By Martine van Bijlert
The Afghan electoral process has gone into yet another phase. The
audit results were passed onto the Electoral Complaints Commission
(ECC) a week ago. They have been endlessly mulling on how to calculate
the number of polling stations that are to be annulled and are expected
to hand over their conclusions to the Independent Electoral Commission
(IEC) today or tomorrow. In the meantime the city is buzzing with
rumors pointing to the possibility of a second round. What is going
on?
Over the last few days there seems to have been an interesting
convergence of, on one hand, the UN-led process of trying to arrive at
some kind of numerical figure (under or over 50 percent) and, on the other
hand, an Afghan process of negotiations on the size of the share of
government that Abdullah’s supporters are to be given in exchange for
his cooperation. The Abdullah camp however seems to have wildly
over-asked, and when Karzai consulted his supporters he was reportedly
told that the demands were unacceptable and that they were ready to
follow him into a second round.
It is unclear whether the figure cited as rumoured election result
(which varies, but tends to be around 48 or 49 percent) has actually been
leaked by the IEC or the ECC and whether it is actually based on a
finalized calculation. Don't forget that this is a negotiating game.
The whole prospect of a possible second round is seen by many Afghans
not so much as the outcome of an investigative statistical process, but
rather as a means to force a preferred outcome -- whatever that may be.
And so it seems that the Karzai camp is calling Abdullah’s (and the
international community's) bluff. You want a second round, you can have one --
very much in the same way as Karzai caught the opposition off guard
earlier this spring when he suddenly gave them what they wanted: an
election date within the Constitutionally prescribed deadline (but
logistically impossible and politically impractical).
So we are left with two dominant tracks, neither of which addresses the
heart of the problem. The UN-initiated audit process lacks local
legitimacy, as it is seen by most Afghans as an elaborate cover for
behind-the-scenes dealmaking -- which will only conclude once the
internationals have received what they want. The process also does not
tackle the devastating impact fraud has had on popular confidence in
the democratic process (voters having a say in choosing their leaders
etc.) and on the practical reality of who has managed to get into
the provincial councils for the coming four years.
The current Afghan process of negotiating a political settlement, on
the other hand, totally disregards the popular demand that rulers stop
treating the government as their personal property. If Abdullah wants
to stay true to his slogans of fundamental change he needs to call back
his negotiators and start talking about reform and a more inclusive
government, rather than this bare-boned attempt at factional power
sharing.
And then we haven’t even talked about the fact that there are probably
at least seven good reasons why really you don’t want to have a second
round, now or anywhere in the medium term future…think winter, violence, disaffection, disbelief, even lower
turnout, even more and possibly more subtle fraud, if no fraud then
localised disenfranchisement, etc.
Martine van Bijlert is the co-director of the Afghanistan
Analysts Network, where this post was originally published.
SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images
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