Now's not the time to dream of nation building

These are constructive suggestions. Faults can be found with them, but this is true of any other course in Afghanistan, including the one now attributed to Gen. McChrystal.

Of the dangers now being warned against, the greatest seems to me to be the narrative problem discussed yesterday by Sec. Gates. The imaginative people we are fighting in Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan appear to see an opportunity to declare another great victory over a superpower, an opportunity we would be wise to deny them. Should Afghan policy be recast along the lines suggested here, care would have to be taken in how the new policy is presented.

There is also the tribal issue to consider. Effectively, the course being suggested here would involve abandoning to the enemy much of the Pashtun-majority areas in Afghanistan. This would introduce an interesting dynamic into our relationship with the Afghan president and Pashtun tribal factions committed, for one reason or another, to him. It might even lead much further than that, to an eventual hardening of the division between the majority- Pashtun areas of the country and the rest of Afghanistan.

This is obviously speculation. However, we cannot simply ignore the nearly eight years that have passed since the Afghan war started. During most of this time, the United States and NATO merely tread water while the enemy slowly recovered its morale after its devastating defeat in the fall of 2001. Some things that might have been possible had they been attempted early in the Bush administration are probably not possible now, not without a commitment of time and resources far greater than the American public will support. In theory, protecting the Afghan population would probably work better than a straight counter-terrorist campaign would, but we are not fighting this war in theory. Perhaps we should begin by protecting the population, as Gen. McChrystal's people suggest, just not all of them.

--different political systems, votes & voting & voters? so what? they can easily be bought or had by various and sundry illicit means and ultimatums and pressure tactics (i.e., Venezuela, Bolivia), voting does not mean there is democracy nor representation by the people, for the people.

--Why is the UN not taking the lead there? This is not a bilateral situation, it is a global situation, and all involved and concerned parties should be involved and represented by a global institution.

--arms & drugs: who really profits from what is going on in Afghanistan? Who makes the arms? Who sells them? Who ships them? Who buys the drugs? Who fuels the drug trade? Someone might wish to take a deeper look at the entire military-industrial complex, contractors, defense industry, and try to "follow the money".

--has anyone asked the Afghan people what they want? or are they too afraid to say? or are those asking incapable of speaking the native languages? What if they were to say they do not want a western-style democracy or republican form of government: could the US live with that statement of self-determination?

--religion, religious influence: just how threatened are the Islamic clergy? As in Iran, these are the dinosaurs who fear extinction and loss of power and privilege. Women's rights, education, empowerment? Ha, not while they are around!

There appear to be more questions than answers, but, bottom line, are the right people asking the deep, troubling, difficult questions that might not have any easy answers?

Michael, I always enjoy your writing on US politics, but I have to disagree with much of what you're proposing here.

Sure, the current situation is a highly problematic mess, and McChrystal faces an uphill battle. We can all see that.

But what you're proposing is the status quo ante: targeting the Taliban and conducting counter-terrorist strikes - both elements that have largely served to alienate the local populations and have proven unsuccessful over the past eight years. It's why Gen. McKiernan is no longer in charge.

Second, we can all agree on the importance of training the ANA and ANP - it's already a priority and has been for some time. But it's a project that will take years. The pressing question is what to do in the meantime.

Gen. McChrystal's COIN approach, whatever its limitations, is still a far a better option than a "new more counterterrorism-focused course" -- which sounds a lot like the old, more counterterrorism-focused course, which hasn't been working out so well since 2001. Ask the folks who spend time on the ground rather than inside the Beltway and you'll find they tend to agree.

I do agree on the need to do more in the north -- particularly with development assistance, rather than just military deployments - which also risk irritating locals further.

The focus on more troops is simplistic and misses the complex picture of what has been done wrong - and what could be done better.

Political corruption can be counterbalanced by a restructuring of the government to cede more power to locally-elected leaders at the province and district level, civil service reform, increased salaries, and channeling more assistance through accountable government mechanisms with tighter oversight, particularly at the local level. Put that together with a counter-insurgency approach that's focused more on stabilizing those districts where the Taliban can be kept out or pushed out, and we just might have a successful strategy.

After everything they've suffered for the past decades, the people of Afghanistan deserve better than to have the international community walk away from them. Doing so would be a discredit to America and its allies.

"The focus on more troops is simplistic and misses the complex picture of what has been done wrong - and what could be done better."

Exactly right.

The Afghan's need more than just protection. In popular demand -- justice.