Pakistan's army heads into the belly of the beast

By Arif Rafiq Share

Afghanistan 2009

By Arif Rafiq

South Waziristan -- home of Baitullah Mehsud, the slain don of the Pakistani Taliban -- is the next stop in Pakistan's war on terror.

Though Washington has been encouraging an operation in the lawless Waziristan area since early summer, the Pakistan Army has decided to go into Mehsud country at a time of its choosing and based on its own reasoning. Pakistan's largely American-funded counterinsurgency is, to a large extent, being conducted on Rawalpindi's terms, not Washington's. The probability of the Pakistan Army going beyond taking care of its own enemy in South Waziristan, the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, and making an honest effort to go after America's foes engaged in attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan, is low.

Preparation for the operations began in June, when the Pakistan Army -- aided by suspected American drone strikes -- started "softening" the terrain with airstrikes and mortar fire and choking off the TTP's supply routes into South Waziristan. The United States, armed with Pakistani intelligence and Predator drones, took out Baitullah Mehsud in a strike on August 5, which has been a considerable blow to the TTP's cohesiveness.

Precision air and drone strikes have eliminated key TTP operatives and facilities, reducing the quality and scale of terrorist activity inside Pakistan. Operation Rah-e Rast, which targeted the TTP in the Malakand division, also in northwest Pakistan, and a series of smaller scale operations throughout the tribal areas, have reduced the TTP's operational space. Much of its leadership is currently confined to the greater Waziristan area.

At the same time, the Pakistani government has been playing hardball with the Mehsud tribe, trying to get it to turn against the TTP. This effort, which includes attempts to form anti-TTP lashkars, has yielded limited success.

But the Pakistan Army apparently feels that now, as winter begins in Waziristan, is an opportune time to seriously debilitate the TTP. The local population in Mehsud country has been ordered by radio to evacuate the area; tens of thousands have left. Heavy ground operations could begin sometime in October.  The window of opportunity is closing. As the New York Times' Ismail Khan notes, the rugged region is generally hit by snow starting in late November.

The Pakistan Army, it is said, distinguishes between the "good" and "bad" Taliban. But such language mischaracterizes the decision making process in Rawalpindi. The Pakistan Army is a coherent, modern organization with a cold, rational outlook on its surrounding landscape. It is interested in furthering its strategic objectives. For the Pakistan Army, some Taliban groups can be seen as strategic assets, while others, such as the TTP, are more clearly enemies.

And so as the Pakistan Army heads into South Waziristan to give the TTP network a decisive blow, there is little likelihood that it will target the networks of commanders like Maulvi Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and Jalaluddin Haqqani, all of whom chiefly target coalition forces in Afghanistan rather than the Pakistani state or military. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the Pakistan Army would begin operations in South Waziristan without the confidence that these three networks would not attack it in defense of the TTP.

The reasons for this are, in part, economic. It's easier to target one group focused in a single area, rather than four or more groups each located on opposite ends of North and South Waziristan. But beyond this, the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment remains concerned with its security predicament in a post-America Afghanistan.

It would like to see a coherent and non-hostile government in Kabul that can, at the very least, serve as an energy and trade corridor from Gwadar and Karachi to the ancestral lands in Central Asia of Babur, the founder of the Mughal Empire. Rival India is emerging on the world stage, and Pakistan would like to restrain the growth of the Indian presence in its own backyard. Add to this the shared population and borders between the two countries, and it becomes clear that no country in the world is as impacted by developments in Afghanistan as is Pakistan.

Recent reports that the United States and NATO members have come to terms with another Karzai presidency have proven Pakistan's contention that to shape events in Afghanistan, you need an allied Pashtun on top. Karzai is the least incapable of America's Pashtuns. But Pakistan, whose relations with Karzai have improved in the past year, also has Afghan Pashtuns of its own, the most important of whom is Mullah Muhammad Omar, head of the Afghan Taliban. And with the Afghan Taliban ascendant, it is not realistic to expect Pakistan to turn against it and affiliated networks just yet. Why would the Pakistan Army ditch a rising Afghan Taliban for a sinking Karzai and his band of kleptomaniacs? The Pakistan army might see itself as betting on the winning horse in the long run.

Arif Rafiq is the president of Vizier Consulting, LLC and a regular contributor to the Pakistan Policy Blog.

ROSHAN KHAN/AFP/Getty Images

 
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AARUN

12:25 AM ET

October 4, 2009

Chicken or the Egg Argument

"But Pakistan, whose relations with Karzai have improved in the past year, also has Afghan Pashtuns of its own, the most important of whom is Mullah Muhammad Omar, head of the Afghan Taliban. And with the Afghan Taliban ascendant, it is not realistic to expect Pakistan to turn against it and affiliated networks just yet. Why would the Pakistan Army ditch a rising Afghan Taliban for a sinking Karzai and his band of kleptomaniacs? The Pakistan army might see itself as betting on the winning horse in the long run"

This argument is probably the most popular for those who defend Pakistan's decision not to go after the Afghan Taliban, citing Pakistan's forward-thinking strategic calculus about the Taliban's increasing power and America's eventual abandonment of Afghanistan. But I see this argument as a chicken or the egg dilemma:

Does Pakistan not want to threaten the Taliban now that it is ascendant? Or is the Taliban ascendant in large part due to Pakistan's unwillingness to threaten it or its sanctuary in Pakistan?

Here are some questions I would love to have answered by defenders of Pakistan's strategic decision not to fight the Afghan Taliban:

1) When the Taliban was ousted and routed from power in 2001, why did Pakistan still ignore it and allow it to re-group steadily inside Pakistani territory? The Taliban was clearly crippled at that point, far from ascendant.

2) If Pakistan chooses to help the US now and directly challenges the Afghan Taliban, would that reverse, or at least positively effect, the trajectory of the Taliban insurgency?

If yes, what's the rationale for not doing so (it cannot still be that the Taliban are winning so Pakistan should bet on the winning horse)?

3) Let's say the US does "abandon" Afghanistan and the Taliban re-claims most of the country. Does keeping a friendly relationship with the Taliban really serve Pakistan's interests, given that the US will still be watching closely and will be even more apt to strike Pakistan should another attack emanate from Afghanistan and/or Pakistan?

 

AHR

9:27 PM ET

October 20, 2009

http://ahraza.wordpress.com/2

http://ahraza.wordpress.com/2009/10/20/a-state-of-denial/

The GHQ attack has drawn accusations from several quarters in Pakistan that it was inspired by foreign powers; some have named India and the US among the usual suspects. Such ‘experts’ rarely bother to give any concrete evidence to substantiate their charges, which are based mainly on conjecture. They can only argue as to which country would want to hurt Pakistan the most: surely it must be India. Since many now see the US as the enemy, it too, in their view, could be the hidden hand behind the attack. In this particular case the leader of the terrorists has been captured alive. An army spokesman has identified him as Aqeel, alias Dr Usman, affiliated with terrorist outfits based in southern Punjab. The terrorists involved in the attack were apparently trained in South Waziristan.