Why can't the Afghans fight their own war?

By Shuja Nawaz Tuesday, August 25, 2009 - 3:09 PM Share

By Shuja Nawaz

Matt Yglesias writes over at Think Progress:

The other thing I wonder about is these incredibly long time horizons for getting the Afghan army up to speed. Why so long? We're not training these guys to mount an amphibious invasion of Japan or get into dogfights with the IDF. The idea is that they need to be able to fight the Taliban. And which superpower is funding, arming, and training the Taliban? Nobody! They're making do with limited support from perhaps some elements in Pakistani intelligence and maybe some Gulf money.
Given Afghanistan's long series of civil wars, there are experienced military commanders around on the non-Taliban side and plenty of veteran fighters throughout the country. It seems as if relatively small quantities of American support should decisively tilt the balance of power. And, indeed, in the winter of 2001-2002 they did decisively tilt the balance of power. Did the Northern Alliance troops suddenly forget how to fight? Did we forget how to help them?

Yglesias is essentially asking the question, why can't the Afghans fight their own war?

Probably because we won't let them. All the talk about the strategy for the war comes out of American mouths. We never hear the Afghans talk about how they hope to conduct the war or how they hope to defeat the Taliban. If the United States and the coalition own the war, they will fight it their way. But Yglesias raises good questions. I agree: Afghans have been fighting for centuries. What sort of training are they missing to fight their compatriots? It is basic war, light weapons, IEDs, and bribes, threats, and coercion being used to win over friends and foes. Who knows the social terrain better? The Afghans or us?

We also need to pay attention to the demographics of the Afghan forces, to ensure that the representation of the various ethnic groups is not distorted in favor of one or the other group. And we must eschew employing Northern Alliance forces in the South, as Yglesias seems to suggest. That feeds the view that this is an anti-Pashtun war. If anything, this creates a backlash. Pashtuns have been fighting each other in the Frontier region of Pakistan for centuries. They will readily do so again, if we let them.

Finally, are we training the Afghan forces to NATO standards? Yglesias implies that "we" have forgotten how to help them. But why not use Pakistani and Indian trainers to train them on basic tactics and weaponry in Afghanistan and in their own countries? Pakistani Pashtun officers and soldiers helped the mujahideen against the Soviets and then reportedly the Taliban, as effective advisors, in the Taliban's drive toward Kabul in the 1990s. They could now work to build the Afghan forces against the same Taliban. This ought to speed up the flow of recruits, and at much less cost than it is for the US or the allies to do so.

Billeting Afghan forces in communities will help isolate the Taliban and protect the people. But they need to be kept under scrutiny so they remain honest. If they abuse their privileges, then we may accelerate the end of the war in favor of the Taliban.

Shuja Nawaz is the director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington, D.C. He is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford 2008) and FATA: A Most Dangerous Place (CSIS 2009).

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KHALID MUFTI

7:31 PM ET

August 25, 2009

Afghan's own war?

Shuja Nawaz sounds Pakistani, so he should know better.

Why can't the Afghan's fight their own war? Probably because they don't think it's their war. They are merely caught up in it.

Pakistani officers should help train Afghan forces against the Taliban? Unlikely as it sounds, Pakistan is too smart to get into that morass.

Once we pull out of Afghanistan, which we will sooner rather than later, Pakistan will have to kiss and make up with the Taliban, who are the most likely party to gain control of their country. Proof: With the forces of 42 countries present there, the Taliban control 50 per cent of the land.

BOREDWELL

11:42 PM ET

August 25, 2009

Pashtun Push

Could it be that Afghan officers/soldiers are no longer clear on who is the enemy?

EXOTTOYUHR

2:28 PM ET

August 26, 2009

Other skills?

A commenter on Yglesias' site points out that logistics, organization, and personal integrity take longer to impart than military skill, and are in shorter supply in Afghanistan.

This last is the largest issue; perhaps we aren't trusting the Pashtuns to fight their own war because they can't be trusted not to take bribes and abuse their position. Remember the article on the conduct of the Afghan police, here on ForeignPolicy a few months ago; or read Rory Stewart's The Places In Between, and note how quickly his fortunes change for the worse when he enters Pashtun country.

In short, they can't fight their own war because they'll go beyond making a hash of it; they'll fight Taliban, all right, but will take bribes, torture locals, rape boys, and do various other things that we would rather have the Taliban win than lend our endorsement to. But the same things will occur if the Taliban wins, and we'll also have a stronger al-Qaida presence to deal with...

So perhaps the right thing to do is to have non-Pashtuns, in fairly large numbers, in the region, and make it clear that the Pashtuns must either assimilate to the standards of reasonable, honest, non-pederastic human beings, or keep their heads down and let the responsible do the fighting -- and the ruling. (People who can't understand statements like "it's wrong to kill strangers for sport" -- again, see The Places In Between -- are simply not ready for democracy.)

OMARALI50

3:38 PM ET

August 26, 2009

Sure, they can fight on their

Sure, they can fight on their own, but not necessarily for the kind of reasonably stable non-terrorist hosting nation that most neighbours (except perhaps the ISI) would like. Left to themselves, I personally dont think the Taliban are going to take over everything. I think their strength has always depended on Pakistani support (providing the skills they lacked and an international long term view) and a particular set of favorable circumstances, and without that support, and in today's changed circumstances, they cannot conquer or hold ALL of afghanistan EVEN IF foriegn forces withdraw. Lets imagine that the US leaves Afghanistan in disarray, right down to the iconic helicopter takeoff from the Kabul embassy roof (maybe with Karzai hanging on to the rope ladder); even in that scenario, the real loss for the US is loss of face. There is no oil in Afghanistan and no easy way to have a functional modern country in the foreseeable future. Taliban ruled Afghanistan would become a haven for the world's adventure seeking jihadis, but the taliban would not have peace. The Northern alliance has been revitalized and will continue to get Indian and Iranian (and probably Russian and American) support and will hold the North. The rest will be one big mess, Somalia X 10, occasionally bombed and cruise-missiled as the need arises. How many international terrorist plots have been launched from Somalia? probably zero. Without Pakistan, the jihadis have nothing except endless brutal war in the world's poorest country.

The real prize is Pakistan.

My question to you is this: do you think the US has finally flipped the Pakistani army or can the Pakistani army go back to training and arming jihadis?

If they dont go back to being jihad central, isnt the job in that region pretty much done? (And I will admit I am trying to start a conversation and learn, these are not necessarily my final views). The Pakistani army could be fighting the jihadis for decades, but as long as they hold the major cities and control the ports and airports, how is that any worse than what is happening now?

It will probably be very bad for the Afghans if the US leaves soon, but is it really that bad for the US?

Some of the fence sitters have an idea about the mess that would result if the US leaves, but again, they are not sure the US can stick around, so mess or not, they have to place their bets on what will follow. On the other hand, if the US looks like it has a winning plan, then everyone else will start calculating differently. btw, "winning plan" does not mean plan to make a deal with the taliban and scoot. In that case, everyone knows who will be cutting heads next year in Kabul stadium and plans accordingly.

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