
By Sameer Lalwani
During the 1980s covert campaign against the Soviets,
Pakistan's General Zia ul-Haq told CIA Director William Casey that being an
ally of the United States was like living on the banks of a major river -- "The
soil is wonderfully fertile, but every four or eight years the river changes
course and you may find yourself alone in the desert." Since then, Pakistan has
remained cognizant of Zia's warning and insulated itself from fully allying
with the United States.
Barack Obama's current approach to Afghanistan fundamentally
depends on Pakistani cooperation to squeeze the Taliban insurgency from both
sides and halt the cross-border raids that have frustrated NATO efforts. But
despite surface appearances and tactical victories -- like the recent
elimination of a major Taliban commander, Baitullah Mehsud -- it is
increasingly evident that the U.S. president does not have the partner he needs
or wants.
After repeated setbacks, advocates of the Afghanistan strategy partly base
their optimism on the Pakistani military's recent turnabout, launching
offensives on Taliban strongholds. Unfortunately, it does not appear that
Pakistan's moves against the Taliban are anything more than tactical, or that
the Pakistani leadership shares America's threat perceptions or strategic
interests.
Nor does Mehsud's untimely demise change this picture. In
the past, the Taliban have displayed surprising cohesion even after the death
of senior militant commanders. In many cases, they've only been replaced by
more zealous leadership.
Of the some 20 militant groups that broadly compose the
"Pakistani Taliban," the Pakistani military selectively confronts the ones that
directly threaten their government. Insurgents who confine their activity to
cross-border attacks on U.S. and NATO forces remain largely untouched. After
Mehsud's death, it is unclear whether Pakistan will be less of a target for
Taliban attacks. One thing, though, is certain: The various factions of the
Pakistani Taliban will not only continue their cross-border raids on NATO
troops but will likely step them up in response to the drone strikes.
Meanwhile, the Afghan Taliban that use Pakistan as a safe
haven will continue to be given a pass. Pakistan considers them "strategic
assets" to hedge against Indian encirclement, the Baluchi insurgency, or a
rapid Western departure from the region that leaves Pakistan holding the bag.
This strategy is the product of what the Pakistanis see as
limited options. Despite calls to model the success of U.S. counterinsurgency
tactics, the Pakistani Army is not adopting such techniques because of the
tremendous costs and tradeoffs involved. A serious counterinsurgency effort
would require a force the size of the entire Pakistani Army. This poses an
insurmountable obstacle since Pakistan still considers its eastern border with
arch-rival India a far greater existential threat than the Taliban, and with
good historical reason. While the latter can launch attacks and disrupt daily
life, the former has defeated the Pakistani military in three wars and
possesses the capability to capture territory and destroy the state.
Manpower requirements notwithstanding, counterinsurgency is
one of the most difficult military strategies to execute. It is extremely
time-, capital-, and labor-intensive -- and bogs down even the most capable and
sophisticated militaries in the world. It can also potentially weaken a military's
conventional capabilities. Recent studies suggest that after decades of quelling
insurgents in the Palestinian territories, Israeli Defense Forces were
underprepared for the largely conventional fight against Hezbollah in the 2006
Lebanon war.
Public opinion also significantly influences Pakistan's
strategic choices. Pakistan is a partial democracy with a vibrant independent media
and an active citizenry. But the public remains distrustful of U.S. intentions
and is loathe to unleash the Army on its brethren for what are seen as Western
interests. Even if the public shares some threat perceptions of al Qaeda,
overwhelming majorities strongly disapprove of U.S. leadership and its mission
in Afghanistan, and believe the United States seeks to divide and weaken the
Muslim world. Pakistani leaders also estimate NATO's presence in Afghanistan to
be more destabilizing for their country.
Obama faces a strategic "Catch-22": If he increases troops
in Afghanistan to demonstrate a commitment to the region, this will reinforce
suspicions of a Western colonial occupation and galvanize support for the
insurgency. If the Pakistani government confronts Taliban militants raiding
Afghanistan, perceptions of colluding with this occupation could intensify
resentment, militant recruitment, and attacks on the Pakistani state. And a
destabilized Pakistan would be far more dangerous than a destabilized Afghanistan.
Strategists in Pakistan think the ruthlessness and ferocity
of the Taliban, which once controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan, will outlast a
hesitant NATO and a largely hapless Afghan National Army. Reports indicate they
already control the south and east and are beginning to infiltrate the north.
Even Americans are starting to balk at the price of a decade-long
counterinsurgency effort that can cost roughly half a trillion dollars and as
much as 50 casualties a month.
Pakistan's calculations won't be easy to change. In 2001, U.S.
threats coerced Pakistani cooperation but today -- with its dependence on
Pakistan to transport up to 80 percent of its supplies for Afghanistan -- the United
States no longer possesses the same leverage.
Understanding that Pakistani strategic and political
interests are not aligned with American ones should prompt a serious rethink of
investments in the "Af-Pak" region. Obama has three options: Raise the stakes
to induce real cooperation by making Pakistan a strategic and financial offer
it cannot refuse, deploy another 100,000 troops or more to control the Afghan
border region without Pakistani help, or forego Afghan nation-building for more
limited objectives like containing al Qaeda, even if it means the Taliban retaking
the country. These options are political nonstarters for now. But so long as
the United States misunderstands its partnership with -Pak, its strategy in Af-
will remain in jeopardy.
Sameer Lalwani is a research fellow at the New America
Foundation, a Ph.D. student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
the author of a forthcoming report on the Pakistani military's counterinsurgency
capabilities.
Mark Wilson/Getty Images
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