Muddying the 'Taliban'

By Brian Fishman, June 11, 2010 Share

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan means more in Washington, Islamabad, and Kabul than in Miram Shah, Khost, or the Tirah Valley. Tribes straddle the border seamlessly, and trading relationships that have existed for millennia shape local cultural and political sensibilities more so than the vagaries of internationally accepted maps. This is one main reason why distinguishing between "Afghan Taliban" and "Pakistani Taliban" is misleading, even if it is useful shorthand. The leaders of the former Taliban government of Afghanistan are now called the Quetta Shura after the Pakistani city where they are based, and Mullah Omar's deputy, Mullah Baradar, was captured in the Pakistani city of Karachi, 350 miles from the Afghan border.[i] Likewise, the Haqqani Network, often considered "Afghan Taliban" because of its tribal roots and operational capacity in Afghanistan, has deep roots in Pakistani territory. The network's current operational leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, was raised outside of Miram Shah in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal agency and studied at a madrassa, or religious school, outside Peshawar. His father, Jalaluddin, had decided to fight the Soviet-backed communist government in Afghanistan at a meeting in Miram Shah in 1978.[ii] More recently, Sirajuddin has intervened in Pakistani tribal squabbles to prevent militants from being distracted from the fight in Afghanistan.[iii]

The third group often called "Afghan Taliban" is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami (HIG).[iv] The HIG remains an important player in stoking cross-border violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but lumping it into the same category as the Quetta Shura and Haqqani Network is misleading. Hekmatyar was exiled from Afghanistan during the Taliban's reign in Kabul, and despite long ties to al-Qaeda and reconciliation with Mullah Omar since 9/11, he now seems more focused on political reconciliation than violence.[v] The HIG does not have a major presence in the FATA, though it has extensive bases in Afghan refugee camps in the NWFP outside of Peshawar.[vi]

In an environment where all of the major Taliban groups are headquartered in Pakistan and virtually all of them cooperate to support operations in Afghanistan, the distinction between "Afghan Taliban" and "Pakistani Taliban" is unhelpful. Moreover, the terminology reinforces the counterproductive fiction perpetrated by some in Pakistan that the Pakistani state is responsible for countering only certain elements of the Taliban -- those with the "Pakistani" designation. In practice, the term "Pakistani Taliban" is often used interchangeably with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the pan-FATA militant coalition that engages in brutal violence against the Pakistani state. The terminology usefully distinguishes such anti-Pakistan fighters from the Quetta Shura and Haqqani Network -- "Afghan Taliban" -- that avoid confrontation with Pakistan. But delineating this strategic difference in geographic terms enables those in the Pakistani establishment who support using militants against Pakistan's enemies to excuse their behavior by arguing that they are fighting against the "Pakistani Taliban" and that the "Afghan Taliban" are someone else's problem. When critical policy decisions are being made in Washington and Islamabad, the terminology favors those who do not want to take comprehensive action against militants in the FATA.

Throughout its existence, the TTP has also supported violence in Afghanistan and provided suicide bombers to bolster Haqqani Network and Quetta Shura operations there. Likewise, there are a host of FATA-based militants, including Mullah Nazir in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan, who have not embraced the TTP's anti-Pakistan ideology and occasionally have clashed violently with the group. The terminology also obscures geographic and strategic differences within the TTP itself. For example, the TNSM movement in Swat is grounded in religious politics, not the tribal structures that guide the Mehsud fighters from South Waziristan.

Some might counter that the "Afghan" and "Pakistani" distinction is really a function of the tribal background of various militant groups. After all, the Haqqanis are from the Zadran tribe, which lives primarily in Afghanistan's Paktika province. But the Haqqani Network, Quetta Shura, and TTP all cross tribal boundaries, and the TTP in particular has aggressively sought to destroy tribal hierarchies in favor of ideological association. In any case, the blunt "Afghan" and "Pakistani" terminology simply fails to capture the complexity of these movements. Muddying important differences with imprecise terminology leads to imprecise analysis and imprecise policy.

Brian Fishman is a counterterrorism research fellow at the New America Foundation. This is excerpted from his longer paper "Militancy and Conflict Across the FATA and NWFP," part of the Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative's 'Battle for Pakistan' series.


[i] Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins "Secret Joint Raid Captures Taliban's top Commander" The New York Times February 15, 2010

[ii] Mustafa Hamid "Jalal al-Din Haqqani: A Legend in the History of the Afghanistan Jihad" Al-Sumud Magazine. English version available: http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=20201

[iii] Anand Gopal, Brian Fishman, and Saifullah Khan Mehsud "The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan" The New America Foundation April 19, 2010

[iv] Stanley McChrystal "Commander's Initial Assessment" August 30, 2009

[v] "support bases" see: Omid Marzban "Shamshatoo Refugee Camp: A Base of Support for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar" Terrorism Monitor May 24, 2007; "exiled from Afghanistan" see: Ahmed Rashid Taliban: Militant islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. (New Haven: Yale University Press) 2000 p. 26-27; "reconciliation with Mullah Omar" see: "Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami Expresses Solidarity with Taliban" Afghan Islamic Press April 1, 2005; "focused on political reconciliation" see: "Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: Ruthless Warlord, Karzai Ally, or Both" Voice of America March 24, 2010

[vi] Omid Mazban "Shamshatoo Refugee Camp"

AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images

 

ZATHRAS

11:57 AM ET

June 11, 2010

The other side

The other side of the terminology usage here is that not distinguishing clearly between Afghan and Pakistani Taliban risks engaging Americans, or at least American drones, in an effort to suppress militants whose interests are confined to Pakistan.

Drone attacks aside, these people may not like us but are not strongly motivated to set their local ambitions aside to attack us. The longer American forces are used by a Pakistani government that publicly denounces drone attacks to fight that government's battles, the greater the risk that this will eventually change.

Now, there is a case to be made that striking at Taliban types whose interest is limited to Pakistan is still in America's interest. What if these groups were left alone, and ended up overthrowing the Islamabad government and getting their hands on Pakistan's nuclear weapons? If that's a choice that has been made by the Obama administration with both eyes open, well, it may still be a wrong choice but there is at least an argument for it.

My concern is that it may not be a choice made in quite that way, and that little by little the Obama administration has allowed itself to get drawn into a drone offensive against people whose grievances are not primarily against us. The offensive relies a great deal on Pakistani sources for targeting intelligence, necessarily so. One cannot help but wonder how so much intelligence about figures in Pakistani Taliban groups has found its way to the Americans, but almost a full decade after 9/11 none has been forthcoming about either bin Laden or Zawahiri.

Do we have some interests in common with the Pakistani government, and with its security services? I believe so. But common interests are one thing, and trust is another.

With that said, I appreciate Brian Fishman's reminders as to the organizational relationships among the various groups in the border region.

 

SURESH SHETH

5:49 PM ET

June 13, 2010

US is fooled into mirages created by Pakistan

‘Pakistani military organized Taliban movement and installed Taliban government in Afghanistan in 1996’ as per UN report on Bhutto killing released on 4/15/2010.
With General David Petraeus and Admiral Mike Mullen as well as Defense secretary Gates justifying Pakistan’s ‘terrorist connections’, Mullah Mohammed Omar’s QST trail from Quetta to Kandahar is operating unimpeded.
McChrystal himself had warned about Pakistan’s sheltering of Taliban terrorists in his August 2009 report to Obama: Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) based in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, is the No. 1 threat to US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Mohammed Omar (Afghan Taliban Chief) announces his guidance and intent for the coming year‘.
But US can not even use its drones to destroy QST that is causing daily deaths of US/NATO soldiers in Afghanistan since 2002! That shows Obama’s continuance of Bush’s mollycoddling of Pakistan.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates sought to justify Pakistan’s terrorist connections, alluding to a “deficit of trust” between Washington, DC and Islamabad. Mr Gates also said there was “some justification” for Pakistan's concerns about past American policies. Gen David Patraeus, rushed in with an apologia for his Pakistani friends, by claiming that while Faisal was inspired by militants in Pakistan, he did not necessarily have contacts with the militants. Both Adm Mike Mullen and Gen Patraeus fancy themselves to be “soldier statesmen” a la Gen Dwight Eisenhower. Adm Mullen has visited Pakistan 15 times and Gen Patraeus no less frequently. Both evidently have high opinions of their abilities to persuade Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to crack down on the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and the Taliban’s Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura.
All American officers in southern Afghanistan know that they cannot prevail in the ongoing military operations, unless Taliban strongholds across the Durand Line in North Waziristan and Baluchistan are neutralized. Adm Mullen and Gen Patraeus evidently do not want to acknowledge that hard options have to be considered if their soldiers are not to die at the hands of radicals, armed and trained across the Durand Line.
With US tolerating and mollycoddling Pakistani support of terrorist outfits across the Afghan border, US mission is doomed to fail no matter how much money and manpower US pours in that terror center of the world which resides in Pakistan.

 

QPZMGR

11:12 PM ET

June 29, 2010

Pathans of NWFP straddle

Pathans of NWFP straddle both Pakistan and Afghanistan; similarly the Kashmiris also straddle Free Azad Kashmir and Indian Occupied Kashmir, Punjab in Pakistan and Occupied Punjab in India, Baluchistan in Pakistan and also in Iran.

These international boundaries are based on administrative / military conquests and defeats of the past century.

Just as the British decided to lop off Kuwait from Iraq or Lebanon from Syria.

The loyalties of the people who inhabit much of the old world, not just that region, cross international boundaries despite the wishes of the administrators or replica TAG inexperienced hands manning the White House.

A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.