Holbrooke on success: “We’ll know it when we see it”

By Katherine Tiedemann Share

 

I've just come from live-tweeting a conference with Amb. Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and members of his interagency team hosted by the Center for American Progress. While there were certainly substantive issues discussed (the role of Iran, the upcoming presidential elections in Afghanistan, the state of the Pakistani Taliban post-Baitullah Mehsud), what caught my attention was a flippant quip by the ambassador.

Asked about how to measure success and progress in Afghanistan, Holbrooke remarked, "In the simplest sense, the Supreme Court test for another issue: We'll know it when we see it."

A universal head-desk rippled through the Twitterverse, with Foreign Policy blogger Mark Lynch tweeting "Feel reassured?" and Spencer Ackerman chiming in with "Is there alcohol here?" CAP's Brian Katulis asked, "Will 'we know it when we see it' be convincing enough for the American people and the Hill, focused on econ and health care?" and FP's own Josh Keating drew the parallel, "Holbrooke suggests AfPak success like pornography: ‘we'll know it when we see it.'" Harvard's Stephen Walt has added his two cents here.

Metrics in Afghanistan are hard. That much is obvious. There's also potential peril in being held to standards that you may or may not be able to meet. But Katulis hit the nail on the head: "We'll know it when we see it" is not a convincing enough argument for the public and policymakers. And since President Obama has made accountability a pillar of his Afghanistan policy, I'm hoping Holbrooke's comment was just an attempt to be funny and nothing more than that.

National Security Advisor Jim Jones has reportedly "approved a classified policy document on July 17 setting out nine broad objectives for metrics to guide the administration's policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan," but another couple of months are needed to work out the details. One metric under consideration is an opinion poll to gauge how corrupt Afghans think their public officials are.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander in Afghanistan, has said that another measure of success is the number of civilians protected, not the number of Taliban militants killed (and indeed, CENTCOM is not  publicizing the latter). Although that first metric is much harder to calculate, it shows the Obama administration's focus on implementing counterinsurgency strategies in the Afghan theater.

Another yardstick of progress will be how legitimate the international community considers the August 20 presidential elections. With incumbent President Hamid Karzai's supporters allegedly trying to buy voter registration cards and security concerns about safety on polling day rampant, to put it mildly, this is a challenge. Holbrooke said at the conference that he's leaving it up to the media to determine whether the elections are legitimate, but one of his interagency team members, British diplomat Jane Marriott, clarified that the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan will handle complaints.

You can check out my live-tweeting along with that of several other colleagues by clicking here.

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ZATHRAS

10:28 PM ET

August 12, 2009

Success

I'm sure Richard Holbrooke was attempting to be funny, but his flip remark throws a spotlight on our major problem in Afghanistan. Success there is intended to be measured by what we do not see, namely use of the country's territory as a sanctuary for al Qaeda.

Now, is a strong central Afghan government necessary to achieve that objective? Is population protection for the time and in the places we can afford to offer it sufficient to achieve that objective? How much of the job we are setting out to do can only be done by Afghans, and what reason do we have to think they can do it?

Everyone knows the political context here: President Obama spent two years attacking the Bush admininstration for "taking its eye off the ball" and ignoring the "real central front in the battle against terrorism" in Afghanistan while it pursued the adventure in Iraq. Whatever else current administration policy in Afghanistan is intended to accomplish, it is clearly intended to fulfill the campaign promise to emphasize the "good war" in Afghanistan and wind down the "bad war" in Iraq.

It is also true that the critics of administration policy haven't offered much in the way of a coherent alternative. As other commentators have already observed, they've raised questions without offering very convincing answers; in particular, administration critics haven't addressed the fact that in Afghanistan (and Pakistan as well) the prevailing historical narrative is that the Taliban and al Qaeda rose in the first place after the United States turned its back on the region after the Soviet withdrawal -- or the possibility that something that looked like America was turning its back again might have similarly negative consequences.

That's not a good reason, though, for the Obama administration to plow ahead with a hope-based strategy. It seems clear enough that what might have been possible seven-plus years ago in Afghanistan, when the Bush admininstration "took its eye off the ball," is not possible any more, or at least is exponentially harder than it would have been then. It takes a lot more effort to make a weak, corrupt government effective than it does to create an effective government from scratch, and we're not working from scratch any more.

I think Obama's people recognize this; I'm just not sure they know what to do about it. They may be where the Bush admininstration was for so long in Iraq -- not seeing a clear way forward, but fearing that lessening the American effort would lead to disaster. And would look like a flip-flop on the President's part, compared to the position he took during the campaign, which would be a different kind of disaster.

 
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