Pakistan: The human cost

By Anna Husarska Share

By Anna Husarska

There has been such expectation and speculation over Pakistan's latest anti-Taliban campaign in South Waziristan that the start of major operations has the feel of something long overdue. Comment and reports by local and international media have focused on troop strength, tactics, and body counts.

But those of us who have been working in humanitarian aid in the region recall the human and specifically civilian cost of similar operations in Pakistan's north-western tribal areas exactly one year ago. Last month I met internally displaced persons from Bajaur and Mohmand tribal agencies (i.e. areas) still stuck in camps outside Peshawar. Those campaigns went largely unannounced and without remark and their real cost is difficult to estimate, as few if any humanitarian agencies have access to the tribal lands along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. But destruction was widespread, most people lost everything -- their homes, their belongings, sometimes even their loved ones -- and instability still reigns.

Even in the Swat Valley and Malakand Division, where the counterinsurgency campaign has been acclaimed and the rapid displacement and return of millions deemed "successful," ground truth is hard to come by. North of Mingora, Swat's main city, the valley remains unquiet. Humanitarian organizations find access difficult; unpredictable daily changes in curfews and checkpoints, and continuing actions against militants, can cut off aid access and mean many Swatis simply can't get on with rebuilding their lives. While many went home voluntarily, others were coerced into returning from camps too early -- and some have fled a second or even third time. So, as the armed forces' long-anticipated offensive in South Waziristan advances, and hundreds of thousands flee, we who work side by side with Pakistani aid organizations in helping those driven from their homes by conflict are asking that the government and Pakistan's international supporters pay equally fierce attention to the human cost.

Right now, the government and army are denying access in the main districts hosting displaced families to international humanitarian organizations with the biggest capacity to deliver life-saving assistance. Local government and local aid groups are struggling with the sheer weight of human necessities -- they need international humanitarian support. In the end, this conflict will be best judged not on the number of Taliban killed but the number of civilians protected. This does sound very much like the new American counterinsurgency doctrine, doesn't it?

Anna Husarska is senior policy advisor at the International Rescue Committee.

AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images

 
Facebook|Twitter|Digg
About Us The Blog Contributors Archive

Is Operation Moshtarak a fool’s mission?

BY NORINE MACDONALD | FEB. 8, 2010

We should be asking some critical questions about the now, much-publicized NATO and Afghan forces operation to take Marjah district in Helmand. For starters: How does this operation fit into the overall strategy for Afghanistan -- why Marjah and why now?

Read Entire Entry

A London fog on Afghanistan

BY GILLES DORRONSORO | FEB. 5, 2010

In restive provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, rallying the foot soldiers of the insurgency is simply never going to work, because they are fighting in defense of values -- such as Islam, and freedom from foreign occupation -- that they see under attack. Even if the coalition achieves limited tactical successes, the Taliban will quickly replace the fighters it loses, and it can easily target the "traitors." These coalition tactics are not new and have never worked before. Why does the White House think they'll work now, with the insurgency stronger than ever?

Read Entire Entry

In Dostum's Debt

BY BRIAN GLYN WILLIAMS | FEB. 4, 2010

When the Karzai government announced last week that it would be reinstating Abdul Rashid Dostum, the controversial Uzbek general, as Chief of Staff of the Army, the cries of foul and protest rang loud. But, when it comes to Afghan politics there is usually more than meets the eye, and Dostum's case is no exception. As usual in Afghanistan it involves some back-room deals.

Read Entire Entry

The Devil is in the Details

BY NORINE MACDONALD | FEB. 2, 2010

During last week's London conference, President Karzai unveiled a six-point "Action Plan" designed to turn around the situation in Afghanistan. But how much "action" is really behind the political façade of his six-point plan?

Read Entire Entry

Karzai's Taliban Surprise

BY J ALEXANDER THIER | JAN. 29, 2010

The Afghanistan Conference in London this week was expected to be a just one more in a series of international talk-fests intended as a show of international solidarity with Afghanistan. But Karzai took things a step further -- and took his hosts by surprise -- by using his speech to call for high level negotiations with the Taliban leadership that would result in permanent political reconciliation. Karzai has opened this door repeatedly before, and there have been several attempts to engage Taliban leaders seriously in talks.

Read Entire Entry

Dead Aid for Afghanistan?

BY GERARD RUSSELL | JAN. 27, 2010

Dependence cannot be ended overnight. But President Karzai’s circle is wrong to suppose that it can continue forever. It is far better, for Afghanistan’s long-term future, that they learn this sooner rather than later.

Read Entire Entry

Peter Bergen's Take

U.S. intelligence briefing: Taliban increasingly effective

BY PETER BERGEN | JAN. 26, 2010

A December 22 briefing, prepared by the top U.S. intelligence official in Afghanistan and obtained by CNN, maps out the strategy and strength of the Taliban and their allies in Afghanistan, and concludes that the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is increasingly effective.

Read Entire Entry

Images from the most-talked about place of 2009.

A primer on the epicenter of global terrorism.
By Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann

A guide to the most critical readings on Afghanistan and Pakistan.