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What if we fail in Afghanistan?

Mon, 11/16/2009 - 10:46am

By Steve Coll

I have a new post up over at Think Tank.

Last week, I found myself at yet another think tank-type meeting about Afghan policy choices. Toward the end, one of the participants, who had long experience in government, asked a deceptively simple question: What would happen if we failed?
First, the question requires a definition of failure. As I’ve argued, in my view, a purpose of American policy in Afghanistan ought to be to prevent a second coercive Taliban revolution in that country, not only because it would bring misery to Afghans (and, not incidentally, Afghan women) but because it would jeopardize American interests, such as our security against al Qaeda’s ambitions and our (understandable) desire to see nuclear-armed Pakistan free itself from the threat of revolutionary Islamist insurgents. So, then, a definition of failure would be a redux of Taliban revolution in Afghanistan -- a revolution that took control of traditional Taliban strongholds such as Kandahar and Khost, and that perhaps succeeded in Kabul as well. Such an outcome is conceivable if the Obama Administration does not discover the will and intelligence to craft a successful political-military strategy to prevent the Afghan Taliban from achieving its announced goals, which essentially involve the restoration of the Afghan state they presided over during the nineteen-nineties, which was formally known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
What would be the consequences of a second Islamic Emirate? My scenarios here are intended analytically, as a first-draft straw-man forecast:
The Nineties Afghan Civil War on Steroids: Even if the international community gave up on Afghanistan and withdrew, as it did from Somalia during the early nineties, it is inconceivable that the Taliban could triumph in the country completely and provide a regime (however perverse) of stability. About half of Afghanistan’s population is non-Pashtun, from where the Taliban draw their strenth, and most of that non-Pashtun population is ardently anti-Taliban. In the humiliating circumstances that would attend American failure, those in the West who now promote “counterterrorism,” “realist,” and “cost-effective” strategies in the region would probably endorse, in effect, a nineties redux -- which would amount to a prescription for more Afghan civil war. A rump “legitimate” Afghan government dominated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks would find arms and money from India, Iran, and perhaps Russia, Europe and the United States. This would likely produce a long-running civil war between northern, Tajik-dominated ethnic militias and the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. Tens of thousands of Afghans would likely perish in this conflict and from the pervasive poverty it would produce; many more Afghans would return as refugees to Pakistan, contributing to that country’s instability.

To read the rest, visit my New Yorker blog.

Steve Coll is the president of the New America Foundation and a staff writer at The New Yorker.

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AfPak | Afghanistan | AfPak Channel | Obama Administration | Taliban | Terrorism | U.S. Foreign Policy

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At least you're trying to define failure

by Norwegian Shooter on Mon, 11/16/2009 - 5:27pm

Disclaimer - I read your Think Tank blog and in general, I enjoy and mostly support your writings. Your recent congressional testimony not so much, but in general I really like your work. And NAF has been an impressive accomplishment. But...

Yes, "what if we fail in Afghanistan" is a simple question, and that it doesn't yet have a satisfactory answer from the escalation brigades is telling. This one doesn't qualify either.

1. Somalia is a good counter-example. We gave up and withdrew, and no native Somalis are involved in terrorism against the US to my knowledge.

2. Fine, try to smear your scare-quote opponents with their "endorsement" of an Afghan civil war. But the question still remains, how would it affect us?

3. The end of this first scenario is pure speculation. First, the current "legitimate" Afghan government is headed by a Pashtun (the runner-up is half Pashtun, and 3rd place was Pashtun, too), why would Tajiks and Uzbeks dominate the government? Together they have roughly the same percentage of the population as Pashtuns, and it isn't guaranteed that they would work together, even against Pashtuns. Have Tajiks and Uzbeks ever dominated Afghanistan?

4. Second, if the US left Afghanistan, it is likely more Afghans in Pakistan would return to Afghanistan than leave their country for the Pakistani tribal areas. Especially with Pustuns in firm control of the border areas. Just who would migrate to Pakistan, under these circumstances?

5. Does the Afghan Taliban really have ambitions in Pakistan? Did they when they were in power in the nineties? No, they were backed by the Pakistani Army - why would they kill the golden goose?

6. How in the world do you figure the Afghan Taliban would support the Pakistani Taliban? The latter is currently fighting the former's patron. Isn't it accepted that the two Talibans have different goals, i.e. in their respective states?

7. This scenario ends as badly as the first. Right now, Pakistan's generals give support to the Afghan Taliban and have accommodated the Pakistan Taliban in the past. At the end of the current fighting, they likely will do so again. Only the territory controlled will shift. How does this change if we leave Afghanistan? Our aid budget to Pakistan is the only relevant factor here.

8. WTF?!?! Have there been any Taliban or al-Qaeda attacks in India? Has bin Laden ever mentioned India? I really don't know, but would be very surprised if either is yes. Punjab does not equal Pashtun. What Pakistani Taliban are Punjabi? You are in la-la land if you can get from US withdrawal in Afghanistan to an Indo-Pakistani war.

9. "The Afghan Taliban are essentially inseparable from the Pakistani Taliban." Again, I really can't understand you saying this. Besides Peter Bergen, I don't think any other knowledgeable commentator I've read would support this. Any other sources that agree with you on this? Neo-cons don't count, I'm afraid. Too much water under that bridge.

10. OMG, can we simply agree not to end essays with such tripe as your last sentence? Or just save the ink and write "mushroom cloud."

Now, work on defining success as something other than not failing.

In re. to his comment on the

by Grant on Mon, 11/16/2009 - 5:55pm

In re. to his comment on the affects of a victorious Afghani Taliban on the Pakistani Taliban, I am not convinced that the Pakistani Taliban would be advanced by their Afghani comrades. It is possible that they would, but I also find it possible that the Afghans would find a settlement with the Pakistani military. Of course this would not be in the interests of the United States, but it would at least avoid the danger of a Taliban-dominated nuclear state.

Exporting terrorism

by Zathras on Mon, 11/16/2009 - 10:33pm

Not that this is solely decisive as to the future of American policy in Afghanistan, but I'm skeptical as well of a Taliban victory in Afghanistan leading to more formidable efforts to overthrow the Pakistani state.

I see the record of the Pakistani security services as pointing toward an attempt on their part to respond to a NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan by attempting to reach an accomodation with Pashtun tribes and their Arab allies, exporting as much of Pakistan's terrorism problem as possible. Whether this attempt is successful would depend more on the Pakistani army's campaign in Waziristan than it would on what happens to the north; if the army damaged the Mehsud faction significantly the Pakistani security services would be in a stronger position, if not in a weaker.

I do agree with Coll that a Taliban regime reestablished in Afghanistan, and with restored support from Islamabad, would be a greater danger to India and other neighboring countries. This danger, it seems to me, is unlikely to be in addition to the danger that the Islamists in Pakistan would overthrow the government there; it is more likely to be part of the price the Pakistanis would pay to lessen the domestic threat.

The Two State Solution

by smci60652 on Tue, 11/17/2009 - 2:51pm

Why hasn't anyone yet suggested just partitioning Southern Afghanistan from Northern Afghanistan?

Center the North around Kabul and the South around Kandahar.

Either fully partition the country roughly around the 34h parallel and give 10 to 12 of the southern provinces to the Taliban, and give the rest to the current government.

Or just have an extremely loose federal scheme with a relatively autonomous "Emirate of Pashtunistan."

I wonder what the Afghan Taliban's take on this proposition would be? I mean they've got to be smart enough to realize that they'll get nothing but heartache by trying to re-impose their will on a much more heavily funded and fortified Northern Alliance.

Control of the Area from Nuristan to Nangarhar would obviously be tricky to deal with concerning Pakistan's regional security outlook.