This week's AfPak
Behind the Lines assesses the state of al-Qaeda in Iraq with
analyst Brian Fishman.
1. What is the current status of al-Qaeda in
Iraq, following the deaths of its leaders Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar
al-Baghdadi in a U.S.
airstrike in Tikrit earlier this year? How has the group adapted to these
losses, organizationally and ideologically?
Since the deaths
of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi, AQI (operating as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI))
has demonstrated that it can still cause death and destruction in Iraq. Nonetheless,
since its dramatic decline in 2007, the ISI's operational profile has changed
significantly, from attempting to control and dominate territory unilaterally
toward more intermittent large-scale attacks. No doubt this shift was a
concession to the reality of decreased influence and authority in Iraq, but by 2009 ISI was finding ways to use
major attacks in Baghdad
and elsewhere to discredit and undermine the Iraqi state. This trend has
continued since the deaths of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi, though one might argue
that the group has focused more on attacking Awakening Councils rather than the
formal Iraqi state. It is too early to draw that conclusion, in my opinion, but
it is interesting because it raises questions about ISI's sense of self and
purpose. Little is known about the new Emir of the ISI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
al-Husayni al-Qurashi and his deputy Abu Abdullah al-Husayni al-Qurashi. They
have given little indication of their strategic focus or background.
2. What is the relationship between AQI and al-Qaeda's central leadership,
based on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border? How has that relationship changed in
the last several years?
This is a critical
question. Especially after the death of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, Al-Masri was the
primary link between AQI/ISI and the al-Qaeda leadership in South
Asia. It is not clear that al-Qaeda's communication systems were
redundant, raising the possibility that al-Masri's death will be quite
disruptive. AQI has always been torn between its obligations to distinct
constituencies: an Iraqi constituency, the al-Qaeda leadership, and the global
community of jihadi supporters (including financial backers). In the past, AQI
leaders have generally deferred to the doctrinaire demands of supporters
outside of Iraq
rather than work on the practical demands of Iraqis. It is tempting to
speculate that in the absence of a firm connection to AQ central, the new
leaders of the ISI may take a new, "more Iraqi" approach -- nationalist
rhetoric, ideological moderation, maybe even provide some social services -- but
to date there is no hard evidence that is the case. It is more likely that
communication with AQ leaders in South Asia
will just be difficult practically, which may lead to miscommunication and
discord. Emphasizing nationalism and reducing confrontation with Sunnis in Iraq
might seem a rational choice for AQI, but there is no shortage of examples
where jihadis have made self-destructive strategic decisions for ideological
reasons. I won't hold my breath waiting for a softer, fuzzier al-Qaeda in Iraq.
3. Many of AQI's foreign fighters at one
point came from Saudi Arabia
and Libya.
How has that changed since 2007, if at all?
The Sinjar Records
revealed the extent of foreign participation in the ISI's operations. Ironically,
those foreign interlocutors eventually became a drain on the ISI system because
the foreigners were security liabilities up until the point that they blew
themselves up or got killed some other way. Non-Iraqis have noticeable accents
and don't know Iraq's
physical or social geography, which made them hazardous to have around for
Iraqi members of the ISI. Not surprisingly, the ISI deliberately limited the
influx of foreigners as its organizational infrastructure was destroyed. In
practice, acquiring unskilled labor is rarely a problem for al-Qaeda. The
harder part is attracting money, folks willing to commit suicide attacks and
those with special technical skills. Training and bomb-making can also be
tricky. Most reports suggest that the rate of foreign fighter entry into Iraq
has fallen from 100+/month in 2007 to between 10 and 20 now. Without hard data
like the Sinjar Records we don't know exactly where they are from, but Saudi Arabia has been the most consistent
contributor of fighters to Iraq
in the past.
Brian Fishman is a counterterrorism research fellow at the New America
Foundation.
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