By Maj. Gen. Gordon Messenger RM, June 18, 2010 Friday, June 18, 2010 - 10:59 AM Share
Having
read Stephen Grey's take
on the U.K.'s operation in
Helmand, I feel compelled to offer an alternative perspective, one based on many
months of both studying Helmand and operating
within it, most recently as the Commander of British Forces last year.
In
short, Helmand is far from the disaster
portrayed. I acknowledge its unenviable status as Afghanistan's most violent province,
and the scale of challenges NATO troops have faced and continue to face there. But
the notion that the British-led force has failed in its prosecution of the campaign
since its arrival in 2006 is wrong and misleading. Genuine and lasting progress
has been made in Helmand in the last four years; provincial and district
governors are delivering on behalf of their people, the licit agricultural
economy is developing strongly, and International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) soldiers are working impressively alongside their Afghan counterparts to
deliver the legitimate security that communities desire above all else. The
vast majority of the population is now within the security umbrella provided by
ISAF and Afghan forces and, critically, the people are increasingly looking to
legitimate Afghan governance to provide their needs and respond to their
concerns.
Helmand was never the "quiet
backwater" described
by Grey. Along with Kandahar, Helmand is renowned as the traditional heartland of the
Taliban; a well-trodden transit route for criminal and terrorist activity and
the hub of the narcotics industry that provides so much of the insurgents'
revenue. That's why there is so much activity there, and why British troops
were deployed there in 2006 as part of NATO's expansion into southern Afghanistan
in response to a growing threat of a resurgent Taliban.
As
Grey points out, it has not been an easy four years since. The insurgents have
come at us with a vengeance and I accept there have been times when the British-led
NATO forces in Helmand were stretched thin and
under pressure. But as with every campaign of this type, and entirely
consistent with the experiences of the U.S. and our other allies, we have adapted
our approach and force levels in response to the changing situation on the
ground. During the first six months of the U.K.
deployment, we increased our force levels by over a third and over the period
of our involvement we have increased troop numbers from 3,250 to nearly 10,000,
ably supported by our superb allies from Denmark,
Estonia,
the UAE and others. We have never been "wedded to a conventional mindset" and
have always sought to improve and learn from others as we encountered the
realities on the ground.
Such
investment was matched by a growing and increasingly effective civilian effort.
Far from being a "parody," the multi-national Helmand Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT) has delivered incredible results in a hugely challenging environment
and is now held up as an exemplar of the Afghan-led approach and civil/military
cooperation. A trip around the principal towns of Lashkar Gah, Nad-e-Ali and
Gereshk reveals bustling bazaars, thriving communities and a real sense of
irreversible momentum among the Afghans. The effect of such progress is felt
across the province.
The
sizeable uplift of NATO forces in Helmand over the last year, principally from
the U.S. Marine Corps, is both a reflection of the importance that Gen. Stanley
McChrystal accords Helmand, and recognition of
the scale of the challenge faced there. Sensible changes to the command
structure have followed and the British-led brigade finds itself proudly
serving under command of an American general. This is not a bailout, nor does
anyone on the ground view it as such. Go to Helmand
today and you will witness troops of many nations operating happily and
effectively alongside each other, all under the NATO banner, all with shared
objectives and a common approach. The unity of purpose is palpable, made all
the more so by the risk and austerity the troops face every day.
Stephen
Grey is a respected journalist and is no stranger to Afghanistan. But he paints a
falsely bleak picture of the situation on the ground in Helmand
and of the performance of the British military. I accept that there have been
setbacks and mistakes along the way, and I do not duck the scale of the
challenge that those on the ground continue to face. But despite the
difficulties and the sacrifice, the endeavors of NATO and our civilians have
delivered real progress and continue to do so. The Afghan government's writ
extends throughout Helmand in a manner that is
unrecognizable from the situation in 2006, and its security forces are
increasingly able to carry the baton. There is still much to do, and there will
be tough times ahead but, even in the most challenging province in Afghanistan,
there are grounds for optimism.
Major General Gordon Messenger RM, the chief of defense staff's strategic communications officer, is the lead spokesman on British operations in Afghanistan.
‘Pakistani military organized Taliban movement and installed Taliban government in Afghanistan in 1996’ as per UN report on Bhutto killing released on 4/15/2010.
Poor General McChrystal! With his bosses General David Petraeus and Admiral Mike Mullen as well as Defense secretary Gates justifying Pakistan’s ‘terrorist connections’, Mullah Mohammed Omar’s QST trail from Quetta to Kandahar is operating unimpeded.
McChrystal himself had warned about Pakistan ’s sheltering of Taliban terrorists in his August 2009 report to Obama: ‘Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) based in Quetta , the provincial capital of Baluchistan, is the No. 1 threat to US/NATO mission in Afghanistan . At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Mohammed Omar (Afghan Taliban Chief) announces his guidance and intent for the coming year‘.
But US can not even use its drones to destroy QST that is causing daily deaths of US/NATO soldiers in Afghanistan since 2002! That shows Obama’s continuance of Bush’s mollycoddling of Pakistan .
Defense Secretary Robert Gates sought to justify Pakistan ’s terrorist connections, alluding to a “deficit of trust” between Washington , DC and Islamabad . Mr Gates also said there was “some justification” for Pakistan 's concerns about past American policies. Gen David Patraeus, rushed in with an apologia for his Pakistani friends, by claiming that while Faisal was inspired by militants in Pakistan , he did not necessarily have contacts with the militants. Both Adm Mike Mullen and Gen Patraeus fancy themselves to be “soldier statesmen” a la Gen Dwight Eisenhower. Adm Mullen has visited Pakistan 15 times and Gen Patraeus no less frequently. Both evidently have high opinions of their abilities to persuade Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to crack down on the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and the Taliban’s Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura.
All American officers in southern Afghanistan know that they cannot prevail in the ongoing military operations, unless Taliban strongholds across the Durand Line in North Waziristan and Baluchistan are neutralized. Adm Mullen and Gen Patraeus evidently do not want to acknowledge that hard options have to be considered if their soldiers are not to die at the hands of radicals, armed and trained across the Durand Line.
With US tolerating and mollycoddling Pakistani support of terrorist outfits across the Afghan border, US mission is doomed to fail no matter how much money and manpower US pours in that terror center of the world which resides in Pakistan.
Why do you write so much ? But since I know that you are a blackindianhindoo I can tell without reading all the above crap that what you have written is baseless and pathetic attempt by Indian Government to discredit support of Pakistan for war on terror. Moreover there are no citations to official sources.
So you are wrong. Passing your opinion as facts you filthy blackindianjewhindoo
To read more on how hindoos can be wrong in more ways visit my friend Orange's blog
The AfPak channel should not some private echo chamber for you guys to spew your idiotic racism and nationalist hatred. You really do deserve each other.
Frequent posting under multiple cybernyms is an abuse by itself, which should get the poster banned from the FP site. The offensive language this poster regularly uses should as well.
I hate to be a biased observer here, but Gen. Messenger's talk of "real progress" and civilian gains inside Helmand Province feels like a list of talking points read out by a spokesman of the British Military. And this was before I scrolled down to the end of the piece and found out that this is precisely what Gen. Messenger's job within the British armed-forces is...the top spokesman for British operations in Afghanistan. From all accounts, he is doing a heck of a job portraying a positive light on the war, especially when most evidence of progress points to the contrary. But what do I know...I'm just sitting on my computer as a passive observer speculating.
I would like to think that things inside Afghanistan are improving. Likewise, I would like to think that the U.S. and its NATO partners are making some real headway within southern Afghanistan's many villages, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar provinces where the Taliban insurgency remains strong. But with so many problems within the training of the Afghan Security Forces- and with the most corrupt political figure controlling a province that is key to a successful counterinsurgency strategy- how can we honestly sit here and give men like Messenger the benefit of the doubt?
More importantly, how can we take Gen. Messenger's talk of progress in Helmand Province when the top NATO commander (General Stanley McChrystal) has described the area's key city as a "bleeding ulcer?" The short answer is you can't.
But the best part of Messenger's entire monologue is his assertion that NATO and the ANA are expanding their "writ" across Helmand and providing the civilian population a great deal of security. If this were so, residents in the town of Marjah would not be experiencing harassment from Taliban militants, nor would they be getting threatening notes posted on their doors warning them not to cooperate or help the Afghan Government. Nor would provincial governors, district governors, and mayors be the target of assassinations across the entire southern sphere of Afghanistan.
If this is the progress that Messenger is referring to, the I'm afraid of what failure is.
Again, I don't want to sound like an overly pessimistic ass, because quite frankly, I've never travelled to Afghanistan. So it's easy for me to assume the worst and pretend that I have all the answers (I know I don't). The initiative on the battlefield and in the villages may very well be shifting towards the coalition (if this were happening, Karzai probably wouldn't be reaching out so desperately to the Pakistanis). But just the fact that Maj. Messenger is a spokesman for the British Military fogs up his entire argument of success. He's paid to exaggerate the victories and underestimate the setbacks, so maybe he's just doing his job.
It is very difficult to take this kind of delusional cheerleading seriously. On the 16th of this month if you had crossed the Helmand river to the west bank heading towards Nad Ali you would have found groups of armed Taliban lounging around on the side of the road without a care in the world. That is well within 81mm mortar range of the British PRT in Lashkar Gah. This is a fact of which the good General should be well aware as it was a British officer stationed at the PRT who reported it. How exactly can that be? How can the Taliban be that comfortable that close to the Provincial capitol after four years of hard fighting?
Good intentions mean nothing in war. Cheerleading by active duty general officers also means nothing in war. Accomplishing the mission is the only thing that matters. Clearly defining the mission (not spinning the press) is the most important job of a commanding general.
There are implementers who are effectively getting projects done in Helmand - but they have nothing to do with the PRT. We should be studying why they are successful not making excuses for why the PRT is not. We need to learn the hard lessons being taught us from the debacle which is the current Afghan campaign. But we won't learn them until the military faces up to the fact that they are failing, and failing miserably.
You are not failing in verbal war but morally loosing from all grounds.
Many countries whose forces are stuck in Afghanistan are in leaving situation due to internal pressures so you have less time to hide your serious criminal negligence.Your Chief operation is actually failing to justify state stance and actual.
From news desk you can sense that what kind of strong nerve general is handling the real war in afghan area.
General David Petraeus, the commander of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, fainted while giving testimony to the US Senate's armed services committee, forcing proceedings to a halt while he was taken away.
The event occurred while the 57-year-old four-star general was answering questions from Senator John McCain on the prospects for withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, about half an hour into the hearing. Asked if he supported President Obama's timetable, Petraeus was giving a diplomatic response. McCain was in mid-sentence when he stopped as Petraeus appeared to be in distress.
... you'd think some sane people would participate in these discussions (and honestly, I think Arvey above is commendable for being straight to the point and sincere), but the proportion of ideologues on this board is washing out what could be a good forum. While I normally dont believe in banning posters from public commentary, I think this topic is too important to be dominated by a few hardcore Nationalist true-believers.
Then again, it does provide some insight into the irreconcilability of the India vs Pakistan mentality. Most Americans are concerned with our own involvement; they use the war as another stomping ground to reenact their historical grievences. Perhaps it is naive to expect anything else.
I have no more joy at Brits dying in this doomed enterprise any more than I like my fellow Americans doing so. I know there are people in the armed forces who sincerely believe in "the misson," but I see much more evidence that they are tragically mistaken.
For one thing, the Taliban operates now from Pakistan. What's the plan to stop that? Nixon invaded Cambodia and that failed also. And Cambodia didn't have nuclear weapons, as Pakistan does.
Drone attacks can't uproot the thousands of Taliban insurgents, we're just creating more rapid upward mobility in their replica IWC command structure. The clear way out is to negotiate an understanding with Pakistan -- the only power that's demonstrated the ability to control or remove rogue Taliban elements.
The deal is -- we facilitate the end of an India-friendly government in Kabul, and they use their influence and power to prevent any more attacks on us from there. We can handle the odd underwear bomber with a tiny fraction of what the Afghan expedition costs.
(12)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE