Brother to brother

By Katherine Tiedemann Share

If you missed today's full-house launch event for the AfPak Channel, be sure to check out the video below for the panel with New America Foundation president Steve Coll, the Washington Post's Afghanistan correspondent Rajiv Chandrasekaran, and AfPak Channel editor Peter Bergen, moderated by the Post's Karen DeYoung and with introductions by Foreign Policy's Susan Glasser.

One of many things worth highlighting from today's discussion is Rajiv Chandrasekaran's anecdote about his recent reporting trip to Kandahar, a Pashtun stronghold and the spiritual homeland of the Taliban movement. Rajiv told the crowd,

I visited perhaps the sole bright spot in Kandahar Province, a district called Dand, south of the city (of Kandahar). It's a very small district, but it was fascinating... it's essentially a suburb of Kandahar, but it has now achieved its own sort of distinct district status. The Canadians, over the past many months, essentially flooded that area with almost all of their troops, and they proceeded to see some fairly significant improvements in security.

But part of that has also come in an unexpected way. The district is half Barakzai, half Popalzai, two tribes in the south that are pretty pro-government, and in a small district where you have pretty binary tribal dynamics it makes it much easier than in some of the other parts of the region. What the Canadians did was to implement a cash-for-work program, but they decided to do it through the local district chief, who's a very charismatic 31-year old guy, and he, like many local leaders, figured the best way to administer this would be to ask his brother to do it.

And his brother, of course, given a pot of money to hire people, did what many brothers of political leader might do in that country: he hired a bunch of Barakzai. To the Canadians in the PRT in Kandahar, this was a very disconcerting turn of events, and they talked to the district chief and said, "Look, you can't be nepotistic about this," but it had a funny effect. By hiring up a lot of the Barakzai, the Barakzai leadership in that district sent a letter to the local Taliban commander saying, essentially, "Stay away, we like what's happening here."

And, they deputized a bunch of young Barakzai men to pick up AK-47s and mount the roving formal security patrols, both of which I think have been very significant in the reduction of violence over there. So this gets to the larger point of the degree to which NATO is, in my view, still not aggressively moving enough to look at tribal dynamics in the South and ways to try to exploit them short of a "let's create a bunch of warlords" strategy."

Rajiv's story underscores the importance of understanding Afghan society, and he correctly points out that we have a long way to go, even with some faint sparks of good news coming out of Kandahar.

 
Facebook|Twitter|Digg
About Us The Blog Contributors Archive

Is Operation Moshtarak a fool’s mission?

BY NORINE MACDONALD | FEB. 8, 2010

We should be asking some critical questions about the now, much-publicized NATO and Afghan forces operation to take Marjah district in Helmand. For starters: How does this operation fit into the overall strategy for Afghanistan -- why Marjah and why now?

Read Entire Entry

A London fog on Afghanistan

BY GILLES DORRONSORO | FEB. 5, 2010

In restive provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, rallying the foot soldiers of the insurgency is simply never going to work, because they are fighting in defense of values -- such as Islam, and freedom from foreign occupation -- that they see under attack. Even if the coalition achieves limited tactical successes, the Taliban will quickly replace the fighters it loses, and it can easily target the "traitors." These coalition tactics are not new and have never worked before. Why does the White House think they'll work now, with the insurgency stronger than ever?

Read Entire Entry

In Dostum's Debt

BY BRIAN GLYN WILLIAMS | FEB. 4, 2010

When the Karzai government announced last week that it would be reinstating Abdul Rashid Dostum, the controversial Uzbek general, as Chief of Staff of the Army, the cries of foul and protest rang loud. But, when it comes to Afghan politics there is usually more than meets the eye, and Dostum's case is no exception. As usual in Afghanistan it involves some back-room deals.

Read Entire Entry

The Devil is in the Details

BY NORINE MACDONALD | FEB. 2, 2010

During last week's London conference, President Karzai unveiled a six-point "Action Plan" designed to turn around the situation in Afghanistan. But how much "action" is really behind the political façade of his six-point plan?

Read Entire Entry

Karzai's Taliban Surprise

BY J ALEXANDER THIER | JAN. 29, 2010

The Afghanistan Conference in London this week was expected to be a just one more in a series of international talk-fests intended as a show of international solidarity with Afghanistan. But Karzai took things a step further -- and took his hosts by surprise -- by using his speech to call for high level negotiations with the Taliban leadership that would result in permanent political reconciliation. Karzai has opened this door repeatedly before, and there have been several attempts to engage Taliban leaders seriously in talks.

Read Entire Entry

Dead Aid for Afghanistan?

BY GERARD RUSSELL | JAN. 27, 2010

Dependence cannot be ended overnight. But President Karzai’s circle is wrong to suppose that it can continue forever. It is far better, for Afghanistan’s long-term future, that they learn this sooner rather than later.

Read Entire Entry

Peter Bergen's Take

U.S. intelligence briefing: Taliban increasingly effective

BY PETER BERGEN | JAN. 26, 2010

A December 22 briefing, prepared by the top U.S. intelligence official in Afghanistan and obtained by CNN, maps out the strategy and strength of the Taliban and their allies in Afghanistan, and concludes that the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is increasingly effective.

Read Entire Entry

Images from the most-talked about place of 2009.

A primer on the epicenter of global terrorism.
By Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann

A guide to the most critical readings on Afghanistan and Pakistan.