By Alex Strick van Linschoten, Kandahar, Afghanistan
With only four days to go before the elections, I thought it
might be useful to comment on how the opposition candidates' rallies went this
past week. Myself and my colleague
were graced with the presence of a good half dozen members of the international
press corps this week, and in all likeliness you'll read several pieces from
Kandahar in the next few days.
I've just seen Jon Boone did one for
the Observer which isn't that bad.
Give it a read.
Wednesday the 12th was Abdullah's day in town. The old Communist governor of Kandahar,
Noor ul-Haq Ulumi, who was responsible for buying off the mujahedeen in greater
Kandahar at the end of the anti-Soviet war had come down a few days earlier to
meet elders and prepare for the rally.
He chose an empty patch of land next to his house as the site for the
rally, and people began to arrive there early in the morning.
All over the city that morning, Abdullah's posters and
billboards had been restrung and reposted as if to pretend that they all hadn't
been defaced and dirtied by his opponents. There were surprisingly few security checks at the rally,
something I've heard from many others about previous rallies he did elsewhere,
and an attempt on his life seemed a very real possibility.
In the hours before Abdullah himself showed up, there was
the traditional atan dancing, and a
small group chosen out of the hundreds of women gathered there practiced their
"Abdullah Abdullah" chants.
The presence of women/girls was interesting, and much noted by the
largely uneducated crowd that had come (read: been summoned) to the rally. It was not a common feature at
political rallies down south, for obvious reasons, and the only reason people
could come up with was that Ulumi "was a Communist and the Communists used
to do this all the time."
People also speculated (Abdullah was several hours late;
there was plenty of time for chit-chat) as to where the girls had come
from. In all likelihood they were
Farsi-speaking girls, born in Iran but returned in the past few years to
Kandahar where their families had moved back. Most of this small but influential community of young girls
-- Farsi-speakers make up a significant proportion of Kandahar's school-going
girls -- are literate, often quite well-educated, so they at least understood
that they were at a political rally, what it was for etc.
The police officer in charge of security at the rally made
an announcement on the loudspeaker system: "If anyone brought any weapons
in with them, please hand them in to us.
If we find them on you later, we won't be so pleasant about
it." Great, I thought, they're
not even pretending to have security precautions in place.
It was really, really, really hot, even under the makeshift
tents, but finally Abdullah came.
[Conversation from the crowd:
A: Which one's Abdullah?
B: He's the one with the turban.
A: That one? He
doesn't look like I thought he would.]
Ulumi had put together a premier list of speakers, all of
whom attested to Abdullah's Pashtun-ness, his Kandahari roots, and his
suitability for the post. The
problem was, nobody was really listening to the speeches, too concerned with
fanning themselves and wondering when it would all be over and lunch would
start.
Ezat Wasefi, former governor of Farah, spoke, as did Hajji
Obaidullah and Ulumi himself. All
of the speeches were reactive in tone, spending more time criticising Karzai
(in all the colours of the rainbow) and responding to criticisms that Abdullah
wasn't a real Pashtun. "He's
from Kandahar, he's a Pashtun, I know his family and I saw him here in the
past," said one, as if that was going to overwrite all the bad feeling in
the city at Abdullah's attempt to "be Pashtun."
In the end, I left early, bored by Abdullah and his fake
rally, bored by the utterly dead crowd.
Ashraf Ghani (in Kandahar more commonly identified by the
last part of his name, 'Ahmadzai') was more interesting. Determined not to make the same mistake
of turning up hours before the rally as with Abdullah, this time I arrived
late, presumably missing a few of the speeches, and had to fight my way up
several flights of stairs, through at least five full body pat-downs and a
visibly edgy security guard at the entrance to the main salon upstairs.
In the main salon itself there was space for around 1500,
but many more had turned up so Ahmadzai's supporters spilled out onto the road,
shouting to be allowed in.
Last week saw one major newspaper suggest that Abdullah was
'the Afghan Obama' on account of his mixed ethnicity; to my mind, though, the
support base of Ahmadzai and its strong contingent of the young and the
educated is more reminiscent of an Obama campaign. Indeed, most of the people who managed to get into the
speech hall were under 30 years old.
In Kandahar, where educational opportunities are few and cultural stigma
works against the educated class, Ahmadzai seems to represent a change that
people could actually visualise.
Once again, though, the speeches that I caught were mainly
focused on criticising Karzai and the fruits of his administration:
- administrative corruption
- "guns and democracy don't go together"
- Karzai's government as a 'millionaire's club'
- etc
Ahmadzai's speech itself was much more forceful than I would
have imagined, with a rasp in his voice and the face of a serious man. I imagine his high educated style of
Pashtu worked against him a little, but he made up for his deficiencies in
speech with a good burst of Kandahari and Pashtun pride.
His more populist positions always drew a cheer and clapping
from the crowd, and he even got in a good deal of criticism of foreign forces
(on the drug problem: "If the foreigners are so weak that they can't even
stop drugs from going into their own countries, then why do they claim to be so
powerful after all?")
He took pains to stress that he understood Kandahar, and the
problems of the people. "I
spent many years studying in America, but remember this: I also drank water
from the village well."
He spent a good ten or fifteen minutes explaining some of
the things he planned to do if he were to win: creating jobs, houses, improving
security, economic plans etc. At
least that was an improvement on Abdullah.
Almost as soon as he arrived, he was gone again, on his way
to Farah for a six o'clock meeting there.
In the end, the rallies of Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani said
less about what might happen on election day -- I think we all have a pretty
good idea about that -- but revealed more about the aspirations of Kandahar's
young generation. Very little is
written about this large section of society, but a repeat of the Karzai regime
is not going to do much for them.
The best they can hope for is to earn enough money to get out -- to
Kabul, to India, anywhere else.
Aside from that small possibility, their future looks bleak.
[UPDATE: Karzai supporters held a rally for him today in
Kandahar Football Stadium and it's worth a few comments:]
Presumably conceived in reaction to the two big rallies for
Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, Ahmed Wali Karzai (the president's half-brother) put
on a huge rally held in Kandahar's football stadium today. As you can see in the video above,
there were lots of people there, far more than were present at Ashraf Ghani or
Abdullah's rallies.
People came from all over the city, again and as for the
previous rallies for the excitement of 'something' happening in town, but also
because all government departments were closed for today and officials
requested to attend the rally. All
schools were also closed, and buses present to take girls, boys and teachers to
the stadium. A rumour went round
that teachers' salaries would be paid at the stadium -- teachers in Kandahar
haven't been paid for a couple of months -- but I was unable to confirm
this. It was a good demonstration
of the power that the state still has: who says Karzai has to use his incumbent
powers to win the election, eh?
We initially heard that Karzai himself was coming to the
rally, but once we arrived were told this wasn't the case. Lots of women were present, a mix of
schoolgirls and others, again more than had turned out for Abdullah, but they
sat in a separate place far from the larger men-only stage area.
As for the esteemed and respected guests, it was an
impressive gathering. A glance
round the stage and those seated nearby revealed a who's who of Kandahar:
tribal elders, mujahedeen commanders, government officials, youth leaders and
so on. Almost all of the speakers
referred to this in their speeches: "Look around you," Ahmed Wali
said. "The other candidates
brought one or two people from Kandahar as their friends from Kabul. We have everyone here to support
us. There isn't a well-known
figure perhaps who isn't here."
It was a highly impressive display of power, but fake
nonetheless.
Afghanmal, provincial council member, noted how all the
opposition candidates had come to Kandahar and said that they were Pashtuns,
that they were originally Kandaharis, that they had Kandahari friends, uncles
and mothers, but that Karzai was the real deal.
Hajji Karim Khan, speaking second, warned people that if
they didn't vote that maybe Karzai would get more votes from Herat or Mazar and
that would be shameful for the people of Kandahar when he was reelected... not
the strongest endorsement...
Khalid Pashtun spoke and told people they needed to be
realistic in their expectations of the regime. 100% success isn't possible, he said.
Ahmed Wali himself took pains to stress how much his
half-brother was working for the country.
"Have you ever heard that Karzai took a holiday? Have you ever heard that he went for a
picnic in someone's garden as is our habit? No! He works
for the country from eight in the morning until seven at night."
He also called on the Taliban to stop destroying the
country. If Pashtuns don't stop
fighting, he said, development money currently earmarked for Kandahar will be
allocated to other provinces. And
the foreigners and their money won't be here forever, he warned.
Responding to allegations of fraud: "People say that
I'm buying up voting cards. Look
at all these people gathered here!
Why should I need to buy cards?"
None of the other speakers said anything especially
interesting, and the rally passed without incident. I think it's clear from all of this how Kandahar will vote
when we get to Thursday...
Alex Strick van Linschoten is a journalist based in
Kandahar. This was originally posted on his blog.
We should be asking some critical questions about the now, much-publicized NATO and Afghan forces operation to take Marjah district in Helmand. For starters: How does this operation fit into the overall strategy for Afghanistan -- why Marjah and why now?
In restive provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, rallying the foot soldiers of the insurgency is simply never going to work, because they are fighting in defense of values -- such as Islam, and freedom from foreign occupation -- that they see under attack. Even if the coalition achieves limited tactical successes, the Taliban will quickly replace the fighters it loses, and it can easily target the "traitors." These coalition tactics are not new and have never worked before. Why does the White House think they'll work now, with the insurgency stronger than ever?
When the Karzai government announced last week that it would be reinstating Abdul Rashid Dostum, the controversial Uzbek general, as Chief of Staff of the Army, the cries of foul and protest rang loud. But, when it comes to Afghan politics there is usually more than meets the eye, and Dostum's case is no exception. As usual in Afghanistan it involves some back-room deals.
During last week's London conference, President Karzai unveiled a six-point "Action Plan" designed to turn around the situation in Afghanistan. But how much "action" is really behind the political façade of his six-point plan?
The Afghanistan Conference in London this week was expected to be a just one more in a series of international talk-fests intended as a show of international solidarity with Afghanistan. But Karzai took things a step further -- and took his hosts by surprise -- by using his speech to call for high level negotiations with the Taliban leadership that would result in permanent political reconciliation. Karzai has opened this door repeatedly before, and there have been several attempts to engage Taliban leaders seriously in talks.
Dependence cannot be ended overnight. But President Karzai’s circle is wrong to suppose that it can continue forever. It is far better, for Afghanistan’s long-term future, that they learn this sooner rather than later.
A December 22 briefing, prepared by the top U.S. intelligence official in Afghanistan and obtained by CNN, maps out the strategy and strength of the Taliban and their allies in Afghanistan, and concludes that the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is increasingly effective.
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