Soon
after the 9/11 attacks, then-U.S. President George W. Bush gave "non-negotiable
demands" to his Pakistani counterpart Pervez Musharraf, telling the general
that he "had to decide whose side he was on" and the former dictator revealed
in 2006 (if he can be believed) that he was also given the threat that Pakistan
would be bombed "back to the Stone Age" in the absence of cooperation.
The
Bush administration, under immense pressure from the American public and coping
with the sense of loss at the death and destruction caused by the 9/11 attacks,
wanted Pakistan, the long time player on the Afghan turf and alleged creator
and financier of the hardliner Taliban regime in Afghanistan, to clarify its
position on the militant organizations that it had for so long abetted or
sheltered.
Then
and now, the United States is attempting to figure out how to defeat al-Qaeda
and Taliban in Afghanistan, a country not known for suffering occupiers gladly,
while the country's insurgent groups can still claim shelter in Pakistan's
border regions. With the administration's the Afghanistan Strategy Review scheduled
for next month and the looming (and self-imposed) 2011 date for the initial
withdrawal of U.S. troops
from the country, this calculation is complicated by Washington's political cycles.
While
General David H. Petraeus is struggling to prevail over the Taliban, and the U.S.
administration is struggling to pave the way for a second Obama term in office
- particularly in face of recent losses against Republicans in the Congress
during the mid-term polls - it is time for the president and his cabinet to go
back to the Bush years for a while and borrow a question: "Whose side are you
on?"
These
few words communicated in black-and-white can reduce the immense pressure if
not fully help winning the war with its branches and roots now spread into the
region.
Since
late 2001, the war against international terrorism has been fought mainly by
the United States, with over 1,300 young men and women dead and billions of
tax-payers' money spent in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is the regional powers
who are struggling hard to have a finger in the Afghan pie.
With
arch rivals Pakistan and India on top of the list, the involvement on
various levels from Iran, Saudi Arabia, China,
Russia and some Central
Asian states is no longer a secret in the ongoing tug of war in Afghanistan. The
recent revelation
by President Hamid Karzai himself about receiving bags of money from Iran
and the ensuing debate can rightly be quoted as a sign of this involvement.
But
it is Pakistan and India who are overtly playing politics at the
expense of U.S.
blood and treasure.
For
Pakistan, the "disputed"
Kashmir territory, and though not mentioned in open, the "disputed" Durand Line
with Afghanistan are the key
motivators behind its obsession with the existence of "more-than-needed" Indian
consulates in the southern and eastern zones of Afghanistan.
Pakistan's
need
for strategic depth and a weak central authority in Afghanistan is mainly
focused on an eventual war scenario with India, along with vows
from the Afghan leadership to accept the British-era Durand Line, which splits
in two the region's Pashtun-dominated territories. But meanwhile, Pakistan takes in huge resources profiting from
control of NATO supply routes into Afghanistan,
while at the same time NATO forces hemorrhage troops and money, all with no
change in Pakistan's
strategic calculations or focus on India.
Even
if Pakistan's military leaders
opt to alter their strategic calculation and move publicly against militant
groups holed up in North Waziristan (recently
suggested, and now delayed
indefinitely), such a move will not tame the insurgency on either side of the
Durand Line. One source familiar with the situation in the tribal areas has
told the author that militants in North Waziristan
are shifting their bases to Orakzai agency, and that any eventual offensive
will not take place until the militants have finished moving.
India, on the other hand, is still working hard
to install a government of its own liking in Afghanistan,
or at least one having little or no deep-rooted ties with Pakistan, particularly the previous
Taliban-style regime, and thus pours men and money into Afghanistan as part of its future
planning for the region.
In
this regard, the presence of Indian consulates in Afghan cities and provinces
bordering Pakistan is
presented as a proof of Indian involvement in the tribal areas and especially
the restive province of Balochistan by the Pakistani authorities during their
meetings with Afghan and U.S.
officials.
Whatever
the number of troops sent to Afghanistan or whatever strategy adopted there, this
regional bickering will persist or even grow more serious unless and until the
regional players are stopped from meddling in the Afghan mess; the situation
needs political pressure and a political deal, rather than just more soldiers.
Although
a large number of analysts and think-tanks are pessimistic about complete
victory against Taliban in the near future, there is still time for the U.S. policy makers to turn the tide by asking
the neighbors of Afghanistan
to lay off their own regional agendas and squabbles, for the more important
purpose of stability in Afghanistan.
To
conclude the Afghan war successfully, the U.S.
needs to stop both Pakistan
and India
from using the Afghan war as a tool to carry forward their own agendas. One terse
warning, if possible, that forced a Pakistani dictator to take U-turn need to
be issued once again not only to Pakistan,
but also to India, Iran and other
regional players.
A surge of troops in Afghanistan
and increase in the number of missile attacks by unmanned aircraft in the
Pakistani tribal areas may be among the best available tactical options for U.S. leaders, but these changes will not block
the channels and external actors fueling the insurgency, and thus will not help
U.S. forces stabilize Afghanistan,
and eventually leave. Instead, the U.S.
must cut its dependence on Pakistan,
and instead create a framework for a political arrangement that ensures all
regional players have a stake in Afghanistan's stability, rather
than its weakness and internal strife.
And for this, "with us or against us" has to be borrowed from the
Bush-era by the existing president who desperately needs a positive change on
the Afghan front to rebuild his pre-election image before the American public.
Daud Khattak is a
Pashtun journalist currently working for the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Pashto-language
station Radio Mashaal.
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