Saturday's New York Times reports that Pakistan has expanded
its maritime land-attack missile program, possibly based on modifications
to U.S.-provided anti-ship Harpoons. News like this fuels concerns that the
Pakistani establishment is not taking the internal security threat seriously
enough, instead favoring its standard obsession with India. In this view, the expansion
of both conventional and nuclear weapons programs shows that Pakistan is not serious about its wars within,
instead myopically focusing on a status quo India
that poses no real threat to Pakistan.
There is certainly merit to the argument that Pakistan simply
"doesn't get it" when it comes to fighting the Taliban. The Pakistan Army has a
deeply-ingrained organizational distrust of India and strong incentives to
continue building and buying expensive new systems, rather than getting into
the dirty, cruel, complex business of counterinsurgency on its northwestern
frontier.
The Army has made various destabilizing and
counterproductive mistakes, whether supporting radical militant groups,
undermining electoral democracy, or contributing to nuclear proliferation. The U.S. has good reasons to make sure that its
agreements with Pakistan
are not being violated. U.S.
military aid can be terminated if the US deems that the use of these
weapons, like the possible Harpoon modification, are against American
interests or being adapted for purposes other than their intended use.
But it is important to keep in mind that continued Pakistani
military modernization is not irrational given Pakistan's dangerous security environment.
India
is hugely powerful relative to its neighbors, with a massive population, a
large and capable military, nuclear weapons, and a growing economy that is
slowly but surely fueling its own military modernization and doctrinal
evolution.
Pakistani forces are outgunned and outmanned by India, and the country would ultimately lose in
a large-scale land war across the plains of Punjab
and Sindh/Rajasthan. This is a crucial reason that Pakistan
has tried to improve its conventional capabilities, adopted a first-use nuclear
posture, sponsored bloody terrorism and insurgency in India, and looked to the U.S. and China for military, financial, and
diplomatic support. As India
further grows, its power will be even more threatening to Pakistan, whether or not India intends
it to be.
This fear is not simply the result of Pakistani domestic
politics, ideology, or military worldview, though those also crucially matter.
Because of its power, India is viewed with
a measure of suspicion throughout the South Asian periphery -- Sri Lanka
has made sure to hedge its bets by cozying up to China and Pakistan (and in the
late 1980s even provided weapons to the Tamil Tigers against an Indian
peacekeeping force), while Bangladesh and Burma in the past have both at least tacitly
provided
sanctuary to insurgents trying to secede from India.
Neither Americans nor Indians always understand how
threatening their military strength can look to weaker countries. This dynamic
is clearly at play in the case of Pakistan
-- Indians feel that they are self-evidently not a threat, while Americans are
often baffled that Pakistani security elites care so much about India, which to the U.S. looks like a positive force
for stability and democracy. At the end of the day, however, the world does not
look the same from Rawalpindi and Islamabad as it does from Washington, and the U.S. needs to
remember these differing goals, incentives, and fears as it pursues its vital
interests in the region.
The Pakistan Army absolutely cannot be given a free hand to
direct American money against India
or to violate agreements about the use of U.S. weapons and aid. But the U.S. should not
assume that Pakistani military modernization is an unambiguous sign of its lack
of commitment to internal security. Indeed, India
itself has expanded its conventional and nuclear forces with an eye on China even as
it battles various separatist and Maoist insurgencies at home. It should come
as no surprise that Pakistan
is similarly trying to keep up with its own larger and increasingly powerful
neighbor.
Paul Staniland is a PhD candidate in MIT's Department of
Political Science and Security Studies Program.
India's 200 million Moslems and Billion Hindus are overwhelmingly obsessed with making a better life for themselves and their family. Pakistan is obsessed with Islime. Staniland is obsessed with political correctness so that is why he writes till he believes his own BS.
Pakistan could care less about American interest; but they are happy for Americans to give them weapons.
The USA is directly responsible for further destabilizing Pakistan and it is reasonable to believe that that was/is Bush/Obama policy objective: that was/is the only possible result of our words/actions there.
From US actions since 2001, the only deducible goal is a nice "long lasting war and sell lots of weapons" c 1991 (about this war).
Yes, I agree the article is trying too hard to be neutral. My opinion is that logically India would have no territorial ambitions in Pak. The problem with occupying Pak is that it already contains Pakistanis :-), and since genocide or ethnic cleansing is frowned upon these days, there is no benefit in it for India to take on the extra population, all of them hostile.
So as behooves a smaller player, Pak should focus on having a strong defensive deterrent, so any potential aggressor will pay a disproportionate price. And it's a dangerous neighborhood, such aggressors could be any of the neighbors including Russia or China in some future scenario.
So building up an explicitly offensive capability is a waste of $, as well as a distraction from their current problems, namely terrorism and poverty.
So you, Mr. Staniland, know better what's in Pakistan's best security and strategic interest than, say, a Pakistani strategic planner sitting in Islamabad?
Washington wants the Pakistani army to become America's policing force in Afghanistan. And people like you in Washington think what is in America's interest must definitely be in Pakistan's interest.
I fail to see a better example of ignorance and arrogance than this.
You can misguide the American public opinion by saying India is not a threat, but you can't change history. And you can't be selective about history. In 1971, India invaded Pakistan [in East Pakistan] exploiting a domestic Pakistani election dispute and helped break up the country by supporting a proxy terror militia. It was an unprovoked Indian act of aggression against its smaller neighbor.
To this day Pakistanis remind the Indians that Pakistan could have done the same and marched into Kashmir in 1962 when the Indians were busy getting beaten by China.
Pakistanis saw in 1971 how India will not hesitate to attack Pakistan without provocation if a chance presents itself. So why shouldn't the Pakistanis prepare against a treacheous larger neighbor who now, thanks to delusions of granduer induced by people in Washington, thinks of itself as an established superpower?
Why should Pakistanis stop securing themselves against an India that loses no opportunity to hit Pakistan? [In Afghanistan, under the watchful eyes of the US military, Indians have been found using Afghan soil to stir trouble in adjoining southwestern Pakistani regions. And this is 2009, way ahead of 1971, but some things don't change.]
It is one thing to defend an American interest in pushing the Pakistani army to do America's bidding in Afghanistan and forget about India, but please do not offer this American viewpoint as the only legitimate angle on the story. Pakistanis have the right to have their own viewpoint about defending their homeland.
Stop peddling this biased, self-interested and pro-Indian assessment of Pakistan as the only version of truth.
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