The looming challenges in Pak-U.S. relations

By Wajahat Ali, October 29, 2010 Friday, October 29, 2010 - 11:39 AM Share

To mark the end of the United States-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue talks last Friday, the Obama administration announced a $2 billion military aid package for Islamabad, the culmination of a negotiation process institutionalized in recent years by the two countries to broaden and strengthen their relationship. Yet skepticism about the viability and effectiveness of the process and the broader relationship continues to dog both sides.

Ironically, despite mutual suspicion, both sides are well-aware of the benefits of working together: Washington's search for an endgame in Afghanistan makes it important for both sides to work together toward a settlement that can restore a modicum of stability to the war-torn country.

Pakistan and the United States have confluences of interest in other areas as well. So, what's the problem?

From Washington's perspective, Pakistan bristles with anti-Americanism. This is despite the fact that the U.S. has helped Pakistan on several occasions, notably in the wake of the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. It has pledged to increase economic assistance to Islamabad in recent years and is helping the latter with its flood relief efforts.

But experts in Washington believe Pakistan is working against U.S. interests by sheltering the Afghan Taliban and not doing enough to secure the NATO supply lines from Pakistani ports and supply depots across the border. Recently, CNN quoted an unnamed NATO official in Afghanistan as saying that Osama bin Laden and his cohort were out of the caves and enjoying a comfortable life in Pakistan.

All this implies that Islamabad is, at best, a frenemy of the United States. According to this thinking Pakistan is playing a double game with Washington, and there is little the United States can do to reverse this behavior.

Yet this view ignores concrete steps that can be taken to turn the U.S.-Pakistan relationship around.

Pakistan and the United States have a common interest in fighting religious militancy. While the United States today is arguably much safer than nine years ago, Pakistan continues to suffer indiscriminate terrorist violence on a daily basis. Religious extremism has also hit the economy badly and foreign investors are staying away from Pakistan. Prolonged violent extremism will only damage Pakistan further in the long run.

Secondly, Pakistan needs more than just economic assistance. Like other states, it has a national security perspective dealing with regional realities. Pakistanis think that Islamabad has put Pakistan's security at risk to protect American interests in the region. They argue that the U.S. has not done much about the Kashmir dispute or even addressed Pakistan's concerns about growing Indian influence in Afghanistan.

For its part, Pakistan needs to evaluate the cost of anti-Americanism. The sentiment has not only narrowed down the country's foreign policy options but has also pushed it toward greater international isolation. It has also generated a false hope that things will drastically improve when American forces leave the region. However, Pakistan cannot afford a new round of factional fighting in Afghanistan and another refugee influx from that country.

The Pakistani establishment must discuss these issues publicly. It must tell the people about the gains it has made by dealing with Washington and how it is likely to benefit from this relationship in the future. It is a fact that Pakistan was not always anti-American even when Pakistanis were not always in agreement with U.S. foreign policy.

Pakistan also needs to address the U.S. concern about various Afghan militant factions that are believed to be hiding in its northwestern tribal territories and parts of Baluchistan, a key sticking point between the two countries.

At the same time, Islamabad cannot fight every militant outfit at this stage. There are too many of them in the region and it makes ample sense for it to go after those groups that are primarily threatening Pakistani state and society. This should also explain why Pakistan has not taken on the Afghan Taliban. Just like the United States did not target Baitullah Mehsud, the popular leader of the Pakistani Taliban, until he openly threatened to launch attacks on the U.S. soil, Pakistanis see little reason to go after the Afghan Taliban who have not attacked their country, including the Haqqanis in North Waziristan.

It will immensely benefit the Pak-U.S. relationship, however, to wean these groups from Al Qaeda and make them renounce violence. The good news is that the international community has finally begun to understand that the Afghan problem is too complex to be resolved through use of force only. Negotiations are imperative at this stage and Pakistan can play a useful role.

The Taliban movement is deeply divided in Afghanistan. Indeed, many Taliban leaders are quite pragmatic and are likely to watch their own interest if they get a chance to enter their country's political mainstream. This is likely to reduce violence and considerably help the international community's movement toward the post-conflict stage in Afghanistan.

It is vital to offer proper political incentives to these groups and let the Afghan-led reconciliation process gain momentum in Kabul. But it would become more meaningful if Pakistan's security concerns are addressed as well.

Political progress in Kabul will benefit Pakistan-U.S. relations more than anything else. Movement toward that goal would require a continuous and transparent dialogue and the need to rescue ties from falling prey to popular emotions in both countries.

Wajahat Ali is The Asia Foundation's William P. Fuller Fellow. Currently, he is working with the New America Foundation as their South Asia Research Fellow. The views expressed in this article are his own.

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MARTY MARTEL

2:22 PM ET

October 29, 2010

Pakistan is an epitome of religious militancy

Only a Pakistani like Wajahat Ali can claim that ’Pakistan has interest in fighting religious militancy‘.

Nothing can be further from the truth.

What was the reason for Pakistan’s democratic government to facilitate of its own free will, the relocation of Osama bin Laden from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996?

What was the reason for Pakistani Army and ISI to create what ex-CIA official Bruce Reidel called ’this jihadist Frankenstein monster’ with funding provided by Pakistan’s democratic governments in 1990s?

It is NOT just madrassas, but even the main-stream educational system in Pakistan is radicalized by Islamic teaching that projects Islam as the only savior in the world. Pakistan is suffering from ‘Saudization’ of its society by the education system that was revised in 1976 by the act of its parliament that, like Saudi Arabia’s system, provides an ideological foundation for violence and future jihadists. It demands that Islam be understood as a complete code of life, and creates in the mind of a school-going child a sense of siege and embattlement by stressing that Islam is under threat everywhere.

The promotion of militarism in Pakistan’s so-called “secular” public schools, colleges and universities had a profound effect upon young minds. Militant jihad became part of the culture on college and university campuses. Armed groups flourished, they invited students for jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan, set up offices throughout the country, collected funds at Friday prayers and declared a war which knew no borders.

Not long ago, Pervez Hodhbhoy, a professor in an Islamabad University wrote the following:

For three decades, deep tectonic forces have been silently tearing Pakistan away from the Indian subcontinent and driving it towards the Arabian peninsula. This continental drift is not physical but cultural, driven by a belief that Pakistan must exchange its South Asian identity for an Arab-Muslim one. This change is by design. Twenty-five years ago, the Pakistani state used Islam as an instrument of state policy. Prayers in government departments were deemed compulsory, floggings were carried out publicly, punishments were meted out to those who did not fast in Ramadan, selection for academic posts in universities required that the candidate demonstrate a knowledge of Islamic teachings and jihad was declared essential for every Muslim. Today, government intervention is no longer needed because of a spontaneous groundswell of Islamic zeal. The notion of an Islamic state – still in an amorphous and diffused form – is more popular now than ever before as people look desperately for miracles to rescue a failing state.

How can Pakistan have interest in fighting religious militancy when Pakistan is the epitome of religious militancy?

VINEYCB1

11:24 PM ET

October 29, 2010

Pakistan and the war against terror

Quondam imperial powers do not easily reconcile themselves to loss of empire. There are copious lessons from history on this. Britain, for instance, has not reconciled itself to the loss of empire, beginning in 1947 and continued since. Britain’s empire still remains – not considering the Commonwealth. Mrs Thatcher could not refrain from sending British forces to the Falklands. Anthony Eden likewise could not restrain himself when Nasser made the Suez Canal Egypt’s national property. Eden even got France to join in the ill-fated Anglo-French intervention in the Suez Canal crisis, but made a hasty withdrawal in the face of worldwide condemnation of the intervention. The exercise will perhaps be repeated on future occasions in respect of other places.
It is difficult to understand whether in the context of the partition of British India in 1947 Attlee’s Labour government had in mind the strategic significance of Pakistan in respect of post-war adversaries, which then included only USSR. But habits of empire do not die easily. It is possible that Britain thought that Pakistan would be an unstable country and would probably offer a footing to Western powers to be not far from the USSR. But the powers that be in this region now include several who were good boys then – China and Iran – and Pakistan and India themselves. None of these is now amenable to Western influence – not even Pakistan.
It is possible to generalize further by citing the record of US and Soviet empires in various places that were formerly part of those empires.
The question here is not another phase of the Great Game, which has been continually mentioned and romanticized since 1979. The current US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 was the result of 9/11. No one at that time thought that this response was excessive or uncalled for. 9/11 was an egregious provocation which was offered to the US by Al Qaeda. It was difficult to imagine that the US would take it lying down. If there was disapproval of the intervention, it was muted. It was widely believed that the US had acted with appropriate self-respect when it proceeded to exact punishment for 9/11. That kind of an event occurs once in an age. The US at this time was led by Mr Bush who was unable to maintain his concentration on the task in hand: he allowed himself other digressions, which served to deflect attention from Afghanistan.
Another part of the story is that Mr Bush thundered at Pakistan and demanded and received its cooperation in the impending action. Pakistan under General Musharraf had no option but to fall in line – unwillingly, it seems. Let us remember that Pakistan along with Saudi Arabia and UAE was among the early supporters of the Taliban and Al Qaeda then ensconced in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden allowed himself expressions which could only be translated as his ambition to work for nothing less than revival and reestablishment of Islamic dominion worldwide, perhaps with Osama himself as the caliph. For a decade before 9/11 and in the decade since, Islamist terrorists have made no secret of their opposition to those whom they regard as enemies of Islam, to wit, the West, Israel, and India, which are home to the Christians, the Jews, and the Hindus, respectively, all infidels according to the Islamist theology. The Islamist terrorists have lost no opportunity of proclaiming their intentions, whose last expression was Mumbai 26/11.
The present action in Afghanistan should not be seen as an isolated theatre of war although it is now being conveniently labelled as something of an excessive action by the US and its Allies. Afghanistan now represents the crux of what must be regarded as the challenge of the Islamists to non-Islamic civilizations, which is ominously similar to Samuel Huntington’s forecast. Whether it is a clash of civilizations, or a clash of fundamentalisms, or a clash of obscurantisms is a subject which can and should be debated at great length. That debate, when it takes place, must be informed by the need to conform to the needs of the growth of human civilization per se, not this civilization or that civilization, this country or that country. The world needs to rise above considerations like nationalism which in its extreme forms has seen repeated wars and suffering for all of humankind.
The debate should also comprehend areas like development for which resources wherever existing should be considered the common heritage of all mankind and not merely the national property of countries in whose territory those resources may now exist. The absence of an attitude like this has already led to enormous disparity and suffering in terms of even the most basic needs of life for very large numbers of people in various parts of the world. People in more affluent parts of the world need to spare a kind thought for the less fortunate of the species.
It is to be noted that the ugliest forms of terror are found in societies that live at abysmally low levels of development. In those societies some of the elites, often the tribal or military leaders, find it convenient and possible to impose a dictatorial regime on their people who see no way of escaping from the suffering, often bordering on cruelty. Luxuries like human rights, freedom, and democracy do not exist for such peoples. It is possible to enumerate several parts of the world which are at present suffering under the boots of a junta or a civilian dictatorship, for the most part in Asia and Africa but also elsewhere.
The war in Afghanistan needs to be considered as the common concern of all who care for the good of humankind. Countries and leaders of the world need to come together and meet the challenge of terrorists, of whatever hue and wherever they are, not only the Taliban in Afghanistan. There should be no compromise with terrorists because it was they who declared war on the rest of the world. Terrorist activities are going on in several countries widely distributed in the continents and on the seas in the form of piracy. All of this needs to be considered as the common concern of all and not the responsibility only of the US or/and its Allies.
It is important to ensure that those who become parts of the coalition against terror are not sympathetic to terrorists in any way. The coalition should not include a country like Pakistan which is known, according to US sources, to have been playing a double game throughout. It is for consideration whether the plans of the Allies against key targets like Osama, Zawahiri, and Omar were leaked out to them by Pakistani operatives because they were often acquainted with the Allies’ plans and because Pakistan’s ISI operatives have been in touch with the Taliban throughout. The coalition cannot afford to have in it members whose sympathies are ambivalent. A global war against terror cannot be carried to successful conclusion if it contains Trojan horses. It is Pakistan’s membership of the coalition that is primarily responsible for the present stalemate in Afghanistan. The present situation is that the US does not see its way to a successful conclusion of the war and it cannot with due considerations of honour withdraw from the war.
Besides, withdrawal from the war in Afghanistan is not going to mean end of US’s difficulties. Terrorists shall feel duly emboldened by a thought that they had succeeded in compelling withdrawal of the US-led Allies. They will go on to organize further acts of terror in the Allied countries and shall without doubt attempt similar acts in the US itself, as they have been trying in the recent past and over the years. US intelligence has been successful so far in guarding against terrorist activity within the US on any large scale, but it will be tempting fate to expect that US intelligence shall succeed every time in the future. The terrorists have to succeed only once – when they do, we may be faced with something like 9/11 II. The consequences of such an occurrence shall be even more traumatic than the 9/11 of 2001. It will impact the US, its Allies, and all of the rest of the world. In a word, withdrawal from Afghanistan now or in the near future without actually defeating the Taliban shall mean invitation to 9/11 II.
V. C. Bhutani, vineycb1@vsnl.com, Delhi, India, Oct 30 2010, 0845 IST

SAIF UR REHMAN

2:35 PM ET

October 30, 2010

Pakistan Phobia.................!!!!

does any 1 waste his time in reading all above usual rhetoric?
I think no one......unless some1 is new on FP and is not familiar with marty agenda....

CEOUNICOM

5:28 AM ET

October 31, 2010

re: "Phobia" is the wrong word

More like "vitriolic hatred", no different than what the Pakistani writers here have reflected back identically on the Indian agitprop.

Of course, the Pakistanis (like Lal Qila, others) usually got banned for repeatedly resorting to ethnic and religious insults and bigotry.

Most readers here understand the anti-pakistan propaganda generated by Indians for what it is; however, it is generally fairly well-received because it generally coincides with *the truth*. While I dislike and mock Marty regularly, he beat me to the obvious comment: Pakistan *is* an example of 'religious militancy'. All the exclamation points in the world does nothing to defend against this charge. Screaming "anti-pak propaganda!!!" all the time does nothing to improve the image of Pakistan's dishonest, double-dealing, 'failing state' status.

SAIF UR REHMAN

2:27 PM ET

October 30, 2010

Does Kashmir Isuues has a link with Afghan Peace Process?

"They argue that the U.S. has not done much about the Kashmir dispute or even addressed Pakistan's concerns about growing Indian influence in Afghanistan. "

Yes, Peaceful settlement of Kashmir dispute according to the aspiration of kashmiri people has a direct link with peace in Afghanistan and region because :-

1. If Kashmir problem is solved, Indian growing influence in Afghanistan will not be Pakistan centric resultantly Pakistan will not bother to counter it.

2. If Kashmir problem is solved, Indian offensive doctrine will not be Pakistan centric resultantly Pakistan will utilize all its efforts to fight militancy , currently Pakistan can not ignore the threats from eastern borders.

3. If Kashmir problem is resolved, the support of insurgencies in each others countries will have no reasons thereby curbing militant trends. Then there will be no groups like baitullah mehsud ( pakistan centric insurgency)

4. If Kashmir Problem is resolved, the scenes of 1990s will not be repeated as India supporting northern alliance and Pakistan supporting Pushtun dominated Taliban Thus Afghanistan will have stability.

Other than these , its better for India to resolve Kashmir Problem. India can not aspire to be a regional power even having tense relations with Pakistan. Pakistan will always challenge Indian ambitions to project its power abroad.
India will be relieved of its western border, it will have economic and social benefits. It will be better for the people of both countries.

VINEYCB1

11:38 PM ET

October 30, 2010

Pakistan and the war against terror

At the outset I would beg of Mr Saif Ur Rehman to conform to the minimum standards of civilized debate. We get nowhere by pouring invective and ridicule on others. Even when we do that, there is a civil way of doing it. One does not have to go out of the way to be disagreeable.
His substantive submission is that the Kashmir problem should be resolved and that there are enormous advantages that will flow to both India and Pakistan from a solution of the Kashmir problem. With this basic formulation no one is likely to disagree. However, it is in the minutiae of the Kashmir question that the problem really becomes intractable. There is no way of resolving the Kashmir problem except re-establishment of the old State of Jammu and Kashmir as it existed before the dawn of Independence on the subcontinent and letting the people of the State decide what they want to do - whether they would like to be with Pakistan, or they would like to be with India, or they would like to be a sovereign independent State. In this day and age it is hopeless to confine the choice as between Pakistan and India. However, there are no takers for that view in Pakistan or in India.
Kashmir problem is unfinished business of the partition. I would beg to remind Mr Rehman, however, that the Indian Independence Act of July 1947, passed by the British parliament to establish the Dominions of Pakistan and India, does not speak of the Hindu/Muslim basis of the establishment of the two Dominions. The Act only speaks of and names the provinces of Sind, British Baluchistan and NWFP and specific districts of Punjab and Bengal which were to be part of Pakistan. About the accession of princely States, the Act contained no provision "preventing the accession of Indian States to either of the new Dominions". The quotation is from the Act.
The Muslim League and its leaders decided on their own - without reference to the people and government of India or to the people and the ruler of Kashmir - that the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which was predominantly Muslim-majority, had to form part of Pakistan, that is, the State was not to be given an option to choose. Then, within days of Independence, Pakistan's army, commanded by British officers, dressed as tribals and rolled into the State and proceeded to implement their "decision" that the State had to join Pakistan.
It does not speak too highly of the democratic instincts that inspire Mr Rehman and all Pakistanis that they even now demand that the Kashmir problem should be settled in accordance with the wishes of Kashmiris. The wishes of Kashmiris shall mean collation of the wishes and preferences of Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists - and, of course also Sufis living in several parts of the State including the so-called POK and Northern Areas and the Sarikol area given by Pakistan to China. Is it conceivable that Hindus of Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh shall choose to be with Pakistan? One is forced to fall back upon suggestions made even from Pakistan that the State has to be considered in parts.
The idea of a plebiscite was made nonsense of by Pakistan when it refused and failed to withdraw its forces from the State as was clearly demanded by the UN resolution that talked about a plebiscite. There are points here that Mr Rehman and his compatriots will do well to keep in mind: one, that Pakistan was required to withdraw all, repeat all, of its forces from the State; two, that India was authorized to maintain some forces in the State for the maintenance of law and order; and three, when these two conditions had been met, the people of the State would be invited to make their choice known. Pakistan never fulfilled the first condition. Indian presence in the State is legitimate and authorized: Pakistan's presence in the State is not legitimate and not authorized.
So many decades after those events it is now hopeless to think that it is possible to consider a solution in terms of the UN resolutions. That idea is outdated and out of court.
Pakistan as a State was conceived and constructed in an attitude which can only be described as anti-Hindu and anti-Indian. It is possible to say that Pakistan's national ideology remains completely wedded to anti-Indianism. If the Kashmir question is resolved somehow, there is no doubt that Pakistan will discover and invent new reasons to justify its anti-Indianism. After all, Pakistanis are taught from their schools that Hindus and Indians are their inveterate enemies. In contrast, no Indian curriculum includes anti-Pakistan teaching, or even anti-Islam teaching: there are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan; India does not stand for preaching opposition to Islam or to any other religion.
The Pakistan Army has battened on Pakistan’s national resources by mopping a very large proportion of the revenues. Even the present army chief justifies his “India-centric” orientation and justifies a very large number of Pakistani troops lined up on the Indian border – because he believes that India is about to launch an invasion of Pakistan. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
No one in India will for a moment regard Pakistan as an adversary, far from regarding it as an enemy, or for that matter even as a friend. There is no comparison between Pakistan and India in terms of resources, educational and technological advance, commercial and industrial progress, growth of social and financial institutions and mores, social cohesiveness, and ability to accommodate dissent in all spheres of national existence. Reduced to arithmetic terms, the comparison may be 1 to 10.
No one in Pakistan should consider trying military conclusions with India. Pakistan has fought four wars with India and lost ignominiously every time. One of them led to the bisection of the country and secession of the eastern wing. People and government of Pakistan should attend to the preservation of Pakistan as a State. Pakistan has been living beyond its means throughout its existence and maintains armed forces out of proportion to the legitimate needs of the country. If it persists in that course, there is very little doubt that Pakistan shall achieve national bankruptcy.
Afghanistan is a problem because Pakistan made it one in the first place. It was Pakistan that installed the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1996 and recognized the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under Mullah Omar’s Taliban: it shared that distinction with Saudi Arabia and UAE, both homes of extreme obscurantism much like Pakistan. If Pakistan would leave Afghanistan alone to grow in its own way, Afghanistan would certainly stabilize and prosper. It is Pakistan which insists on using Afghanistan as an area that gives it “territorial depth” vis-à-vis India – as if Afghanistan was its fifth province.
Indian growth and progress has been autonomous and taken note of by the rest of the world. It is not possible for Pakistan to operate in an anti-Indian manner much longer: it will earn disapprobation worldwide while India goes on becoming a more important country with every passing year.
Terrorism was the deliberate policy choice of the government of Pakistan. People would remember how even in ZA Bhutto’s time an Indian civilian aircraft was hijacked by a group of Pakistanis, taken to Lahore airport where Bhutto embraced the hijackers, then released the passengers and burnt the aircraft on the tarmac. Events relating to IC-814 are too recent: the hijack was intended to secure release of some hardcore terrorists.
Pakistan used terrorist methods in Punjab during the Khalistan agitation and later on in Kashmir where it has been honoured by Pakistanis as intifada, while the fact was aptly summarized by no less a person than Gen Musharraf: “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” Pakistan is a state sponsor of terror and that is a distinction which it will assuredly earn in due time. India did not contribute to the growth of terror in Pakistan. The traffic moved in the reverse direction.
V. C. Bhutani, vineycb1@vsnl.com, Delhi, India, Oct 31 2010, 0908 IST

CEOUNICOM

5:54 AM ET

October 31, 2010

re: "Pakistan was not always anti-American"

The blog you linked to sets the root-date of Pakistani anti-Americanism in 1988-90, due to refusal to hand over the F-16s based on opposition to Pakistani nuclear programs. (which I believe in fact was not completely one-sided: the American negative response was precisely engendered by Pakistan's duplicitous behavior - not even mentioned in the piece. Its not like the American 'embargo' emerged out of thin air. Had the Pakistanis come clean about the issues, I'm sure they would have had an easier time getting their planes delivered. Or their money returned, perhaps. I'm not impressed with the U.S. behavior over that incident, however, the linked piece fails to acknowledge any Pakistani responsibility for the decline in reltions)

I think perhaps the blogger ignores some other, perhaps more salient events: try, the 1979 burning of the US Embassy, death of 2 employees? Widespread suspicions that the US had orchestrated the coup d'état of Z.Bhutto? I sincerely doubt these sorts of situations could have emerged in the 70s had there not already been a fertile base of anti-Americanism throughout the Pakistani public. In addition, despite American and Pakistani praise for the Pakistani military's "resolution" of the embassy burning, it is well established that Pakistani police and military flat out refused to come to the aid of the embassy until well after the situation had already flared out.

Here's some actual detail:

http://www.msg-history.com/historicalitems/HI_Islamabad_1979_EmbassyAttackChronology.html

Money quotes - directly from a phone contact at the embassy:

1500 -"Gen Akhtar, head of Pakistan Intelligence arrived at the scene and is doing nothing."
1520 -"Nothing being done by PAK authorities."
1530 -"Pak troops in the area but doing nothing."
1610 -"Troops are still doing nothing."
1705 -"Troops still doing nothing."

...

1920 -"Someone in Gen. Zia's office told the British Ambassador
earlier in the day that a Battalion of Army was being sent to the American Embassy. They never showed."

Again, these are direct quotes from officials inside the burning embassy. Not exactly the most Pro-American environment I can imagine, where the citizens murder your diplomats, and the Army purposely stalls coming to your aid.