Bribing Afghans is a bad idea

By Joanna Nathan

Fareed Zakaria argues that the U.S. needs to put "buying, renting or bribing" tribesmen before nation-building. The problem is that such deal-making has been the failed policy in Afghanistan.

From the crude suitcases of cash handed over in the immediate wake of September 11, 2001 to today's more euphemistic payments to "security" companies and a blind eye to abuses by "allies," the U.S.'s strategy has largely been about snuggling up to strongmen.

Fred Kaplan similarly suggests that the U.S. should "bribe" its way to victory because "the Afghan regime is corrupt, and if the Afghan people regard it as illegitimate, then it can't provide "good governance," and it won't be embraced as "an alternative to Taliban rule." This fails to recognize that the illegitimacy, corruption and bad governance stem from the very fact that U.S. policy has been centered around backing favored individuals. No need to give "serious thought... to bribing several governors and other key figures as well." That is broadly what has been attempted for eight years.

Corruption is not, as seems to be assumed here, something innate to Afghan culture or the result of extraordinarily bad luck in political appointments. It is an entirely logical and systemic reaction -- which would be seen anywhere in the world -- to huge amounts of money washing around without accountability. What minimal accounting that exists is to international donors rather that to the Afghan people. Mouthing nominal allegiance to Afghanistan's central administration often appears all that is required. That is not democracy, it is not nation-building, and it does not promote stability.

Outsiders are terrible at knowing who to pay off and perceiving the consequences amidst a social fabric rent by decades of war. Trusted Afghan "allies" have systematically used naïve foreigners to entrench their own networks and alienate or eliminate rivals. The grievances and impunity created have played an enormous part in the burgeoning insurgency and exploding opium trade. To simply now seek to draw more "Taliban" commanders and abusive predators in the mix, as Zakaria promotes, without tackling the internal and regional structural issues that have driven decades of conflict would be fuel for the fire.

This is of course not just about the last eight years -- but how little we have learned from history. Hard-line groups dominate the political landscape (both government and anti-government) to a much greater extent than any real constituency specifically because of international support received, at the expense of more moderate groups, during the years of anti-Soviet war. It was previously U.S.-funded hired guns that so terrorized the Afghan population in the following civil war that there was initial support for the Taliban -- itself a twisted incarnation born of the U.S.'s prior policy of backing the most radical and extreme jihadists.

When the United States chose to rent these men again, rather than putting foreign troops on the ground in large numbers to ensure what would have been a welcome neutral security presence, it was with little accountability. A diplomat once boasted to me that it was good that the local "police chief" was a drug dealer because he could then afford to outfit his "police" with better equipment than those subsisting purely on (foreign-financed) government supplies. Never mind that his abuse of rival communities was in large part responsible for the area being a hotbed of "insurgent" activity.

It all makes me wonder exactly what policymakers have been told back in Washington about the importance of nation-building. Nation-building certainly has not been the priority on the ground. Stunting the growth of political parties, sidestepping the elected National Assembly and Provincial Councils, cash for strongmen and a preference for expensive contractors rather than strengthening local ministries does not add up to a sustainable Afghan state being the priority.

Since 2004 the ‘Pashtunization' of the center has been one of the most noticeable political trends in Afghanistan, so I don't understand Zakaria's point on this. Far more important in incubating the festering sense of alienation -- which the Taliban have been quick to pick up on -- are local intra-Pashtun grievances. Carmela Baranowska's brave 2004 documentary "Taliban Country" featuring then-Uruzgan governor Jan Mohammad and Sarah Chayes' book The Punishment of Virtue on post-2001 Kandahar and the role of then-governor Gul Agha Sherzai are excellent resources to understand exactly who was backed and to challenge ideas that nation-building has already been given our best shot.

Additionally, payments to strongmen are not even guaranteed to protect U.S. interests. There have been mysterious attacks by "the Taliban" when "allies" are seeking price increases from foreign paymasters for providing convoy "security" in what are often little more than protection rackets.

Rented allies are not reliable allies. Simply buying or bribing more commanders of whatever ilk will mean more instability in an environment where entrenched interests in a war economy are already playing the international community -- not the other way around. Money is leverage and the populations of both Afghanistan and the U.S. need to be involved in debating how it is spent, rather than grubby backhanders. This must include clearly agreed public standards and measures -- and sanctions if they are not met. I am not saying this is easy, but simply blindly backing individuals has already been tried and failed. The top priority must be a real commitment to nation-building and trying to ensure an administration and institutions worth joining.

Joanna Nathan is currently undertaking a mid-career masters at Princeton University. She lived in Kabul from 2003 to 2009 first for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting then as senior analyst for the International Crisis Group. Views expressed are her own.

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