Withdrawal without winning?
By Katherine Tiedemann
Monday, September 14, 2009 - 11:00 AM
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By Robert Jervis
Most discussion about Afghanistan has concentrated on whether and how we can defeat the Taliban. Less attention has been paid to the probable consequences of a withdrawal without winning, an option toward which I incline. What is most striking is not that what I take to be the majority view is wrong, but that it has not been adequately defended. This is especially important because the U.S.has embarked on a war that will require great effort with prospects that are uncertain at best. Furthermore, it appears that Obama's commitment to Afghanistan was less the product of careful analysis than of the political need to find a "tough" pair to his attacks on the war in Iraq during the presidential campaign. It similarly appears that in the months since his election he has devoted much more attention to how to wage the war than to whether we need to wage it.
The claim that this is a "necessary war" invokes two main claims and one subsidiary one. The strongest argument is that we have to fight them there so that we don't have to fight them here. The fact that Bush said this about Iraq does not make it wrong, and as in Iraq, it matters what we mean by "them." Presumably if we withdrew the Taliban would take over much of southern and eastern Afghanistan. This would be terrible for the inhabitants, but would it harm us? I don't think anyone believes that the Taliban would launch attacks against us or our allies, so that the menace is not a direct one.
Instead, the fear is of a repetition of the pre-2001 situation in which al Qaeda would have bases that would facilitate attacks. Obviously, this is a danger, but how great a one? The Taliban would not want to repeat what happened after 2001, and so I do not think one can simply assume that Taliban control would automatically lead to al Qaeda control. Nor is Afghanistan the only country that might permit an al Qaeda presence. Somalia is perhaps as troublesome, and yet noone calls for the U.S. to re-intervene there. Furthermore, al Qaeda has some sort of base ofoperations in Pakistan now (and is not likely to lose it even in the best outcome across the border); how much worse would it be if we withdrew?
In part, this might depend on exactly what "withdrawal" means and on what "bases" mean. Clearly al Qaeda grew by having large training camps in Afghanistan before 9/11, more than they have now in Pakistan and which they might be able to reestablish, presumably on a smaller scale, if we left. But are these still needed? The fact (assuming it is a fact) that 9/11 could not have happened without those camps does not mean that their reestablishment wouldlead to renewed terrorism. To put this another way -- and this is a genuine question and not a rhetorical one -- what sort of facilities might be established in Afghanistan that would increase the danger to the U.S.? It presumably would be easier for al Qaeda to operate, but would this translate into more and more effective attacks?
The second part of the question is exactly what withdrawal means. What would we keep in the region? What could we achieve by airpower? How much intelligence would we lose, and are there ways to minimize this loss? It is often said that we withdrew before 9/11 and it didn't work. True, but the circumstances have changed so much that I don't find this history dispositive. While al Qaeda resurgence is a real danger, I am struck by the thinness of theargument that in order to combat it we have to fight the Taliban and try tobring peace if not democracy to Afghanistan.
A second argument, made most recently by Frederick Kagan inthe September 5-6 Wall Street Journal, is that, to quote from its headline, "A stable Pakistan needs a stable Afghanistan." But does it really? Are there reasonable prospects for a stable Afghanistan over the next decade no matter what we do? Isn't there a good argument that part of the problem in Pakistan stems from our continued presence in Afghanistan? We are told that bases in Pakistan are used to support the insurgents in Afghanistan, while simultaneously being told that it is the fighting in Afghanistan that is endangering Pakistan.
Reciprocal causation is certainly possible, but this modern version of the turbulent frontier doctrine is not backed by solid logic. Pakistan's ISI and army clearly maintain ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and although they cannot exert anything like complete control, once the danger of a Taliban defeat by the U.S. passes they would have every incentive to reign in their clients.
Furthermore, the stability of Pakistan does not depend on pacifying the tribal areas. While the recent efforts by Pakistan to regain control of some of its territory may owe something to our combating the Taliban, I wonder if the effect is a large one. In parallel, it can be argued that we gain general influence over Pakistan by fighting in Afghanistan, but here not only the magnitude of the effect but its sign is open to question.
A third but subsidiary argument is that withdrawal would undermine American credibility around the world. Again, the fact that this is an echo of Vietnam does not make it wrong, but it does seem to me much less plausible than theother arguments. Who exactly is going to lose faith in us, and what are theygoing to do differently? Much could depend on the course of events in othercountries, especially Iraq, which could yet descend into civil war. But if it does, would American appear more resolute -- and wiser -- for fighting in Afghanistan? Of course if we withdraw and then we or our allies suffer a major terrorist attack many people will blame Obama, and this is a political argument that must weigh more heavily with the White House than it does with policy analysts.
It is worth noting that these issues are much less ideologically-charged than those surrounding the war in Iraq (or in Vietnam). This means that it shouldbe easier for the concerned community to address them seriously, although notnecessarily to come up with (correct) answers, and for people to change their minds. This makes it particularly unfortunate that we have not had a searching and thorough discussion. Although some deeply-rooted beliefs are involved, such as those involving the propensity for dominoes to fall and perhaps an estimate of how great a danger terrorism is, we are mostly in a more pragmatic realm.
Of course Yogi Berra was right when he said that prediction is difficult, especially about the future. But once we move beyond the alluring but unsustainable claim that our inability to exclude the possibility that withdrawing would be very harmful means that we must fight, it becomes clear that we are building a large and risky war on predictions that call for closer examination.
Robert Jervis is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University.
MANAN VATSYAYANA/AFP/Getty Images
Withdrawal is not an option at this stage
Mr. Jervis, I find your article "Withdrawal without winning?" well meant, if completely misguided. You are correct, the ramifications of a pre-emptive roll back or withdrawal have not been examined properly - and perhaps we should examine the notion. However, if you were to put a car in reverse while driving 60 miles per hour down the highway could you expect anything but a wreck or at best a siezed engine or blown transmission? The same principle applies to the war in Afghanistan.
We are gearing up, throwing 21,000 more troops and trainers into the mix...waiting for the full assessment of resources necessary by McChrystal, Gates, Mullen, and a hob nob with the President to determine if we are going to go bigger or test the NATO waters in a "present" vote of pause. All of the top brass are saying 18 months will tell the tale - so why not go big for 18 months and see what happens?
The April leaked maps of the Afghan Ministry show Taliban now threaten control virtually half of Afghanistan due to our gross inaction for years... The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report "Afghanistan's Narco War" back on the 9th of August finally shows that our Pentagon and Congress understand after 8 long years that there might actually be a link between terror financing and the poppy underground, chalking up 50 nexus targets on their kill or capture board - let's go knock out those nexus targets while we have the congressional support. Last October's NATO agreement that allowed the targetting of heroin labs is now bearing fruit - it is time to push.
We are facing crossborder raids from Mehsuds and Haqqanis, yet we are utilizing Predator drones admirably well against both groups through the unmatched and unlauded efforts of our powerfully well-oiled intelligence teams in the NWFP and FATA regions.
It is possible that MycChrystal may have ham strung our troops with new Rules of Engagement; however, that possibility may best be analyzed by the mainstream in terms of your premise of withdrawal without victory.
But though your thoughts are well conceived mental gymnastics, it is time to dismantle the narco Taliban drug network which supports the Taliban and crush the smuggling ratlines by placing a spotlight on Afghan and Pakistani official corruption down to the police level.
Senator Levin has stated we should ramp up training of Afghans to play the major role...looking at double the previous assessment of needs for the Afghan State to hold a sense of maintaining sovereignty on its own two feet - ok, fine, send more trainers, but let's get the job done.
The effectiveness of Panther's Claw and Operation Sword are unsung victories. Moreover, we are in a state of region building in which billions of dollars are heading to the AfPak in multiple manners, and it is unlikely that the CNAS, CFR, and Brookings Fellows in influential roles will switch from their "Triage" mentality on Afghanistan any time soon - at least not until the QDDR comes through next year...and USAID gets a new head to coordinate the efforts of the civilian and military wrungs of the comprehensive effort in the area.
It seems Jervis, your consideration is an academic one and not even in the realm of possibility at least through 2011. The President has a plan - dismantle, disrupt, and defeat - and though it may be complete theory in the end, his refusal to let al Qaeda off the hook for 9/11 is a decision I am willing to support. In my opinion, though, it is as though you have so disassociated the radical Jihadist nature of our enemy that your mind has broken. The label of "extremists" has veiled your eyes and your reason to the nature of the threat. In that sense, after 8 years and 3 days of understood warfare on the United States, you have convinced yourself that there is no monster in the closet.
The way I see it is this. Al Qaeda is a school yard bully: if you let him go without bloodying his nose every time he bucks on a classmate, he will terrorize your friends forever. Though the bases might not grow large enough to fully challenge the United States, the fact that you are willing to accept the existence of radical jihadist terrorists congregating in this day of open borders and lax immigration is disturbing.
If we withdraw, what is the likelihood that we will be in the position to support the Pakistani government should it be overrun with Islamists bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, headed by say a rogue ISI operative gone power hungry? When minutes and seconds count, what then? Sure, predicting the future is hard; however, until the Taliban were knocking at Islamabad's door, the contingency could not even be contemplated by our state department...so much so that Bruce Reidel then put out his nightmare scenario on The National Interest.
Honestly, from my vantage in Gray, it seems your time there at Columbia might be better spent dealing with the threat rather than wishing it away. Buck back. Don't let al Qaeda destabilize your reason...that is jihad's goal.
But not for practical reasons. From an U.S. centric perspective your views on costs and likely benefits make perfect sense.
I'm not from the US however, I'm an Australian living in South Korea, and I feel confident in assessing that were the US to withdraw without winning the damage that would be done would be done to any future requests for international support in operations like Iraq or Afghanistan.
The reasoning behind both wars (particularly Iraq) was already a hot topic of debate in most countries which sent resources, and such a withdrawal, based upon purely US centric reasons, would be viewed as a complete admission of failure, and that US requests for aid in conflicts, particularly when using flimsy, emotional/rhetoric arguments, as were predominant following S11, simply cannot be trusted to follow through on their claims.
Given that many political leaders (particularly in Australia and S.K. that I know of) faced considerable public opposition to their support of the Irag and Afghanistan wars, such international doubt may become a significant issue for the US in the future.
Now I'm aware that, in the logistical picture, the contributions of many smaller nations who participated in these battles were small compared to the larger players, but the impression that these operations were truly global operations, and supported by nations worldwide is something that I think *was* important.
Anyway . . . that got a lot more long winded than I intended. Cheers :P
Iran is an important element in the equation
So far, I have not heard about the benefits that pulling out of Afghanistan could have with regards to Iran. If Iran is preoccupied with its neighbors, then it should welcome US military involvement in Afghanistan, as that takes off pressure from the Iranians having to intensify their drug fighting efforts, as well as worrying about insurgents crossing the border.
America and NATO pulling out of Afghanistan would essentially leave Iran with new worries about its eastern border, thus making it potentially easier to deal with at the negotiating table.
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