Wednesday, January 12, 2011 - 6:06 PM

As
dissection of the Obama administration's Afghanistan strategy review
from last year continues, lost in the debate is the reality for Afghans trapped in the middle
of this nine-year war. For them, seeking
assistance provided by either side in the conflict has become almost as
dangerous as going without it.
It's largely taken as a given that all players in the Afghan theater are
"humanitarian." The U.S. Army, NATO allies, the Afghan government, and even armed
opposition groups all highlight their so-called humanitarian activities as they
vie for the hearts and minds of the civilian population.
On the surface, this would appear to only be of benefit in such an impoverished
and insecure environment. After all, when you are hungry, you don't care who
gives you a bag of food. Yet, as the war spreads and intensifies in Afghanistan
and the humanitarian needs increase commensurately, it has become ever more
dangerous for the Afghan people to receive assistance provided by military
bodies or groups affiliated with them. The case for the independent and
impartial provision of aid has never been more urgent.
Nearly all of the provinces in Afghanistan
are experiencing
active conflict. Record-high numbers of attacks restrict the provision of basic
services to the people. The best that can be managed during a war -- any war -- is
maintaining lifesaving services in strategic locations and to try to help
patients reach them. It was for this very reason that international
humanitarian law was conceived -- to ensure critical medical care for all
during conflicts, delivered independently from warring parties.
For sick or wounded Afghans, going to a NATO-run clinic or receiving assistance
from groups affiliated with the NATO counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy risks
retaliation from the opposition, be they Taliban or other militant groups.
Civilians face the same risks from international and Afghan forces if they turn
to the opposition for assistance.
In this environment, seeking help amounts to choosing sides in the war. The
result is a tragically absurd catch-22: People put off seeking assistance
because doing so can endanger their lives.
The experience of patients assisted by Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF) in the town of Lashkar Gah, in the
battleground of Helmand province, bears this
observation out. Intense conflict in the province has left around 1 million
people without access to health care. A patient in our hospital there recently
explained that "in our district headquarters hospital there are now military
doctors, but we can't go there. This is a civilian hospital -- that's why we
come here. I don't see any weapons here. That means you don't have any
problems with the opposition or the international forces." Another patient said
that "no one goes to the NATO clinic because they will become targets. It's too
dangerous."
Indeed, in August 2009, Afghan and NATO forces raided a clinic in Paktika province,
followed by a hospital raid carried out by U.S.
forces one week later in Wardak province. Armed militants
destroyed a clinic in Khost province in May 2009.
These are but just a few examples of the abuse of what should be inviolable
medical facilities.
One can argue that the military should not pretend to be a humanitarian agency
doling out assistance based on need, rather than on political and military
goals; or that civilian development assistance -- often carried out with military
protection -- is based ultimately on strategic nation-building. But no one, least
of all Afghans, expects states to actively work against their own strategic
interests.
Civil society, though, does have the choice to act independently.
While NGOs mostly claim their assistance is based on humanitarian principles,
this is often inaccurate in Afghanistan.
Many NGOs implement nation-building projects at the behest of Afghan and U.S. government
agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The opposition militant groups challenge the
legitimacy of these efforts because they fall under the broader COIN strategy.
In effect, these NGOs are choosing sides in the war. So, despite the presence
of hundreds of NGOs in the country, there are few places Afghans can safely go to
seek vital assistance.
This doesn't have to be the case. MSF has been able to carve out operational
space in Afghanistan
through regular, direct, and transparent negotiations with all the warring
parties and though complete financial independence from Western- and
Afghan-government sources. We also enforce a strict no-weapons policy in its
medical facilities. Our independence and purely needs-based approach to
providing aid is enabling the possible expansion of operations into other
war-wracked parts of the country, such as Kunduz province in Afghanistan's
troubled north. While other groups lament the lack of "humanitarian
space," we see it opening by maintaining our independence and dedication to
helping Afghans, without an agenda.
But confusion remains. USAID and other Western donors often contract out
development work to commercial firms, such as Development Alternatives Inc. or
International Relief and Development, to implement COIN projects. These
companies operate like military outfits, complete with armed and fortified compounds.
They are an example not of how soldiers are morphing into aid workers, but of
how so-called aid workers are morphing into military-like figures. Media
references to these companies as "aid groups" creates confusion.
These
companies have made their choices and can claim neither neutrality nor
independence. These NGOs should make the choice now to work independently, in
order to provide humanitarian assistance based on needs, and needs alone.
As the conflict intensifies and spreads, the Afghan people must be able to
receive essential assistance without having to make the life-threatening choice
of taking sides in the war.
Michiel Hofman recently completed a two-year assignment in Kabul
as country representative for Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF) in Afghanistan.
Pascale Zintzen/MSF
EXPLORE:AFPAK, AFGHANISTAN, AFPAK CHANNEL, CORRUPTION, DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN AID, TALIBAN, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, UNITED NATIONS
Aid workers, in particular unpaid volunteers, are already contributing their valuable time. They should not be expected to accept unnecessary risks to their lives on top of it.
The sad fact is that massacres of unarmed aid personnel continue to happen despite these "understandings" with the warring parties. As these incidents increase, the pool of available volunteers will continue to shrink. Volunteers may be cheap but they are not all stupid. Fewer will be willing to venture into dangerous areas without defensive weapons or work in facilities that lack meaningful security.
Perhaps the diplomatic efforts should be focused on explaining to all sides why armed security is necessary for aid workers in today's world and that people should not be reluctant to seek help merely because a few defensive weapons may be present.
Helping Those Most in Need to Achieve Long-Term Progress
International Relief and Development strongly disagrees with the arguments and factual inaccuracies presented in Michiel Hofman’s post.
First, IRD is not a commercial enterprise. We are a global non-profit, non-governmental, mission-driven organization. Our focus is on helping the most vulnerable people wherever they may be, especially in conflict situations.
In locations, such as rural Afghanistan, where some humanitarian organizations, including MSF, have decided it is too dangerous to work, IRD is bringing services directly to the people most in need, rather than requiring them to seek assistance in far off urban areas and “strategic locations.” In order to more effectively reach those in need in rural Afghanistan, IRD has made an operational decision to sometimes coordinate with the Government of Afghanistan, the Afghan military, the U.S. military and NATO forces. Other organizations may make different decisions, but their ability to assist the most vulnerable in certain areas of Afghanistan is most definitely compromised because of their decision not to coordinate.
IRD believes we can and must do so much more than “maintaining lifesaving services in strategic locations” during a war. Individuals need jobs and food in order to care for their families. In fact, a 2010 IRD survey in Kandahar and Helmand found that economic conditions were the people’s major concern. IRD is helping to build back local farms, markets, and economies in order to provide families with a dependable source of income. We are working with the people of Afghanistan and their local, provincial and national government leaders to treat the underlying causes of instability and ensure their long-term progress. IRD has been doing this type of transitional assistance for more than a decade. We want to see Afghans thrive in a stable, safe, and self-sufficient nation. Most importantly, they want it too.
A more complete response to this article is posted at http://www.ird.org/who/press/foreign_policy_response_01-21-11.html.
Jeffrey Grieco, IRD Chief of Communications
It's not as simple as NOT choosing sides in AFG
Mr. Hofman raises some interesting points about delivering aid in unstable environments. However, the underlying premise of his argument assumes the Afghan people are a neutral entity, caught between coalition forces/Afg gov't and the Taliban. The reality is a little more complex.
Afghans are hedging their bets, waiting to see which side will outlast the other. It is not uncommon to learn that a family or tribe has, for example, a brother in the Afghan police, a brother who is a laborer for a US-military funded project, maybe a cousin who is a store owner or farmer and another cousin who is a Taliban foot soldier. That family has a hand in each pot, cautiously waiting to see which side ultimately wins out. Of course, this is a generalization and not every family can hedge their future in this manner. However, Mr. Hofman's argument fails to acknowledge this reality and assumes the "Afghan people" are caught between a rock and a hard place.
Furthermore, in many parts of Afghanistan, particularly in places like northern and southern Helmand province, the only outside entity villagers ever see are US troops. I've heard good things about MSF in Lashkar Gah, but their presence is only in Lash.
(And Lash, btw, is definitely NOT the battleground for Helmand province; it's actually a growing and relatively safe economic center. Places like Sangin in the northeast part of the province are in more contest than Lash right now.)
Helmand is a big province where roads are still very bumpy, narrow and unimproved. Getting to Lash from the outlying districts takes hours. The only other options for healthcare and humanitarian assistance are the various US Marine bases and outposts that are scattered throughout the Helmand river valley. I would hope Mr. Hofman would be able to acknowledge the many instances where US Marines and Navy corpsmen have treated Afghans on a patrol base or re-routed a rescue helicopter to save an Afghan life. It happens all the time.
The question of militarized aid is a good and valid one. It should be debated and discussed thoroughly. However, aid groups should not be so naive as to think they can independently deliver their assistance--albeit necessary and valuable assistance--to a population that may or may not have already chosen a side.
(3)
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