While all eyes were glued on Afghan President Hamid Karzai's opening speech at the Loya Jirga, the grand assembly of more than 2,500 Afghan elders who were tasked with advising him on signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States, nearly two weeks ago, an unprecedented, amusing, and thought-provoking incident occurred. Almost 40 minutes into Karzai's speech, a female senator, Belqis Roshan, from Farah, a province which lies along the border with Iran, raised a banner covered with anti-BSA slogans that compared the signing of the agreement to committing Watan Feroshi, or treason.
What the senator had not judged was the response she received from other participants. Chants of "Death to slaves of Pakistan" and "Death to slaves of Iran" suddenly filled the hall, prompting even Karzai to laugh, something he has not done publically for years. He finally intervened, urging calm, and called on the jirga participants to not accuse those who opposed the BSA of being spies for neighboring countries.
For wary Afghans, the incident demonstrated the overwhelming support that existed in the jirga for signing the security pact. But it was interesting that any opposition to signing the BSA was viewed as a subversive act by Afghanistan's two neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, both of whom disapprove of the agreement.
Additionally, Karzai's cleverly crafted speech reinforced the jirga's preliminary support for signing the BSA. He touched upon Afghanistan's vulnerabilities, stressed the need for ending civilian casualties caused by American forces, and eloquently provided a convincing rationale as to why the deal was important for the future of the country.
After four days of intense deliberations, the assembly not only overwhelmingly endorsed the BSA, but also called on Karzai to sign it before the end of the year. And this support even went beyond endorsement. Some committees also called on the Americans to establish a base in Bamiyan, Afghanistan's central province and home of the ethnic Hazara minority, who are mostly Shiite Muslims, and where Iran is perceived to have influence.
The jirga, which is the ultimate source of national decision-making in Afghanistan, illustrated a distinct paradigm shift as Afghans have never been receptive to the presence of foreign militaries in their country. However, despite this widespread support, Karzai rejected the jirga's recommendations and refused to the sign the BSA unless his newly-raised demands were met, creating an uproar both inside and outside of Afghanistan.
Karzai's new conditions include no U.S. interference in next April's presidential elections, the termination of U.S. military raids on Afghan homes, the release of Afghan detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and U.S. help in restarting the stalled peace talks with the Taliban. Coming after the jirga approved the BSA, Karzai's stated demands and delaying tactics have perplexed almost everyone. Some argue he does not want to sign the BSA. Others say he will lose his final leverage if he signs it now. However, many may have missed the nuances behind his bizarre gesture.
Karzai's political posturing is most likely designed for domestic consumption and he actually has no intention of not signing the BSA. After all, if he wasn't planning on signing the document, why was his opening speech to the jirga focused on approving the document? By holding off on signing the agreement, he is generating further domestic support for the pact. In other words, he is effectively building public pressure against himself. Why? Because there is a historical stigma attached to any agreement that includes the establishment of foreign military bases in the country. While Afghans currently support the creation of these bases, with the country's uncertain political future, Karzai is worried about his legacy and he does not want to be seen as the person who facilitated this development if the domestic sentiment changes. By increasing the public pressure, he is creating an environment that would allow him to sign the BSA, while claiming that he had no other choice but to yield to the public demand.
Karzai also intends to send a message to the Taliban and undermine their narrative that he is a puppet of the United States, stripping the group of a propaganda tool it has used to discredit the regime and recruit fighters. In fact, the Taliban sent out a press statement earlier this week that politely praised Karzai for his refusal to sign the agreement.
Despite his statements to the contrary, Karzai knows he cannot hold off the BSA's completion until after the elections because of the extensive and destructive impact that would have on the process. He also understands that postponing the agreement's signing will further uncertainty about the country's future as the BSA is perceived as creating the biggest physical and psychological support for the political and economic stability of Afghanistan. Afghans know that an atmosphere of uncertainty will be detrimental to holding elections that are considered vital to the long-term stability of the country. After all, perception of the election process is as important as the actual practice.
As for the argument that he won't sign the BSA because he will lose his leverage over the Americans, there is no doubt that he will lose his ability to use to the document as a bargaining chip when he signs it. But, as a practiced politician, Karzai will always find other ways and means by which to pressure the United States. Even after signing the agreement, he will remain the most powerful figure in the country until after next April's elections, and will probably remain a dominant political player once he is out of office as well. He has proven to be a shrewd tactician with remarkable courage and a knack for brinksmanship and confusing everyone. But this time, Karzai should understand that he has gone too far, as many Afghans are beginning to question whether he is out for his own interest or the nation's. They have also started to question Karzai's stability in terms of making decisions for the country since they do not understand the underlying objectives behind his bizarre moves.
Yet for all of Karzai's bluster, the United States should know that he will most likely sign the BSA soon, even if his conditions are not met. In the past 12 years, relations between Afghanistan and its Western allies, particularly the United States, have been pushed to the brink of collapse multiple times because of failures to fully understand each other. This lack of understanding has been a primary source of complications and setbacks, so there is dire need for Washington to learn about Kabul's domestic dynamics and Karzai's psyche, and for Kabul to grasp the political realities in Washington. Karzai feels insecure and wary about his own political survival, and the United States expects to be treated as a superpower. Both stances have undermined the countries' pursuit of the main goal, fighting terrorism.
It is important for the United States to realize the significance of Afghan people's support for the BSA. A nation that has long fought against any invading military, regardless of its might, supports, for the first time in its history, the presence of a foreign military on their land. And they proved that they want close ties with the world, without factoring in any ideological or religious ideals.
It should be clear by now that Afghans are the United States' only ally in an unstable region where extremism and anti-U.S. sentiment is consistently promoted by violent extremist groups and, more importantly, governments themselves. Acknowledging that the United States' investment in the country has won over the Afghan people, it is critical that it continues to support Afghanistan's political development and the strengthening of its security forces, who have now taken over the battle against extremism. Sustained engagement with Afghanistan would enable the country to become an anti-terrorism sanctuary in the region.
Najib Sharifi is a member of Afghanistan Analysis and Awareness, a Kabul-based think tank.
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How do you solve a problem like Hamid Karzai? According to his former counterpart at ISAF command, Gen. John Allen, and other pundits, the answer is simple: Ignore him. After all, Allen and others have reasoned, there is no need for the United States to add injury to Karzai's insults by playing into the drama surrounding his refusal to sign a security agreement that would keep U.S. forces in Afghanistan through 2024. While this might be good advice for dealing with an unruly guest at the dinner table, it is probably not the best counsel when making a multi-billion dollar deal with an inveterate gambler-cum-head-of-state with a proven penchant for betting the farm on a pair of deuces.
Many things can and will be said about Afghanistan's president when he finally steps down. Some will say he was crazy, like a fox. Others will say he was a vainglorious old man obsessed with his legacy. Few will extol his poker playing skills. What is important to understand is that after 12 years as head of state, the last thing Karzai wants is to be viewed as a washed-out-has-been with no cards left to play. Only time will tell, however, whether he has aptly chosen the right moment to leverage the deal over a continued U.S.-NATO presence to his own personal benefit. To judge whether matching Karzai's brinksmanship with more brinksmanship is the right course of action, the White House would do well to evaluate the spread, assess who is bluffing whom, and decide whether the stakes are worthwhile.
The release of key Taliban members from the U.S.-run prison at Guantanamo Bay tops the list of call options Karzai has placed on the table. Control of senior Taliban prisoners has been at the center of Karzai's negotiating strategy for years. The only problem is that he hasn't been able to reap many benefits from this approach since Congress and the Pentagon have shown reluctance to play along. Last week, however, on the very same day that Karzai announced he was digging in his heals on the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and upping the ante, the Senate, in a little noted move, opted to loosen the stringent rules governing the transfer of Guantanamo prisoners to detention facilities in either their home or third-party countries. The move may face tough resistance in the Republican-held House of Representatives, but, as demonstrated by the recent visit of the Department of Defense's special envoy, Paul Lewis, to the island prison, there can be no mistake that a thawing is underway.
Karzai may be right to add these important signals in his "plus" column, but there is no assurance that his timely pronouncements on Guantanamo and chest beating over the U.S. security deal will win him much. Along with the prisoner release demand, Karzai has also pressed for the United States to get serious about restarting negotiations with the Taliban. This presumably means making sure that the Taliban understand that doing business in Kabul and Kandahar will mean doing business with the Karzai clan. The trouble is that the Karzai clan will not likely count for much if it can't deliver the elections to its chosen successor.
Indeed, the Afghan president's greatest fear must be that the clock is running out on his ability to impact the endgame. So he has fallen back on the tried and true approach of injecting uncertainty into the mix, which we've all seen play out in Afghanistan before.
In 2009, we saw 1.2 million fraudulent votes discarded in the presidential and provincial council elections. In 2010, 1.3 million votes were thrown out due to fraud in parliamentary elections; results were disputed for nearly a year before both chambers were finally seated in 2011. In both instances, uncertainty about the timing of the elections exacerbated structural flaws in the political system that remain unresolved. Not surprisingly, Karzai has apparently pressed the head of Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission to postpone the April 2014 polls, a move that would force the White House to rethink its plan to leave 8,000 to 12,000 coalition forces in place as part of an advisory mission.
Karzai knows this well, of course, and so do those in his inner circle who are hoping to benefit from promoting a course of mercurial high-risk gambling. Key among the advocates of this strategy is, reportedly, Abdul Karim Khurram, Karzai's chief of staff and a stalwart member of the conservative wing of the Hezb-i Islami party. Khurram, a confederate of Hezb-i Islami warlord extraordinaire and former Afghan prime minister, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has earned a reputation for being bloody-minded when it comes to dealings with Americans.
But it is not entirely clear that this time around his interest aligns with Karzai's. Where Karzai is looking to insulate himself from the inevitable blowback that will occur once his principal backers in Washington reduce their investment in the Karzai brand come 2014, those allied with hardcore conservatives like Hekmatyar are looking to blow the whole game up. Amid all the drama this week over the BSA, Hekmatyar went so far as to write a letter to Karzai, threatening to rescind the informal ceasefires that have been in place for the last year or so if Karzai signs the deal. Hekmatyar knows as well as any other of the irreconcilables, like Mullah Mohammed Omar, the spiritual leader of the Taliban, that a sustained U.S. presence in Afghanistan means there is no coming home for them anytime soon. From where Karzai is sitting, these facts considerably increase his bargaining power with Hezb-i Islami and the Taliban.
So is there any "getting to yes" with Karzai on signing the security deal? Probably, but it's not certain that "yes" will mean much. History suggests that the deal the Obama administration cuts with Karzai today may not necessarily hold with his succesors tomorrow. Under the current political dispensation, it is unlikely that the Afghan government will be both willing and able to deliver any time soon on a strategy that calls for the country's beleaguered security forces to secure its borders and contain the insurgency. Although the Afghan National Security Forces have shown marked improvement, they have sustained heavy casualties in the face of the continued resurgence of the Taliban. They also have been heavily impacted by a spike in political factionalism within the upper echelons of the security sector.
Proposals to extend the U.S. military presence beyond 2014 additionally present a troublesome paradox: as long as U.S. forces remain, so too must the parallel legal infrastructure that has grown up around aggressive U.S. counterterrorism operations that have become anathema to many Afghans. The lack of trust between U.S. and Afghan partners over civilian casualties and night raids does not improve prospects much. The continued threat of insider attacks will also place an undue burden on U.S. military leaders to maintain unrealistic force protection measures regardless of whether Western force levels are at 10,000 or 1,000 after 2014. The latter point is all the more salient given Pakistan's apparent unwillingness to abandon its support for the Afghan insurgency. Any expectations that U.S. strategy in the region will profit greatly from a further investment of military assistance should be lowered accordingly.
Washington's post-2014 options are deeply constrained by these rather bitter facts, but it doesn't mean that the "zero option" is the only option. An investment in Afghanistan's stability needs to be an investment in the Afghan people, first and foremost. This means focusing hard on supporting a fair election process, ensuring that the economy remains stable, that rule of law and education programming continues to receive international support, and that women's rights and better health care remain high on the international aid agenda. Washington also needs to focus more on arriving at a political settlement that will hold. Boots on the ground, even in limited numbers, may be an important part of that signaling strategy in the short-term. But if the fraught political gamesmanship that has marked Karzai's tenure isn't brought under control within the next few months, it will be hard to ignore the unruly guest at the dinner table for much longer. The White House should send a strong signal to that it is still serious about a strategy that envisions an Afghanistan that can eventually stand on its own. A post-2014 U.S. strategy that maintains the status quo of insecurity and instability is hardly worth betting 10,000 American lives on and risks seeing the country held hostage to the caprices of ambivalent Afghan leaders for yet another decade.
If the short-term goal is to keep some troops in theater, then the long-term goal must be to leverage continued American assistance to influence the course of a negotiated political settlement that engages both armed and unarmed factions in the Afghan opposition, and to resolve longstanding frictions with Pakistan over military incursions and trade disputes across the Durand line, the disputed border between the two countries. This may mean that Washington and the rest of the international community will have to get creative in seeking solutions to current and future impasses over a continued Western presence in Afghanistan. Throwing money and military resources willy-nilly at the problem of widespread political disenfranchisement in Afghanistan will not bring greater security to the country or its region.
Instead of simply ignoring Karzai, there are a few ways that Washington can signal its seriousness about a responsible drawdown in Afghanistan. The first would be to publicly back the appointment of a U.N. special envoy and negotiating team to facilitate a regional settlement. A second way would be for the United States to engage regional powers, like China, India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asian states, on the possibility of encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to agree to refer the bloody, costly, and divisive dispute over the Durand line to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The sooner Washington and its international partners acknowledge the longstanding hostilities between the two countries as the center of gravity in a conflict, the better. Shifting the focus from boots on the ground to building momentum for a negotiated settlement may also mean taking more practical steps to resolve the status of high-level detainees held at Guantanamo Bay in the near term, as Karzai has repeatedly suggested. All of these recommendations may seem distasteful to a war-weary White House fed up with Karzai's antics. But the sooner the Obama administration acknowledges that the conflict in Afghanistan is desperately in need of a negotiated end, the less need there will be to bet billions on propping up compulsive gamblers in Kabul.
Candace Rondeaux is a non-resident research fellow at the Center on National Security at Fordham University Law School. She lived in Kabul from 2008 to 2013, working first as the South Asia bureau chief for the Washington Post, and most recently as the senior analyst in Afghanistan for the International Crisis Group. She is writing a political history of the Afghan security forces and is currently undertaking a mid-career masters at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.
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The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime's recently published summary report on Afghanistan's opium harvest in 2013 paints a dire picture on first glance: Estimated opium poppy cultivation expanded by 36 percent and, at 209,000 hectares (ha), set a new record, slightly exceeding the previous record of 193,000 ha in 2007. While estimated opium production in 2013, at 5,500 metric tons, is only the fourth-highest year recorded (well below the 2007 peak level of 7,400 metric tons), it rose steeply -- by almost 50 percent -- from 2012. And despite a modest reduction in opium prices, the volume of drug money -- most of which goes to drug traffickers, their sponsors and associates inside and outside the government, and to warlords and the Taliban insurgency -- also has risen sharply.
However, the temptation to see these developments in alarmist (or even apocalyptic) terms must be resisted. While the growth and spread of the opium economy in 2013 is concerning, it does not represent a fundamental change in the situation, and poorly thought out and misguided reactions would cause more harm than good and could turn out to be more problematic and destabilizing than the rise in opium cultivation and production itself.
Part of the increase in 2013, which was predicted and should not have come as a major surprise, can be attributed to the large year-to-year fluctuations that have always been the norm for Afghanistan's opium economy, especially since 2012 was a year of low yields and production. This reflects the importance of weather and other factors for Afghan agriculture more broadly, with a climate characterized by low and variable precipitation and little in the way of water conservancy investments to stabilize water supplies. Moreover, the 2013 figures are not grossly out of line with longer-term trends in opium cultivation and production. In fact, estimated opium production is exactly in line with those trends (as projected based on 1995-2012 data). Although the cultivated area is somewhat higher (about 25%) than the long-term trend, this is similar to some of the annual fluctuations seen in earlier years.
What 2013 does underline, however, is the resumption of continuing growth of Afghanistan's opium economy after temporary and unsustainable reductions in poppy cultivation and opium production in the years following the 2007 peak. This is not surprising, as the factors which supported those reductions have been dissipating.
First, the withdrawal of U.S. and other international military forces, especially from key opium-producing provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, has been reducing the overall security presence and associated pressure to reduce poppy cultivation, particularly in more remote areas where the Afghan National Army is not able to maintain the level of activities carried out previously by International Security Assistance Forces. Even though international troops were not directly involved in the eradication of poppy fields, their presence provided a security umbrella for counter-narcotics activities and also was used by Afghan officials as a threat against local leaders and farmers to dissuade them from cultivating poppies.
Second, funding for programs promoting alternative livelihoods is being sharply reduced, leaving much smaller potential financial incentives for farmers and other local actors. Even though such programs were not sustainable and were often characterized by inefficiency and waste, adequate funding will clearly be a prerequisite for effective and sustained rural development in the future.
Third, concomitant with foreign troop withdrawals and reductions in international funding, the political leverage to press for counter-narcotics actions is declining. Moreover, the drug issue is likely to be distinctly secondary on the list of political priorities for the United States and other international partners.
Fourth, domestic political and other trends in Afghanistan have weakened the ability to contain, let alone curtail, the opium economy. The 2014-2015 election cycle is distracting from drug issues and will likely lead to avoidance of politically sensitive counter-narcotics actions; some stalwart anti-opium provincial governors have been weakened or changed in the past year or so; there has been some recovery of opium yields from unusually low levels in 2012; and prices for opium remain relatively high despite modest reductions.
These recent trends, which are expected to continue in the future, demonstrate that the counter-narcotics policies implemented during the past decade, reliant as they were on temporary factors and, as in the case of the Helmand "Food Zone," endeavoring to replace opium largely with wheat (a low-value, relatively low labor-intensity crop with no export prospects), were not sustainable. Moreover, the suppression of poppy cultivation in core growing areas, such as the canal area of central Helmand, stimulated a shift of farmers and cultivation to new areas, leading to the further spread and entrenchment of opium.
Even though predictable and occurring for understandable reasons, the adverse impacts of recent developments should not be minimized, including:
However, there are also some mitigating factors that need to be kept in mind:
In any case, knee-jerk reactions and ill thought-out actions against the illicit narcotics trade in Afghanistan will be counterproductive. Whether aerial spraying or massive eradication of the opium crop at one extreme, or attempts to institute licensed opium production for legal pharmaceuticals at the other, there are no "silver bullets." These options, as well as other simplistic solutions, are not implementable or sustainable and will make the situation worse.
What, then, can be done? First, modest expectations and a long-term time horizon are called for on the part of both the international community and the Afghan government; eliminating illicit opium cultivation in Afghanistan most likely will be the work of decades, not years.
Second, there is a need to be prepared for growth in the opium economy in coming years and to avoid hand-wringing or overreaction. In particular, adverse short-term developments and fluctuations should not become an excuse for the international community to sharply cut or stop overall funding for Afghanistan, let alone exit from the country.
Third, preserving gains made in eliminating opium poppy cultivation in localities with favorable resource endowments, good access to water resources, proximity to urban markets, good roads, and at least a modicum of government presence and security will be very important and is certainly possible based on past experience.
Fourth, law enforcement efforts against drug traffickers, drug transport, heroin processing, and money laundering need to continue and be built upon over time, keeping in mind that progress inevitably will be gradual.
Fifth, investments in rural infrastructure -- in particular major water conservancy projects -- will be essential. More generally, broad-based rural development is the way forward over the medium-term to enable rural areas to escape from dependence on opium poppy cultivation, requiring sizable investments and effective programs to this end.
Sixth, value chains for suitable Afghan labor-intensive cash crops that enable them to reach both domestic and export markets will need to be developed. There is no substitute for the private sector to do this -- particularly elements of the international private sector that represent and link to the demand side and will be able to promote and ensure the essential quality and health and safety standards for exports. Creative ways to incentivize the international private sector to engage with Afghanistan in this way will need to be found.
Finally, it has to be recognized that none of this will be easy, that the drug industry will be present in Afghanistan for quite some time, and that keeping modest expectations while avoiding major mistakes and wrong turns on the counter-narcotics front will be essential.
William Byrd is a senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The views expressed here are his own.
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Like many other regular readers of Foreign Policy's AfPak Channel, I was surprised by the announcement that it is to be rebranded as the South Asia Channel. But while my friend Ziad Haider received a quantum of solace from ‘AfPak' losing its conceptual toehold in Washington, I had instinctive misgivings about the adoption of ‘South Asia.' What exactly does that phrase connote today? Is the term in any way useful? Or is it so poorly defined -- culturally, politically, geographically, and bureaucratically -- as to make it problematic in its own way? In fact, beyond one rather ineffectual international organization and a handful of sporting events, does ‘South Asia' even exist?
South Asia -- as any sort of single entity -- was not really worthy of Washington's attention until the 1990s. India and Pakistan did feature in American strategic calculations beginning with their independence in 1947, but usually in the context of U.S. policy toward China or the Soviet Union, which often determined American responses to the region's political developments. All of that changed when India, and then Pakistan, conducted nuclear tests in 1998. The handful of South Asianists from academia and the diplomatic world -- and there weren't many Americans who could lay claim to that label -- were suddenly in high demand by the U.S. government and think tanks to address a narrow set of American priorities: nuclear proliferation, India-Pakistan tensions, and the Kashmir dispute.
The region assumed further importance with the 1999 Kargil War, by which time India and Pakistan were effectively "hyphenated," treated as inextricably intertwined and perennially in competition with one another. As a result, other countries in the region -- Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, etc. -- were often ignored; issues related to national economies and domestic political dynamics remained poorly understood; and the broader regional strategic context -- such as the role of China -- was often overlooked.
An important shift began with the 9/11 attacks, which was around the same time that Washington belatedly recognized the prospect of India's economic and political emergence on a wider Asian canvas. India, largely on the strength of its burgeoning economy, began to be incorporated into the institutional and commercial structures of East Asia, such as the ASEAN-led regional groupings, and a new term eventually began to make the rounds in strategic circles: the Indo-Pacific. But while India is now considered an unequivocal part of ‘Asia,' the other states traditionally constituting South Asia are not necessarily granted that same privilege. Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, are often seen as part of the Greater Middle East, a somewhat arbitrary shorthand, it would appear, for the Muslim world west of India.
Which brings us back to what precisely defines South Asia. Is it geography? The Indian Plate excludes all of Afghanistan and much of Pakistan, Nepal, and Bhutan, and includes the Irrawaddy basin. Religion? Not when India and Nepal are majority Hindu, Sri Lanka and Bhutan majority Buddhist, and Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives majority Muslim. The legacy of British colonial influence? Maybe, but where then does that leave Myanmar? Ethnicity and language are similarly limiting. Pakistani and north Indian languages are more akin to Persian than to the Dravidian tongues of southern India, while it would be a stretch to draw ethnic links between the Manipuri, Baloch, and Sinhalese peoples. How about the footprint of Brahmanic culture and Sanskrit? That, as historians have noted, would mean encompassing much of Central and Southeast Asia.
It should be no surprise that conceptual confusion manifests itself in U.S. bureaucratic structures. The U.S. State Department has a South and Central Asia bureau. The armed forces, however, deal with Afghanistan and Pakistan as part of U.S. Central Command, with India and the rest of the region falling to U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. Meanwhile, the Office of the Secretary of Defense groups Afghanistan and Pakistan in with Central Asia and considers India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka under the rubric of South and Southeast Asia.
While a confusing construct, the term ‘South Asia' persevered in America's strategic consciousness, despite the inevitable dehyphenation of India and Pakistan. Among non-specialists in the counterinsurgency era, it was often used as a casual and more politically-correct synonym for AfPak, marginalizing not just India, but also Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, all important countries in their own rights. I recall reviewing the syllabus of a graduate studies course on South Asia at a major American university two years ago, and you could have been forgiven for thinking that the India-Pakistan border constituted South Asia's eastern frontier.
A real concern is that a conceptual resurgence of ‘South Asia' -- especially as an outgrowth of ‘AfPak' -- could be accompanied by the conscious or subconscious rehyphenation of India and Pakistan, and the prolonged side-lining of other states in the region. As the anonymous genius behind the Twitter handle @majorlyp has caustically written:
Indians are Indians and Pakistanis when caught in tight situations (like in Airports) are Indians too. In other circumstances they are South Asians. Being "South Asian" offers many advantages. Such as an overwhelming numerical advantage.
Example: When faced with the question "Is radicalization a problem"? South Asians can reply with a straight face "Only 170 million, or less than 10% of the South Asians are radicalized". Which sounds entirely reasonable.
The author writes in somewhat cruel jest, of course, but like the best parody, there is more than a grain of uncomfortable truth in what he says. Will U.S. discourse related to South Asia come to be dominated by the problems of terrorism, Islamist extremism, nuclear proliferation, and anti-Americanism at the expense of the incredible opportunities and challenges associated with dynamic economic growth, raucous democracy, immense social and cultural diversity, and broad support for a U.S.-led international system? Let's hope not.
Dhruva Jaishankar is a transatlantic fellow with the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. Follow him on Twitter at @d_jaishankar.
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Most of the recent talk on Afghanistan has focused on whether or not Afghan President Hamid Karzai will sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States by the end of 2013, distracting Afghans and the international community from paying attention to an ultimately more important, but not as sensational, issue -- the 2014 Afghan presidential electoral landscape and process. After weeks of high drama over the BSA, it is time to focus less on the negotiations' rhetoric and more on the real legacy of the nascent Afghan democratic progress.
After all, a "good enough" presidential election outcome in April 2014 will offer a measure of hope and could signal the end of a troubled beginning for the 21st century Afghan state. It could also reenergize commitment from an international community whose interest in Afghanistan is waning. A "bad enough" election result -- a contested or tainted outcome that is not accepted by the Afghan people -- will likely force most remaining coalition partners and Afghan elites with foreign passports to rush for the exits, leaving the Afghans who remain to look for protection along ethnic, tribal, and political interest boundaries. The stakes are high, primarily for the Afghan people, but also for the international community, whose 12-year involvement has not yet yielded a peaceful outcome.
Of the original 27 presidential candidates and their vice presidential running mates who registered their nominations with the country's Independent Election Committee, 11 remain. The list ranges from obscure figures to high-profile former government officials, with principles ranging from strong anti-Taliban sentiment to inclinations towards accommodation. From these presidential hopefuls, only five candidates hold exciting promise.
Abdullah Abdullah remains the leading contender, with respected BBC reporter David Lyon considering him "the man to beat." This former foreign minister and head of the National Coalition of Afghanistan has managed to create an impressive team. His running mates include Hizb-e-Islami icon Mohammad Khan, a Pashtun from the Qarabach district of Ghazni province, as the first vice president, and Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, the head of the Hizb-e-Wahdat party, as the second vice president. With additional backing from the Jamiat-e-Islami party, Abdullah unites many northern allies in a strong national movement and his selection of Mohaqiq brings the Hazara minority vote into the mix. He also has the critical support of Mohammad Atta Noor, the powerful governor of Balkh, and, if early indications are accurate, the backing of the current first Vice President Marshal Fahim Qasim, giving Abdullah what Lyon accurately describes as "wide support."
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Zalmai Rasool's team is also impressive. A well-respected moderate with royal ties, he now appears to be one of Karzai's favorites in the election. Rasool is a respected, honest, and humble diplomat who has tried to articulate his vision for Afghanistan in recent interviews, receiving positive feedback from both Afghans and the international community. Rasool has picked his key running mates wisely. His choice for first vice president, Ahmad Zia Massoud -- a former first vice president, the brother of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, and the current leader of the National Front of Afghanistan -- challenges Abdullah's primacy in the north. Former Bamyan governor Habiba Surabi, Rasool's pick for second vice president, is a popular and reasonably successful former governor who can appeal to both Hazaras and women's rights groups.
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, who also ran in 2009, has put together a much stronger coalition than during his previous bid for the presidency. Ghani, a brilliant, charismatic, and hard-working perfectionist is perceived by many as one of the few Afghan leaders who have laid out a basic framework of how to "fix" Afghanistan. This former finance minister, well-regarded economist, and "transition czar" -- responsible for the shift of security responsibilities from NATO soldiers to the Afghan security forces -- is well known to the international community and is considered by Afghans to be one of their brightest scholars. Interestingly, he has picked Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former jihadi commander with the ceremonial role of Chief of Staff (of the Army) to the Commander in Chief and de-facto leader of the Junbush party, as his first vice president. There are rumors that Karzai orchestrated this arrangement in order to take the Uzbek vote away from Abdullah's team. Whether or not this is true, Dostum is a controversial figure with enormous influence. Although Ghani once condemned him as a "killer," Dostum can deliver the majority Uzbek vote.
For his part, Dostum has apologized for his actions during the Afghan civil war, and he is not the only politician running for office who is facing accusations of serious human rights violations. For his second vice president, Ghani has picked former Minister of Justice Sarwar Danish. A lesser-known and certainly less controversial figure, Danish rounds the ticket off with his Hazara credentials.
Representing the staunchest anti-Taliban movement, Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf is another formidable presidential candidate. Most recently, he became the Afghan Taliban's "public enemy number one" for his open disdain of the group, and for using religion to condemn Taliban suicide bomber tactics. Ahmad Shafi put it best, saying that, "quoting Islamic texts extensively, Sayyaf said he wanted to send a message to the militants that on Judgment Day, they would show up with "flags planted in their buttocks from the back," marking them "unforgivable" in the court of God." For Sayyaf and his running mate, Mohammad Ismail Khan -- the influential "Amir" of western Afghanistan and a legend among jihadi commanders -- reconciliation with the Taliban is not an option. In fact, this is the one team that has remained consistent in its contempt of the Taliban and any accommodations towards them.
According to Sayyaf, Afghans should do their best to "eliminate [the Taliban] from the face of the earth." But his tough talk is not the greatest source of concern for the Taliban leadership. More worrying for them is Sayyaf's use of Islamic text and belief in challenging their religious right to fight against the Afghan government and their foreign allies. In fact, Sayyaf's religious credentials from the prestigious Cairo-based Al-Azhar University make him an authority on religious issues, and thus capable of countering Taliban ideology at its core. But Sayyaf comes with baggage.
Human Rights Watch has extensively documented allegations of war crimes against Sayyaf and his party, Dawat-e-Islami, particularly against Hazara civilians. Also, in the 9/11 Commission Report, Sayyaf was listed as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's "mentor." Completing the Sayyaf-Khan ticket is second vice president candidate Mawlavi Abdul Wahab Irfan, a Junbush-e-Milli Islami senator from Takhar province and a Dostum confidant. Irfan brings with him both a conservative block from the north, as well as a substantial number of Uzbek votes.
The last of the serious contenders is Abdul Qayum Karzai, the current president's older brother. His running mates are former Afghan mines minister Wahidullah Shahrani and former lawmaker Ibrahim Qasemi. Although Qayum Karzai -- a former member of parliament with a horrible attendance record -- has little real experience in government, he is a "Karzai" and should therefore not be underestimated.
Shahrani, an Uzbek, and Qasemi, a Hazara, seem to offer a good ethnic balance to Karzai's strong Pashtun credentials, but this group is unlikely to win much of the popular vote amongst ethnic constituencies. Most of the Uzbek vote should be secured by Dostum, Irfan, and then perhaps Abdullah. The Hazara vote will be split between Mohaqiq, Danish, and Suhrabi. Karzai's team, however, has a lot of money.
There are other groups with strong financial backing, but they are not in the same league as the Karzai team. Between Qayum, Mahmud, and Shah Wali, the Karzai brothers are spending most of their time in Kandahar, where there is a significant financial reserve they can tap into for support. Shahrani also has his own group of financial supporters who will undoubtedly contribute to Qayum Karzai's campaign.
It is still uncertain if President Karzai will back his older brother or pick another candidate in the 2014 race. The president's motives appear to be less about a continuation of the "Karzai dynasty" and more about his own survival and continued influence over his successor. In fact, four of the top five candidates have received significant support from the president. By actively encouraging Rasool, Sayyaf, and Ghani to run and providing tacit support to his brother Qayum, Karzai has split the vote amongst "his favorites" in such a way that he could prevent Abdullah from winning the necessary 51 percent of the vote needed to win in the first round of the election. In a place such as Afghanistan, where conspiracy theories run wild, many think that he orchestrated the candidacies of four of the top five presidential contenders to ensure that, in a runoff election, at least one of the two candidates would owe him some allegiance. Rumor also has it that Karzai plans to rally the candidates who don't make the run-off behind his preferred candidate to ensure his own post-election survival and continued influence over Afghan politics.
The other five presidential candidates who qualified to run for the 2014 election (Gudbudin Hilal, Rahim Wardak, Gul Agha Sherzai, Nader Naeem, Hedayat Amin Arsala, and Daud Sultanzoi) do not, for a variety of reasons, have a chance of getting a significant number of votes. At the same time, they will play critical roles in both the election itself and the government that follows. For example, Sherzai, the powerful tribal leader of the Barakzai tribe from Kandahar, may not have a chance at winning the presidency, but his support of another candidate will carry significant weight amongst Pashtuns in the south. Similarly, endorsement and support from Arsala -- one of the most respected political figures in Afghan politics, with impeccable credentials as a technocrat and as a Pashtun tribal leader -- will go a long way in building confidence and validating a mandate in a leading candidate's camp of supporters.
Although the election campaign season will not officially start until February 2014, the political maneuvering is already in full force, and candidates are laying out their primary campaign plans, along with contingency plans for all sorts of outcomes. These include scenarios in which there is no election and in which the election result is so heavily contested that the Afghan population becomes disenfranchised, disgruntled, and drives the country to the brink of civil war.
While all the candidates are considering the most dangerous scenarios in earnest, the truth is that most Afghans remain cautiously optimistic that this next election will move the country forward. Time will tell which scenario unfolds, but the international community needs to remain vigilant to prevent some of the more perilous scenarios from occurring. Otherwise, the modest -- if not minimal -- gains of the past 12 years will quickly disappear.
With six months to go to, one thing is certain: The road to the April 2014 election will be bumpy. From shifting alliances to politically-motivated assassinations, the run-up to the election will be both bloody and hard to predict. Additionally, one should expect nuanced meddling and bet-hedging from regional powers who want to guarantee their influence, regardless of the election outcome. And Afghan elites who have benefitted significantly from a decade of instability will likely offer their support to candidates in hopes of securing their own prominence once the race is over. These shifting allegiances and manipulations will keep everyone guessing as to who is working with whom, and to what ends.
Finally, the way the U.S. and Afghan governments behave between now and the elections will either put a burden or alleviate pressure on Karzai's successor. As noted earlier, the BSA has been getting too much attention. That said, one cannot ignore the fact that Karzai's behavior during the jirga and his propensity for controversy continue to put unnecessary stress on already strained U.S.-Afghan relations. Perhaps he is deliberately trying to maintain focus on the BSA to keep the United States from meddling in the 2014 elections, as they did, in his mind, in the run up to the 2009 vote.
Regardless of his motives, Karzai's actions this week highlight the fact that no matter who wins Afghanistan's elections, salvaging the deteriorating U.S.-Afghan relations will be the top priority. Faced with "Great Game" politics characterized by external actors meddling in Afghan affairs, a flourishing narco-trade, a fragile economy that is as inefficient as it is corrupt, and a raging insurgency in rural areas, just to name a few challenges, the new Afghan administration cannot afford to alienate those same international actors who must provide the donor funding necessary for Afghanistan's economic survival.
While the international community has signaled that it will not abandon Afghanistan after 2014, Karzai and those hoping to replace him should remember that this support will come with conditions. Years of unaccountable waste and corruption must give way to a true commitment to stability and economic progress in ways that honor the memories of the Afghan and NATO fallen (and their families) who sacrificed their lives to give Afghanistan a second chance. In the end, the April 2014 election offers another fork in the road in Afghanistan's journey as a nation. Depending on the outcome, the newly elected administration will serve either as a source of hope for a better, brighter future or it will flicker out and Afghanistan will descend into the chaos of civil war ...again.
Ioannis Koskinas was a military officer for over twenty years and now focuses on economic development projects and innovating solutions to challenging projects in Afghanistan.
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As I scrolled through my Inbox earlier this week for my daily news clippings from this blog, something seemed amiss. Instead of "AfPak Channel," the header read "South Asia Channel." An error I presumed. Scrolling down further, however, I realized the error was mine: "Next Monday, November 25, the AfPak Channel will be relaunched as the South Asia Channel" with the addition of "key stories and insights from India."
The notification got me thinking about the twists and turns in Washington's conception of South Asia over the past decade. Somewhere along the way "AfPak" had appeared. Due to the distortions it produced, the phrase has for some time now been winding its way into retirement. The 2014 drawdown in Afghanistan will give it the final push. AfPak will no doubt have plenty of company with "hearts and minds" and countless other pithy friends in Washington's little known Archives for Foreign Affairs Shorthands of Fleeting Value. Can't say I'll miss it.
I came to Washington ten years ago to work as an analyst in the Henry L. Stimson Center's South Asia program. Having grown up in Pakistan, I had actually never uttered the phrase "South Asia." The region to me was a simple, if tormented, duality: Pakistan and India. I discovered that in Washington, South Asia meant the same two players, and the issues boiled down to Kashmir, militancy, military, and nuclear issues. Afghanistan was relegated to its own war-torn limbo.
At the time, Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf and Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, were talking about peace between the two countries. Both have since fallen silent, with the former facing treason charges; between India's upcoming elections and Pakistan's unending turmoil, peace commands little attention in Delhi and Islamabad today. The United States was two years into the war in Afghanistan, yet the lens on South Asia was varied. Afghanistan was a policy imperative, but so was managing the Indo-Pak rivalry and the risk of nuclear escalation.
Those working on South Asia in Washington seemed to fall into two camps. The South Asia wallahs had spent decades working in and on the region, often with formal academic training. The Cold Warriors sought to apply lessons from a superpower rivalry to a relatively nascent nuclear dynamic on the subcontinent. They reflected the fluidity of functional analysts within the strategic community -- crossing boundaries while the regionalists remained in their lanes.
Soon enough, a new crop of functional analysts crossed over. They anchored their world views on a different issue: counterterrorism. Thereafter came "AfPak." The phrase traces back to the first year of the Obama administration and the tenure of the first Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP), Richard Holbrooke. A region that was once viewed as India-Pakistan, with Afghanistan on the margins, gave way to India on one hand and Afghanistan-Pakistan on the other.
With the change, India got its wish to be "de-hyphenated" from Pakistan. The Bush administration keenly helped facilitate this shift via a civil nuclear deal, in light of India's perceived strategic import in Asia. Meanwhile, AfPak eventually flipped to "PakAf" given deepening concerns about the various militant groups that were "veritable" arms of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency and the safety of its nuclear arsenal.
To be sure, AfPak helped focus attention on the war in Afghanistan after a misguided invasion in Iraq. It framed the theatre and the operational challenge posed by "safe havens" in Pakistan. Though Holbrooke espoused a wider view within its confines on forging a broader partnership with Pakistan that extended beyond kinetic issues, the diplomatic piece was and remains fluid, messy, and hard. As the war wore on, patience and imagination dried up. AfPak became shorthand for CT (counterterrorism) -- far too constricted a prism for the colors and complexities of the region.
The Obama administration eventually recognized the limits of the AfPak moniker itself; Islamabad made sure of it. Like Delhi, it had its own gripes about being lumped with its neighbor. Little wonder then that regional integration in South Asia is among the lowest in the world. Yet even as the phrase largely vanished from official public statements, it continued to periodically surface and, importantly, cast a shadow in Washington -- until now.
As the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan winds down by the end of 2014, AfPak is undergoing its own retrograde. The office that embodies the term, SRAP, will need to assess not whether but how and when to reintegrate within the U.S. State Department's Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.
Think tanks in Washington are also rebooting their South Asia programs. Some are doing so in the pre-AfPak mold, others with variation. The Brookings Institution, for example, now has a stand-alone India program, focusing on politics and economics, as much as foreign policy -- kaleidoscope eyes on a potential Asian power. Along with and related to the shifting geopolitical winds are the interests of funders who share Washington's AfPak fatigue. Their weariness, however, cannot match that in the region whose "troubles" (to borrow from Northern Ireland) are likely to rage on.
Newer shorthands such as the "rebalance" or "pivot" to Asia have also provided a new prism with which to look on South Asia. A fresh crop of scholarship has arisen on how South Asia relates to the Asia-Pacific region, from the "Indo-Pacific" concept to Pakistan's role in the rebalance -- welcome efforts to think beyond traditional silos in an interconnected Asia.
The periodic reimagination of South Asia in Washington is as inevitable as it is easy to miss. We are in such a transition right now. So come next Monday, when the "South Asia Channel" pops up my Inbox, I will be fumbling a bit to figure out how all the pieces fit. So might you.
Ziad Haider is the Director of the Truman National Security Project's Asia Expert Group. He served as a White House Fellow in the U.S. Department of Justice and as a national security aide in the U.S. Senate. You can follow him on Twitter at @Asia_Hand. The views expressed are his own.
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On November 13, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released its annual Afghanistan Opium Survey, which found that opium cultivation reached record levels in 2013, despite a decade of attempted counter-narcotics activities by U.S. and NATO forces. It also comes just a few weeks after NATO announced it will scale down its post-2014 troop commitments to Afghanistan.
NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan will conclude at the end of 2014, marking the end of the largest, most expensive, and most politically contentious mission in the alliance's history. The announcement reflects NATO members' eagerness to put the Afghan saga behind them, leaving only a small vanguard of trainers and advisers in place to oversee the transition. Yet Afghanistan's rampant drug trade, now at an all-time high, threatens to upend NATO's decade of fragile progress and mixed successes.
For over a decade, U.S. and NATO policymakers have struggled with the inconvenient truth that the insurgency in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the opium poppy trade. Opium poppy plants are hardy and durable, require little water, fetch a high market price once processed into heroin, and store without rotting, making them an ideal crop for Afghanistan's inchoate economy and arid mountain climate.
When U.S.-led ISAF forces initially entered Afghanistan in October 2001, they ignored the opium poppy fields, convinced that destroying a primary income source for many Afghans wouldn't earn them any local support. ISAF forces also elicited support from local Afghan warlords to combat insurgent groups with hundreds of millions of dollars. This flooded the Afghan money market, rapidly devaluing the already weak Afghan currency and prompting Afghans to put their money into the only safe and profitable investment in the Afghan economy: opium poppy farming. By 2003, when NATO assumed control of ISAF, Afghanistan's estimated opium income was $4.8 billion, compared with $2.8 billion in foreign aid.
Many U.S. policymakers eventually acknowledged the severity of the burgeoning drug trade problem in Afghanistan, but the diagnosis proved easier than treatment. Indiscriminate eradication, ISAF's next attempted strategy, failed miserably as it significantly undermined the coalition's popularity with Afghans who had no means of income outside opium poppy farming. Moreover, NATO forces could only eradicate the opium poppy fields in areas they controlled. By 2008, 98% of the poppy plants were cultivated in insurgent-controlled areas, and total poppy cultivation in Afghanistan grew to the point where the drug trade's potential export value constituted nearly 25% of the country's GDP.
One of the few positive outcomes from this failed policy was a slight improvement in NATO-Russia relations, as illustrated by the NATO-Russia Council's small Counter Narcotics Training Program (which today remains one of NATO's only formal initiatives tasked with addressing Afghanistan's drug trade). However, while this program represents a modest success story in the otherwise anemic NATO-Russia relationship, it is anchored in Russia's stubborn support for full-scale eradication policies, which stems from the widespread use of Afghan opiates and heroin in Russia.
The Obama administration took stock of these failures and transitioned to a strategy of selectively eradicating poppy farms that were linked to the Taliban, while simultaneously implementing "alternative livelihood efforts" for Afghan farmers. Yet poppies remain the most profitable crop available; farmers can earn up to $203 per kilogram of harvested opium, compared with $1.25 for a kilogram of harvested rice. Additionally, many Afghans doubt whether the alternative crop subsidies that currently counterbalance these price discrepancies will outlast ISAF's 2014 mission mandate.
While the selective eradication concept was promising, NATO provided no framework for its members to coordinate targeted eradication policies across their respective sectors of command. This led to a phenomenon known as "the balloon effect" -- if NATO forces effectively countered opium poppy production in one region, production would simply increase in another region.
All the while, drug money became a vital source of funding for the insurgents. By 2013, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that Afghan insurgent groups earned over $200 million annually from the drug trade. In the words of former ISAF commander Gen. David Petraeus: "drug money has been the oxygen in the air that allows these groups to operate."
The unchecked drug trade dovetails Afghanistan's notorious and ossified corruption problems, which pose as large of a threat to Afghanistan's stability as the Taliban. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made dramatic, but ultimately disingenuous, public promises to tackle corruption. In practice, he has perpetuated corruption and the drug problem through his internal political entanglements, affiliations, and dependencies. For example, Karzai's current anti-corruption czar, Izzatullah Wasifi, was once arrested for attempting to sell $2 million worth of heroin in Las Vegas (an act that Karzai waved off as a "youthful indiscretion"). Karzai vehemently counterattacks allegations of corruption, arguing that the bigger problem in Afghanistan is the corruption in ISAF contracts with private security firms. As this blame game continues, it risks undermining already feeble public confidence in Afghanistan's fledgling democratic institutions and poisoning the roots of Afghanistan's future.
Unfortunately, the window of opportunity for NATO to fully confront Afghanistan's opium poppy trade will likely close with its 2014 drawdown, especially now that NATO's post-2014 commitment represents only a modicum of its initial plans. However, NATO can still take a few relatively low-cost steps to at least curb Afghanistan's drug trade in the short-term, as it lacks the resources for a long-term effort.
The perennial first step is admitting the problem. NATO leaders have quietly acknowledged the dangerous drug trafficking problem Afghanistan faces without offering any real solutions, lest the alliance be labeled as the party in charge of ‘fixing' the drug problem while lacking the means and will to do so. However, after 2014, Afghanistan will take responsibility for its own security. When that happens, NATO will be on the sidelines, with more political breathing room to raise awareness for and offer suggestions to the Afghan government on the opium poppy trade.
Second, NATO can increase its financial and political investments in the Counter Narcotics Training Program, which has potential, but only if the alliance can convince Russia of the pitfalls of indiscriminate eradication. Counter-narcotics units are most effective when they are stringently vetted and highly trained with expert support. Afghanistan cannot produce such units without NATO funding and support.
Third, NATO can provide helicopters to support Afghanistan's counter-narcotics efforts, as they are the only viable way for counter-narcotics units to swiftly respond to and interdict drug traffickers in a mountainous country devoid of transportation infrastructure. As the U.S. Senate Drug Caucus concluded, "there is no end game capability in Afghanistan without the appropriate number of helicopters." As a corollary to interdiction efforts, NATO should leverage its integrated command structures, intelligence sharing capabilities, and well-established intelligence infrastructure in Afghanistan to support these counter-narcotics activities.
Finally, NATO needs to conduct an honest assessment of how the opium poppy trade impacted its own counterinsurgency. A NATO Counter-Narcotics Center of Excellence, a member-initiated and independent in-house think tank, offers one mechanism to provide the post-mortem on ISAF's failed drug policies and serve as NATO's institutional memory for its Afghan mission. As European Union forefather Jean Monet famously said, "the lessons of history are doomed to be forgotten unless they are embedded in institutions."
Though NATO members are reluctant to commit to costly long-term missions in the foreseeable future, the alliance has agreed to provide a residual force of trainers and advisers to the country under the auspices of Operation Resolute Support. Yet many of the threats that NATO's stability and reconstruction initiatives aimed to eliminate still persist. And for better or worse, NATO's reputation as a viable international security alliance is inextricably linked to Afghanistan. If NATO is ever pulled into another major operation, the world will look to Afghanistan as the benchmark for its successes and shortfalls.
NATO's announcement that it is scaling back its already sparse commitments to Afghanistan after 2014 does not augur well for efforts to curb the country's prevalent drug trade and record-high opium cultivation levels. Afghanistan's fate hangs in the balance, and the opium poppy plant may prove heavy enough to tip the scale against the full weight of NATO and a nascent Afghan democracy.
Robbie Gramer staffs the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. He can be reached via email at rgramer@AtlanticCouncil.org.
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Afghanistan's presidential race has started, but among the ten remaining candidates, there is no obvious successor to President Hamid Karzai. While at this early stage, the leading candidates seem to be Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai -- both are experienced former ministers -- neither has Karzai's charisma nor, even more important, his consensus-building abilities. And the race has already brought some surprises.
Compared to the 2009 elections, the current list of candidates includes a greater number of warlords -- men who tore the country apart in the 1990s and paved the way for the Taliban and al-Qaeda to gain a foothold -- including Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Gul Agha Sherzai. Sayyaf has even teamed up with another warlord, Ismail Khan, choosing him as his running mate for First Vice President. Abdullah himself has chosen Hazara strongman Mohammad Mohaqiq as his candidate for Second Vice President. And Ghani, one of the most prominent reformers, has registered with one of the most infamous warlords, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum. Disappointed that Karzai had not given him more in return for his endorsement in 2009, Dostum now seems to have made his support contingent on an offer to become First Vice President, and Ghani gave him what he asked for.
This Ghani-Dostum pairing is the most remarkable in today's race. In an article for the London Times on August 20, 2009, when Ghani received three percent of the votes in the presidential elections, he called Dostum a "killer" and lashed out against Karzai for calling Dostum back from Turkey to lend him his support. Now, Ghani has invited the very same Dostum to be his closest partner in the hope that this new alliance will bring him victory. "Politics is not a love marriage, politics is a product of historic necessities," he explained to Agence France Presse a few days after he had chosen Dostum.
As a result, members of the Afghan human rights community, which would normally be Ghani's constituency, threatened to withhold their support. Young voters took to social media to express their disappointment. "Then I am out. Mark my words, Ghani," one female activist wrote about the prospects of a Ghani-Dostum team. Seeing the possible fallout of his new partnership, Ghani asked Dostum to issue an apology for his past actions -- and he did.
On October 7, Dostum issued a widely published statement of apology to people who have suffered on both sides of the conflict while avoiding any direct reference to his personal role in the fighting. However, he emphasized that all ethnic groups have been victims of atrocities. Predictably, the statement was received with suspicion by many, who insisted that an apology would not help people forget his crimes. Nevertheless, the statement could be important beyond its immediate aim of pacifying disillusioned voters, as it is the first such apology given by any of the commanders from the civil war.
According to Ghani's interview with Agence France Presse, Dostum "should be praised for his courage" and for making "such a clear break with the past to embrace the future." However, the question many will be asking is whether the statement really signals an embrace of the future or simply aims to prolong the political lives of the men of the past.
The prominence of the old warlords on the candidates' list reflects the reality of Afghan society today. The new president will inherit an exceedingly complex political environment -- one in which warlords are still powerful and cannot be ignored. It is this same environment that shaped Karzai's 12 years as president. For more than a decade, the failure to understand this complexity has often led the international community to simplistic interpretations of reality in Afghanistan and to misguided policies.
To seek justice while maintaining stability in Afghanistan is a still a daunting challenge. However, by addressing the past, Dostum has removed a barrier that has been there for too long. Moreover, Ghani's credibility now is on the line. From now on, both men will be challenged to demonstrate that the apology was not a tactical move, but an important political initiative.
Dostum's statement challenged others with similar backgrounds to issue their own apologies and to, according to Dostum's words "develop a common understanding of the painful events of the past." If they do, it could open up a discussion of past atrocities and suffering that has so far been absent in the Afghan society. General apologies do not bring back the dead, heal the suffering, or repair the damage inflicted on so many, but they are better than silence or a continuing atmosphere of denial.
Dostum has -- perhaps inadvertently -- created an opportunity to initiate a process of reconciliation, of coming to terms with the legacy of the civil war. If Afghans can exploit this opportunity it could also give a much-needed boost to the generational transformation of Afghanistan's political life. However, it is a process that must be carefully handled to ensure that it truly enables Afghans to put the past behind them and does not lead to a return of past conflicts. Only Afghans themselves can find a way and a framework to make this possible.
Kai Eide was the U.N. Special Representative to Afghanistan from 2008 to 2010. He is now a PRIO Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.
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Two months ago, Pakistan's political parties, with support from the powerful military, unanimously passed a resolution to conduct peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). While the new federal government proposed the idea of dialogue with the militant group, the state continues to face the wrath of the insurgency in the form of targeted killings, suicide bombings, and other violent incidents. Following the recent death of Hakimullah Mehsud, the former TTP leader, in a U.S. drone strike, many within Pakistan are expecting strong retaliation from the group and security has been beefed up throughout the country.
Outraged by the drone strike, Pakistan's Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, has called for a review of U.S.-Pakistan relations, stating: "This is not the killing of one person, it is the death of all peace efforts." Ejaz Haider, the editor for national security affairs at a private Pakistani television channel, argues that this reaction is expected, arguing:
The government has made clear its opposition to drone strikes. However, it can't cherry pick which strikes are good and which are bad. The government had convened the APC [All Party Conference] and initiated talks with the TTP so the outrage is apropos of the timing of the strikes and the fact that it took out the chief of the TTP. This is the real issue at hand. Now even if the talks happen, there will a ramped up effort by the new chief of the TTP to prove his mettle, avenge the killing of Mehsud and mount more attacks.
Fulfilling this prediction, the TTP recently elected a new chief, the hardline commander Mullah Fazlullah, who is notoriously known as Mullah Radio for broadcasting sermons against polio vaccinations and girls' education, as well as demanding a strict enforcement of shari'a law in Swat. Fazlullah also ordered the attack on Malala Yousafzai last October.
With Fazlullah's appointment, the TTP has rejected any prospect of peace talks. Shahidullah Shahid, a Taliban spokesman, stated: "There will be no more talks as Mullah Fazlullah is already against negotiations with the Pakistani government." According to him, the Taliban view the peace talks as a U.S-Pakistan deal to sell out Taliban fighters and as nothing more than another "political stunt."
In response to Mehsud's killing and the Taliban's rejection of talks, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has decided to shelve the reconciliation effort until U.S drone strikes in the country are halted. Given Fazlullah's brazen threats to the Pakistani military, it is expected that the establishment will back Sharif's decision. But Taliban threats against the military are not a new phenomenon, and militant attacks have been on the rise since Sharif assumed power in May this year.
Following the initial talks at the APC on September 9, a number of major attacks took place, bringing to light the futility of the government's decision to negotiate. On September 15, a roadside bomb claimed the lives of Maj Gen Sanaullah Khan Niazi and two other officers. Two weeks later, a bomb placed inside a van carrying 40 Civil Secretariat employees in Peshawar exploded, killing 19 people and injuring 44 others. The TTP proudly claimed responsibility for both attacks.
But the most horrific incident since the APC was the suicide blast outside the All Saints Church in Peshawar on September 22 that took the lives of 85 people and injured 120, the majority of whom were women and children. The Jundallah Group, a faction of the Taliban, readily claimed responsibility for the incident. However, the TTP later issued a statement painstakingly denying their direct involvement but affirming that the attack was in accordance with shari'a law.
While the attack was one of the largest on Pakistan's Christian minority group, it was not the first time it had been targeted by the TTP and its allies, nor is it the first time militants have targeted a place of worship. On August 8, a suicide bomber detonated his explosives outside a mosque in Quetta during funeral prayers for a policeman who had been killed the day before. Thirty people, mostly policemen, were killed and 62 were wounded.
Events such as this, along with the killing of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's Law Minister Israrullah Gandapur, have shifted public opinion, specifically in Pakistan's northwest region. Imran Khan, leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party and perhaps the strongest proponent of peace talks, has been publicly called a ‘Taliban apologist," while policy analysts have criticized his dangerously simplistic and naive understanding of critical security issues. Though he remains a key player in Pakistani politics, Khan's apologetic defense and conspiratorial stance of linking the growing militancy in Pakistan solely to the American intervention in Afghanistan or CIA drone strikes in the region, has dealt a strong blow to the PTI's support base.
A history of peace talks and negotiations
For now it seems that the Pakistani government has decided to postpone the peace talks as it reviews its overall counterterrorism strategy. The problems with conducting such reconciliation talks are manifold and the Sharif government would be wise to address their shortcomings.
First of all, a dialogue or negotiation is conducted between two equal parties that come to the table with a readiness to compromise and a list of terms on which to negotiate. The militants' escalation of violence so soon after the government proposed the talks seems to indicate that they have no interest in pursuing such an offer. With the recent election of Fazlullah, a strong opponent of negotiations, peace talks seem even less likely. Furthermore, the TTP lacks a central command structure; instead it is comprised of a number of different factions that operate under one umbrella group, bound by its hostility towards Islamabad. So the real question is, to whom should the state be talking?
Second, the government should, as a pre-requisite, demand a ceasefire from the militants before it begins any negotiations. That said, Pakistan has entered into a number of previous negotiations, both written and verbal, with the militants, only to see those peace agreements be violated constantly.
In April 2004, for example, after launching an ineffective military operation to pressure Pashtun military leader Nek Mohammad to cease his support for foreign militants, the Pakistani government signed the first of three peace agreements in North and South Waziristan. Despite the agreement, Mohammad refused to surrender foreign militants, and attacks on government supporters and security forces continued.
Then, in February 2005, the government signed the Sararogha Accord with leading militant and future TTP leader, Baitullah Mehsud, which stated that the Pakistan military would compensate militants for any damage the soldiers had caused and that, in return, the militants would stop attacking Pakistani targets. However, the accord was quickly broken. A ceasefire was again announced in May 2006, but the infamous "North Waziristan Agreement" that was signed in September that year allowed the existing militant groups to expand and reorganize.
In May 2008, the Pakistani government signed a peace accord with Fazlullah himself. The terms required Fazlullah to support the government's efforts to establish law and order in the area and to denounce terrorist activities. In return, the government dropped its criminal charges against him. However, his militant Swat Taliban faction violated the agreement by attacking security forces and strictly enforcing shari'a law. The subsequent breakdown of the peace accord led to the Rah-e-Haq military operation in Swat, where the Pakistan army largely emerged successful.
But despite that success, throughout 2008, Taliban militants re-entered Swat and engaged in battles with security forces. By 2009, the TTP had regained control of 80 percent of the area. Pakistan's security forces ended their subsequent offensives when the provincial government signed the Swat Agreement with Fazlullah and released Taliban leaders in exchange for the group halting its attacks on the military.
In April 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari's government signed an ordinance, dubbed the Nizam-e-Adl (System of Justice), allowing the implementation of shari'a law in Malakand, in return for halting violence. With the armed forces effectively abandoning the area, the TTP was granted de facto control over the area, interpreting the ordinance as a formal acquiescence by the Pakistani government to their ruthless rule. However, within days, the Swat Taliban tried to expand their control to the neighboring district of Buner, and violence against civilians and the military spiked. Emboldened by the government's policy of appeasement, the Taliban occupied the Swat district's largest city, Mingora, in May 2009, and advanced up to 60 miles away from Islamabad. This advancement prompted a strong military operation that ended with the Pakistani Army regaining control of Mingora, forcing Fazlullah to flee from the Swat Valley, and capturing or killing a number of Taliban commanders. Though the situation in the area remains precarious four years later, many claim it is far better than its darkest days.
Ejaz Haider argues that: "The notion that the state has never talked is factually incorrect. There have been a number of major and local agreements, some of which have failed and some that are ongoing. The issue of talking is not a wrong policy. The real issue is whether the state is sending signals of strength or weakness. With the APC, it seems to be the latter."
Third, and perhaps most troubling, is the fact that a militant group which rejects the Pakistani constitution, ruthlessly murders innocent civilians, and brazenly targets Pakistan's security forces is dictating the terms of the peace process. Zahid Hussain, author of The Scorpion's Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan, warns that "the Taliban terms are very clear. They have dictated exactly what they want. The unconditional talks are a bad idea. A move such as this dangerously legitimizes militancy and terrorism," thus providing more room for the Taliban to exploit any peace negotiation.
A jeopardized peace process
Policy analysts have begun criticizing the government's halt of the peace talks in reaction to Mehsud's death, arguing that if that if the violence was a determining factor, they should also have been halted when Niazi was killed or when countless innocent Pakistanis were butchered at the hands of the TTP.
Since 2003, close to 17,911 Pakistani civilians have been killed in terrorism-related violence. While Khan claims that the war in which Pakistan currently finds itself embroiled is "America's war," the truth is that escalating attacks against minority groups and innocent civilians on military bases, near places of worship, and in crowded urban areas have transformed it into Pakistan's war; one which must be fought against a breed of elusive and ruthless militants.
And this militancy is no longer confined to Pakistan's tribal areas, to be dealt with solely by Pakistan's military forces. The war has permeated Pakistan's villages, towns, urban centers, and mindsets. Haider notes: "In urban centers, police forces, along with specialized counterterrorism police units, are required to address mounting terrorist attacks. However, the state has had a stunted response to militancy. The state wants to talk, thinking it can achieve desired results where fighting has not been successful. That is incorrect."
Truly fighting this militancy requires not only army action, but also comprehensive political will. While the Taliban has remained clear, consistent, and adamant in their demands, the government has failed to create a consistent and unified political discourse against terrorism that counters the powerful militant narrative. Some analysts claim that Pakistani authorities are only too aware of how imperative a stable Afghanistan is to Pakistan's future. By brokering a peace deal with the TTP beforehand, Pakistan may be able to prevent any internal security distractions as it focuses on a post-2014 Afghanistan. Hussain argues that: "Ambivalence has made the government weak. The state has failed to take a decision. The Taliban, on the other hand, are buying time and regaining lost ground," yet all the while tightening the noose around the Pakistani leadership.
As has been seen in the past, despite the government entering into a number of peace agreements with and conducting a handful of military operations against the militants, conducting a reconciliation dialogue from a position of weakness has strengthened the TTP and allowed it to challenge the state. The sad reality of the entire exercise is that the TTP will not lose much if the talks don't take place. The Pakistani state, on the other hand, has already put too much at stake.
Arsla Jawaid is a journalist and Associate Editor of the monthly foreign policy magazine, SouthAsia. She holds a bachelor's degree in International Relations, with a focus on foreign policy and security studies, from Boston University and can be followed on Twitter @arslajawaid.
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The Waziristan-based Pakistani Taliban, also known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), picked Mullah Fazlullah, nicknamed "Mullah FM Radio," as their new chief on Thursday. Once known for his two-year reign of terror in Pakistan's tourist resort of Swat, Fazlullah is stepping into the shoes of Hakimullah Mehsud, another dreaded TTP chief who was killed in a CIA drone strike in North Waziristan on November 2.
As the newly-elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif struggles to launch peace talks with the TTP, a number of Pakistani analysts believe that any hope of reconciliation is now dead.
"The appointment of Fazlullah as head of the TTP means the chapter of talks is closed for the time being," said Sen. Haji Muhammad Adeel, a top leader for the secular Awami National Party. Talking to this writer on Thursday, hours after Fazlullah's leadership was announced, Adeel said the Pakistani army would also be averse to talks since Fazlullah was behind the attack that killed Maj. Gen. Sanaullah Niazi, a top military officer, in September.
From Fazle Hayat to TTP chief
Fazle Hayat, as Fazlullah was originally known, was a common village boy who joined the religious seminary of a Malakand-based cleric, Sufi Muhammad, and later married one of Muhammad's daughters. He was impressed when his mentor and father-in-law launched the Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in the early nineties, but his first fighting experience began when Muhammad led a lashkar of thousands of volunteers from Malakand, as well as the Bajaur and Mohmand tribal districts, to fight alongside the Afghan Taliban against NATO and U.S. forces in October 2001.
Muhammad's arrest by Pakistani security agencies in late 2001 upon his return from Afghanistan left a vacuum in Swat's militant movement. But his son-in-law, who had himself spent about 17 months in a Pakistani jail, came forward to fill the void and started preaching at a small mosque in the Swati town of Mam Dheri, which he later renamed "Imam Dheri" to add a more Islamic touch.
Born in 1974 or 1975 to a simple farming family in Mam Dheri near Fizza Ghat area of Swat, Hayat changed his name to Fazlullah in the 1990s to bolster his credentials as an Islamic leader, even though he had failed to receive full credentials from any religious institution.
Once an employee at a ski lift in Fizza Ghat, he used to say that he was not a religious scholar, but that did not stop him from advocating for the imposition of shari'a law in Swat.
Though Fazlullah initially taught the Koran to children at his Mam Dheri mosque, his preaching tone changed from sermons to threats after he launched his unauthorized FM radio channel in 2004. People started supporting him with men and material as he earned the nickname "Maulana Radio." Though he addressed the people of Swat very generally at first, he soon gained supporters among the conservative Pashtuns of the area, as well as erstwhile supporters of the jailed Muhammad and Pakistanis working abroad in Dubai and Saudi Arabia, whose families back in the country relayed Fazlullah's messages.
While encouraging his listeners to pray five times a day and avoid sins, Fazlullah also preached anti-Americanism, focusing on the U.S. forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. As his audience grew, he started discouraging parents from sending their girls to schools and spoke out against watching television or listening to music. In November 2005, after he criticized the "evil of television," some local Swatis responded by setting fire to thousands of TV sets.
According to Fazlullah himself, he burned television sets, video equipment, computers, and digital cameras worth 20 million rupees (approximately $32,000) because "these are the main sources of sin." He added: "Now we have no other option but to re-organize our movement and work for a society purged of all types of evils including music, dancing and drinking alcohol." In September 2007, Fazlullah's supporters also tried to destroy the centuries-old statues of Buddha and prehistoric rock carvings in the Swat Valley on the grounds that they were un-Islamic.
Fazlullah's fiery speeches carried an appeal for virtually everyone, from household women and laborers to landowners. They came forward in large numbers to donate goods such as wheat flour, cooking oil, and sugar, as well as cement and bricks for construction work. But despite the Swatis' initial support for Fazlullah, his movement began to lose popularity. His armed brigades patrolled marketplaces across the valley, intimidating locals into keeping their daughters home from school and beheading local opponents. But the general population was unable to resist publicly, because by late 2007, Fazlullah had gained too much power.
Fighting and agreements
During his 2007-2009 reign in Swat, the Pakistani government signed two peace agreements with Fazlullah, both of which ended in a military operation and further escalation of violence.
The first peace agreement was signed on May 21, 2008, and the Swat Taliban said they would not challenge the writ of the state in exchange for the release of Taliban prisoners and the implementation of the shari'a system. The agreement, however, only lasted for a little more than a month when Fazlullah demanded the government withdraw army troops from Swat. Soon after, the Taliban launched attacks on the army and police, and the government launched Operation Rah-e-Haq (Just Path) in June 2008.
In February 2009, the Fazlullah-led Taliban and the government of Pakistan's Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province signed another peace agreement. Like the previous agreement, this one lasted for just a few months and the Pakistani government had to order a massive operation, Rah-e-Raast (Right Path), in May 2009.
After the operation, the Taliban vacated Swat and Fazlullah fled from the area, taking refuge across the border in Afghanistan. Several of his close associates were killed during the operation, while several others were captured -- some of which, like his spokesman Muslim Khan, are still believed to be in the custody of the Pakistani security agencies.
Since 2009, the 39-year-old Fazlullah has been hiding in the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan and orchestrating attacks in Pakistan from across the border. Prominent among those attacks are the shooting of Pakistani schoolgirl Malala Yousufzai in October 2012, and the bomb blast that killed Niazi.
While some in the Pakistani government still hope the Taliban will agree to carry forward the peace process, Adeel, whose party held extensive negotiations with Fazlullah in 2008 and 2009, says "the chapter is closed, at least for the coming few months, if not years, after the appointment of Fazlullah as the TTP head."
While Fazlullah is regarded as a hardliner, it took at least seven days and a lot of maneuvering for the Taliban shura council members to choose their new leader and operational head. Though his appointment was not unexpected, analysts and locals from Waziristan, the Taliban's stronghold, believe his status as a non-Mehsud TTP leader and his living across the border in Afghanistan will neutralize his strategic skills, vast fighting experience and oratory, and that some Mehsud Taliban leader could challenge him and cause cracks in the umbrella organization in the future.
Daud Khattak is a Pakistani journalist currently working as a senior editor of Radio Mashaal for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Prague. He has worked with Pakistan's English dailies The News and Daily Times, Afghanistan's Pajhwok Afghan News, and has written for the Christian Science Monitor and London Sunday Times.
The views expressed here are the author's own and do not represent those of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
A. Majeed/AFP/Getty Images
The recent killing of Hakimullah Mehsud, the notorious leader of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), in a U.S. drone strike has not only put the newly-elected Pakistani government in a difficult position, it has also presented the militant group with a serious leadership crisis that may culminate in wider rifts, fragmentation, and even armed confrontations if it persists for a long time.
Looking at the reign of terror let loose by the ruthless TTP fighters under Mehsud's command, both in Pakistan's tribal areas and the country's cities, there is every reason to celebrate his death. However, the reaction from the Pakistani ruling and opposition political parties have converted him from a dreaded villain, whose daring attacks on Pakistani civilians and government installations forced state authorities to place a 50m-rupee ($470,000) bounty on his head, to a hero.
In an emotional press conference on November 2, Pakistan's Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, announced that "this is not just the killing of one person, it is the death of all peace efforts." While this may seem like hyperbole to some, Khan has to avert the wrath of the Taliban, as well as snatch the opportunity away from his government's key rival, Imran Khan, the leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party, who has threatened to block the NATO supply route through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where his party controls the government.
Since the May 2013 election, the PTI has emerged as the third biggest party in Pakistan's parliament and Khan himself is a staunch opponent of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the covert CIA drone program that targets wanted al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. Although public opinion over Mehsud's death is widely divided, Sharif has had to condemn the U.S. strike, even though it killed a wanted terrorist, lest his opponents -- like Khan and Monawar Hassan, leader of the anti-U.S. Jamiat-e-Islami party -- accuse him of being complicit.
In September, under pressure from the opposition, the government convened an All Parties Conference and continued appealing to the Taliban to begin peace talks, despite the latter's ruthless attacks on civilians and military personnel, which include the killing of a two-star general and a double suicide attack on a church in Peshawar.
The second, and somewhat more important, factor behind the Pakistani government's angry reaction to Mehsud's death is the fear of revenge attacks by the TTP. Silence, let alone a hint of satisfaction on part of the government, could provide enough ground for Taliban suicide bombers and target killers to chase government ministers, just as they did with the Awami National Party and Pakistan People's Party during this year's election campaign. (The two parties had ordered military operations against the TTP in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and South Waziristan in 2009.)
In discussing the Pakistani reactions to the killings of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and Mehsud last week, local columnist and commentator Ayaz Amir said: "When Osama bin Ladin [sic] was killed the army went into mourning, citing breach of national sovereignty. Hakeemullah [sic] Mehsud's killing has plunged much of the political class into mourning." As there has been no serious reaction to the November 1 drone strike from Pakistan's military, the silence is being seen as consent on the part of Pakistan's security establishment.
Apart from the unnecessary hysteria about the release of Dr. Aafia Siddiqui and an end to U.S. drone strikes, which was mostly for public consumption, Sharif's October visit to Washington was quite successful, particularly on the economic and social fronts, military-to-military relations, and Pakistani concerns about the post-2014 Afghanistan. But the November 1 drone strike and the political considerations Sharif faces at home present the Pakistani government with a dilemma.
Being a close U.S. and NATO ally, Sharif can't raise the issue of the killing of a declared terrorist via diplomatic channels. But Pakistan can't welcome Mehsud's death either, lest that invite the wrath of the TTP and provide an excuse for opposition groups to take to the streets. However, those in Sharif's close circles believe that, despite the rhetoric of his interior minister and angry speeches in the Pakistani parliament, the prime minister is still supportive of close ties with the United States.
Testing time for the TTP
If the killing of TTP founder Baitullah Mehsud in a U.S. drone strike on August 5, 2009 was the first serious blow to this loose network of a dozen-plus militant outfits, Hakimullah Mehsud's death may prove fatal.
In 2009, signs of rift among the TTP factions emerged as the group tried to find Baitullah Mehsud's successor, choosing between his two close associates Wali ur-Rehman Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud. Though the matter was resolved when Hakimullah was appointed as the new TTP commander and Wali ur-Rehman was named as his deputy, the differences persisted, despite the duo's appearances exchanging smiles in several videos.
Tensions flared up again when Wali ur-Rehman was killed in a drone strike in May 2013 and his group declared Khan Said, alias Sajna, as their leader, without consulting Hakimullah or the TTP shura (consultative body). It was the same old rivalry that resurfaced this past weekend when Hakimullah loyalists refused to endorse Said as his successor, despite the fact that he had received support from 43 of the 60 shura members.
Local sources told this writer that Asmatullah Shaheen Bhittani, who was named the group's interim chief, comes from Hakimullah's group and is maneuvering hard to draw maximum support for a Meshud group commander from the shura members. If that occurs, the grievances, even open opposition and confrontation, from Said supporters could lead to fragmentation in the network.
Apart from Said, there are quite a few names on the potential successor list, but the tribal dynamics are such that it is unlikely the Mehsud faction will concede leadership to a non-Mehsud. Prominent among the potential candidates are Fazlullah, the chief of the Swat Taliban who is also known as "Mullah FM" for his notorious FM radio channel and is now running his bases from Afghanistan; Omar Khalid Khurasani, who leads the Taliban in the Mohmand tribal agency; Hafiz Saeed Khan in the Orakzai tribal district; and Bhittani.
Since the TTP is drawing most of its fighting force from the Mehsud tribe and uses Mehsud terrain for its base, the Mehsud loyalists will always want a lead role in the organization. However, serious tensions exist among the Mehsud, and even if the shura were to pick Hakimullah's successor soon, the years of disputes and bad blood between the two main factions could lead to serious divisions in the TTP rank and file.
Daud Khattak is a Pakistani journalist currently working as a senior editor of Radio Mashaal for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Prague. He has worked with Pakistan's English dailies The News and Daily Times, Afghanistan's Pajhwok Afghan News, and has written for the Christian Science Monitor and London Sunday Times.
The views expressed here are the author's own and do not represent those of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
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Dan Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America's Tortured Relationship with Islamabad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
Since President Obama took office in 2009, there have been several books published highlighting the deception, failures, and flaws of the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Most of these books, such as Mark Mazzetti's The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, Vali Nasr's The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, and David Sanger's Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power offer insider accounts of the U.S. and Pakistani political dynamics that made it so, with a particular focus on U.S. counterterrorism policies and the war in Afghanistan.
All of these texts open a window into Washington's thinking, infighting, and attempts to fix what has become America's most tortured relationship. Nasr talks about Pakistan's "frenemy" status with the United States and whether it is in the U.S. interest "to stress the friend part or the enemy part." Sanger elaborates on Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who as Chief of Army Staff "understood the American paranoia about a Pakistani meltdown, and he took advantage of it." Mazzetti gets to the heart of the matter when he says that the CIA's war in places like Pakistan was conceived as "a surgery without complications," but became a "way of the knife" that "created enemies just as it has obliterated them," fomenting "resentment among former allies and at times contribut[ing] to instability even as it has attempted to bring order to chaos."
While American policymaking in Pakistan remains haunted by the demons of the September 11th attacks, even older demons linger on the Pakistani side, among them the memory of U.S. sanctions, American pressure on its nuclear weapons program, and the CIA's reliance on Pakistan's covert support during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. During a 1995 Senate hearing, then-Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel described the discontent of the Pakistanis, explaining that: "the key impact of sanctions relief is not military or financial. The effect would be primarily in the political realm, creating a sense of faith restored and an unfairness rectified with a country and people who have been loyal friends of the United States over the decades."
Dan Markey's new book, No Exit from Pakistan: America's Tortured Relationship with Islamabad, heeds Raphel's comments and attempts to answer the perennial questions of the relationship: why do they hate us? How did it get so bad? What are America's options for future relations with Pakistan? Markey roots his analysis in French existentialism, of all things. In French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre's play No Exit, "three sinners, all dead to the word" are subject to "eternal torment by each other," each both capable of and vulnerable to the punishment doled out by the others. Building on this idea, No Exit from Pakistan argues that while "Pakistan's leaders tend to be tough negotiators with high thresholds for pain, Washington can cut new deals and level credible threats to achieve U.S. goals. This is not a friendly game, but out of it both sides can still benefit."
Markey spends a good portion of the book summarizing themes, issues, and events since 1947 that explain this mutual vulnerability and mutual gain between the United States and Pakistan. And he covers the full gamut: Cold War cooperation, sanctions, anti-Americanism, energy, trade, infrastructure development, India, China, the Musharraf years, demographics, youth culture, Afghanistan, the Osama bin Laden Raid, the list goes on.
As an introductory primer for understanding what ails the relationship, this approach is constructive, especially in understanding the U.S.-Pakistan dynamics since 9/11. Markey also writes with a directness and honesty that should be appreciated in the context of one of Washington's most sensitive relationships. He accuses the Pakistanis of being addicted to U.S. assistance dollars, while claiming "Washington's top policymakers felt a personal animus towards Pakistan."
Markey also rightly focuses on new political trends and ideas in Pakistani popular culture that have been largely ignored in other accounts of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, as well as in the course of much of the policymaking in both countries. For example, when discussing Pakistani notions of abandonment and national honor, Markey highlights the nationalist anti-American sentiment that grew from nuclear sanctions both among the government and the Pakistani public. As a sign of progress, he notes the success of Pakistani pop band Beygairat Brigade, who released a video on YouTube in 2011 "with thinly veiled references to a wide cast of Pakistani xenophobes, religious extremists, and conspiracy theorists" with lyrics that "lampoon many of the notions associated with defending Pakistan's national pride."
Herein lies the strength of Markey's analysis - his acknowledgment of the grassroots efforts currently afoot that are trying to transform Pakistani politics. He identifies four complex and often contradictory identities of Pakistan: "the elite-dominated basket case," the "garrison state," a "terrorist incubator," and a "youthful idealist, teeming with energy and reform-minded ambition." Without this information, the casual observer of Pakistani politics can easily conclude that the government and its people are merely confused, duplicitous, careless - or all three.
It is hard to argue with the claim that knowing Pakistan is critical to understanding the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. But what of the Pakistanis - do they not need to understand why the United States behaves the way it does? Markey's approach puts the entire onus on the Americans to understand how complex Pakistan can be.
While he does outline a comprehensive set of options for managing the U.S.-Pakistan relationship - ranging from looking beyond Afghanistan, waiting until after 2014, "defensive isolation" which involves ending formal cooperation, to comprehensive cooperation - he fails to suggest which specific path the countries should take, or even how the United States and Pakistan might prioritize the management or mitigation of threats over time. Markey simply recommends that the solution for this troubled relationship is nothing other than "patient, sustained effort, not by way of quick fixes or neglect" and that "managing or mitigating threats over time is a more realistic expectation." But is he speaking for the United States, Pakistan, or both? It is not clear.
No Exit from Pakistan is more useful as a relationship management strategy than a policy prescription. But the United States and Pakistan seem to have already entered the realm of relationship management over disengagement. This proved true after a NATO cross-border strike in November 2011 at the Salala border post, where over 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed. Pakistan closed NATO routes for nearly seven months and the United States delayed coalition support funds payments. The two countries eventually resumed dialogue after the brief period of disengagement with the tacit acknowledgement that they had gone too far, especially so close to the pending withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2014.
Ultimately, No Exit from Pakistan introduces some uncomfortable questions about ownership and blame in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. On the one hand, Markey blames the basket case quality of Pakistan on the country's political elites, who "sent their children to private boarding schools while millions of other children never learned to read. Too many sipped cool cucumber soup even as their countrymen struggled to find safe drinking water." But on the other hand, he recognizes that the $1.5 billion-per-year U.S. assistance pledge, known as "Kerry-Lugar-Berman," "was not grounded in an assessment of specific Pakistani development needs or America's ability to meet them."
This is perhaps the true perennial question Markey has set out to answer - who is responsible for Pakistan's problems? He would agree that the United States and Pakistan share in the blame. The decades-long focus of the bilateral relationship on security assistance, militancy, covert activity, and proxy wars has left much unattended by way of development, economics, and stability. Likewise, in Pakistan: A Hard Country, Anatol Lieven pushes for the recognition that the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan "has been responsible for increasing Islamist insurgency and terrorism since 2001." In Mohammed Hanif's A Case of Exploding Mangoes, it becomes acutely apparent whom and what is to blame. The book is a fictional account of the events leading up to the deaths of Pakistani military ruler Gen. Zia ul-Haq and American Ambassador Arnie Raphel in a C-130 plane crash in 1989. As they walk to the plane to enjoy a case of Pakistani mangoes, Zia says to Raphel: "Now we must put our heads together and suck national security."
The controversial writer Salman Rushdie tackled the same question from another angle in his 1983 work of fiction, Shame, which focuses on internal politics in Pakistan and relations between the East and West. Rushdie writes:
Wherever I turn, there is something of which to be ashamed. But shame is like everything else; live with it for long enough and it becomes part of the furniture...you can find shame in every house, burning in an ashtray, hanging framed upon a wall, covering a bed. But nobody notices it any more. And everyone is civilized.
Rushdie's final reminder is simply: "Shame, dear reader, is not the exclusive property of the East."
While the anguish of Sartre's No Exit resonates strongly with the current psychology of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, Rushdie's commentary on shame is a much stronger parallel. It too recognizes that both countries pursue their own interests even as they inflict harm upon themselves and each other. But it focuses on a much more embarrassing aspect of the mutual vulnerability: the fact that the harm, which has become so prevalent, is unacknowledged. Yet both move forward together because, as Markey says, "this is not a friendly game, but out of it both sides can still benefit," even though there is much to be ashamed about.
Shamila N. Chaudhary is Senior Advisor to Dean Vali R. Nasr at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies and is a Senior South Asia Fellow at the New America Foundation.
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Matt Zeller, Watches Without Time: An American Soldier in Afghanistan (Charlottesville, VA: Just World Books, 2012).
Ben Anderson, No Worse Enemy: The Inside Story of the Chaotic Struggle for Afghanistan (Oxford: One World Publications, 2011).
Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
As the U.S. military reels from budgetary battles and withdraws from Afghanistan, commentators offer post-mortem after post-mortem on counter-insurgency (COIN) - an ambitious operational concept-cum-strategy hoisted on its own petard in Afghanistan. These sundry writers - including military officers, scholars, bloggers, and talking heads - have collectively sought, in the words of one blogger "to fire a few shotgun rounds into the recently buried corpse of population-centric counterinsurgency to prevent it from rising again." The specter of the Vietnam Syndrome has become flesh once more, and now the U.S. military plans, or attempts to plan, what form it will take in the decades to come. That is what the COIN debate has always been about - not Iraq or Afghanistan, but the future of the U.S. military.
It is likely that the outcome of this struggle will have a far greater impact on the United States and the world than America's strategic defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan. Still, not only is it unfortunate that these debates are not more rooted in the theatres in which these conflicts have taken place, it is very typically American. Contravening Clausewitz, the COIN debate proceeds as if war can be divorced from policy and politics; as if the organization, training, and equipping of the U.S. armed forces can take place apart from the aims to which and the places where these forces will be applied.
It is in this context that the books reviewed here all have considerable value, showcasing different perspectives of the Afghan campaign during its most crucial and resource-intensive years: the experience of an American soldier, a brave journalist covering the war for years, and a political officer coming to know his district and its history with an uncommon intimacy.
Matt Zeller's Watches Without Time provides a moving portrait of the war in Ghazni province through the author's eyes as a young lieutenant struggling to make sense of the war around him. The book is a collection of letters, reflections, and diary entries on everything from combat to working with the Afghan National Security Forces to the journey home. If anyone is wondering what it is like to go to war, read this book. It is packed with drama, excitement, fear, humor, and heartbreak. More importantly, it contains incisive observations about Afghan society from a young man trying to understand the war around him. His brief anecdotes and explanations of political corruption and the performance of the Afghan National Police are worth the price alone.
Of the many journalists who have covered the war in Afghanistan, Ben Anderson is one of the most impressive. His book, No Worse Enemy, which informed his excellent 2013 documentary with Vice, "This Is What Winning Looks Like," spans 2007 to 2011 and covers his time with the British Army and the U.S. Marine Corps as they struggle to pacify Afghanistan's deadliest province, Helmand. As a military outsider, Anderson struggles to make sense of the British and American militaries as much as he tries to understand the war in Afghanistan, thus making No Worse Enemy an interesting companion read to Zeller's insider account. Anderson is at his strongest when his narrative illustrates the complexity of telling friend from foe and right from wrong in a country where such distinctions are hopelessly blurred. He concludes that, if he were Afghan, he "certainly wouldn't be picking sides." He continues:
If someone built me a school or repaired my mosque, I would undoubtedly smile, shake their hand, maybe even make them a cup of tea or pose for a photograph. But this would be simple pragmatism. It would not mean I offered them my loyalty, much less that I had rejected the Taliban. The nature and detail of this pragmatism is entirely lost on idealistic foreign commanders.
This critique cuts to the heart of the series of assumptions that are often grouped under the misnomer of "counterinsurgency theory." If one cannot truly "clear" an area of the insurgency because the difference between a guerrilla and a disgruntled farmer is far from obvious, and one cannot effectively "hold" an area because the Afghan police are abusive and ineffective and Western forces rotate every six months (as in the case of the British and the U.S. Marines), or "build" in a "held" area because the government is alternatively venal, corrupt, and disinterested, what can Western counter-insurgents really accomplish in Afghanistan that will endure? Through their engaging portraits of the campaign in the south, Anderson and Zeller confront these contradictions head on.
But one cannot truly understand the war unless one understands Afghan history, especially on a very local level. Carter Malkasian, also in Helmand, clearly mastered these details. While all three books are excellent, War Comes to Garmser stands above the rest. The term "instant classic" long ago achieved cliché-status by being applied to middling works - much like the word "brilliant" has lost its luster by being applied to average people - but War Comes to Garmser truly became a classic as soon as it was put on store shelves. It will be one of a small number of books on Afghanistan to be published in the last 12 years that will be read for decades to come, and demands to be consulted if the United States ever again dispatches its forces to a faraway land to embroil itself in an internal war.
Malkasian's book, a history of Garmser through the prism of conflict, begins centuries ago. As someone who has also worked at the local level in Helmand, I can assure you it is no exaggeration to say that you must go this far back in order to truly understand the dynamics of the current conflict. He narrates the tribal and factional dynamics as they developed over the decades, alternately forged and fragmented through war, until his own more recent labors as a State Department political advisor working with the U.S. Marines. Malkasian - who is currently advising Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, the Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force - is something of a folk hero among Afghan hands. He learned Pashto, achieved an unmatched understanding of his district, admirably violated State Department security strictures in order to go where he needed to go and speak with whom he needed to speak.
Gen. Larry Nicholson - who knew Malkasian from his time commanding the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Task Force Leatherneck, in Helmand - memorably said:"We need a Carter Malkasian in every district of Afghanistan." But to say that is to draw the wrong lesson from both his book and the conflict. While it is true that we cannot understand (and therefore cannot be effective) without understanding what I call "micro-conflicts" - the localized, enduring conflicts and rivalries driving politics within the Afghan government and the larger insurgency - and that Malkasian understood them as deeply as any outsider could, this level of understanding alone could not illuminate the nature of the Afghan campaign.
This campaign, as Anderson vividly depicts, rests its "success" on empowering a government and security forces that behave monstrously and feed the problems they are funded to defeat. Which brings me back to my main argument: when a military campaign is so disconnected from politics that it cannot succeed without exacerbating the true political problem - in this case the Afghan government - it matters not how many Carter Malkasians we have or how "good" our military becomes at counterinsurgency.
Ryan Evans is the assistant director of the Center for National Interest in Washington, DC. He is the editor-in-chief of the web magazine War on the Rocks. In 2010-2011, he worked as a social scientist on a human terrain team in central Helmand province. You can follow him on Twitter @EvansRyan202.
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No country aside from Afghanistan has more to lose than Pakistan from the coming departure of international forces. All post-2014 scenarios seem dark for Pakistan should the challenged Afghan state begin to unravel. In a protracted civil war, a reluctant Pakistan stands a good chance of being drawn into the conflict along with other regional powers. Taliban gains leading to a radical Islamic regime in all or most of Afghanistan, while once welcomed by Pakistan, may now result in empowering Pakistan's own militant extremists. Intensified fighting across the border is certain to push millions of new refugees into a Pakistan unprepared and unwilling to absorb them. Prospects that a successfully negotiated political agreement might some time soon avert these outcomes seem dim.
And yet, Pakistan does have one policy option that can result in a brighter scenario for itself and its Afghan neighbor. This opportunity has, in fact, been available throughout the course of the last 12 years, but it requires a strategic reassessment by Pakistan of its long-term national security interests, recognizing that they are best served when there is a stable, peaceful, prospering and, yes, independent Afghanistan. While Pakistan officially endorses this vision, its policies regularly undermine its achievement, above all by giving sanctuary and sustenance to Afghan insurgents. Instead, Pakistan should fully embrace efforts that improve prospects for the emergence of a moderate, economically improving, and accountably-governed Afghanistan. As University of Peshawar professor Ijza Khan advises, rather than pursuing a strategy focused on ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul, Pakistan should strive to win the friendship of the Afghan state and its people.
Convincing Afghans of Pakistan's good intentions will not be easy. Almost regardless of their political disposition, Afghans view their neighbor as overbearing and covetous, blaming it for much of the country's problems. Building trust is bound to be a slow process. Yet Pakistan is not without the means with which to allay Afghan suspicions. An economically-strapped Pakistani government cannot offer the kind of financial assistance that the West and Japan provide Afghanistan, or even match India's development aid portfolio. But Pakistan has advantages that come with geographical proximity, overlapping cultural and ethnic affinities, and established economic ties. It also has a relative abundance of human capital available with which to help strengthen the Afghan state.
To begin, Pakistan could agree to open the long denied trans-country routes that block India's trade with Afghanistan. Afghanistan's critical dependence on road links to the port of Karachi could be better secured and border impediments removed. Existing training programs in Pakistan for Afghan civil servants could be greatly expanded. Pakistan can do more to allay Afghans' beliefs that it is obstructing a peace deal with the Taliban and assure them that it has no plans to divide Afghan territory ethnically. Pakistan can also help secure Afghan presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled in 2014 and 2015, respectively, by using its not inconsiderable influence to limit Taliban interference. It could also place additional troops at the border to reduce infiltration, much as it did during elections in 2004 and 2005. Although largely symbolic, Pakistan might even propose a non-aggression pact. But all these trust-building actions would pale against a decision by Pakistan to withdraw its patronage of the Afghan Taliban. Simply put, it must be willing to evict, if not arrest, Afghan Taliban fighters and their leaders on its soil.
Admittedly this will be hard. It will incur risks for Pakistan, particularly inviting a backlash not just from Afghan Taliban in the country, but also from their Pakistani allies. Afghans may be driven into open alliance with Pakistani insurgents and other extremist groups against the state. Yet this is a fight that Pakistan must eventually undertake. It cannot continue trying to differentiate between good and bad militants and expect the country's endemic violence to end. Delay has only made the task more difficult. If there is to be a reckoning, Pakistan may find that dismantling the Afghan Taliban offers a less difficult first step toward eliminating all of the militant groups that are currently or will inevitably be challenging the Pakistani state.
Pakistan has much to gain from a strategic reappraisal. Aside from possibly avoiding an Afghan civil war and its consequences, Pakistan could expect to enlist Afghan efforts to deny Pakistan's Taliban insurgents the safe haven they have found across the border. Pakistan could feel confident that the Baloch rebellion is not being fueled from the Afghan side of the border and that India does not overplay its hand once NATO forces leave. More broadly, Pakistan should have less reason to fear India's role in Afghanistan. A stabilized, secure Afghanistan would find it unnecessary to look to India to provide a counterweight to Pakistan or worry Pakistan by maintaining an oversized army.
Building confidence between the two countries could also perhaps permanently defuse their long-standing dispute over the Durand Line that separates them. With improved security in Afghanistan, new life could be breathed into plans to construct a gas pipeline from the fields in Turkmenistan. A growing Afghan economy would open up new markets for Pakistani goods and services and improve opportunities for investment. And Pakistan's dreams of using Afghanistan as a road bridge to Central Asia to extend its commerce and political influence might finally become a reality.
Without reciprocating Afghan policies, friendly overtures by Pakistan cannot be sustained. But it is Pakistan's initiatives that will drive any embrace. More than any external power, its actions will determine whether the present Afghan state can succeed against the current odds. And through assisting its struggling neighbor, Pakistan may help secure its own future.
Marvin G. Weinbaum is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and is a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute. He served as an analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003.
Assertions and opinions in this editorial are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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Last week, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made his first official visit to the United States since being elected by a strong majority to serve his third term in office. The word from the White House is that the bilateral relationship is back on track, and the Prime Minister's public address supports that conclusion. While Sharif continued to condemn U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal regions -- remarks that may have prompted the leak to the Washington Post of documents implicating at least some Pakistan government officials in secretly endorsing the program -- he also expressed a desire for cooperation on critical issues such as increased trade and foreign investment in Pakistan, cooperation with India, and a willingness to pursue difficult reforms outlined in the recent loan package from the International Monetary Fund. In exchange for the Prime Minister's willingness to play nice, the United States government released $1.6 billion in military assistance to Pakistan that had been held up since 2011.
A renewal of military aid will, for the time being, shore up the relations between Washington and Islamabad. But military aid will not help Pakistan deal with the daunting development challenges it faces: the loss of its territorial integrity to the Taliban and other groups; the rise of sectarian conflict; high youth unemployment; ongoing power blackouts; underfunded health and schooling services; potentially catastrophic water problems and agricultural losses to soil salinization; and a hopelessly low level of tax revenue for the state to address these challenges.
So what about economic development aid, which continued to flow over the last two years as envisioned in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (better known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill)? Washington reported real progress in the aid program toward achieving important medium term goals, but U.S. economic aid, even at 10 times the current levels, cannot serve as a substitute for the decisions and political will the civilian government of Pakistan needs to provide -- whether increasing energy tariffs to attract desperately needed investment in the power sector, or raising and collecting taxes on the country's small but powerful elite.
One point of economic aid is to enable the United States to work alongside Pakistan's civilian government in tackling its considerable challenges, working as a partner and building the sense of shared understanding and trust that can spill over into cooperation on more sensitive security and anti-terrorism issues. That is the vision Richard Holbrooke, the first Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan had, and we believe it is a vision that can still animate the U.S. approach.
Though the current aid program is handicapped by U.S. government mandates to track money instead of results, red tape, security constraints on U.S. staff working in Pakistan, and the difficulty of shifting management of programs from U.S. contractors to local Pakistani institutions, it can be fixed. At least equally, if not more, important, the United States has other tools in its development toolbox beyond traditional aid. These include mechanisms that facilitate trade, such as providing duty-free, quota-free access to U.S. markets, and unleashing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to encourage private investment in the country's small and medium-sized enterprise sector and its beleaguered energy sector.
U.S. officials are already deploying some of these tools, but to ensure they constitute a coherent development program rather than a haphazard set of projects, we recommend that the State Department and the government of Pakistan establish a formalized Development Dialogue. This should be a discrete component of the Strategic Dialogue Secretary of State John Kerry has agreed to host by March 2014. Discussions could focus on ways to forge a long-term partnership between Pakistan's civilian government and the U.S. government, including but going well beyond traditional aid.
To use the marriage metaphor often invoked to describe the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, a Development Dialogue could help build the resilience that any healthy marriage needs to withstand life's trials and tribulations. It could bolster the countries' vows to work together in good times and in bad by insulating the development agenda from often competing security and diplomatic objectives. And if successful, it could lead to more times of health and fewer times of sickness -- both for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, and the people of Pakistan.
Nancy Birdsall is the founding president of the Center for Global Development. From 1993 to 1998, she was executive vice president of the Inter-American Development Bank and previously served 14 years in research, policy, and management positions, including director of the Policy Research Department, at the World Bank.
Alexis Sowa is a senior policy analyst at the Center for Global Development focused on the organization's ongoing work on Pakistan and contributing to the Oil-to-Cash initiative. She has worked as a governance advisor in Liberia with the Africa Governance Initiative and as a program and policy manager at Malaria No More UK where she identified, developed, and managed investments in sub-Saharan Africa.
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At long last, it appears that the Bilateral Security Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan may be nearing the finish line. However, there are equally consequential negotiations reportedly underway between the Taliban and Afghan government. While it is still unclear what the results of these negotiations will be, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar made the group's position clear earlier this year when he said that they will not attempt to monopolize power in Afghanistan, but that the Taliban seeks "an inclusive government based on Islamic principles."
With the U.S. troop drawdown underway, this statement needs to be fully considered by both the United States and the international community, as it will directly impact Afghan women's rights and human rights more broadly. Afghanistan's future is on the line.
Currently, things are far from stable in Afghanistan. The recent assassination of Arsala Jamal, the governor of Logar province, through a bomb hidden inside a Koran, is a new low in the militants' race to the bottom. Meanwhile, the intimidation and targeted killings of female Afghan government officials and societal leaders continues. Statements by U.N. Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay after her September trip to Afghanistan highlighted these ongoing abuses against Afghan women.
Gains have certainly been made -- women's rights are respected in ways that were unthinkable 15 years ago, there is an independent media, and political parties are active -- yet all of these are tenuous and reversible. Why? The climate of impunity, and the fact that the current Afghan constitution has effectively established a restrictive interpretation of shari'a as the law of the land. Consequently, Afghans lack both personal security and freedom of thought. Protections do not exist to safely dissent from state-imposed orthodoxy, to debate the role and content of religion in law and society, to advocate for the human rights of women and religious minorities, or to question narrow interpretations of Islamic precepts.
Despite this reality, Mullah Omar said it was not enough and his government would be based on Islamic law. His desire for more would be fatal to Afghanistan's effort to emerge from decades of war and instability.
I saw a glimpse of possible things to come first-hand during a trip to Kabul in May, when I visited the Afghan parliament during the debate on the proposed Elimination of Violence Against Women Law. The bill was introduced by the irrepressible parliamentarian Fawsia Koofi, who wanted to replace the imperfect but important presidential decree on protecting women. Koofi thought it better to have a law enjoying popular support through parliamentary passage. When I arrived at the Parliament, Koofi was being thronged by female MPs vigorously arguing that introducing legislation was foolish, as it risked giving conservative elements an opportunity to roll back protections.
Despite these protests, Koofi forged ahead. The outcome? Conservative legislators pressed for amendments based on their narrow interpretation of Islamic law, such as reducing the marriage age from 17 to 14, but the bill did not pass.
If this is happening under the umbrella of protection afforded by the United States, it should give policymakers pause as they look to engage Afghanistan after U.S. forces drawdown. From this low starting point, any consideration of Mullah Omar's offer for a government based on his retrograde interpretation of religious law would be deeply problematic.
Right now, those who think and speak freely in Afghanistan do so at their own risk. My conversations in Kabul made it clear that Afghanistan is a generation or more away from experiencing anything close to freedom of thought due to decades of war, the theological echoes of Taliban rule, poor rule of law, and weak human rights protections. Furthermore, the current environment promotes a vicious cycle: diverse thinking is snuffed out, either by state action or violent religious extremists, which amplifies extreme voices while marginalizing differing Islamic interpretations or debate about religion/state questions. Allowing Mullah Omar to constrict that discussion further would be disastrous.
Afghanistan has not only struggled to respect women's rights, it has also failed to value and protect its religious diversity. I repeatedly heard that Afghanistan is 99% Muslim, a factoid that obscures its existing religious diversity, of which many Afghans are unaware. In the Sunni majority, there are different schools of thought, including "moderate" Muslims who hold a progressive view of religion/state relations. The Shi'a community is theologically and ethnically diverse between Hazara Jafaris and Tajik Ismailis. The historic Hindu and Sikh communities continue to exist, with their distinctive dress and burial traditions providing a visible reminder of Afghanistan's historic pluralism. The hidden Christian and Baha'i communities, not acknowledged by Afghan religious leaders or government officials, live a vulnerable existence in the shadows.
Despite this challenging environment, the U.S. government needs to continue to press all the players seeking peace to protect members of the majority faith whose views contradict the religious establishment or Taliban sympathizers, as well as religious minorities. The Taliban and other militants have long used religion to advance their religio-political agenda. The United States, however, can undercut their message by offering counter narratives of tolerance and understanding, while supporting women's groups and other human rights groups.
The U.S. Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement, on which I informally advised, offers guidance on a way forward. It addresses the issue of advancing pluralism and human rights, including the protection of religious freedom, stating:
Building on current initiatives, the Administration will increase efforts to engage a diverse spectrum of religious leaders on the advancement of universal human rights, promoting core U.S. values like respect for the human rights of members of minority and marginalized groups, pluralism, tolerance, and sensitivity to and respect for the beliefs and traditions of others.
As endgame negotiations speed up, this strategy needs to be brought to bear in Afghanistan immediately. Religion provides a narrative and context for much of what happens in the country, and Mullah Omar wants to re-enshrine his religio-political worldview as international forces withdraw. Instead of ceding the religious space to him, the United States should take steps to protect diverse religious and political views. Doing so can support other U.S. priorities, such as women's rights and free speech, while undercutting the Taliban and other militants seeking sway over the Afghan population.
Knox Thames is the Director of Policy and Research at the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. The views expressed here are his own. He can be followed on Twitter @thames22.
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With the looming withdrawal of NATO troops and a persistent insurgent threat, Afghanistan is in a precarious position. Innumerable tragedies have beleaguered rural Afghans throughout the past decades of conflict -- perpetual violence, oppression of women, and crushing poverty have all contributed to the Hobbesian nature of life in the Afghan countryside.
While the Afghan government has been able to address some of these issues since the Taliban's ouster in 2001, archaic social traditions and deep-seated gender norms have kept much of rural Afghanistan in a medieval state of purgatory. Perhaps the most deplorable tragedy, one that has actually grown more rampant since 2001, is the practice of bacha bazi -- sexual companionship between powerful men and their adolescent boy conscripts.
This phenomenon presents a system of gender reversal in Afghanistan. Whereas rural Pashtun culture remains largely misogynistic and male-dominated due to deeply-ingrained Islamic values, teenage boys have become the objects of lustful attraction and romance for some of the most powerful men in the Afghan countryside.
Demeaning and damaging, the widespread subculture of pedophilia in Afghanistan constitutes one of the most egregious ongoing violations of human rights in the world. The adolescent boys who are groomed for sexual relationships with older men are bought -- or, in some instances, kidnapped -- from their families and thrust into a world which strips them of their masculine identity. These boys are often made to dress as females, wear makeup, and dance for parties of men. They are expected to engage in sexual acts with much older suitors, often remaining a man's or group's sexual underling for a protracted period.
Evolution of Bacha Bazi
Occurring frequently across southern and eastern Afghanistan's rural Pashtun belt and with ethnic Tajiks in the northern Afghan countryside, bacha bazi has become a shockingly common practice. Afghanistan's mujahideen warlords, who fought off the Soviet invasion and instigated a civil war in the 1980s, regularly engaged in acts of pedophilia. Keeping one or more "chai boys," as these male conscripts are called, for personal servitude and sexual pleasure became a symbol of power and social status.
The Taliban had a deep aversion towards bacha bazi, outlawing the practice when they instituted strict nationwide sharia law. According to some accounts, including the hallmark Times of London article "Kandahar Comes out of the Closet" in 2002, one of the original provocations for the Taliban's rise to power in the early 1990s was their outrage over pedophilia. Once they came to power, bacha bazi became taboo, and the men who still engaged in the practice did so in secret.
When the former mujahideen commanders ascended to power in 2001 after the Taliban's ouster, they brought with them a rekindled culture of bacha bazi. Today, many of these empowered warlords serve in important positions, as governors, line ministers, police chiefs, and military commanders.
Since its post-2001 revival, bacha bazi has evolved, and its practice varies across Afghanistan. According to military experts I talked to in Afghanistan, the lawlessness that followed the deposing of the Taliban's in rural Pashtunistan and northern Afghanistan gave rise to violent expressions of pedophilia. Boys were raped, kidnapped, and trafficked as sexual predators regained their positions of regional power. As rule of law mechanisms and general order returned to the Afghan countryside, bacha bazi became a normalized, structured practice in many areas.
Many "chai boys" are now semi-formal apprentices to their powerful male companions. Military officials have observed that Afghan families with an abundance of children are often keen to provide a son to a warlord or government official - with full knowledge of the sexual ramifications - in order to gain familial prestige and monetary compensation. Whereas bacha bazi is now largely consensual and non-violent, its evolution into an institutionalized practice within rural Pashtun and Tajik society is deeply disturbing.
Pedophilia and Islam
The fact that bacha bazi, which has normalized sodomy and child abuse in rural Afghan society, developed within a deeply fundamentalist Islamic region of the world is mystifying. According to a 2009 Human Terrain Team study titled "Pashtun Sexuality," Pashtun social norms dictate that bacha bazi is not un-Islamic or homosexual at all -- if the man does not love the boy, the sexual act is not reprehensible, and is far more ethical than defiling a woman.
Sheltered by their pastoral setting and unable to speak Arabic -- the language of all Islamic texts -- many Afghans allow social customs to trump religious values, including those Quranic verses eschewing homosexuality and promiscuity. Warlords who have exploited Islam for political or personal means have also promulgated tolerance for bacha bazi. The mujahideen commanders are a perfect example of this -- they fought communism in the name of jihad and mobilized thousands of men by promoting Islam, while sexually abusing boys and remaining relatively secular themselves.
The rampant pedophilia has a number of far-reaching detrimental consequences on Afghanistan's development into a functional nation. The first -- and most obvious -- consequence of bacha bazi is the irreparable abuse inflicted on its thousands of victims.
Because it is so common, a significant percentage of the country's male population bears the deep psychological scars of sexual abuse from childhood. Some estimates say that as many as 50 percent of the men in the Pashtun tribal areas of southern Afghanistan take boy lovers, making it clear that pedophilia is a pervasive issue affecting entire rural communities. Many of the prominent Pashtun men who currently engage in bacha bazi were likely abused as children; in turn, many of today's adolescent victims will likely become powerful warlords or government-affiliated leaders with boy lovers of their own, perpetuating the cycle of abuse.
A second corrupting, and perhaps surprising, consequence of bacha bazi is its negative impact on women's rights in Afghanistan. It has become a commonly accepted notion among Afghanistan's latent homosexual male population that "women are for children, and boys are for pleasure." Passed down through many generations and spurred by the vicious cycle created by the pedophile-victim relationship, many Afghan men have lost their attraction towards the opposite gender. Although social and religious customs still heavily dictate that all men must marry one or more women and have children, these marriages are often devoid of love and affection, and are treated as practical, mandated arrangements.
While the Afghan environment has grown more conducive to improving women's social statuses, the continued normalization of bacha bazi will perpetuate the traditional view of women as second-class citizens -- household fixtures meant for child-rearing and menial labor, and undeserving of male attraction and affection.
The third unfortunate consequence of bacha bazi is its detrimental bearing on the perpetual state of conflict in Afghanistan, especially in the southern Pashtun-dominated countryside. Because pedophilia and sodomy were, and remain, a main point of contention between the Islamist Taliban and traditional Pashtun warlords, the widespread nature of bacha bazi likely continues to fuel the Taliban's desire to reassert sharia law. The adolescent victims are vulnerable to Taliban intimidation and may be used to infiltrate the Afghan government and security forces.
The resurgence of bacha bazi since the Taliban's defeat and the significant percentage of government, police, and military officials engaged in the practice has put the United States and its NATO allies in a precarious position. By empowering these sexual predators, the coalition built a government around a "lesser evil," promoting often-corrupt pedophiles in lieu of the extremist, al Qaeda-linked Taliban. Going forward, the strong Western moral aversion to pedophilia will likely erode the willingness of NATO and international philanthropic agencies to continue their support for Afghanistan's development in the post-transition period. As Joel Brinkley, a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle, asked: "So, why are American and NATO forces fighting and dying to defend tens of thousands of proud pedophiles, certainly more per capita than any other place on Earth?"
Despite the grave nature of the child abuse committed across Afghanistan, this tragic phenomenon has received relatively little global attention. It has been highlighted mainly in sporadic news articles and one Afghan-produced documentary, while other Afghan issues such as women's rights and poverty are center stage.
From a human rights perspective, the pervasive culture of pedophilia deserves substantial international consideration due to its detrimental effects -- the immediate and noticeable effects on the young victims, as well as the roadblocks it creates towards achieving gender equality and peace.
The only way to tackle both bacha bazi and gender inequality is to modernize Afghanistan's rule of law system. Afghan officials have been scrutinized in multiple reports by the United Nations' Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict for their failure to protect children's rights. Although Afghan officials formally agreed to outlaw these practices in response to U.N. criticism in 2011, the government's ability and willingness to internally enforce laws protecting children has been non-existent.
If a future Afghan government can achieve a balance between the Taliban, who strictly enforced anti-pedophilia laws but harshly oppressed women, and the current administration, which has put an end to the hard-line Islamic subjugation of women but has allowed bacha bazi to reach shocking levels, Afghanistan's dismal human rights record may improve.
An additional strategy for combating bacha bazi is to attack the issue from an ethno-cultural standpoint. Identifying key tribal elders and other local powerbrokers who share the West's revulsion towards such widespread pedophilia is the first step in achieving lasting progress. As is true with women's rights, understanding Afghanistan's complex social terrain and bridging its cultural differences is necessary to safeguard the rights of adolescent boys.
The Afghan government's acknowledgement of bacha bazi and subsequent outreach into rural Pashtun communities, where the legitimacy of the government is often eclipsed by the power of warlords and tribal elders, will also be critical. The most important breakthrough, of course, will come when the Afghan government, police, and military rid themselves of all pedophiles. If the central government can ensure its representatives at the local level will cease their engagement in bacha bazi, the social norms are bound to change as well.
Eliminating this truly damaging practice will finally occur when a pedophile-free Afghan government is able to more closely connect the country's urban centers to its rural countryside. Only then will a progressive social code be established. And if this evolved social code can incorporate the tenets of Islam with social justice and effectively marginalize the archaic and abusive aspects of Pashtun and Tajik warlord culture, there is hope for Afghanistan yet.
Chris Mondloch served as an analyst for the U.S. Marine Corps for five years and directed intelligence production for the Corps' Economic Political Intelligence Cell in Helmand province in 2012.
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Managing Afghanistan's nascent industrial base will be critical as the nation attempts to build a modern economy that is increasingly less dependent on foreign aid. Today, there is great room for optimism as Afghanistan moves toward the post-transition period. Despite having a GDP that was made up almost entirely of outside aid in 2011 and 2012, certain industries -- including the Afghan telecommunications, agricultural, and mining sectors -- have begun to demonstrate remarkable growth and potential, leading to the vital stability needed for a viable, diversified marketplace.
Experts estimate that Afghanistan holds deposits of $1 trillion to $3 trillion of oil, gas, gold, copper, iron ore, and other natural resources. Of this subset, perhaps the most intriguing is the country's marble industry, which is further along in its exploitation than other areas, and whose emergence is an instructive success story on seeding enterprise in the war zone. As commodity cycles turn, prices increase, and large-scale resource extraction projects scale up, Afghanistan is focusing on the industry as an anchor for the development of its resource corridor. According to the Afghanistan Investment and Support Agency, the Afghan marble industry has expanded by 60 percent since 2008, a growth that has positives effects on other industries as well.
Economic considerations aside, Afghanistan's post-2014 future will be heavily tied to its security situation. In geostrategic hot spots around the world, counterinsurgency experts have long argued that adequate development and economic prosperity follow security. But if there is a successful strategy that upends this conventional wisdom, it may lie in western Afghanistan, where the development of the nation's multi-billion dollar mining industry is growing the economy and consequently forcing improvements in the security sector. In essence, as businesses have begun to flourish, despite the lack of fully settled security, Afghans have moved swiftly against nefarious actors to ensure that they do not impact the flow of marble and revenue generation.
Ultimately, an economy is built out through trade, not aid, as growth and new jobs are the most sustainable way to raise living standards. With increasing exports across Europe and Asia, the Afghan marble sector already earns at least $15 million per year and remains the top marble producer in the region. If present maturation trends hold, the marble sector could generate nearly $700 million in exports by 2018.
Over the last five years, other sectors have also demonstrated robust growth: the Afghan media, health, and agriculture sectors (dry fruits and seeds, which surpassed carpets as Afghanistan's primary export) have all shown impressive development. However, these areas rely to a significant extent on the funds available from foreign aid, and subsequently have not generated sizable, sustainable profits that maximize the sectors' full potential. Conversely, certain large-scale mining activities have turned a profit relatively quickly and have continued to expand at a dynamic rate, especially as innovative Afghan companies increasingly access a burgeoning global market for the nation's rare, world-class materials.
Since 2008, Afghans have sharply focused on the country's export capacity to meet the rise in international demand for high-end stone. Since its introduction to the global market, Afghan white stone, a marble noted for its unusually rich quality and rainbow color, has been actively sought by some of the world's wealthiest buyers -- industry insiders -- who are engaged in a continuous price war for the most expensive marble products. By increasing its share in this highly competitive market, Afghanistan is already carving out broader regional economic relevance, with the World Bank concluding that "in a scenario with higher investment in mining development, growth could increase to 6.9 per cent on average until 2025, and fiscal revenues could reach 2-4 percent of GDP in the early 2020s, depending on the number and scale of the exploited mines and the pace of their development." The potential earnings from the mining trade are therefore poised to become an important source of fiscal revenue, as well as a vehicle for creating jobs, developing infrastructure, and ensuring national economic growth. The key remains strategic management and investment.
The largest marble producer in Afghanistan, Equality Capital Management (ECM), founded in 2006 by Nasim and Adam Doost, has implemented a successful framework for foreign direct investment and economic growth. In Herat province, located in western Afghanistan, ECM has secured multi-million dollar commitments from leading international firms by offering an exclusive right to its top-grade marble, in exchange for modern production machinery, mining refinement technology, and technical support from geology and engineering experts. As a result of this business model and efficient management, ECM has helped bring the Afghan mining sector in line with international standards, while also using public-private partnerships to improve infrastructure, power reliability, and access to deepwater ports that are crucial to making the industry competitive.
The effects of these improvements have been clear. Since ECM's introduction of Afghan marble to some of the world's top stone importers in 2008, it has become a highly sought commodity -- a global-luxury good competing with Carrara marble, an Italian stone generally recognized as one of the finest in the world. Consequently, ECM's current portfolio boasts foreign buyers from a vast lineup of nations, including China, India, Italy, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and the United Arab Emirates, among others. Afghan stone is increasingly used in prestigious construction projects across the world, such as the building of China's St. Regis Shenzhen, a premier five-star international hotel, and in the new headquarters of Margraf Industria Marmi Vicentini, a century-old firm and the fourth largest marble exporter in the world with ties to some of the world's most distinguished architecture.
Because not all foreign companies are keen to enter an unproven market in a war zone, Afghan leadership in cultivating joint ventures to share risks and costs in regions fraught with danger has been critical to the industry's growth. The combination of security operations and economic growth sprouting from these marble-for-security deals, in which Afghan business owners provide marble to the Afghan government in exchange for hard security guarantees, has created challenges for the insurgency. Pursuing this course, "the Afghan National Army has taken the lead and a more active approach to secur[ing] the marble mines, checkpoints, and transit routes over the last six months," notes a senior U.S. military official of Regional Command West. As a result of such deals, in order to guard the industry's growth, the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Security Forces have become more responsive, reinstating the flow of commerce hindered by illicit activity and constraining the insurgency in key zones.
Given the improved security, the growth of the marble industry has created an impressive spillover effect. As noted by Mansour Rahimi, the head of the Herat Marble Union, the number of Afghan-run small-to-medium-size marble enterprises in Herat province alone has increased from four to over 40, and the number of quarries contracted with the government has grown from two to 12, a rate that Adam Doost predicts "will generate 40,000 jobs ...over the next five years in this region." In fact, many of the relatively smaller businesses working beside ECM recently established the Marble Union to help capitalize on opportunities and solve challenges facing the industry due to this growth.
The size and sophistication of the mining industry, and the direct work of Afghans themselves as owners, have made the Herat marble industry a model for Afghan businesses in other regions and industries, such as barite, gold, limestone, lithium, tin, and even oil and gas. Acknowledging this influence, a group of Lashkar Gah onyx dealers from Helmand province in southern Afghanistan recently toured several Herat manufacturing facilities and met with the Doost brothers and Marble Union leaders to learn from their successes. The timing of these study tours is crucial, as the Helmand business leaders are currently introducing their highly prized onyx to the global market for the first time. Afghans' direct participation in these industries is absolutely essential for long-lasting economic growth and stabilization in the region.
Despite this success, fundamental obstacles to developing the mining sector remain. Procuring stable investment and credit facilities for businesses, repairing and updating antiquated technology and infrastructure, and improving the structure and application of mining laws all remain significant challenges. To be sure, no "one-size-fits-all" solution can guide business development and the next generation of entrepreneurs who are leading the way in mining and other growth enterprises in Afghanistan. Businesses throughout the nation need more robust trade opportunities and strong partnerships with foreign investors, since the marble sector is capital intensive and driven by a technological skill base, one which is still in its relative infancy in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, drawing on the Afghan marble industry leaders' blueprint for facilitating foreign direct investment and modern technology has already provided practical steps for up-and-coming Afghan business leaders to take as they seek to achieve transformative results.
In essence, understanding why the marble-for-security model works is especially relevant to the economics implicit in counterinsurgency operations across Afghanistan and other strategic zones. Actively seeking ways to identify, study, and apply the lessons learned from the reality of the war zone -- specifically how economics are incentivizing Afghan leaders to turn against the insurgency and drive hard security and stability guarantees -- can effectively help improve growth and stabilization successes across multiple industries throughout Afghanistan for decades to come.
Melissa L. Skorka is a Counterinsurgency Advisor for the Commanding General's Advisory and Assistance Team in Afghanistan.
BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images
Dear Mr. President:
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is meeting with you on Wednesday with high expectations. He is a pragmatic business-oriented politician with a powerful electoral base who has shown magnanimity and deftness in allowing opposition parties to form governments in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces, and he backed the election of a nationalist Baloch as the chief minister in Baluchistan. While this could be seen as a policy of sharing the misery of trying to govern an ungovernable Pakistan, it could also be an attempt to work within a fractured political system. Regardless, he represents a chance to provide continuity for civilian governance in Pakistan and to build a relationship that goes beyond our immediate need to exit Afghanistan gracefully.
On Afghanistan, his advisors, both civil and military, will have told him that we need them badly; Pakistan tends to overestimate its leverage on such security issues. You will have likely been told by many yourself that we can get the Pakistanis to yield, if only we tighten the screws on them -- militarily via our aid program and the use of drone strikes, and economically via threats to withhold assistance directly or from international financial institutions.
We already have some credit on the latter. Pakistan has a new loan package with the International Monetary Fund, that we supported, though it remains to be seen if they will be able to deliver on the tough policy shifts they have to make to sustain the loan. This type of international financial support is an easier way for us to help or squeeze Pakistan without bringing Congress into the game.
As for the game itself, we can play the short game, focusing primarily on Afghanistan. In that case, making smoother payments from the Coalition Support Fund, and replacing Pakistan's heavily-used military materiel will help. Closer collaboration in helping them target their local Taliban fighters would also win points and cooperation.
Or, we could go for the long game and broaden our influence beyond the central government to the business community and the people of Pakistan. Large numbers of Pakistanis hate the United States because they have seen us support unpopular leaders, both civil and military, in the past. Sharif, a popular and business-oriented leader, appears to have the right instincts on a number of issues. He favors trade over aid, and he favors open borders with his neighbors. We could directly assist him by lowering the tariff rates on Pakistani imports, especially those on textiles -- at least to the level of European countries which have already given Pakistan that concession. Call it a level-playing field. At worst, you will lose South Carolina. But we will bring the emerging and powerful Pakistani business community to our side. In turn, it will help Sharif make the case domestically for open trade with India. You could also use quiet diplomacy with India to help it work things out with Pakistan on trade and border issues while waiting for the next Indian elections in spring 2014.
We also have a substantial proportion of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman funds that have not yet been disbursed and though that aid program ends next year, you could extend it for another two years without seeking additional monies and thus use the full $7.5 billion that has been allocated. Though this is not a huge amount when compared with Pakistan's needs, the symbolic value would be substantial.
Currently, Sharif is personally running the foreign, commerce, and defense ministries -- a tall order for any prime minister. But it allows us to deal with him on a wide range of issues at the highest level. His energy ministers are already working with our key officials and even intelligence collaboration exists, regardless of the underlying mistrust. If we can avoid looking for an obvious quid pro quo in the short run, we may be able to help the Pakistanis also play the long game.
In short, we may be able to do business with Sharif. Recall that he did help President George H. W. Bush with Somalia in the early 1990s.
You will have only a short time with him on Wednesday. Instead of having him recite his grievances, it might be better to have him define a path for the future that helps both countries, and offer to help strengthen his position at home as a result. He will get that. You do not get to be prime minister of Pakistan for a record third time without such smarts. Trust him. But tell him you will verify his moves once he gets home.
Shuja Nawaz is the Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., and is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within.
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Afghanistan has come a long way since the United States and its allies arrived in the country 12 years ago. Daunting challenges remain, but it is a far cry from the failed state and terrorist hideout it was in 2001. Doom-and-gloom press prognostications of an inevitable post-2014 return to Taliban tyranny do not reflect the realities on the ground. The fact is that Afghanistan has a solid chance of becoming significantly more stable, productive, and self-sustaining. This outcome, however, depends upon the will of the United States, its partners, and the leaders Afghans choose in next April's presidential elections.
As political leaders in Washington wrestle with budget issues in the coming months, they should resist the temptation to slash funding for Afghanistan. Outbursts from an outgoing President Hamid Karzai should not obscure larger U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region. Abandoning Afghanistan now would squander the significant investments and sacrifices the United States and its partners have made there, including the sacrifices still borne by many U.S. service members and their families. The scale of the investments needed over the next few years pale in comparison with the magnitude of the earlier ones, which have enabled the Afghan government and its police and military forces to degrade the Taliban-led insurgency and build the country's institutions and economy.
Although skepticism exists in Congress and even parts of the administration, most officials who have worked on Afghanistan, regardless of their political leanings, tend to have far more confidence in the future of the country. That's why I and many other former officials and diplomats and civil society leaders have come together to support a new initiative - the Alliance in Support of the Afghan People, a bipartisan coalition dedicated to preserving and protecting the progress made by the Afghan people since 2001.
Underlying our confidence is an appreciation of how much Afghanistan has changed for the better. Living standards have improved dramatically across most of the country. Significant advances have taken place in agriculture and healthcare. An unprecedented 8.2 million children and young people, four million of them young women and girls, are now in school in Afghanistan, and 180,000 of them are in university classes. Women in Afghanistan, who suffered unspeakable oppression under the Taliban, have become an increasingly significant voice in Afghan society, calling for minority rights, criticizing corruption, and demanding the rule of law. Fresh, young leaders with passion, commitment, resilience, and incredible talent are already emerging. These twenty- and thirty-somethings are serving in the private sector, non-governmental organizations, government, academia, and many other professions. Though they are Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and often refugees who grew up abroad, they see themselves first and foremost as Afghans. The recent victories of the Afghan soccer and cricket teams, which were celebrated across all ethnic lines and throughout the country, highlighted this new reality.
The Taliban insurgency will not overrun Afghanistan's central government so long as the United States and its partners continue to support the Afghan government and its military and security forces as planned. Some 80 percent of the population is now largely protected from Taliban violence, which has increasingly been confined to the country's more remote regions. The major cities and transportation routes are now secured by the Afghan security forces rather than by foreign troops.
Why surrender this success in the area of security -- the sine qua non for success in every other aspect of communal life?
The next generation of Afghan leaders offers a compelling vision and opportunity for the country's future: Afghanistan can combat corruption and hold increasingly free and fair elections -- undertaken within a legal framework and overseen by independent electoral watchdogs -- that produce officials and legislators acceptable to the country's voters. It can become a country where the political rights of women are fully respected. It can undertake an inclusive peace process that addresses the root causes of conflict. And it can continue to develop its economy, trade, and regional ties.
True, these would be immense achievements for any poor, remote, war-torn country, but this vision is not beyond the reach of Afghanistan, with modest international support. Given all that we have achieved together and all that we have sacrificed together, it would be worse than foolhardy to short change this future now. It would be tragic.
Michèle Flournoy, a former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, co-chairs the Center for a New American Security's board of directors; she is also a signatory to the Alliance in Support of the Afghan People, a bipartisan coalition dedicated to preserving and protecting the progress made by the Afghan people since 2001.
KIM JAE-HWAN/AFP/Getty Images
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's memories of Washington cannot be pretty. He was last in town in July 1999, when he met then-President Bill Clinton to discuss the escalation of tensions amongst India and Pakistan in the Kargil district of Kashmir, an area long disputed between the two neighbors. Four months later, Sharif was out of a job.
Sharif's own Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Musharraf, initiated the coup that led to his ouster after Sharif pulled troops out of Kargil -- at Clinton's urging -- to avoid any further escalation. His entrée into the "military's space" by initiating these troop withdrawals ultimately led to his downfall.
This time around, Sharif is in a much stronger position politically. His party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, dominates the National Assembly as a result of its landslide victory in the May elections earlier this year. The military, a perpetual thorn in the side of the civilian government, is showing no visible signs of getting in Sharif's way for the time being. The government is about to receive a multi-billion dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund to breathe life back into the country's economy. Sharif's economic team seems to be making all the right noises on other aspects of economic reform, mainly in the privatization of state-owned steel mills and railways, as well as improvements in the energy sector.
This week, Sharif is in Washington, where he will meet President Barack Obama on Wednesday for an official visit at the White House. Meeting with Obama is typically a sign of strength for foreign leaders back home, but in Pakistan, the American president is so unpopular that Sharif wins no domestic brownie points for the meeting. In fact, it could hurt Sharif or be used against him. When he returns to Pakistan, any dramatic moves on security issues could be construed as a response to American pressure, real or not.
Furthermore, the strengths of Sharif's government are irrelevant under the current circumstances, especially on the issues the United States cares about the most. While his engagements with the American business and development communities will be more positive, Sharif will face "hard messages" from Obama and other American officials that won't be as easily answered. Among many issues, high on the White House's agenda will be the drawdown in Afghanistan, the lingering al-Qaeda threat in Pakistan, the recent uptick in tensions with India, and everlasting concerns about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. High on Pakistan's agenda will be pushing for an end to CIA drone strikes, asking for continued assistance in fighting the Pakistani Taliban, and seeking more information on NATO's plans for withdrawing from Afghanistan.
If it sounds like nothing's changed, that's because it hasn't. A combination of patronage, pressure, and mixed messages has always defined U.S.-Pakistan relations. In December 1998, when Sharif traveled to Washington at Clinton's invitation, security concerns at the time centered on India and nonproliferation. When President Asif Ali Zardari was in Washington in January 2011 for the memorial service of Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Amb. Richard C. Holbrooke, he was lucky Obama even met with him. Some American policy advisors at the time seriously questioned Pakistan's willingness to disrupt the Taliban, viewing the country's "double game" with the militants as reason enough to deny Zardari an audience with Obama.
While military ruler-turned-president Pervez Musharraf received a much warmer reception in Washington during his 2006 trip, he too faced the music when dealing with American officials on Pakistan's relations with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and its nuclear weapons program. Another military ruler, Gen. Zia ul-Haq, probably enjoyed the highest level of American patronage in the history of Pakistani leaders -- the result of his covert cooperation with the United States in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan. But during his 1980 visit to Washington, even Zia faced pressure from the Carter administration to give up Islamabad's secretly expanding nuclear program.
Given the trends, it is apparent that Sharif will have the same kind of trip every other Pakistani leader to the United States has had: beset with unrealistic expectations in Washington and Islamabad; a scramble for "deliverables" identifying progress in the relationship; disappointment that the White House did not grant the Pakistanis the coveted "state visit;" mixed messages on both sides about how "hard" and "soft" the talking points were; and an underlying cynicism questioning the existence of the "unholy alliance" between the two countries. In all fairness, the same circumstances apply when American officials travel to Pakistan.
It is easy to get excited at the prospect of high-level engagements; such visits offer a potential pivot moment for bilateral relationships going through difficult times. We all know how badly the United States and Pakistan need a pivot, but the two countries may have already moved beyond that point. The visit occurs at a time when the countries have initiated a period of more subdued, private, and pragmatic engagement. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's trip to Pakistan in August was an initial attempt to "open a new chapter" in the relationship. The recent release of $1.6 billion in military and economic aid was possible because "ties have improved enough to allow the money to flow again." And while the recent decreased frequency of drone strikes does not appear to be coordinated, it probably doesn't hurt.
This new tone and approach can be helped along by strong diplomatic ties at the highest levels of government -- a condition that has been lacking in both U.S. and Pakistani policymaking circles for several years. Sharif's visit to Washington this week gives both him and Obama an opportunity to formally begin a professional relationship that could do just that.
But as in all things U.S. and Pakistan, a heavy dose of reality is recommended. The two countries face many potential pitfalls as they look towards 2014 when NATO departs Afghanistan, and high-level diplomacy alone cannot ensure that Pakistan and the United States successfully avoid them. Coordination between American and Pakistani militaries, intelligence services, diplomats, and development specialists will also be in demand; engagement on many of these fronts is still recovering from the conflicts of the past two years, whether it be the Osama bin Laden raid, the Raymond Davis incident, or the cross-border incident at Salala. At the least, the Sharif-Obama discussion will offer a taste of what challenges lay ahead and one way to engage on them.
Shamila N. Chaudhary is Senior Advisor to Dean Vali R. Nasr at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies and is a Senior South Asia Fellow at the New America Foundation.
NICHOLAS KAMM/AFP/Getty Images
When Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif lands in Washington this weekend, he would not be blamed if he is wracked by mixed feelings. His last visit to the U.S. capital, in July 1999, occurred in the wake of the Kargil adventure with India that he allowed to get out of hand, and which led to a break with his army chief and his eventual ouster as prime minister. Due to the coup by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan was in the political doghouse until the then-president became a U.S. ally in the wake of the terrorist attack of 9/11 and the allied invasion of Afghanistan. For over a decade, Musharraf played the Afghanistan and terrorism cards to his advantage, while his own country slid into the depths of militancy and terrorism. Ironically, he never visited his own troops who were fighting and dying inside the border region. Neither did most of Pakistan's civilian leaders.
Sharif promised a change toward more active democratic governance when he took over after the May 2013 elections, but his tenure has had a slow start. If he is to make a difference, he will need to show much more alacrity, planning, and boldness in his dealings at home and abroad. He comes to Washington, a place that Charles Dickens once called city of "magnificent intentions," though a number of realities will challenge him both during and after this visit.
First, Washington is distracted at home by its recent budgetary battle and government shutdown. Abroad, Syria and Iran have stolen the attention of policymakers and lawmakers alike. The good news is that Pakistan is not on the front burner. But the bad news is also that Pakistan is not on the front burner. Sharif will, at best, meet a polite reception, but it is unclear what big issues bring the two countries together, while many issues potentially threaten this tenuous relationship. The impending coalition exit from Afghanistan is a short-term issue. A stable and prosperous Pakistan is what will matter most for the long run. Sharif needs to resist the temptation of showing how important he is to the Americans. If he is strong at home in governing and delivering on the promise of democracy, he will carry greater weight abroad.
Second, Sharif has yet to establish clear civilian control over the military. His tentative steps in handling the upcoming changes in the military's leadership leave more questions on the table than answers. Exercising his constitutional prerogative to appoint military commanders is critical, but so is the timing of those actions. Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani gave him an opportunity by publicly announcing that he would in fact be stepping down at the end of November. Sharif muddled that opening by delaying the naming of the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army chief. What lessons will the Americans draw from this? Most likely that they must continue their military-to-military relationship as the dependable cornerstone of the current engagement with Pakistan, at least until they exit Afghanistan next year.
Third, despite Pakistani claims of victory when the United States agreed on Friday to pay $322 million worth of arrears of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) to Pakistan, the future is uncertain. Pakistani Finance Minister Sen. Ishaq Dar, during his recent visit to Washington to attend the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, said he had taken up the issue of CSF payments with U.S. State and Treasury Departments and they had assured him that payment would be made soon. But the reality has been obfuscated by that cheerful announcement.
CSF payments will cease at the end of 2014. Currently, there are no U.S. plans to support Pakistani military operations beyond next year. Furthermore, no payments will be given to Pakistan for the period when the Ground Lines of Communication with Afghanistan were closed. So forget about those seven months. And U.S. authorities have laid down new rules, meaning that the previous claims for expenditures outside the border region and unrelated to military operations will no longer be entertained for reimbursement. In effect, roughly a third of the previous claims will not be paid. The only bright side is that claims will now be paid on a quarterly basis at the potential rate of roughly $100 million a month.
Fourth, Pakistan has not shown many signs of ground work in Washington since the Sharif government took over. Not on the Hill, nor with the administration. Even the prime minister's own visit was not preceded by high-level preparation. And there is no Pakistani ambassador in town, as yet. All of this leads one to believe that no major issues will actually be discussed or resolved. Afghanistan will loom large. India may be raised. But the United States has its own India agenda that does not always include Pakistan. Congress will likely want to know what will happen to Dr. Shakil Afridi and to Musharraf. Will Sharif be able to provide a clear set of answers?
Pakistan needs a new and clear strategic overview of its region and global relationships. It cannot lurch from crisis to crisis, nor can it rely on the global fear of its nuclear arsenal falling into the wrong hands to be the excuse for aid to a country that has not clearly defined its domestic or foreign policy. It faces a huge domestic terror threat. It needs to open its borders to its neighbors and to trade across the region. Sharif has an opportunity to boldly and unambiguously state where he stands on these issues. If he does so in Washington, he may mark an early turning point in his tenure. Ambiguity and business as usual, however, will not do.
Shuja Nawaz is the Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., and is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within.
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This project was made possible by support from the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.
Name: Dost Mohammad
When not working out at Kabul's cricket academy, Dost Mohammad is working in his father's shop, selling clothes and trinkets, knockoffs from Asia of brands from Europe. And when he's not at the family store, he's playing more cricket -- pick-up games with neighborhood boys, practicing his bowling or his special kind of batting. The cricket academy is almost lush by Kabul standards, with a well-manicured grass field surrounded by a grandstand. But the field across the street, where Mohammad does his extra practice, is harsh. There's no grass, just hard-packed dust that pounds his joints and kicks up into his lungs, and there's no respite from the sun, which is strongest at midday when Mohammad tends to be there.
Kabul is a city that could be planned for the express purpose of punishing athletes. At 6,000 feet above sea level, the air is thin and heavily polluted, not just because there are so many vehicles and no enforced emission standards, but because there is so much dust that carries all kinds of pollutants. Grass and shade are scarce because during the communist regime, trees were cut down so the mujahideen couldn't hide in them, and with few trees to provide relief from the sun and roots to hold moisture, the city's plant life was defenseless against drought, which eventually, inevitably, struck.
Mohammad is thin and not immediately identifiable as an athlete, but when he begins to move at practice, he reveals a sinewy kind of strength; he is able to wind his body up and release it with tremendous force. To see him bowl from up close is to witness a kind of violence, his body unfurling, dust rising around him, and the ball leaving his arm like a rifle shot. To those like me, uninitiated to the game of cricket, he is a walking testament to the fact that this is not just a game for old, slow socialites. And as Afghanistan begins to make a name for itself in international sports -- winning a South Asian soccer tournament against India in September and qualifying earlier this month for the 2015 cricket world cup -- Mohammad hopes he'll make the national cricket team and become part of the movement.
The following are the words of Dost Mohammad, as told to Jeffrey E. Stern
I was around 7 to 9 years old when I started watching cricket on the TV. We were living in Pakistan, and I was eagerly watching India and Pakistan play each other. It was my dream to be a good cricketer. At that time, Afghanistan did not have a cricket team.
Cricket is the game of power, because the ball is very heavy -- about a kilogram (2.2 pounds). It needs a lot of power to bowl it. Batting is my favorite, but it is very difficult. If you miss the ball, you get injured, because it is very heavy. You have to concentrate when the bowler bowls.
There are some batsmen legends, like Tendon Karen and Parok Pandi. They have the ability to push the ball and move their feet at the same time. They have the ability to face 130, 140 kilometers/hour. Only the really good players can do that.
In Afghanistan, we have trials once a year. There are four to five coaches and one from Pakistan. They are experts in the field of cricket. They examine the players. I didn't know it was happening until my friend said, "Today is the last day of the cricket trial!" And they encouraged me: "You have to go, you have to go!" So I rushed over, I filled out the form -- name, there you put your father's name, there you put your picture -- and went to the field. But I hadn't brought my own equipment, my bat, helmet, I had to borrow from someone else.
The coach says that he wants to bowl you the short pitch. You have to play it. If you can't do it, it means you failed. And then the coach tells you that the bowler will bowl you in the feet. The ball comes this way. He told me that I have to cut that way. Then he told me another way. That day I faced 10 or 12 bowls.
More than 10,000 people came from 34 provinces of Afghanistan, and to most of them, the coach said "You are not able to join." When I found out I made it, it was amazing.
Now that we're practicing to make the national team, we have four sessions in a day. They go from 5 o'clock in the morning until 5 o'clock in the evening. My session is the second. There are about 120 players. We have fast ballers, slow ballers, spin ballers. All of them are working very hard to join, but maybe just five people will make it.
When we came from Pakistan, it was the first period of Hamid Karzai. There were few American troops, and all of Afghanistan was secure. When the amount of foreigners increased, the situation in Afghanistan got worse.
It is my own thought, but I think that the main reason the situation is getting worse is the foreigners. They are not doing well. To be very honest, I wish them to leave and to join their families in their own countries, because many of them lost their lives in Afghanistan.
But I don't think that they will leave Afghanistan, because they spent a lot of money here. They came here for their own aim. Some of them might leave Afghanistan, but not all of them.
I am not happy with the presence of ISAF and others in Afghanistan because they have done many bad things in some parts of the country, like Kandahar and Helmand. Most of the people say that about five or six years ago, there was some security in that part of Afghanistan, but when these troops came, the security situation got worse day by day.
You know, during the night they just go to the villages, without any reason, and search the women. Afghan people are very -- I mean they don't let other women touch their women. Now foreign soldiers come to touch their women.
And also, there are a lot of reasons that the foreign troops have bad attitudes. If you take an example from Kabul -- when they leave their base, they do not allow other people to go near their cars. It is a big problem, they're causing traffic jams. If someone wants to go close to them, I have seen many people get shot. When I was in Bagram, there was a person who had some urgent work and wanted to arrive quickly, and when he got close to the tank, they shot him.
There are a lot of people that have no relation or connection with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, but the foreign troops just collect them and put them into jail. And they spend 10 years in Bagram or somewhere.
And I'm not worried about the Taliban. We had a football match between Afghanistan and Pakistan, have you watched that? I saw on the news, there were three or four people who came from Kandahar, or maybe it was Herat. They wanted to come to Kabul to watch the football game, and the Taliban stopped the car. The Taliban was searching for people associated with the government. The guys in the car looked like military personnel, so the Taliban snatched them out of the car. On the side of the road, the Taliban covered the heads of their captives with masks and took them away to execute them. But first the Taliban said, "Why you are going to Kabul?" And the men said, "We want to go to Kabul in order to watch that game." Then the Taliban called their friends over and said, "Let's all recite the holy Koran and pray for our national team to win." And then they let them come here!
They posted the picture of the travelers on BBC. So I'm not worried about the Taliban, because the Taliban love sport. They supported sport before.
Edited by Jeffrey E. Stern.
Jeffrey E. Stern -- www.JeffreyEstern.com -- is a writer and development worker whose reporting from Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere has appeared in Esquire, Time, newsweek.com/The Daily Beast, and the Philadelphia Inquirer.
Jeffrey E Stern/Author Photo
A curious thing happened two weeks ago in the militancy-ravaged Pakistani city of Peshawar.
An anti-terrorism court sentenced a man named Muhammad Saeed to two years in prison. His crime? Distributing pamphlets critical of the Pakistani army and election commissioner.
Pakistan is a nation where anti-state insurgents and sectarian militants murder civilians with savage regularity -- yet are rarely arrested, much less prosecuted. It's also a nation where terrorist leaders live free and are protected by the state.
And yet Saeed received two years' imprisonment simply for passing out anti-state literature.
Stranger still, Saeed belongs to a global Islamic organization that embraces nonviolence and boasts a Pakistan-based membership numbering only in the hundreds-represented mainly, purportedly, by academics, engineers, and other seemingly innocuous educated elites.
Tellingly, in recent months other Pakistan-based members of this organization, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), have suffered fates similar to Saeed's. They've been arrested for hanging anti-government banners and handing out leaflets urging Pakistanis to boycott elections. They've even been jailed for violating the country's sedition law. Last year, the organization's spokesman in Pakistan, Naveed Butt, went missing. HuT says he was abducted by intelligence agents.
So what gives?
For starters, one can reasonably argue that HuT actually constitutes a considerable threat -- thereby justifying the draconian measures against its members.
HuT vows to overthrow, via bloodless revolution, democratic governments worldwide -- and then establish a global caliphate. This campaign is to be orchestrated not by the masses, but by educated, affluent professionals and senior-level military officers -- strategically-placed elites with the capacity and clout to effect change. HuT has launched recruitment efforts at prestigious Pakistani universities, and earlier this year, according to Pakistani and Western media reports, activists descended on a Pakistani youth leadership conference at the University of Oxford to influence the discussions and disseminate marketing materials. Officers have also reportedly been recruited at Britain's Sandhurst military academy.
And this recruitment strategy has apparently worked. Last year, 19 engineers, professors, and scientists were arrested in an affluent Lahore neighborhood for alleged ties to HuT. In recent years, senior military officials -- including a former Air Force base commanding officer and a Major-rank security officer for former president Pervez Musharraf -- have been arrested as well. Last year, five army officers -- including a brigadier named Ali Khan -- received jail sentences for their links to HuT.
Another troubling aspect of HuT is its belligerent rhetoric, which belies its assurances of nonviolence. A pamphlet in Indonesia has depicted a decapitated Statue of Liberty flanked by a Manhattan skyline in flames. In Pakistan, official statements speak of "shattering the ribs" of traitors, and of military commanders leading "noble armed forces to the conquest of India." HuT's views are often indistinguishable from those of violent militant organizations -- and are quite distinct from more moderate global Islamist outfits like the Muslim Brotherhood. A recent press release, for example, blames America for last month's deadly church bombing in Peshawar, contending that Washington is "punishing" Pakistanis for refusing to support "the American occupation in Afghanistan."
Then there are HuT's activities in neighboring nations. New Delhi has accused HuT of providing "intellectual and often financial assistance" to the Indian Mujahideen, an indigenous militant organization. Dhaka linked HuT to an unsuccessful 2012 coup attempt, and has since arrested university students for HuT ties. Moscow describes HuT as an "international terrorist organization," and has even blamed the group for organizing attacks on civilians. Finally, officials often accuse HuT of fomenting hatred in Central Asia -- a critical region in this story, given that analysts allege links between Pakistan's HuT chapter and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an extremist organization that claims to be fighting Pakistan's government.
Not surprisingly, Pakistani security officials have painted a disturbing picture of HuT, a banned organization in the country. One intelligence official, speaking to a Pakistani newspaper, says it has a "potentially far more destructive method of operation" than al-Qaeda. The official, who was not identified, added that HuT members "target minds instead of strategic installations and personnel, using the power of the intellect instead of roadside bombs." No wonder Pakistan cracks down so hard.
Yet there's likely another reason: Pakistan's relationship with the United States, one of Islamabad's chief sources of military and economic assistance.
Washington regards Islamabad as either unwilling or unable to wage an all-out assault on extremism -- especially because several militant groups have ties to the Pakistani security establishment.
Enter HuT. Unlike the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), HuT has never been sponsored by the Pakistani state. And unlike the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), HuT does not use violence. In other words, it is neither a trusted proxy nor an active combatant. This allows Islamabad to demonstrate to Washington, without strategic or tactical obstacles, that it can and does take robust action against militant threats. It's an easy way to impress its American benefactor.
Consider that Khan, the officer convicted for HuT ties, was arrested four days after U.S. special forces raided Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad. Khan's detention can be interpreted as assurance to the Americans that despite the bin Laden debacle, Pakistan remains serious about apprehending militants.
Similarly, according to his supporters, HuT spokesman Butt disappeared on May 11, 2012 -- four days before Pakistani and American officials announced an "imminent" deal to reopen NATO supply routes in Pakistan, which Islamabad had closed the previous November after NATO aircraft accidentally killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. This announcement came just after the United States agreed to invite then-President Asif Ali Zardari to Chicago for a NATO summit on Afghanistan -- an invitation Islamabad would describe as "critical" for a supply lines deal. Certainly Butt's seizure alone didn't prompt Washington's invitation to Zardari, but it nonetheless could have been a factor (the supply routes would reopen in July, after Washington apologized for the deadly airstrikes).
Skeptics may argue, with reason, that Islamabad, in its zeal to demonstrate its countermilitancy bona fides, inflates the threat posed by HuT. The sensational charges originally leveled against Khan -- planning to have the Pakistani Air Force bomb a corps commanders' conference so that HuT could swoop in and implement Islamic rule -- were eventually dropped. In the end, he was convicted on more vague charges of "links with a banned organization." Khan has consistently denied any guilt. It also bears mentioning that the most alarmist assessments of HuT in Pakistan -- including one describing it as "a potentially more potent threat" than the TTP -- are expressed through anonymous quotations in media reports, and not through public statements.
Furthermore, few if any serious charges against HuT have been proven in other countries -- from the Bangladesh coup allegations and Indian Mujahideen links to its reputed strength in the Caucuses (independent analysts actually say HuT has committed few if any attacks in Uzbekistan, and enjoys "virtually no support" in Turkmenistan).
So perhaps HuT should ultimately be seen not as a destructive threat, but as an ultra-conservative and bellicose gadfly: more likely to disrupt conferences or, as seen in recent days, protest the Miss World beauty competition than to take up arms and pull off putsches. At least for now.
Still, given Pakistan's nuclear status and pathological instability, HuT's presence and activities in the country are troubling -- and Islamabad's emphatic countermeasures are therefore laudable. If only Pakistan could be as vigilant toward the murderous TTP and LeJ as it is toward the likes of Muhammad Saeed, the hapless HuT member jailed for passing out pamphlets.
Michael Kugelman is the senior program associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He can be reached via email at firstname.lastname@example.org or on Twitter @michaelkugelman.
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Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf is a controversial Afghan politician, a former member of parliament, and now a presidential hopeful for the country's 2014 election. To his supporters, he is a leader who took on the Soviets and played a key role in the jihad against the Afghan communists. To his critics, he is a warlord who led bloody battles on the streets of Kabul, killing thousands of Shiites and Hazaras during the 1990s. To Westerners, he's an extremist with links to al-Qaeda-minded people, whose name alone has inspired other Islamist groups as far away as the Philippines. And now, for the Taliban in Afghanistan, he has become "Public Enemy No.1," someone they have already declared a dead man.
Sayyaf, which means "the swordsman" in Arabic, does not venture out of his sprawling residence west of Kabul very often, and he has kept a relatively low profile in the parliament over the last decade. But his role in the violent and often unpredictable Afghan political world extends beyond the country's "House of People." He is known to have played a key role in the appointments of governors and district governors across the country. He runs his own university and TV station in Kabul. He is wealthy, media-shy, and a shrewd behind-the-scenes political operator. But over the past few years, he's taken on a subject that is critical for the survival of the Taliban and other violent extremists -- their own religious narrative to inspire, recruit, and justify violence in the name of God -- making him their new arch nemesis.
It began during a speech in September 2012 to commemorate the first anniversary of the death of former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, President Hamid Karzai's chief peacemaker who was killed by a Taliban suicide bomber posing as a peace envoy, when Sayyaf publically warned Taliban suicide bombers about their fate in the afterlife. Quoting Islamic texts extensively, Sayyaf said he wanted to send a message to the militants that on Judgment Day, they would show up with "flags planted in their buttocks from the back," marking them "unforgivable" in the court of God. He continued by declaring: "You are not fighting against foreigners, but against Islam and Muslims." Sayyaf then told the crowd: "They [Taliban] are enemies of God and his Messenger (Prophet Muhammad). Quran says kill them well. Kill them with torture. Do you know what it means to kill them well? With Zajir (torment or torture). Hang them! Let people see them hanged for a month. Cut their right hands and left feet. And do your best to eliminate them [Taliban] from the face of the earth."
Then last week, during an Afghan government-sponsored International Islamic Scholars conference in Kabul, Sayyaf again spoke against the Taliban, this time targeting the militants' financial backers in Middle Eastern countries. This is because the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, their chief ally, are known to do fundraising in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf Arab states. Sayyaf knows this well because he himself used to travel to Arab countries in the 1980s, using his oratory skills and knowledge of Arabic, to raise funds for mujahideen fighting the former Soviet Union.
Speaking in fluent Arabic, Sayyaf addressed the approximately 200 international Muslim scholars about the alleged support Muslim countries provide to the Taliban. "I ask you, and for the sake of God tell me, those [Taliban] who are fighting now, their war is not against foreigners," Sayyaf declared. He also asked the international Muslim scholars to explain why some Muslims countries did not oppose the intervention by the U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan when the United Nations vote came up in 2001. "Did any of the Islamic countries at the United Nations oppose the arrival of foreigners in Afghanistan? All of the Islamic countries voted in favor for the arrival of them in Afghanistan," Sayyaf remarked. He also questioned the religious credentials of the Taliban by telling the scholars: "Those who are killing innocent Afghans, they don't know anything about Islam."
The Taliban and their violent extremist allies responded immediately to Sayyaf's remarks. In one article titled "What does this old Dajjal (anti-Christ) say?," they attacked Sayyaf, calling him a "manifestation of Satan," and used Quranic texts in an attempt to counter his remarks. Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, also tweeted articles, social media posts, and reports from the militant group's own gathering of "1600 undisputed Islamic scholars" and their fatwa to discredit Sayyaf and the government-sponsored Islamic Scholars conference.
The primary reason that the Taliban militants view Sayyaf's remarks, and condemnations by the international Islamic scholars, as an existential threat to their survival is simple. For almost a decade, the Taliban have relied on skewing the interpretation of Islam's religious texts to justify their violence, especially the use of suicide bombing, which had no precedence in Afghanistan until the mid-2000s. But while Afghans abhor the use of suicide bombings, despite extensive propaganda campaigns by the Taliban to justify it on religious grounds, Afghanistan's religious scholars have yet to strongly and consistently counter the militant group's religious justifications for violence -- until now. Since Sayyaf's "challenge" to the Taliban's religious narrative, the militant group appears to have found itself outgunned in the battle for ideology, something which is far more important to them than winning a military campaign. This is because Sayyaf has established religious credentials from Sunni Islam's most prestigious school, the Cairo-based Al-Azhar University, which allows him to speak with authority on religious issues. He is also a charismatic and gifted orator, which brings him coverage in the local media, and he maintains political influence through his traditional networks in some key northern provinces of Afghanistan, as well as in some of the former Taliban heartlands in the south, which adds to his leverage. Because of this, the Taliban want Sayyaf dead -- in fact, Afghanistan's intelligence agency recently announced that it had foiled a Taliban plot to assassinate Sayyaf only days after his speech in early September of this year.
Sayyaf is not a saint to Afghans. Nor is he considered a moderate Islamist. His involvement in human rights abuses, especially during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s, is well documented by Human Rights Watch. Yet his current stance, effectively challenging the Taliban on their own ideological and religious turf, is something significant for both the international stakeholders who are attempting to end the war in Afghanistan, and for regional Islamic countries that are searching for ways to rescue the peaceful message of Islam from the dark interpretation espoused by violent extremists. After all, the Taliban and other militant groups are expected to step up their terror campaign inside Afghanistan after the withdrawal of international troops at the end of 2014. To do so, they need their religious narrative to hold, enabling them to bring in new recruits to maintain their ranks and sustain their violence. Sayyaf, despite his own violent past and infamy, appears to be taking the lead in challenging this narrative, making him "Public Enemy No.1" to the Taliban and other extremists in Afghanistan and beyond.
Ahmad Shafi is an Afghan journalist and a former NPR producer in Afghanistan.
MASSOUD HOSSAINI/AFP/Getty Images
The frenzied phase of registration for the 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan ended Sunday with more names on the roster than expected, more last-minute horse-trading than anticipated, and more questions than answers about what is already shaping up to be a hectic but vibrant process leading up to the critical ballot next April.
Nominee registration began as a trickle and ended as a deluge of presidential hopefuls submitting their paperwork. Finally, 26 men and one woman -- some known political figures, others untested -- presented their running mates (consisting of 45 men and 9 women), and took advantage of the media glare to present their core campaign slogans to millions of enthused, but bewildered Afghans on live television.
Of the 27 candidates, it is expected that some aspirants will be disqualified by mid-November for failing to meet eligibility conditions -- which include putting down a hefty registration deposit and submitting 100,000 eligible voter endorsement cards -- most probably resulting in a shortlist of no more than half a dozen serious tickets.
The biggest challenge in an overcrowded field will be to engage in another cycle of coalition building during or after elections to strengthen team-building and to realign agendas and policies that are not fundamentally contradictory or contrary.
The Karzai factor
Most contenders tried until the last minute to form multi-ethnic tickets, at times breaking up their own fragile alliances, to garner support from perceived owners of both small and large "voter banks." Some seem to have succeeded, others seemingly not, and the rest had to contend with leftover constituencies that might not tilt the balance in their favor after all.
However, after months of political wrangling and chai-sipping, what is certain is that while the Afghan political arena may look dynamic and lively on the surface, in essence it is more fragmented and mismatched than at any other time in the past decade.
Part of the reason lies with President Hamid Karzai who has ruled the country for the past twelve years, and the inner clique he has relied upon to do his bidding. Karzai, masterful at domestic political intrigue and maneuvering, and consumed by his own future political leverage, legacy, and place in history, is eager to be the ultimate kingmaker in next year's presidential vote.
More importantly, although Karzai believes he has transcended ethnic and factional lines, he has publicly shown disdain for organized political movements and resisted any attempt to promote and nurture democratic party-based politics over the years. With encouragement from his loyalists and key members of his family, he has applied clan-style politics at the national level, relying largely on tribal and local power-brokers with monetary and factional influence.
Although this approach appears to have served him well, it has increasingly undermined the professionalization of politics, where a constitutional order underpinned by platform-based political activity could flourish.
Additionally, there are indications that Karzai may have overplayed his hand with regard to the 2014 elections, and inadvertently facilitated the formation of a muddled setting that may undermine his own legitimate aspirations. There are real fears among Afghan political elites that Karzai could be urged by his cronies to attempt at influencing the election process, in less obvious and more subtle ways than the 2009 presidential election debacle, should the outcome of the vote not tilt in their favor.
Although the president once again reiterated on Monday that he will remain impartial and will not allow government interference in electoral matters, Atta Mohammad Noor, the powerful governor of Balkh province, alleged later that same day that the president's camp had a few days back offered him a "blank check," along with the top vice presidential position, to secure his support for Karzai's candidate of choice.
Karzai now has to make do with a fragmented polity and too many horses in the running, most of whom may engage in destructive mud-slinging. More significantly, in the event that no winner emerges with the 50%+1 requirement in the first round of voting, Karzai can stealthily orchestrate a major showdown during the second round by forcing re-alignments, perhaps even tapping into Taliban and external pools of support.
This calculation might explain not only his fixation on courting the Taliban, but also his reluctance to sign a bilateral security agreement with the United States, even though most Afghans are in favor of seeing the document finalized.
While Karzai has always raised the specter of foreign meddling in the elections, it is, in fact, the domestic wheeling and dealing and infringement mechanisms on the election, through election commissioners he recently appointed and ballot box handlers, that Afghans dread the most.
Frantic realignment and mismatched tickets
However, Karzai is not the only reason for the initial disarray of the nomination process. The other major factor is the flimsiness of ideological and conceptual politics, where the nexus of collaboration lies less with shared ideas, values and policies, and more with interest-driven horse-trading and deal-making at the expense of marginalizing the Afghan people.
This may seem natural in the Afghan context, but when coupled with the insurgency that rankles from one side, and public disenchantment caused by widespread corruption and ineptness on the other, the many candidate choices -- not too dissimilar in terms of their views and past records in most cases - may cause some Afghans to stay away from casting a vote. All key contenders must therefore take voters apathy seriously into account and regain the electorate's trust by engaging in a healthy race.
The dissolution of a number of so-called political alliances at the 11th hour on Sunday also demonstrates the fragility of coalition-building and the weakness of political groupings to gel and offer a common policy platform.
At the end of the day, harsh political realities meant that ethnic voter banks were more valuable than ideological and policy commonalities.
The frantic realignment of political figures over the last few days has in some cases led to the creation of mismatched tickets, where not only old foes joined hands but even decentralization advocates coalesced with backers of a strong central government. It will require a great deal of work for several contenders and their running mates to tie together their visions that are largely incompatible, solidify new alignments, form platforms, and eventually manage a campaign, all in short order.
And, while there is a greater possibility of some fragmentation of voter banks along different ethnic and factional lines, the biggest challenge for vote bank owners will be to maintain the integrity of their followers' vote and ultimately avoid a backlash from their constituents.
Opportunities and prospects
Amid the ongoing mud-slinging, there is an opportunity before and during the campaign season for eligible and visionary candidates to develop their programs and agendas, build up electoral charisma, connect to the electorate, and offer the public real choices and solutions.
These presidential hopefuls need to realize that it is not enough to sign-up, spend money, make backdoor deals, and run in a less-than-transparent election to hold office.
The best choice for Karzai is to not tarnish his legacy, to truly remain impartial and prevent any official intrusion or the use of state resources in the elections.
The political class, especially the current leadership, has had a dismal record for listening to the people's voice. Now is the time to change the stale manner in which politics has been practiced by warlords, technocrats or amateur politicians, engage the electorate, and focus the debate on priority challenges facing the country during and after 2014.
The Afghan people, including the younger generation, expect more from their leaders.
As international security and development commitments diminish, and Afghanistan becomes more self-reliant, elections offer a unique opportunity for Afghans to elect a unifying and competent team that can offer better security prospects, more predictability in the social and economic spheres, more jobs and productivity, better governance, a believable justice system, and stable relations with Afghanistan's friends and allies.
There is no greater calling for contenders and voters than ensuring that the political transition and peaceful transfer of power take place on time, and be inclusive, acceptable and credible. Then it will be time to rise above politics and take the best interests of the country into account by accepting the results, work together and steer the country away from danger.
Omar Samad is a Senior Central Asia Fellow at New America Foundation, and a former Afghan Ambassador to France and Canada.
Javid Ahmad is a Program Coordinator for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The views reflected here are his own.
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In an historic moment this weekend, Pakistan's two-term army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani announced that he would retire at the end of November after six years at the helm. An official later stated that Kayani would not seek any other job after retirement, putting an end to speculation in Pakistan that Kayani may stay on in another perhaps more powerful role. This marks a necessary transition in the slow return to the supremacy of the elected civilian government over the military that has dominated decision making in Pakistan for the past 13 plus years, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's first government was overthrown by a coup on behalf of Gen. Pervez Musharraf. But the road ahead for Pakistan's political evolution remains difficult, as stunted civilian institutions struggle to assert themselves in the face not only of lingering military power, but also a massive internal militancy and potentially hot borders on both Pakistan's East (with India) and West (with Afghanistan). While this is a start, a number of other transitions are needed for Pakistan to regain its stability. Kayani may be gone, but military influence in the country remains powerful. His successor as army chief would do well to keep it on a downward trajectory.
Kayani, a graduate of the command and staff college at Fort Leavenworth, was the first head of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate to become army chief. He is also the last army chief to have fought in a full-fledged war, with perennial rival India in 1971. His U.S. training often led U.S. leaders to mistakenly assume that he was "pro-American," most notably former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, who made 26 visits to Pakistan to with meet Kayani during his tenure as chairman. Mullen also penned an over-the-top paen to Kayani for TIME magazine's "100 Most Influential People" issue in 2009, calling Kayani "a man with a plan." However, Mullen ended that relationship in 2011 on Capitol Hill with a scathing attack that described the anti-U.S. and pro-Taliban Haqqani Network as a "veritable arm of the ISI." Mullen, like others, had made the mistake of assuming that Kayani would bury his strong nationalism in favor of meeting U.S. goals in the region, even after Kayani had made it clear that he did not think the United States had a clearly defined strategy for Afghanistan or the region and hedged his bets accordingly.
At home, Kayani tried to act as a political umpire between often-warring political parties, resisting the temptation to intercede or take over when they got into seemingly intractable feuds. In 2009, for instance, he prevented a major crisis during the Pakistan Peoples Party government of then-President Asif Ali Zardari when then-opposition leader Sharif led a "long march" into Islamabad to restore the ousted chief justice, admitting to a visitor: "I could have taken over then but did not." Kayani stayed his hand for six years, but some powerful negatives have also marked his two-term stint.
Within the army itself, Kayani fostered unhappiness, especially among the younger officers, when he accepted a second three-year term from Zardari in 2010. The gap between him and his senior officers also widened. His newestcorps commanders are some 17 courses junior to him at the Pakistan Military Academy, a veritable lifetime in military circles. And the disastrous 2011 killing of two Pakistani civilians by Raymond Davis in Lahore, followed by the U.S. raid on Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden, the attack on the Pakistani border post at Salala, and the subsequent closing of the ground line of communications for the coalition in Afghanistan tarnished Kayani's tenure. He had to face angry young officers at the National Defence University after the Abbottabad raid, and some senior officers were critical of his management style, saying that he reflected a paradoxical desire to be close but to retain a cool aloofness. As a result, Kayani kept his cards very close to his chest and relied on a handful of key colleagues to keep him informed of developments inside the army.
During this time, the ISI also came under severe criticism with accusations that it had overstepped legal boundaries in its pursuit of critics, including journalist Saleem Shahzad who was killed after publishing critical articles of the military's dealings with militants. Separately, Kayani announced an inquiry, but did not share the results of the investigation, into the videotaped killings of unarmed, bound, and blindfolded captives during the counter militancy campaign in Swat.
But for all of the criticism, the ISI appeared to gain greater strength during Kayani's term as army chief. Instead of becoming a policy-neutral intelligence agency, it came to be more of a policymaking body. If the post-Kayani transition is to take hold, the role of the ISI will need to be re-examined and reduced, and its relationship as a multi-service institution (rather than as a fief of the army alone) should be reshaped with civilian authorities. Sharif must take the lead in selecting the head of the ISI and also demand regular intelligence briefings, while resisting the urge to ask for policy advice or implementation. He must also regain control of a Defence Ministry that is heavily dominated by retired military officers. The challenge for Sharif will be to find capable civilians, starting with a full-time Defence Minister, who can make defense-related decisions, rather than trying to manage the ministry himself.
Kayani made history by averting a coup and supporting the return of civilian rule. Sharif could make history by regaining control of the country's polity. He must begin by exercising his constitutional prerogative to select the next Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and the head of Pakistan's army. He has a choice among capable three-stars, one of whom will have to provide strong and inspiring leadership for an army that has suffered the ravages of continuous insurgency and militancy for over a decade.Shuja Nawaz is the Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., and is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
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Irfan Ali, a tireless campaigner for the rights of minority Shiites in his native Pakistan, volunteered to collect scattered limbs after an explosion tore through the billiard hall of his hometown Quetta in January 2013. The 33-year-old tweeted from the scene. "Was on the way to home nearly escaped bomb blast," he wrote in English. As he helped the injured to ambulances, he wrote in another tweet: "Sad day for diversity." Moments later, a second explosion ripped through the carnage, killing Ali on the spot. Sunni militants Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) claimed responsibility for the twin attacks, which killed at least 80, kick-starting another bloody year for Pakistani Shiites, who bear the brunt of their country's increasing sectarian violence.
Between January 2012 and June 2013, 77 attacks were launched against Shiites in Pakistan, killing 635. At least 120 more have been killed since July and the bloodletting shows no signs of abating. The widespread violence against Shiites, estimated to make up to 20 percent of Pakistan's population of 180 million, is unprecedented. Entire Shiite communities feel under siege, and many blame the government for failing to protect them. Human Rights Watch went so far as to say the government's seeming indifference in hunting down perpetrators could be seen as masking covert backing.
Out of this tense arena of escalating hatred, a small Pakistani Shiite political party rose out of obscurity to victory in May's general elections.
Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM), which roughly translates from Urdu as the Assembly of the Unification of Muslims, became the first Shiite party to ever win a seat. Fiercely nationalist, MWM believes sharia law should be implemented across Pakistan and wants to eradicate sectarian violence by providing free education.
Party leaders say its success comes from unlikely advocates: women.
I met Ali's mother, Saida, several months after her son was killed. She was in a group of mourning mothers at a martyrs' conference in Rawalpindi, an energetic sprawl of a city adjacent to the capital Islamabad. The women, including a 15-year-old girl who lost her entire family to attacks on Shiites, were being feted by MWM in a large, dimly lit hall decorated with black and green lines from the Koran. Hundreds of men and women sat divided on either side of the hall, sobbing quietly. Some held plates of pungent rose petals on their laps.
Cloaked in black, her eyes creased and dampened with tears, Saida leaned towards me: "I'm a proud mother and have no regrets my son was sacrificed." Like the others, she clutched a framed picture of her slain son. Smiling, he was waving a placard that read ‘Peace we Love.' "We're being victimized for following Hussein," she said, referring to the son of Ali, Mohammad's son-in-law, whom Shiites say is his rightful successor, a belief at the core of the Sunni-Shiite split.
Since that conference in late March, MWM has organized 15 such events across the country, each honoring mothers of the "martyred." In the lead up to the May 11 elections, the party organized scores of protests against what it says is genocide. Women were the "protest pioneers," said MWM's deputy leader Amin Shahidi. As the government failed to make arrests for Shiite attacks, mothers launched street protests - first in Quetta, where most Shiites come from the ethnic Hazara minority, and later across the country. "Women have this ability to transfer the feelings of struggle, of sacrifice, to their communities," Shahidi told me at his cliff-top home near Islamabad. Crowned by a white turban and elegantly dressed in a diaphanous brown gown over linen, Shahidi charted MWM's mercurial rise from its creation in 2008 to the present day, where it can command tens of thousands of supporters at rallies. "And it is the women who are getting this many people," he said, almost in surprise at his own statement.
Female branches of MWM were first set up in 2010 to double the party's impact. "Once we involved women, our messages and goals spread very quickly," said Zahra Najafi, who runs the women's wing in Karachi, nestled in a concrete Shiite neighborhood covered in MWM graffiti. Her tiny frame engulfed in a black chador, she said 750 women in Sindh province, which includes Karachi, now report to her. Most are involved in door-to-door campaigning and frequently organize sit-ins, demanding justice for Shiite attacks.
This kind of activism among Pakistani Shiites is not new. For many, it begins with the Imamia Students Organization, which was founded in 1972 to prevent encroaching socialism. Another Shiite political party, Islami Tehrik Pakistan, has existed since 1979 but merged with the Pakistan People's Party for the recent elections.
But not all Shiites agree with MWM's vociferous approach. "We're more under attack as a result of these protests," deputy speaker of the Sindh assembly, Shehla Raza, told me in her Karachi home where armed policemen keep 24-hour watch, reflecting increasing fear after eight of her relatives were killed in bomb attacks and targeted shootings.
MWM's win, however, carried weight. Its candidate Syed Mohammed Raza won a seat - one of 65 - in Baluchistan's provincial assembly in Quetta. Though numerically tiny - each of Pakistan's four provinces has its own parliament, in addition to contributing members to the national assembly - "we now have a firm foot in the ground," said Sandleen Rizvi, head of MWM's Rawalpindi women's wing.
Though no official gender data exists for individual party votes, Rizvi, whose husband Saeed ran for office in Rawalpindi, believes women made up at least 60 percent of MWM's vote across the country - at least 15 percent more than the national average. Ejaz Hussain Bahishti, a cleric on MWM's Islamabad ticket, reckoned women made up to 70 percent of the vote. "They came as a duty to the martyred," he told me.
Despite former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto serving in the position twice, women have played a relatively marginal role in Pakistani politics. But female voter participation is increasing, and women made up 44 percent of the country's overall vote in May.
Pudgy-cheeked and bubbling with enthusiasm, 37-year-old Rizvi has been hard at work since she organized the martyrs' conference I attended, setting up MWM units around Rawalpindi where women are taught about campaigning. "We are afraid that a Syria-style situation will arise here with the Shiites," she tells me over ice cream in her home, where miniature replicas of Ali's sword, the Zulfiqar, hang on her walls. Rizvi's 10-year-old son and three teenage daughters, their heads wrapped in bright headscarves, surround their mother to listen eagerly. "We must convince all Shiites to unite," she says.
As such, the focus of MWM's protests has expanded to include "the oppressed" around the world, in a display of solidarity with Shiites in Syria and Egypt. Accusations are rife that Shiite groups such as MWM receive funding from Iran as part of its wider proxy war with Saudi Arabia, which the State Department says supports Sunni extremists. When asked if MWM received financial support from Tehran, Shahidi smiled and pointed to a bowl of pistachios on the table between us. "The only things here from Iran are those nuts!"
Such suspicion, however, is likely to continue as MWM broadens its influence and cements its position as a political platform for Shiites across the country. Earlier this month the party took aim at the central government by calling for anti-American demonstrations, exposing an agenda largely hidden from its election campaign. Its leaders are becoming more brazen, delivering confidence-packed speeches that demand the government do more to protect Shiites. As such, what began as a measured reaction to a minority under siege could become the latest fault line in Pakistan's identity crisis.
Amie Ferris-Rotman, a John S. Knight journalism fellow at Stanford University, was formerly Reuters' senior correspondent in Kabul.
This project was made possible by support from the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.
Narges, who asked to only use her nickname, is soft-spoken and always colorfully dressed, usually opting for rich, dark fabrics. Her affect is, at first glance, demure, almost passive. But it belies a fearlessness and a clever wit, both of which she deploys constantly as an ardent defender of women's rights who says she thinks her country has it all wrong, and who has maintained and defended this view, though there is little support for it even within her own family.
Narges speaks slowly and carefully in English, and in her native language with an Iranian accent (which she believes is proper and her friends poke fun at as haughty), but she takes her words seriously and believes the message she has is worth delivering with precision. Besides, her accent is the result of two decades spent in Iran and she doesn't see the use in spending much energy trying to change it.
The following are the words of Narges, as told to Jeffrey E. Stern.
My mother always told me a story about her life, that they were afraid to express their religion because they were Shia and their neighbors were Sunni, and Shia people were a minority in Herat and in most of the provinces of Afghanistan.
So why did they choose to go to Iran? Because the government was, is, Shia, and they thought: "If we go to Iran, we won't have any problem. They will understand us, they will treat us as human!" But what they thought about Iran was totally wrong. We faced so many limitations because we were always seen as Afghan. For example, for education, that's the reason I left Iran and left my family, because I wasn't allowed to go to university. So I had a big interruption in my education. For five years I couldn't continue my education, because they banned us from the university, all Afghans.
And you don't know the policy of Iran. Never, you will never understand the policy of Iran. Sometimes they allow you to go to university, sometimes they don't. It's like that. Sometimes you have movement limitation -- Afghans cannot buy houses or cars, they cannot travel in other cities, only because they are Afghan, even though they have good resumes, even though they have been in Iran for 30 years.
I was born in Iran. So my first time in my own country was 2010. It was strange. I faced so many difficulties because my accent was Iranian, and Afghan people, they don't have a good attitude toward Iranian people and the Iranian government because they believe that Iran is misusing Afghans. Afghans are doing hard work in Iran, but they have no rights, they are not treated as humans. They thought I'm Iranian, so I'm like the government. They ridiculed my accent.
I was here in my country for two years and then I got a scholarship, so this is the third year that I haven't seen my family. I hope next year I can visit them. I tried to get a visa to go see them in Iran, but the Iranian government didn't give me a visa. I'm just a student! But they didn't give it to me. They said that "you will stay here, you won't go back."
I had come to Afghanistan with my aunt. She had come from Iran to visit her daughter, so I came with her; I couldn't come alone. First we came to Herat, and I found Herat very conservative. The people are conservative and women are really in trouble in Herat, to get education, to express themselves. I remember when I went to a party, and one of the girls came to me and said she has problems getting an education, because whenever she goes to school, her other relatives -- mostly men -- go to her father and say "you know, your daughter can read and write, she doesn't need anything else and she should get married." She was young, really young.
I think the presence of America in Afghanistan is necessary to help women get education. When America leaves, women will miss this opportunity. Now I have friends, I've gone to Bangladesh for education, I'm studying liberal arts, you know, we're studying humanism and women's rights. We can see we have so many shortages in women's rights, and we have to do so many things. But we don't think government will help us.
I will give an example from my friends. They had a project about combating child marriage, so they went to talk to Parliament members, but the Parliament members told them: "No, we can do it. And we should do it." And one of the Parliament members told them, "You know, these are not only my words. I have so many other friends in Parliament who agree with me."
Many parliament members are people who had been in Afghanistan's wars, they were mujahedeen, and during Taliban times, they changed their policies. Their minds are really old, and now they are in parliament. This is the problem we have. And if foreign organizations don't push them, don't put pressure on them, they won't help us.
I don't know if this news is true, but I heard about the law, the "violence against women" law. We were going to have a law against violence against women but Parliament didn't accept that. But I heard that now the American government is putting pressure on Parliament members. I heard that the American government told them that if they don't support it, if they don't confirm this law, they will cut the budget that they are giving to the Afghan army. So that's good.
This is our problem, we want to improve women's situations, improve child rights in Afghanistan, but if we don't get support from Parliament and America is leaving, how we can improve? How we can have progress?
When America leaves, I know that most of the human rights organizations will leave Afghanistan because of the security. And we need more time. We need America to stay more, so we can, you know, build what we want.
And then they can go. Laughs.
Edited by Jeffrey E. Stern.
Jeffrey E. Stern -- www.JeffreyEstern.com -- is a writer and development worker whose reporting from Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere has appeared in Esquire, Time, newsweek.com/The Daily Beast, and the Philadelphia Inquirer.
Jeffrey E. Stern/Author Photo
The two suicide bombers struck just as worshippers were leaving the morning service at All Saints Church in Peshawar on Sunday, September 22, 2013. Instantly, a scene of peace became one of carnage, with more than 80 people killed and 130 injured, though the death toll will likely climb as hospitals are unable to save the wounded.
All Saints is one of the oldest churches in Pakistan, but before Sunday, many outside observers probably were unaware that any church, let alone one holding 600 congregants, existed just miles from the Afghan border near Pakistan's tribal region. Built in 1883 during the British colonial period, its architecture resembles a mosque more than a European cathedral. Now it shows pocket marks and other scars from the ball bearings used in the attack. After years of successfully navigating the challenging political and religious terrain, the church is now the site of arguably the largest attack on the Christian community in Pakistan.
However, this was not the first act of violence against Christians in Pakistan. And unless the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif takes resolute action, it will not be the last.
For instance, the Pakistan Religious Violence Project of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) documented attacks between January 2012 and June 2013 against all religious communities in the country. Based on publicly available information, the project recorded 37 attacks against Christians, resulting in 11 deaths and 36 injuries, as well as five women who were reportedly targeted for rape. On Sunday, this body count jumped almost tenfold.
Earlier this year near Lahore, an entire Christian village named Joseph Colony was burned to the ground after an allegation of blasphemy. Instead of trying to stop the attack, police ordered the residents to flee. While the Punjabi government is rebuilding the destroyed homes and other buildings, no one has been held accountable. The incident was eerily similar to the 2009 burning of the village of Gojra, where seven Christians were burned alive. Past being prologue, all of the Gojra cases were dropped and no one was found guilty.
Other high profile instances of violence include the 2011 murder of Federal Minister for Minority Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti, the only Christian in the previous government's cabinet. He was killed by the Pakistani Taliban for his opposition to Pakistan's blasphemy law. The Zardari government did not seriously investigate his death, and the unsolved crime sent a chilling signal to the Christian community that not even their leaders will be protected. There was a recent break in the case when two Pakistani Taliban members arrested for their involvement in other crimes confessed to killing Bhatti. However, this was due to dumb luck, not a tireless investigation. Whether they will be prosecuted remains to be seen.
In addition, Pakistan's notorious blasphemy law is repeatedly used against religious minorities. Most recently, a 29-year-old Christian named Sajjad Masih was found guilty in July of denigrating the Prophet Mohammed and sentenced to life in prison, despite the accuser recanting. Reports indicate that mobs pressured the judge into the conviction and sentence. With Masih's imprisonment, almost 40 individuals are serving life sentences or sitting on death row for blasphemy - a statistic unmatched by any other country in the world - the majority of which are believed to be Christians. This includes Asia Bibi, the Christian mother of five who was sentenced to death for blasphemy in 2010, who continues to languish in jail.
But the Christian community isn't alone in its suffering. USCIRF's Pakistan Religious Violence Project also recorded the killing of 635 Shi'a in 77 separate suicide bombings and targeted shootings between the same timeframe. The Pakistani Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, another militant organization, repeatedly claimed credit. Ahmadis continue to face drive-by shootings and live under an apartheid-like legal system that criminalizes their faith, while Hindus are reportedly leaving for India to escape the religiously-inspired violence against their community.
Even members of the Muslim majority who dare encroach on the religious turf of extremists are not immune from violence. The governor of Punjab province, Salman Taseer, paid with his life for criticizing the blasphemy law, while the Pakistani Taliban tried to assassinate young Malala Yousafzai for her advocacy for women's education, which they deemed un-Islamic. The Pakistani Taliban also targeted politicians they deemed "secular" during the run-up to the May election and afterwards. Scores were killed from the more moderate Pakistan People's Party and the Awami National Party, which had a senior member murdered in August.
The Peshawar attackers are believed to be from Pakistani Jundullah, an offshoot of the Pakistani Taliban. They justified the church attack because of the ongoing drone strikes by the United States, saying that they will continue to target non-Muslims until those end. The terrorists see the churchgoers as symbols of the West, not as Pakistanis. Unfortunately, Imran Khan, whose party runs Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Peshawar, seemed to give credence to this deeply problematic linkage in his comments after the attack, noting that a drone attack had occurred earlier that same day.
Pakistan's political leaders have condemned the All Saints bombing, as did the National Assembly in a unanimous vote. Sharif has also called off peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban as a consequence of the attack, after having recently built political consensus on negotiating with them and other militants. International condemnation was universal and swift, coming from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the European Union, the United Nations, and even Japan. However, talk is cheap and more must be done to prevent future attacks. Inaction will impact all Pakistanis, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.
What is needed is not complicated - it is basic law enforcement and legal reform. The federal and provincial authorities must do more to provide protection, arrest perpetrators or those inciting violence, vigorously prosecute them, and send them to jail. Turning a blind eye or continuing to enforce the blasphemy law will only further embolden militants and foster a culture of violent extremism and impunity. The international community can help create political will by insisting that Pakistan address the violence, both on human rights grounds and also because of the destabilizing effect it is having on this nuclear-armed country.
Knox Thames is the Director of Policy and Research at the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. The views expressed here are his own. He can be followed on Twitter @thames22.
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