar‘s QST, Al Qaeda and LeT - and will not abandon them for any amount of US money‘, as diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show.

However General Petraeus is an apologist for Pakistan’s General Kayani who has been continuing Musharraf’s duplicitous policy of ‘running with the hares while hunting with the hounds’.

Defense Secretary Gates has sought to justify Pakistan’s terrorist connections, alluding to a “deficit of trust” between Washington, DC and Islamabad. Mr Gates also said there was “some justification” for Pakistan's concerns about past American policies. Gen David Patraeus, rushed in with an apologia for his Pakistani friends, by claiming that while Faisal was inspired by militants in Pakistan, he did not necessarily have contacts with the militants. Both Adm Mike Mullen and Gen Patraeus fancy themselves to be “soldier statesmen” a la Gen Dwight Eisenhower. Adm Mullen has visited Pakistan 15 times and Gen Patraeus no less frequently. Both evidently have high opinions of their abilities to persuade Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to crack down on the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and the Taliban’s Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura.

For some diabolical reason, Gates, Mullen, Petraeus & Company has split the Taliban into the Afghan and Pakistani parts even though they are two peas of the same pod. The US military is going after the Pakistani Taliban, while it encourages the Pakistani intelligence to continue to shelter the entire top Afghan Taliban leadership in Baluchistan province (now relocated to Karachi by Pakistani ISI to protect it from US drone strikes). Mullah Muhammad Omar and other members of the Taliban's inner shura (council) had been ensconced for years in the Quetta area and are now in Karachi.

As General McChrystal reported in his assessment of August, 2009 to the President: ‘The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) based in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, is the No. 1 threat to US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Mohammed Omar (Afghan Taliban Chief) announces his guidance and intent for the coming year‘.

However US drones have targeted militants in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), but not the Afghan Taliban leadership operating with impunity from Baluchistan. US ground-commando raids also have spared the Afghan Taliban's command-and-control network in Baluchistan (now in Karachi).

Afghanistan is destined to fall to Taliban under Pakistani control no matter how many Afghan security forces US military trains.

 

OLD BLUE

12:46 PM ET

March 30, 2011

Sounds Catchy... But...

Comments with catchy pop-culture memes built into them sound brilliant, unless you read them having experienced Afghanistan and working with ANSF in particular. Do the ANSF have HUGE challenges? Undoubtedly. Are the prognostications above accurate? Not really. They are deeply flawed. Pop-culture includes incomplete truths with outright misinformation to achieve its breathtaking failure to add value to any conversation while still appearing relevant.

Let's take the obvious first. Comparisons to Viet Nam are so flawed as to be the first indication that a commenter is a lost ball in tall grass. The Vietnamese Army collapsed in the face of an onslaught by an aggressor state, not an insurgency or civil war. North Vietnam invaded with armor and regular formations, defeating the ARVN via traditional maneuver and shock effect. The provision of external sanctuary is a similarity... but that sanctuary, post 1968, was primarily the hiding place for NVA infiltrators who were bearing the brunt of the fighting after the Viet Cong were decimated in the Tet Offensive. In order for the comparison to be sound, the Pakistani Army would have to be infiltrating in significant numbers as units and be poised to deal the death blow with maneuver elements. That is not the case. Also, while Pakistan is double-dealing, there is no superpower support being rendered to tip the scales. Comparison = Fail... unless you are a pop-culture historian.

Firsthand experience has shown me both corrupt officials and heroes. I have seen ANP who stood their ground and risked their lives every day. You had to leash them to keep them from charging immediately when fired upon. I know an ANP officer, at the time a district chief, who was seriously wounded in an ambush directed specifically at killing him personally. The RPG slammed into his unarmored Ranger pickup, shards of metal all but shattering his left shoulder. He insisted on standing up, under fire, so that his ANP could see that he was still in the fight. The ANP rallied and broke the ambush. His actions were the stuff of legend. He was not the only Afghan hero that day, nor was he only heroic on that day. He was also not the only Afghan hero I have known and seen in action. I have seen myself the ANP go from being reviled to respected in a given area. Simplistic, broad generalizations about the effectiveness of ANSF are fatally flawed... unless you are a pop-culture observer. This situation is not black-and-white.

I have also stood aghast in the face of pernicious corruption. There is both, and it is a constant struggle between the two.

I have seen massive improvement in the ANA and ANP. It is more difficult with the ANP, and the mentoring mission is woefully undermanned. Mentoring makes a huge, huge difference and far too many have none. That being said, the ANSF are not the weak point. More and more often, the ANSF are able to establish themselves in an area and aggressively pursue security. The other two main logical lines of operation, governance and development, are the weak points. Governance is the key. While a lack of security precludes effective work being done in these two areas, a failure on the part of NATO to mobilize the resources and influence to seriously impact the governance issue is the Achilles heel of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan. Our weakness is not the military effort; it is the civilian side which could fail to the point of catastrophe. The "civilian surge" has achieved great results... where it has actually had the human resources to be applied. Seriously thin, the civilian surge has not matched the military surge.

This is, in fact, the greatest danger. The failure to provide effective mentoring and development of governance, the failure to leverage the non-military power of the Coalition, got us to where we are today more than any mythical military futility. NTMA has taken development of the ANSF to the next level. I'm not a cheerleader of LTG Caldwell's, but the organization he leads has made impressive progress that has not quite been matched by his civilian partners. Failure to improve governance will eventually cause security to fail in the face of an insurgency which has an easy competition with a corrupt and/or ineffective government on a local level.

This war is not going to be won or lost in Kabul. Local governance is where the struggle will be decided. Karzai could be the most honest broker in the world, but if the 364 district sub-governors cannot equitably administer their districts, the insurgency would not die out. This development is crucial, and it is difficult but not impossible.

I see commenters on this thread who apparently fancy themselves as experts. Why do they not take action other than to whinge online? Step up and take action. Seek and accept employment with State, USAID or one of their contractors, all of whom are seriously short-handed. Don't be a Matthew Hoh about it, either. Don't just stay a few months and quit, self-proclaiming yourself an expert, making a living off of frustration and failure. Have some endurance, learn what you are doing, and put some real effort into it. Make a difference. The greatest shortage is not military investment, but the civilian effort to assist in professionalizing Afghan government at the local level. Where these efforts have been undertaken, huge strides have been made. Armchair whinging is cheap, easy and danger-free. It also sentences one to assembling emotional and flawed pop-culture memes into catchy-sounding prognostications of absolutely no value whatsoever.

Also, while the presence of external support and sanctuary is practically a necessity for a successful insurgency, it is by no means a lock. Statistically, of the insurgencies that have been decided and included these factors, a little less than two-thirds involved either insurgent failure or what Rand calls a "mixed outcome." A mixed outcome would be a success in that the struggle re-entered the realm of civil politics and violence was discontinued in a domestic political situation. That is a counterinsurgency success. The job of a counterinsurgent is to bring the conflict back into the civil realm and out of the realm of warfare (violence as an extension of politics).

Insurgency is a competition to govern. It is a political struggle with a very violent component aimed at contesting, weakening and delegitimizing the sitting government. In a competition to govern, strengthening effective governance is imperative. All politics is local, and strengthening local governance is key. In Afghanistan, it is more imperative than even the national-level governance. Complaining about the Kabul Kleptocracy is less than fully informed. Political success at the local level will do more to bring the insurgency to a resolution we can live with (including re-absorbing insurgents into the political process) than 300,000-plus armed and trained Afghans. Once the struggle becomes political, without widespread political violence, the ANSF will not need to maintain such strength, so the British Conundrum described above is alarmist and diversionary. A political solution is actually attainable, but progress in that direction is indeed halting and fragile. Apparently all the brilliant contributors who could take that effort to the next level are too busy with their pop-culture armchair quarterbacking to actually make that contribution on the ground.

 

ABBOTT

1:20 PM ET

March 30, 2011

Faulty Assumptions

Some commenters on this blog have spent more days in Afghanistan than you've had hot dinners. Some commenters on this blog have been engaged with Afghanistan for more than a decade. You are not the only commenter on this blog to have been shot at, rocketed, IED'd and mortared. Some commenters on this blog have had a $50,000 price tag put on their heads by the Taliban and have the night letter to prove it. You are not the only commenter on this blog to have operated in the field with the ANA and the ANP, or to have spent endless hours in the District Police Chief's office every time a family complained about missing property after a compound search.

Some commenters on this blog are, in fact, history majors, and know more in their toenail clippings about Vietnam, military history, and counterinsurgency than you will ever know if you live to be a thousand years old. Some commenters on this blog are, in fact, graduates of resident courses in Command and General Staff Colleges, which you are not, and have advanced degrees in military studies. Some commenters on this blog have made Afghanistan their life, not their passing fancy but dint of having been there recently getting their military ticket punched.

In fact, the Vietnam anology is PERFECT for Afghanistan, because Afghanistan is a exact re-enactment of the Vietnam War in every dimension at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. It's the same war with a different name. The ARVN collapsed in three days, not because of a few NVA tanks, which they had plenty of weapons and a huge, modern air force to combat successfully, but because, like the ANA, they had nothing but a totally illegitimate, totally corrupt, and totally incompetent government to fight for.

And some commenters on this blog have the wit, the intelligence, and the analytical ability to understand that the war in Afghanistan has been lost for at least three years, that what is going on now is a perfect replay of Nixon and Kissinger's cynical search for a "decent interval" while good men are dying for domestic politics and a lost cause, and that posting comments here suggesting "success is right around the corner" and "we're making progress" in Afghanistan are, in fact, repeating the words of Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara VERBATIM.

 

OLD BLUE

1:52 PM ET

March 30, 2011

Uh-huh.

Sounds like the shoe has found a wearer, Abbott. It sure didn't take much to spark a butt-hurt outburst of arrogant outrage. But, you are full of it, and you are making things up. Arrogant chest-thumping is not going to change that.

In fact, the Vietnam anology is PERFECT for Afghanistan, because Afghanistan is a exact re-enactment of the Vietnam War in every dimension at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.

That is so patently false as to be ridiculous. Is this the contents of your brilliant toenail clippings?

And some commenters on this blog have the wit, the intelligence, and the analytical ability to understand...

Well, they haven't commented on THIS thread.

For such a well-educated and experienced man (who you surely must be to take such great offense, unless you are taking offense on behalf of others who have not commented on this thread), you are remarkably weak in your point about Vietnam. There are similarities, but it is such a flawed comparison as to be unhelpful as a comparison, especially in the end game. You're not wowing me, and insisting that you are magnificent and unchallengeable really isn't getting it for me, either. It does sound catchy, though. Serious students of insurgency can see right through the weak sauce these comparisons bring. Vietnam comparisons were abandoned years ago and rarely occur unless the conversations are emotionally charged political diatribes, as your comment appears to be. Your "Psyops" theme is pretty weak, too, trying to resurrect the failed "Rolling Stone" thrust. No, you don't sound like a well-educated veteran of Afghanistan.

Speaking of assumptions, you make a lot of assumptions yourself. Also, I did not state that, "success is right around the corner," anywhere in my comment.

The ANP is worse. It gives half its weapons, ammunition and vehicles to the Taliban annually.

Fabrication. Sounds impressive, but it is false. Made-up. Concocted. Where is your proof that half of the property book of the ANP is donated to the Taliban? There is none because that is patently false. Has it happened that ANP weapons and equipment have been misappropriated? I've seen it. Half? BS. I don't care where you claim to have been educated. Such made-up arguments do not speak well for either your education or your integrity. One or both is short, or else you would not use concocted percentages which you state it as a fact to support your arguments. . I contend that it is either a convenient line you pulled out of your magic hat or an outright lie. Either way, that is not impressive.

 

TINNAS

11:35 PM ET

April 11, 2011

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ABBOTT

2:54 PM ET

March 30, 2011

That's it?

That's all you've got? Every assumption you made about "armchair quarterbacks" was totally demolished Your innuendo that commenters here lacked your heroic boots-on-the-ground exploits all exposed as crap. So now your last refuge is ad hominem attacks, trolling and blog-baiting. Let's put your weak arguments to rest:

ANP loses half its equipment annually:
Inspectors General of the State Department and the Defense Department
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/76103.pdf

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

ANP ammo used by Taliban:
Newsweek:
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/03/18/the-gang-that-couldn-t-shoot-straight.html

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Afghanistan is an exact replication of the Vietnam War
U.S. Army Military Review:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091231_art004.pdf

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Anything left? How about Petraeus's new line that "all that information is outdated, we've made huge changes and progress in the last 20 minutes"?

 

OLD BLUE

5:54 PM ET

March 30, 2011

Ummm... yeah.

Abbott, what is more ad hominem than putting words in my mouth? You have twice insinuated that I said things that I did not. In this case it was "heroic," a term that I neither used nor implied in reference to myself. I am attacking your ideas and doubting your veracity as an academic due to your inability to make sense. If that's ad hominem, I'll own it. Basically, you're making stuff up and supporting your dramatic pop-culture analogies with scanty frameworks.

As an aside, a laundry list of "some commenters on this blog..." is unconvincing, falling well short of demolition. No, I do not know specifically what your experience is. If you were there once, I am glad that you are not now because your attitude is inappropriate and your assertions are only getting more moth-eaten. Example of your analytical prowess follows:

As of June 1, 2006, the majority of ANP units possessed less than 50 percent of their
authorized equipment. CSTC-A projects that by September 1, 2006, the majority of units should
possess 80 percent or above of authorized equipment.32 Based on current funding and
memorandums of request, all ANP units should receive complete equipment issue, with the
exception of vehicles, by the first quarter of FY 2008.

What part of this excerpt (from a 2006 report, for Pete's sake... 5 years old) says that the ANP can't account for 50% of their issued equipment? What this indicates is that the ANP units still had not been issued 50% of the equipment that they were authorized by their Tashkils. This is the type of "knowledge" that you insist is deeper than I will learn in a thousand lifetimes? Really? We won't even go into your taking that from a mis-read stat to it suddenly finding its way onto Taliban property books. You, Sir, made that crap up. You didn't understand what you read and you morphed it further into something that was never documented other than in your own mind. Ridiculous. And you complain about the Afghan level of reading comprehension?

I suppose that's ad hominem. Oh, well... you are getting tiresome.

In short, you proudly support your assertions by providing a 5 year old report that does not say what you say it does, a freaking Newsweek article (you've got to be kidding me) and an academic paper, the assumptions of which could be successfully argued against pretty easily and which ignores even more elementary differences between Afghanistan and Vietnam. Oh, that and some personal extrapolation regarding the eventual destination of the 50% of ANP equipment (as of yet unissued in 2006) that magically appears on the Taliban order of battle. That's really pretty sad, Abbott. I mean, really, really weak. You are proving my initial point very clearly. Your contributions to the conversation are based on memes, falsehoods and half-digested academic streams of consciousness. It's you and people like you who divert the discussion towards the pop-culture abyss.

And yet you retain a remarkable degree of arrogance about it as well. Fascinating.

However, in all of this, there is one little gem from the Military Review article which I find pretty interesting and actually echoes what I wrote above. It begins on Page 6 and is titled "The Critical Difference." It discusses local governance. It is also over a year old, and I have seen the shift towards re-empowering traditional village leadership structures. I note with some satisfaction that instead of correctly identifying this difference/development, you blithely ignore it and continue to insist furiously that Afghanistan=Vietnam. Again, Abbott, very catchy pop-culture idea that is not well accepted by those who can actually see the myriad of differences which render the comparison less useful than you seem to believe it is. However, if you give up on this central assertion, your entire argument today pretty much dissolves, so you will not disabuse yourself of it. (Man, that McNamara ghost is sooo hard to give up on, isn't it?? What about Nixon? It's, like, the very soul of "fail," isn't it? Who could give that image up?) This is also tiresome. Send me some more outdated reports to support your thoughts, though. I love when you do that. Oh, and do continue to misread and morph what you do read. And instead of "demolition" being your theme, why don't you try, "winning?" I think it suits the depth of your arguments and I'm beginning to think your character as well. Call that ad hominem, but some of what you've written today could be considered untruthful assertions. Where I come from, we call these lies and where I come from, that speaks directly to character. If you made untruthful assertions which you now recognize and would like to correct, now would be the time. Otherwise, continue wearing that shoe, Abbott. It fits better and better the longer you break it in.

 

CEOUNICOM

8:42 PM ET

March 30, 2011

In related news...

...pot accuses kettle of racism.

 

MORTIMUS

5:28 PM ET

March 30, 2011

A plague on both your houses!

For the record, I think both Abbott and Old Blue are prissy, insufferable assholes whose internecine sniping is pathetic and who should remove themselves from the war zone ASAP, before they fuck things up more than they already have. If that's the kind of talent we're rolling with over there, then it's safe to say that the Afghans would be better off without any more doofuses like those guys. Let the Afghans solve their own problems, be they POLITICAL or MILITARY.

Oh...that's right. We're not in Afghanistan because we love the Afghans; we're in Afghanistan because we can't invade Pakistan directly. Shoot! And why can't we invade Pakistan? Well, let's just say that even generals like Caldwell aren't stupid enough to fall into a viper pit like that one. And we can all thank Ronny Reagan for making everything extra-hairy in that part of the world, starting with his brilliant decision to allow Zia to develop the 'Islamic bomb.' Thanks, buddy! You're the best! I also gotta give a shout-out to that wrinkly Pole, Brzezinski! Thanks alot, asshole!

The center of gravity for the War on Terror is that strip of god-forsaken, unforgiving, dystopian shitscape that straddles the Durand Line; call it part Afghanistan, Pakistan, Baluchistan, Waziristan; whatever. Unfortunately, as long as the region remains ungovernable, the US will have no choice but to loiter in the regions of Afghanistan that it does control so that it may be able to put out any fires that may rage in the regions that it doesn't control.

I don't even know why I bother...

 

OLD BLUE

7:18 PM ET

March 30, 2011

LOL

I'm glad that you didn't write my evaluation! But you write some really funny stuff. You're like some kind of geopolitical comedian; the Sam Kinison of Realpolitik. When I read your stuff, it sounds like this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_GnyOIRRtY&feature=related

Very entertaining! Keep it up!

 

CEOUNICOM

8:14 PM ET

March 30, 2011

OLD BLUE...

...Deserves credit.

The deck chairs on the Titanic DO look much better now. And people really do complain far too much about a little cold water. It's *bracing*. Do them good to get a little exercise. Plus, all these efforts and money and lives are a crucial part of our regional geopolitical strategy. Which is what now, you ask? It's our regional geopolitical strategy. Duh!? Its people like you negative-nancy critics who never get anything *done* with all your, "why are we doing this anyway?"-talk.

See, whether Old Blue or Abbot is the one completely in the right in their assessment... it sorta doesn't matter either way. Whether a turd is dry and crumbly, or fresh, wet and pliant and covered with rainbow sprinkles... guess what? It's still a turd.

"But see... we're making PROGRESS!"

...the casual observer with no military experience, and who has never been to Afghanistan (and thanks the Maker every day for that blessing), nods in understanding, deferring to their deeper, professional understanding of the issue. "Yes. Yes you are." He doesn't bother pointing out to the Progress-Makers that the wonderful progress made over the last 10 years* has become an exercise in replacing Strategy with Statistics. Where are you now, Frank Capra of Afghanistan...? where are the Big Thinkers out there to explain Why We Fight, instead of explaining how we're turned X% of former sheepherding illiterate hash-smoking pederasts into slightly-more-effective footsoldiers in a conflict that has no particular goal anymore other than to...well, keep making progress?

Who thinks anything achieved by our newest, latest, much more seriously considered and professionally executed efforts to create a viable ANA are going to last more than a few months post our exit? That we will manage to somehow with nothing but dollars and sheer will force reliable, independent institutions into being in a country where almost none have ever existed beyond the next regicide?

I have no doubt the new-improved Afghan forces are being literified, professionalized, and better-equipped by the day.

I also have no doubt this will simply make the eventual collapse of the current regime and subsequent infighting and proto-civil-war that follows our exit (when? Soon? Ever? Obama?) much more professionalistic and disciplined compared to previous government collapses and civil conflict in Afghanistan.

But maybe in 5 more years I'll feel more cynical about the issue. Maybe it will just be as bad as if we'd just bombed the #($@) out of the place for a while and called it a day.

 

ABBOTT

1:16 AM ET

March 31, 2011

Deja Vu

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"We had to destroy that village in order to save it.”
Air Force Major Chester L. Brown
After the deliberate destruction of the village of B?n Tre, South Vietnam
February 7, 1968

"We had to destroy that village to not lose momentum."
Army LTC David Flynn, CO, CJTF 1-320th
After the deliberate destruction of the village of Tarok Kolache, Afghanistan
October, 2010

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November 1967:
"In November of 1967, the Administration launched an extensive "public relations" campaign. It was designed to convince Congress, the press, and the public that there was "progress" in Vietnam and that the war was being "won." Johnson was advised to "emphasize light at the end of the tunnel instead of battles, deaths, and danger." "There are ways," Johnson was told, "of guiding the press to show light at the end of the tunnel" (Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War, p. 98- 99).

November 2010:
"Army Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez, ISAF second in command and head of the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, said Friday that slow progress is being made in Afghanistan and that the 2014 goal for handing over security to local forces is possible, adding that the slow progress being made throughout the country means the date is a "light at the end of the tunnel" for U.S. forces." (Newsroom America)
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