Afghanistan is ruled not by law, but by power and patronage. The absence of the rule of law fuels the country's savage insurgency. When citizens can't rely on the state to protect them against systemic abuses, then rebellion becomes a far more attractive option. Tragically, in Afghanistan the abusers, more often than not, are from the government itself - including ministers, governors, police chiefs and militia leaders.

It needn't be this way. If there is one policy reform that all the main actors in Afghanistan purport to agree on, it's the critical importance of building the rule of law. President's Karzai's speeches are liberally salted with promises to reform the legal system and tackle corruption. The Taliban understands that a key way to win Afghans' hearts and minds is to provide them with the justice they so desperately desire. It does so by setting up mobile courts, delivering a very rough and ready justice, but one that is often preferred to the arbitrary rule of local commanders. And Western governments have spent billions on rule of law reforms, with little tangible impact.

So with this apparent unanimity on the need for the rule of law, why in Afghanistan do the powerful continue to abuse the weak with near total impunity?

The answer is that the purported commitment is largely in name only. True rule of law requires laws that are public, clear, and apply equally to everyone. It needs government officials who accept that they are subject to the law. It requires reasonably fair, competent, and efficient courts, prosecutors and police who respect the presumption of innocence and due process. It needs judges who are reasonably independent and impartial, and have the confidence in their safety to properly perform their jobs.

But the reforms necessary to achieve all this present an existential threat to the power of the ruling elite in Afghanistan. Building the rule of law involves challenging vested interests at the highest levels of the government. It is far more a political exercise than a technical one. Many Afghan power holders -- from President Karzai downwards -- benefit from a patronage based system. It enables them to buy and maintain loyalty. Corruption is an integral part of such a system.

It's not just corruption that thrives in such an environment.  Equal treatment by the law requires that those who have committed atrocities against their people be held accountable for these crimes. Failure to do so promotes a climate in which the powerful continue to commit abuses with impunity. But in Afghanistan those responsible for grave human rights abuses continue to occupy positions of power. These include officials like Vice Presidents Mohammad Fahim and Karim Khalili, who face credible accusations of war crimes or crimes against humanity during the brutal civil war. They also include a generation of post-Taliban leaders -- such as the Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs, Asadullah Khaled, as well as powerful provincial governors allied to Western forces -- accused of serious human rights violations since 2001. A report soon to be released by the Afghan human rights commission -- if not blocked by the government -- will document many of the past crimes.

International intervention encouraged and promoted this impunity by returning to power warlords and commanders. Influential international actors continue to rely on alliances of convenience with these abusive power holders to promote perceived stabilization goals.

Meanwhile the Taliban also preys on the local population, and subjects those it is purporting to liberate from foreign occupation to horrendous abuses, including suicide bombings, assassinations and the use of civilians as human shields.

For Afghans, the tragic result is that today's reality is not much different from that of the last thirty years, and their lives are still dominated by powerful men with guns.

Achieving accountability is not a question of naïve aspiration: the culture of high-level impunity must be challenged, as failure to do so will undermine all other rule of law efforts and perpetuate an environment in which conflict will flourish. 

The culture will not change until some of those responsible for the worst abuses against the Afghan people are prosecuted. The best option would be for the government itself to pursue some of these abusers. This would increase its legitimacy in the eyes its people and would send a clear warning to those in authority and to those seeking to do deals with the government who believe they can continue to kill with impunity. It would also undermine one of the claimed attractions of the Taliban -- that it provides harsh, but fair, justice where none otherwise exists.

Unfortunately, there is no prospect of the government providing high-level justice. The Karzai administration has consistently opted for expediency over principle when it comes to accountability, most notably in enacting a law giving amnesty to former warlords. Most international actors have been largely silent on this law. In fact, it appears that a desire for a quick exit by NATO countries may have stifled all discussion of the critical need to link reconciliation with accountability and to tackle Afghanistan's longstanding culture of impunity.

But expediency will not promote stability, and a failure to build the rule of law will lead to more instability, not less. It will also ensure that Afghan power holders - government and Taliban alike - continue to commit abuses that shock the conscience of the international community and fuel the very instability that led, a decade ago, to such a costly international  intervention.

Nick Grono is the Deputy  President of the International Crisis Group.

Cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan is batting to strike out two major "conventional" political parties -- the leftist Pakistan People's Party and the conservative Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz -- simultaneously. He talks about eradicating corruption, handling the grievances of the Baloch and the tribal areas, "friendliness" as the ultimate foreign policy, and his plans to combat four of Pakistan's biggest "emergencies" in 90 days, should his party, Tehreek-e Insaf, win Pakistan's general elections planned for 2013.

Massive public turnout at his rallies -- what he calls a "tsunami" of support -- has inspired self-doubt among other politicians who claim to have captured the hearts of Pakistani people. But Khan's critics are unforgiving; some call his approach radical, and others believe he is backed by the establishment, although Khan dismisses such claims. Kiran Nazish talked with Khan about his meteoric rise and his plans to achieve what he calls "the New Pakistan."

Kiran Nazish: You have been talking a lot about leading a civil disobedience movement, but it hasn't happened yet. Will it happen at all?

Imran Khan: We have thought many times [that we might] go for it, but we have been reluctant to initiate because we do not want to exaggerate the chaos that has already shaken Pakistan. There was a point when we used to discuss amongst ourselves, that we should really commence the movement, but we refrained because we knew that it would only worsen the situation for the common man. However, if we do see the state of governance in the current regime getting out of hand, we would have no other choice but to go for it.

If the current government does anything unconstitutional, my party will boycott that and protest that. I am and will stand against anybody who goes against the judiciary or does not respect the judiciary. Anyone includes everyone. These few thieves [the politicians] have looted billions from the poor nation, and to save their own wealth they are now after the only sovereign institution [the Supreme Court].

KN: You keep calling the current government corrupt, making aggressive statements regarding the government-Supreme Court rift. But this government got elected democratically. Isn't that like saying you are against the people's choice?

IK: If you read Condoleezza Rice's books, she has exhaustively explained how the U.S. worked with Benazir Bhutto and General [Pervez] Musharraf to form their own type of puppet government. Now this government is responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians and soldiers who have been killed in [the war on terror].

With the extent of corruption that this government has been indulging in, it was inevitable that they had this clash with the Supreme Court. The day the Supreme Court had called the NRO [National Reconciliation Ordinance] government unconstitutional, it was decided right then that this government couldn't have survived a good relation with [the Supreme Court]. Sadly, we have had no genuine opposition in this country. [There might have been] an opposition within parliamentary members who could have stood up and questioned the government, but that did not happen. The government did not resign, and everyone else was busy trying to save democracy -- while of course the government was trying to save their corruption.

The Supreme Court of any state [is the institution that should have] the highest reliance and authority. Such an institution in a democratic state has no [ground for] military intervention and has the highest power to launch a control system for the corrupt actions, or a corrupt state. If and when any other democratic institution fails to perform, the Supreme Court can control them and make them accountable. No one can challenge the Supreme Court. Our government, on the other hand, is a corrupt government. I reject calling it a democratic state, it having laid its foundations on the basis of a corrupt engagement called the NRO.

KN: So how do you plan to protect the Supreme Court?

IK: Now the Supreme Court is openly attacked and insulted, which I hope you agree is not a democratic act. Should we let the corrupt government spoil the first independent chief justice in the Supreme Court? I don't think so. We will decide in our party central executive committee meeting soon when we will draft a plan and later present it. This presentation will have guidelines on how to protect the system and the judiciary from an imposed failure.

KN: How do you think this idea of civil disobedience can save democracy?

IK: There is just one thing that I suggest, a singular solution, which is something the Supreme Court has also suggested. And that is: go to the people -- which means, we should have free and fair elections, and let the people decide their true, democratic leader.

KN: What would you say about the "Memogate" crisis?

IK: If at any point the government fears military takeover, it should act with maturity not impunity. A democratic government needs to go to the people, not to outsiders. This happened twice in our country. In 1999, according to [counterterrorism expert and former CIA analyst] Bruce Riedel, [former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz] Sharif went to him and asked him to save him from the military. And now we have this memogate [with Adm. Mike Mullen and former Pakistani Ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani].

A democratic government should never fear, and needs to take responsibility. I take responsibility! Whoever takes responsibility, it will be very difficult for them. When I take responsibility, I will need authority as well. If I don't get that authority, I will go back to the people. The people who elected me! I will never [put] a foreign agenda [ahead of] my own people. I will not go to the U.S. for help -- or anywhere else for that matter.

KN: Are you ready for the elections if they take place sooner?

IK: We are ready for elections anytime. Our entire party will be ready, whether the elections happen now or later. We have been talking about mid-term elections since the NRO cases came out in the open, and yet were dismissed in the Supreme Court by the government. But it seems that at that time the N-League [Nawaz Sharif's party] wanted to save the system. We have been ready, and now we think we should have early elections. We will reveal our action plan soon.

Whatever happens and whenever the elections take place, PTI [Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf] will sweep the elections. We can't be confident enough.

KN: You have been making too many promises. What would you do if you are unable to handle things, if and when you come into power?

IK: I am completely confident; I will not fail at anything. My party will not fail. I will change the entire system in 90 days. If the system is not corrected in 90 days, it will never be corrected at all.

I believe there is a proper way to handle every institution. The only way to run a government appropriately is when the institutions are strong and work under a system of accountability and in synchrony. We need to restore the institutions.

I have a well-thought-out plan to change the system in 90 days. When a country loses its ethical leadership, that is when its physical leadership takes over. This means if your democratic government fails, your army will take over. We need to ensure that point doesn't come. And I take that responsibility.

KN: What role do you want to give to the army? How much intervention will you allow?

IK: In a democratic government, the power is held by the state head. Every policy is supposed to be made by the government and not the army. Foreign policy is the job of the democratic government and not the army. Why is the army controlling the war on terror? I will never understand.

I am against military takeover or any sort of military intervention, to any extent at all, in any capacity at all. Pakistan needs democracy and public political participation without any sort or form of authoritative control.

It's the responsibility of the civilian government to take control of state matters, especially those which have to do with state's sovereignty. I don't think I will be so lousy that the army would have to make my decision[s].

KN: And how would your civil military policy balance out?

IK: No aid, proper taxation, and proper division of resources are my major strategies to balance out the whole system. We can't free the people until we give them what they want. We need to identify the needs of this country and focus on that. Why would the military intervene if the democratic government is operating in harmony and giving the people what they want? My goal is to bring that harmony. Everything else will fall into place on its own.

KN: What's your policy on the U.S.?

IK: Friendly! Look, we don't want to make any enemies. My nation and my people is my priority. I will do whatever is my people's priority. The war on terror was fought for dollars, and do you see what lesson we learn from it? The lesson is, to not fight the war for dollars. The lesson is, to not disadvantage your own people, to feed your government. We don't want dollars if they will overshadow our people's interest.

KN: What's your policy on Israel?

IK: Pakistan's founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, wrote a letter to Harry S. Truman talking about the injustices done to the people. Every Pakistani stands by that letter. We stand by the one simple fact that Palestinians should be given their homeland. PTI is not against any people, we are with the people. We believe in human rights, and that is our ultimate stance.

KN: What's your policy on the India-Kashmir conflict?

IK: We will definitely try to work our way around our relationship with India. India is indeed our closest and most familiar neighbor. We would love to improve trade and other interactions.

The only problem with India is that there has to be a road map. Once we figure that out, we will know how to go about it too. We will try to work on the Kashmir issue with whatever mutuality allows us to. But it is very important to note that we cannot ignore Kashmir. Or else, if another Mumbai happens, we will be back to square one.

KN: How do you plan to deal with the militants or Jihadis?

IK: We have learned that proxy policies don't work. To keep militant groups is not the idea we should follow and is certainly not the strategy I support or will follow. In Karachi when the Supreme Court did the hearing, they found out the three major parties had hired militant groups to escalate their fights. We can't let such things happen. People get hurt.

We need to do a truth and reconciliation strategy in the tribal areas. Why should we keep fighting? Wars don't achieve anything. We are having a dialogue as we speak. Americans are having a dialogue, and we need to do this too. So far, since the dialogue has been initiated by the U.S. and ourselves, haven't you noticed how militancy and bombing has come down significantly?

KN: You have conducted dharnas (sit-in boycotts) against drone strikes, and protested against the government's act of carrying them out. But the U.S. and Pakistan governments say that they are efficient in targeting the Taliban.

IK: Drones can never be good. Like I said, war is never good for people. Give me one example of war that has reconciled a nation or brought peace. There is no possibility that drones can help these people. What kind of country or nation gives permission to another country to have drones attacks within their country. What kind of country takes money to kill their own wives and children? This is a corrupt government with greedy leadership, and drones for them is a mere barter for dollars and luxury. Therefore, it supports these drones. An honest government should think about the people. If this government had any honesty, it would have come up with alternative strategies.

KN: What's your vision for Pakistan?

IK: First, we need to understand what kind of country we want. Pakistan should be an Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which should follow the Objectives Resolution, something every political party of the country has endorsed, at all times: the ideology of the Quaid [Muhammad Ali Jinnah] -- who is my greatest inspiration -- and the ideology of Iqbal when he spoke about spiritual democracy. No one must bow down to anyone who speaks against the interest of the people.

We will declare four major emergencies. First and foremost, the education system.. There must be one core system of education, with a singular syllabus. A proper syllabus committee will be established. It will be ensured that there are equal opportunities for everyone and equal competition for everyone. Equip the people with a technical education.

Nothing can be done if there is [no] rule of law. We will also strengthen the judiciary and the police system. We will de-politicize the police, step out of the war on terror, and invest [our] time and resources on internal system cleansing. Revenue collection is next. We need to establish [a better] tax culture and eradicate contamination in tax distribution. And the most important agenda is to control corruption. Conflict of interest law will be established. This all needs to be done in 90 days. If you cannot do it in 90 days, the corrupt system will come back.

KN: How will you change Pakistan in 90 days, when the environment is conducive to the contrary of your agenda of filtration and cleansing?

IK: We need to create good governance and an enabling environment for good people who want to work. I will work towards attracting overseas Pakistanis and make it feasible for them to work here. Once that environment is created, recovery will automatically be on its way. 

We will support professional politicians who will be ready to make sacrifices and compromises to take politics seriously. There is no room for opportunity seekers and no room for corruption and the corrupt. I will support and invest in the process of strengthening the NAB [National Accountability Bureau]. I will ensure the judiciary is strong. 

KN: Your critics find it amusing that you talk about asset declaration while there is a bandwagon of politicians joining your party simultaneously -- many of whom you have criticized in the past. How do you justify that when you talk about accountability?

IK: I'm not going to be hijacked by a few people. When someone joins PTI, the first step for them is to declare their assets. If they default, they are held by our accountability committee. The corrupt system has to change. I believe that if you cannot do it in 90 days, you will never be able to do it. It's basically the question of who has the will. It's not what we have to do; it's who wants to do it.

KN: People of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] and Balochistan have been secluded by the state for six decades. You say you plan to accommodate them. How would you do that, given their hostility?

IK: We will have a completely new relationship with the people of FATA and Balochistan and Gilgit. We will sit with them. We will mutually explore which laws they want to keep. We will try to develop mutual understanding on every matter that concerns them. A PTI government will execute massive development in FATA and Balochistan. We will try our best to ensure that the grievances of the people, of the common man, in any area, from any background, are not ignored. We will engage with every single Pakistani and ensure everyone gets their basic rights. Their right for food, employment, education, equity, and human rights. And we will do all this by good governance.

The way Pakistan is run should be changed, that's what I mean by a New Pakistan.

Kiran Nazish is a journalist, activist, and academic based in Pakistan. She can be followed on Twitter @kirannazish.

Two weeks ago, 24-year-old Pakistani-American Jubair Ahmad admittedthat he had been making videos for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) from his Woodbridge,Virginia home under the direction of LeT leader Hafiz Saeed's son Talha. Aroundthe same time, governments on both sides of the Atlantic published findingsinto the link between online activity and terrorism. In the United Kingdom, theHome Office publisheda paper that concluded "the internet does not appear to play a significantrole in AQIR [al Qaeda influenced radicalization]," while in the United States,at a hearing on the Hill, RAND terrorism guru BrianMichael Jenkins concluded that jihadist websites "may create virtualarmies, but these armies remain virtual." But while the link between turningindividuals from passive consumers into active terrorists may be weak, caseslike that of Jubair Ahmad show the important role this virtual army can play inmagnifying the message of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups.

Jubair Ahmed is not the first Western individual who has helpedestablish websites or created video content in support of radical groups. Oneof the earliest was U.K.-based www.azzam.com,established in 1996, which provided a point from which groups in Afghanistanand Chechnya could broadcast their message while also telling potentialrecruits how to contact the groups. In addition, www.azzam.com  (using the moniker Azzam Publications) helpedproduce a series of videos and cassette tapes about the fighting in Bosnia andChechnya that venerated fighters in the field.

By the mid-2000s, the Internet had become a more viablevehicle through which videos could not only be sold, but also streamed anddownloaded. Recognizing the value of getting footage from the field out asquickly as possible, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was at the forefront of a newpractice, turning videos into slick packages that could be uploaded ontoradical forums. But what was most interesting was the revelation in late 2005that British police in London had found a young Moroccan who turned out to be theinfamous online jihadist known as Irhabi007(terrorist007). Using this online handle, Younis Tsoulihad set himself up as a key webmaster and designer for AQI, and was notoriousfor being able to find the webspace needed to publish the grim video Americancontractor Nicholas Berg's beheading.

The novel aspect in Tsouli's case was the fact that AQIleaders noticed his online abilities and started to use him as a key outlet fortheir material. There have been numerous other Western webmasters for importantal-Qaeda linked websites - for example, in Belgium, Malikael-Aroud ran MinbarSoS, a website that provided a forum to recruitFrench-speaking Muslims to fight in Afghanistan. From the sunny Costa Blanca inSpain, FaicalErrai helped run ansaraljihad.net, and provided assistance for radicalsseeking to get to Afghanistan and Chechnya. But Tsouli appears to have been oneof the first Western residents to have been actively solicited by groups in thefield for his technical abilities.

And since Tsouli, we have seen al-Qaeda in the ArabianPeninsula (AQAP) use the skills of a young Pakistani-American radical blogger, SamirKhan, to help them produce Inspiremagazine - a publication that has repeatedly shown up in the hands of recently arrestedterroristplotters. Khan and hisAmerican-Yemeni mentor Anwar al-Awlaki are now both dead, but in a reflectionof the importance that AQAP placed upon al-Awlaki's capacity to reach a Westernaudience through new media, communicationsfound during the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden'sPakistani compound allegedly include an offer from AQAP leader Nasiral-Wuhayshi to put al-Awlaki in charge of the regional group. Bin Ladendeclined the request, possibly highlighting the different level of importancehe placed upon new media capabilities in comparison to his regional affiliateleader.

A particularly surprising aspect of the Jubair Ahmad case isthe volume of micromanagement that Talha Saeed put into creating the video. Hetells Ahmad what images to include (not ones from the group's infamous Mumbaiattack), where to insert images of his father, the LeT leader, and what musicto have over the video. Saeed is obliged to get someone in America to do thetechnical work for him - quite a long distance from which to direct theproduction of a short YouTube video using easily available technology - whichlikely reflects a greater facility with such technology had by people broughtup in the West.

Just how easy it is to create these videos was seen recentlyin a case in the United Kingdom in which a law student, Mohammad Gul,was convicted of producing YouTube videos that glorified terrorist violence.While clearly the technology to make such videos is something that isuniversal, it does seem as though it is aspirant jihadists in the West who findit easiest to use. There was no evidence that Gul was being directed by foreignterrorist organizations to produce his material, and his case shows the continuedexistence of young Westerners producing radical material on their own. It mayindeed be the case that the virtual armies have yet to fully emerge as activewarriors on the battlefield, but in the meantime they are doing a great deal tokeep the jihadist flame alive on the Web, either by themselves or at thedirection of organized parties.

RaffaelloPantucci is an Associate Fellow at the International Center for the Study ofRadicalisation (ICSR) and the author of the forthcoming "We Love Death AsYou Love Life: Britain's Suburban Mujahedeen" (Hurst/Columbia UniversityPress). His writing can be found at: http://www.raffaellopantucci.com.

When it comes to women's rights, Pakistan has been in the news for all the wrong reasons. The list of wrongs perpetrated against women, which includes honor killings, domestic violence, sexual assault and acid attacks, is disturbingly lengthy. What is unfortunate is that the current state owes as much to the lawmaking agencies of the country who have been unable to enforce justice for women as those who perpetrate the actual violence.

But tangible progress is underway. The Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Act 2011, a twice-snubbed landmark bill demanding greater social protection for women, passed this November by the Pakistan National Assembly, is a major move in the right direction. Framed and amended by Dr. Donya Aziz, the bill was unanimously passed by the lower house, which is headed by speaker Dr. Fehmida Mirza -- the first female parliamentary speaker in the Muslim world. The bill is currently awaiting approval by the Senate, but civil society, women's rights activists and NGOs are optimistic that this bill will become law.

Outside of Pakistan, the bill is being hailed as a show of collective resolve by Pakistani political parties to counter societal taboos against women, dealing with issues such as forced marriages, physical violence against women, or depriving women of their inheritance. The bill deems all of the above as crimes that can lead to three to ten years' imprisonment or a fine of up to up to RS1 million (approximately $11,400). The bill also criminalizes the practice of ‘Haq Bakhshish' -- forcing women into giving up their right to marriage by marrying them to the Quran. While not a mainstream custom and mostly practiced in the rural areas of the country to prevent the loss of property if a woman marries someone who is not a relative, Haq Bakhshish has been an eyesore for women's rights and human rights activists in Pakistan for decades.

But things aren't all that straightforward. While supporters of women's rights in Pakistan revel in the recent development, 2011 also saw a notable setback for their cause. The Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Bill, passed earlier in the year and signed by President Asif Ali Zardari before becoming the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act 2011, reversed the right of women to bail. That right was granted under the Women's Protection Act 2006 and signed into law by then-President Pervez Musharraf. But come 2011 and bail can only be granted by the court, putting women again at the mercy of the criminal justice system.  

Under the Women Protection Act 2006, bail became the right of a woman accused of any crime except involvement in terrorism, financial corruption and murder or a crime punishable with death, or a minimum of ten years imprisonment. More simply, they were given the right to bail without going to the courts. Mostly meant to decrease the number of women in jail, especially those accused of zina, or adultery, the WPA 2006 made it harder for the police to hold women in custody. However, with President Zardari's recent amendments, that right has been taken away.

Women's rights activists are raking President Zardari's government over the coals at the hushed, sudden, revision. According to Farzana Bari, a civil rights activist in Pakistan, women may be detained on minor offences and even as a result of family disputes, and women will need to go through court hearings before being able to be bailed out of prison, thanks to the amendment. Speaking to a local English newspaper, Bari called the move a "dangerous reversal, as more than 80 percent of the gains achieved through the Women Protection Act 2006 have been lost."

The WPA 2006 was an attempt by the then-government to amend the heavily-criticized Hudood Ordinance laws in Pakistan enacted by military dictator Zia ul-Haq in 1979, which governed the punishment for rape and adultery in the country for decades.

Take "adultery" and non-marital consensual sex as a case in point -- both criminalized by the Hudood Ordinances. For many years in Pakistan, the laws made female rape victims liable to prosecution for adultery if they could not produce four male witnesses to the assault; however, the WPA 2006 brought rape under the Pakistan Penal Code, which is based on civil law and not Sharia (Islamic law). What that did was take away the right of law-enforcement agencies to detain people suspected of having non-marital consensual sex. Instead they were to require a ‘formal accusation' in court. Even though the amendments still treated adultery and sex outside of marriage as an offence, the judges could now deal with rape cases in criminal rather than Islamic courts. That did away with the practically impossible ‘four witnesses' requirement and allowed convictions to be made on the basis of proper circumstantial and forensic evidence.

Unfortunately, however, the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act 2011 is a giant step back, almost to the Hudood Ordinances themselves. President Zardari's government believes getting custody of the accused is critical to investigations, especially in the scenario where it becomes easier for criminals to engage women in offences, as the WPA 2006 made it easier for female criminals and their co-conspirators or those who trapped them to get out of jail quickly.  However, the civil rights activists in the country remain perplexed as to why bail laws had to be reversed almost completely, especially when amendments could have been introduced to check potential misuse without ‘robbing' women of their previously hard-earned concessions.

Thus, for every step forward with women's rights in Pakistan, we take a giant step back. On the one hand, bills are signed to protect women in Pakistan from early marriages and physical abuse, while on the other, juvenile convicts detained for committing zina are exempted from being granted special remission, a standard practice around the Eid al-Fitr holiday where the President of Pakistan lessens the sentences of juvenile prisoners and others. Exempting those convicted of zina from these remittances puts them on the same level as terrorists, in the eyes of Pakistani law.

While Pakistanis both in Pakistan and in the United States appreciate the role of the Pakistan National Assembly in making this landmark legislation see the light of day, they are also skeptical over the future status of the bill and its implementation by local law enforcement agencies. Pakistani civil society groups have vowed to stage a sit-in demonstration outside the Parliament if the bill is blocked by the Senate. And while activists remain optimistic about this legislation, the fact remains that the gap between the theory of law in Pakistan and its practice has always been enormous. For now, one can only hope that the Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Act lives up to its name.

Rabail Baig is a Pakistani journalist based in Boston.

Last month, Afghanistan's Chamber of Commerce, the ACCI, elected its new leadership. The process was not without controversy. A lively pre-election trade in ACCI membership* cards allowed large numbers of underage children and people who had nothing to do with running a business to participate in the vote at the provincial level. And at the national level there were allegations of deal-making, money transfers and ethnic politicking. The fact that highly powerful individuals and networks find these positions worth competing over illustrates their importance. The controversies surrounding the vote also underscore how deeply problematic elections - of any kind - have become, and how the involvement of the Independent Electoral Commission is no guarantee for a serious vote.

The ACCI's leadership elections, organized by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), took place between September 11 and October 14, 2011 in the 21 provinces that have their own ACCI departments. It was followed by the election of the national Executive Board on October 24, 2011. Most of the provincial-level elections went unreported, with the exception of Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif where there were at least some echoes of the tumult going on behind the scenes.

In Mazar the vote was postponed for weeks due to complaints over the irregular distribution of ACCI cards and the high number of candidates. Local traders hinted that they expected Governor Atta to step in and solve the problem (read: pre-select the members of the provincial ACCI board) and, indeed, by the time the Mazar election took place there were exactly the same number of candidates as there were seats. In Kabul the Chamber's CEO, Mohammad Qorban Haqju, assured the media that the electoral procedures had been fully transparent and that all allegations of fraud were baseless. A video obtained by AAN, however, suggests otherwise.

This video is a collection of short recordings, 15 minutes in total, taken in one of Kabul's polling centers in what appears to be a large tent.** It shows, among other things, considerable chaos, with multiple voters behind the cardboard voting booths (which can be partially explained by the complexity of the vote; in Kabul voters could mark up to 19 candidates).

More seriously, the footage also shows a large variety of obviously ineligible voters, who were nevertheless allowed to vote. This included men and women who indicated that they were not involved in any kind of business (in some cases whole groups of what appeared to be family members of candidates were brought to the polling center, receiving last-minute voting instructions) and large numbers of under-age voters. The video shows groups of students, some of them in identical uniforms, and interviews with boys and girls as young as 14 years old, all of them holding ACCI membership cards. There is a recording of a member of the ACCI leadership, who is shown a very young boy and asked whether the boy should be allowed to vote, telling the staff that it is alright as long as he holds a card.

The footage confirms allegations, including by businessmen who chose to boycott the vote for this reason, that there had been a lively and uncontrolled trade in ACCI cards in the run-up to the election (in an ironic parallel to the country's presidential and parliamentary elections, which have become increasingly impossible to control due to the massive over-registration of voters). This is also borne out by the figures, as described with an admirable lack of irony by the ACCI in their own report of the election:

‘During this period [i.e. during the weeks of the provincial level elections] membership in the Chamber increased from approximately 35,000 to an estimated 62,000 as individuals and enterprises sought to exercise their right to vote for the future of ACCI.'

A total of around 29,000 members are said to have voted countrywide.

There were also complaints of ethnic campaigning, for instance in Kabul (and during the national-level vote), alleging that separate lists with either Pashtun or non-Pashtun (Northern Alliance-linked) candidates had been created and distributed, and that candidates and their backers were encouraging voters to vote along these lines. The video footage does indeed show voters holding photocopied pieces of paper with selected candidates and using them while filling in the ballot (there were 57 candidates in Kabul and voters were allowed to mark up to 19 candidates, given that there were 19 seats).

The national-level election of the ACCI Board took place during the High Council Congress on October 23 and 24. It was not plagued by the same level of controversy, if only because the number of voters was fixed and limited to the 319 provincial representatives that had been voted in at the provincial level. There were, however, allegations of behind-the scenes deal-making, money transfers and a similar kind of ethnic politicking as took place on the provincial level (with candidates and their backers seeking to secure bloc votes along ethnic and factional lines). 

The ACCI in its current form is a relatively recent institution and was established after the merger of two initially competing bodies. The pre-existing body, the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) was a Soviet-era government institution, whose main function had been the valuing of imported goods against a fee to facilitate the government's collection of custom taxes. The second, much more recent body - the Afghan International Chamber of Commerce (AICC) - was an independent, market-oriented business association. It was established in 2004 by none other than Sher Khan Farnod and Mahmud Karzai, two protagonists in the Kabul Bank scandal. The two chambers were supported by competing donors with diverging agendas: GTZ, the government-owned German development agency (now renamed GIZ), and USAID.

The new ACCI that was established in 2008 represented a compromise: the old-style chamber was reformed rather than dissolved, but its character is much closer to what the U.S. had in mind than what the Germans and the Afghan government had initially been working toward (a government-led single point of contact for all businesses). When the new ACCI held its first leadership elections in 2009, Sher Khan Farnod and Mahmud Karzai were re-elected as chairman and first vice chairman, as they had been in the U.S.-supported association.

The ACCI's second leadership election in October resulted in a national board in which half of the members are newcomers. Sher Khan Farnod and Mahmud Karzai, the leaders of the first hour, have both gone (neither of them were candidates) and the new ACCI chairman is Hassin Fahim, another leading protagonist in the Kabul Bank saga and brother of Vice President Qasem Fahim. His main competitor for the seat of chairperson was Dr. Faridun Noorzad of the Maiwand Bank, who also has deep roots in the Kabul Bank network (originally a medical doctor, Noorzad started his banking career in the hawala businesses of Shaheen Exchange and Kabul Exchange, after which he became deputy CEO for Kabul Bank and Azizi Bank, before taking over Maiwand Bank. Shaheen Exchange was founded by Sher Khan Farnod and was instrumental to the irregular financial transactions of the Kabul Bank).

The backgrounds and business interests of the ACCI board members provide an overview of where money can currently be made and influence peddled: banking, construction, oil and gas, and trade (mainly import of consumer goods, fuel and construction materials). Much of this is related to the international presence, which has allowed newcomers to rise to prominence and in some cases outflank the more established businessmen. A case in point is the election of the head of the Transport Committee, Ajmal Rahmani, a young Bagram contractor and son of Parwan MP Rahman Rahmani.*** 

Many of Afghanistan's large businessmen run groups of companies, allowing them to be involved in multiple sectors at the same time, in an effort to maximize influence and profit. This is also the case for several of the ACCI board members, including most prominently the Zahed Walid Group (Hassin Fahim), the Ghazanfar Group (Ismail Ghazanfar), Kamgar Group, which includes Kam Air (Zmaray Kamgar), the Javid Jaihoon Group(headed by ‘Lala Javid' now also head of the Afghan United Bank), and the Zamindar Group (headed by Latif Khan Zhwanday, son of former Azizi Bank vice chairman, Ali Akbar Zhwanday). Some of these business groups have their roots in generations of cross-border trading, such as for instance Ghazanfar, while others, such as for instance Jaihoon, became well-established in the years of war and resistance. Others are newcomers and rose to prominence through their ties to government and international contracting, like Hassin Fahim or Ajmal Rahmani. Many of them have headquarters abroad.

The new board also has a few remarkable omissions, for instance Abdul Ghaffar Dawi of Dawi Oil, who used to be on the board as previously the Deputy for Services. But also some of the other big name companies are unrepresented, such the Azizi Hotak Group, known for its banks (Azizi and Bakhtar), fuel, import of cars and watches, and real estate investments; Habib Gulzar, known for its Coca Cola plant and cigarette imports; or the Alokozay Group, famous for its tea, but also cooking oil, fuel, cigarette imports, real estate, biscuits and tissues.**** None of them, incidentally, were candidates, at least not in the national election. There were no women elected to the board this time. Last time there was one: Hossay Andar, known to many as an unsuccessful, but very active and vocal parliamentary candidate. She was one of the three female candidates but failed to secure sufficient votes.

Serving on an ACCI board is clearly not just a matter of prestige. Although the Chamber of Commerce has no direct executive powers, it is an influential body that can help shape policies, legislation and business practices. It also provides its members with important opportunities to raise their profile. Several senior government officials, including former Ministers Rahimi, Qaderi and Eilaghi, are believed to have started their rise to prominence here.

It will be interesting to watch how the new ACCI board uses its influence. There is a great need, not just for an improved investment climate and better legislation, but also for greater self-regulation in the various sectors - as was rather dramatically illustrated by the Kabul Bank crisis (and the fact that many of Afghanistan's other banks remain shaky in their own ways). The controversies surrounding the ACCI election, however, seem to suggest that we should not be holding our breath just yet.

* Acquiring ACCI membership does not require much more than a copy of a valid business license and a yearly fee (and even that may have been recently ‘waived'). ‘Ordinary membership' costs 500 Afghanis (10 USD) per year according to the website - although this may also be an outdated figure, given that the membership form mentions 2000 Afs (40 USD) as the yearly ordinary fee. Silver, Gold, Platinum and VIP memberships cost 200, 500, 1000, and 5000 USD per year respectively and provide an increasing scale of privileges, including invitations to conferences and matchmaking events, visa recommendation letters, legal services, access to credit, VIP vehicle passes, and invitations to regular meetings with the President, donors and other high-level officials.

** The quality of the footage strongly suggests that it was recorded by a professional journalist, and there is evidence on the video of a considerable and active media presence during the Kabul vote. The lack of media reporting, despite the obvious and on-tape irregularities, can probably be explained by the ongoing parliamentary scuffle and hunger strike of Semin Barakzai at the time, which probably took precedence.

*** The company name given, Ahmad Rashed Rahmani Ltd, does not appear in an internet search, but his other companies do, including Ajmal Rahmani Construction and Road Building and Afghan International Transport and Logistics (the company briefly featured on what appears to be a blacklist - the EPLS; Excluded Parties List System - before it was apparently removed again). 

*** The Alokozay Group has also secured the exclusive bottling rights for Pepsi and the acquisition of Brac Bank. The group is not to be confused with Khan Jan Alkozay Ltd, the company of ACCI First Deputy Khan Jan Alkozay. Alikozai is a wide-spread tribal name (and the variations in spelling here follow the transcriptions used by the companies themselves).

The newly elected ACCI national board (with company names as given by ACCI, and * signifies that the person is a new member):

1. Hassin Fahim (Zahed Walid Construction Company); Chairman (previously ACCI Deputy for Industries and Mines)

2. Khan Jan Alkozay (Khan Jan Alkozay Ltd); First Vice Chairman (previously Deputy for Commerce)

3. Mohammad Ismail Ghazanfar (Ghazanfar Oil and Gas Trade Company); Deputy for Services

4. Mohammad Yunus Momand (Shadab Zafar Construction Company); Deputy for Commerce*

5. Baz Mohammad (Afsar Khan Ltd); Deputy for Industries and Mines*

6. Zamarai Kamgar (Kamgar Trade Company); Adviser International Affairs*

7. Ajmal Rahmani (Ahmad Rashed Rahmani Ltd); Head of the Transport Committee*

8. Mohammad Daud Yusufzai (Afghan Petrol Group Ltd.); Head of the Oil Committee*

9. Azarkhash Hafizi (Afghan-German Company and on the Board of Directors of Azizi Bank); re-elected as Head of the International Relations Committee

10. Sadullah Haqyar (Khalid Jaihoon Construction Company); re-elected as Head of the Secretariat

11. Javid Jaihoon (Afghan United Bank); re-elected as Treasurer

12. Gholam Nabi Eidizadah (Nabi Akbar Ltd); Member

13. Mohammad Ebrahim Zarif (Arif Zarif Ltd); Member

14. Esmatullah Wardak (Kabul Fulad); Member

15. Assadullah Faruqyar (Rahim Farid Ltd.); Member

16. Khairuldin Mayel (Bashir Nawid Group); Member

17. Latif Khan Zhwandai (Zamindar Group); Member*

18. Nezamuldin Tajzadah (Ettehad Aftab); Member*

19. Jamaludin Ishaq (IRAA Ishaq Construction Company); Member*

20. Mohammad Latif Ghanawizian [sic] (Super Cola); Member*

21. Faridun Nurzad (Maiwand Bank); Member*

A total of 46 candidates, including three women, competed for 21 seats. The electoral results can be found here.  

Martine van Bijlert is the co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, from which this piece was adapted. The original article can be found here. 

Countries that have experienced decades of conflict and political turmoil, and have historically featured persistent executive-judicial disputes tend to have less judicial autonomy. Afghanistan epitomizes this. The country has not only lacked comprehensive, integrated laws for much of its history, but what laws existed were culturally dictated and enforced, and in most cases, still are.

As an Afghan, articles about the emergence of the rule of law in the West make me think about the intersection of culture and law in Afghanistan and its challenges. Even before its formal establishment as a nation, the United States began to create common law by using centuries-old written precedents from Great Britain, and applying American notions of reason and justice. Since there is little written tradition in Afghanistan, it does not have such a heritage, nor common law texts, as a starting point. Its starting point is a religious text, the Quran, written in Arabic, a language understood by only a small number of Afghans, the oral history of past decisions, and "felt necessities of the time," as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. characterized one aspect of the development of the common law in the United States.

The Afghan idea of a justice system is also defined by Pashtunwali, a social code of conduct and way of life that predates the Anglo-Saxon common law.  Pashtunwali defines the fundamentals of the Afghan culture, identity and, above all, personal honor.  What distinguishes the practice of Pashtunwali is its emphasis on using influential local and tribal leaders (Maliks, Khans and mullahs), or respected outsiders chosen arbitrarily by the conflicting parties, to act as fact-finders and decision-makers.  Furthermore, decisions must be seen as arbitrary and impartial, not compelled by any of the players in the conflict. This is one of the key reasons people in rural Afghanistan have historically opted to use customary shuras (councils) and jirgas (assemblies) as the primary decision-making forums in which to resolve their disputes. Over the course of Afghan history, the ideals of Pashtunwali have driven and influenced local decisions and rulings, primarily in rural Afghanistan, though the ethos of the system may be seen in all Pashtuns. The few attempts by the central legal authorities to supplant this indigenous centuries-long system of beliefs have been, and may continue to be, largely unsuccessful.

Laws in the United States made by federal, state and local representatives are designed to supersede and override the common law, while in the absence of a statute (or the Constitution), the common law prevails. Although broad policy objectives are not well mapped by use of the common law, it is a filler of necessity and provides an indispensable resource for judicial decisions in the absence of legislative guidance. By contrast, Afghans are usually handed oral, extemporized rulings influenced heavily by village elders, local and tribal leaders, Khans and mullahs, through the long-practiced shura and jirga system. Shuras and jirgas are said to be more efficient, accessible, cost-effective, less corrupt and more trusted by the Afghans than the formal state justice institutions. But these rulings often occur without reference to - mostly because of a lack of knowledge of, indifference to or defiance of - the Afghan Constitution, statutory laws or any other written records. Instead, these leaders rely on their understanding of the Quran, oral histories of past decisions known to them and to their people, Pashtunwali, and their "felt necessity."  

Thus, there is no cohesive thread connecting these oral decisions across villages and tribes to any common national public policy objectives. Afghans who have experienced both the formal and non-formal justice systems find the latter more in line and in compliance with local norms, customs and traditions, including the promotion and encouragement of consensus and avoiding a culture of impunity. Ignorance of and disregard for the country's written law , as well as prevalent corruption, mean that people have little confidence in the laws and low expectations of justice brought through the formal court system.  A report released last year by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) notes that in 2009 alone, Afghans paid an estimated $2.5 billion in bribes, equivalent to 23 percent of Afghanistan's GDP, and that judicial officials topped the list of those who received the bribes. By contrast, judges in the United States use a more consistent process and look to the written precedents in common and statutory law, as well as publications of scholars and retired judges when they do not have written precedents in their own jurisdiction to guide them.  This reduces the incidence of corruption, since wide departures from these precedents would bring critical attention to anomalous decisions.

So what happens in Afghanistan? The disparate sense of "felt necessity," guided by various interpretations of a religious text many cannot read and many misunderstand - together with flawed oral histories of past judgments - drive local decisions, creating a confusing and conflicting hodgepodge of rulings devoid of broad public policy considerations. A key point to note here is that a lack of nationally accepted laws permits subversive elements such as the Taliban and leaders who may be unaware of the formal justice system or distrust government institutions, to intuit and then adopt the most draconian of these incongruent decisions. These actors then form "public policy" based on their interpretations, and enforce it in the areas that they control with attribution to the Quran and use of brutal penalties for non-compliance. 

The solution, it seems, would be for Afghan scholars and those with legal education and background in Afghanistan to go to village and tribal leaders across the country and record the background and results of recent their rulings and judgments. These scholars could then tease out common public policy threads from dispute resolutions that were build on factors ranging from the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad to local conditions and "felt necessities." Having distilled the core essence of such decisions, a "Restatement of the Law of Afghanistan" could be written, similar to the one that exists in the United States, which would set out the main principles of a developing Afghan common law.  It would have no legal power, but it would provide a starting point of the type the founding fathers of the United States received from Great Britain.  Through this mechanism, the future decisions of village and tribal leaders in Afghanistan would be guided but not bound by the past. They would at last be put into writing, further developing coherent and better reasoned guides for Afghanistan's judicial system and a foundation against which ill-conceived and corrupt decisions can be measured and criticized.

It would be these written decisions of village and tribal leaders that would begin the long process of codifying the actual common law of Afghanistan, providing a place to look back for precedent and forward for the common threads of a rule of law.

There are no effective alternative power centers in Afghanistan that could create incentives for the people to take their disputes and disagreements to courts. Indeed, there are only a few courts now in existence and most are distrusted and discredited. However, codifying the actual common law of Afghanistan and applying it in the formal court system could create an incentive for the Afghan people to more formally and habitually refer their disputes and problems to the justice system.

Javid Ahmad, a native of Kabul, is Program Coordinator with the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington DC.

The market has recently been flooded with books about Pakistan by academics, policymakers, and journalists. Many of these have sought to explain - and to some extent apologize for - contemporary Pakistani society to the western world. Pamela Constable's Playing with Fire: Pakistan at War with Itself is the rare exception that acknowledges this goal, and then lives up to its appointed task. Western readers could hope for no better guide to present-day Pakistan than Constable, a veteran journalist who has reported extensively from Pakistan for over a decade with The Washington Post. Her new book is a sound introduction to Pakistan's contradictions, inequalities, tumultuous politics, and every fluctuating national identity. 

As newspaper headlines about Pakistan policy choices become increasingly shrill, readers seeking context will find much of use in Playing with Fire. The book traces political and security developments across the country, primarily since 2007, that fateful year when former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated and the army's poor handling of a siege at the radical Red Mosque in Islamabad led to a spate of nationwide suicide bombings. In addition to political upheaval and terrorist attacks, Constable documents new laws, corruption scandals, media trends, civil society movements, and more, making her book one of the few holistic backgrounders on Pakistan.

Indeed, Playing with Fire benefits immensely from its author's journalistic background. The book covers those aspects of Pakistan that are rarely examined in works by political scientists or retired diplomats focused on Pakistan's security issues or regional geopolitics. Constable includes chapters on women and their divergent experiences in different social classes, upper-class Pakistanis, religious minorities, and life in rural Pakistan (in the interests of disclosure, I read an early draft of one of these chapters while Constable and I overlapped as fellows at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC).

Like good journalism, the book also combines faithful documentation with sharp analysis: Constable bookends extensive quotes from Pakistanis - whether brick kiln workers or land-owning politicians - with her own insights into Pakistan's problems. These insights are inevitably the best nuggets in the book; for example, Constable observes that the dynamics of landed feudalism have trickled down into the contemporary industrial sector, where factor workers remain indebted to their employers.

Constable's most profound insight into Pakistan is stated at the outset, in the book's introduction. She argues that Pakistanis are essentially powerless: "they see the trappings of representative democracy around them but little tangible evidence of it working in their lives." The various chapters of Playing with Fire then show how this powerlessness is manifest: in the vestiges of the feudal system, in the failings of the judicial system, in the endless paperwork of a bloated bureaucracy, in the limited circles of dynastic politics, and in the ‘honor' codes of a patriarchal society. Through characters, narratives, statistics, and direct quotes, Constable shows how Pakistanis are denied rights and opportunities in a way that perpetuates the status quo. One only wishes that with each example of a powerless Pakistani she offers, Constable reiterated the theme more explicitly for emphasis. 

Interestingly, while acknowledging their powerlessness, Constable allows Pakistanis to speak for themselves in her book. The liberal use of direct quotes provides an insight into Pakistani perceptions of global trends and political issues. Numerous excerpts from newspaper editorials and columns (including one of mine) also give a taste of public discourse within Pakistan. The country is frequently faulted for its head-in-the-sand attitude towards internal security developments, particularly the long-term fallout of cultivating militant groups. But Constable's regular nods to Pakistani opinion-makers show that a spirited, if convoluted debate about Pakistan's future and identity is currently underway in the country.

The most interesting chapter in Playing with Fire documents the slow ‘Talibanization' of Pakistani society. Constable points to the diverse elements that have led many Pakistanis to equate patriotism and religiosity: the content of government-issue textbooks, the successful campaigns of religious political parties, the moralizing rhetoric of student politics, the vitriol of television talk show hosts, and the state's foreign policy. Moreover, she uncovers how Pakistani society has evolved in a matter of years from wearing its religion loosely to developing extremist sympathies. Constable shows how Islam became "hip" among university students who embraced their religious identity as a way to participate in global trends. She also notes that "poor yet pious" Pakistanis use religious fervor as a way to push back against "errant Muslims of a higher class," introducing equality in what is otherwise a highly stratified society.

This nuanced chapter is bolstered by Constable's overview of the origins and ideologies of Pakistan's various militant and sectarian groups. The book also documents major security-related events such as the formation of the anti-state Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the takeover of the Swat Valley in 2009 by TNSM, another extremist organization. With these snapshots of militancy, Playing with Fire becomes a handy user's guide to terrorism and security for those who have not followed regional developments at a granular level.

One argumentative disconnect does however emerge in the book. Constable's chapters on the ‘Talibanization' of society and Pakistan's use of militant groups as ‘strategic assets' emphasize that extremism is a top-down phenomenon in Pakistan, perpetuated as a result of state policies. But in other sections of the book, she suggests that extremist tendencies are organic-the expected fallout of widespread poverty, joblessness, and frustration. For example, Constable quotes the bitter complaint of a young man from Peshawar who graduated from a prestigious engineering school but was unable to find a job. He suggests that the lack of opportunity creates terrorists. Similarly, in a chapter about sectarian tensions and violent discrimination against religious minorities, Constable includes a rant by a butcher who denounces rampant corruption, crime, and poor leadership. The decision to include his viewpoint implies that the failure of state institutions is fostering religious intolerance.

There is an ongoing debate about whether extremism in Pakistan is a product of years of state-sponsored militancy and General Ziaul Haq's Islamization policies in the 1980s, or whether it is a contemporary response to flawed Pakistani and American policies. Given Constable's intimate knowledge of the region, a direct summary of her perceptions on this matter would have given the book even more substance.

Throughout her book, Constable draws out the clashing ideological and political stances of Pakistan's liberals and conservatives. She will be aware then that some liberals may find her book too soft on the Pakistan Army. No doubt, the book maps the fallout of the army's many dalliances with militant groups. But the chapter on the ‘murder of democracy' focuses on corrupt politicians such as President Asif Ali Zardari, dynastic politics, and the inefficient bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Constable's analysis of the Pakistan Army delves into the choices made by military dictators Ziaul Haq and Pervez Musharraf as well as the shenanigans of the intelligence agent Khalid Khawaja. This focus on controversial characters (though compelling to read) makes the army's flaws seem individual rather than institutional. A concise assessment of the impact of military interference in Pakistan's political and economic spheres over the decades would have served the book well.

Ultimately, though, Playing with Fire is an accessible yet comprehensive guide to a country that is constantly evolving and much written about, but little understood by westerners.  

Huma Yusuf is a columnist for Pakistan's Dawn Newspaper, and was the 2010-11 Pakistan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Last year, Qasim, a construction worker from eastern Afghanistan, was detained in a joint US-Afghan raid on his home in Kabul. He eventually ended up in the hands of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan intelligence agency. For over a week, Qasim was hung by his arms, taken down only to go the bathroom and pray. Several times a night he was beaten with pipes and electrical cables, his head bashed into walls, and threatened with much worse. After a week and a half, he could no longer walk, not even to bring himself to the bathroom. My organization, Open Society Foundations, and its Afghan partners have interviewed many other Afghans who, like Qasim, have suffered acts of torture at the hands of the NDS, ranging from beatings, and burns, to electric shock, and sexual abuse.

In a ground-breaking report released yesterday by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the true scope and severity of such abuse is made clear. The UN found evidence of torture and mistreatment in 16 Afghan detention facilities, including electric shocks, hanging detainees from ceilings, beatings, and threat of sexual assault. As a result of the report, the Afghan government dismissed several NDS officials implicated in the report, though it unclear whether there will be any criminal prosecutions.  The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has temporarily halted the transfer of ISAF detainees to the 16 facilities.

ISAF's halting of transfers to facilities identified in the UN report is an important first step. The Afghan government's initial response was certainly less positive, but will hopefully improve following now that the report has been publicly released. Looking forward, however, there is real concern that the ISAF and Afghan government responses will prove rather superficial, and ultimately fail to fully grapple with the depths of the problem.

One area that the Afghan government and ISAF should prioritize is accountability. Though perhaps politically difficult, accountability for abuses is key, and must be pursued vigorously and publicly. The UN report is an opportunity for the right signals to be sent, both within the Afghan justice system as well as to the Afghan public.

Without sustained efforts on this front, it's likely that even if those Afghan officials who are responsible for abuse are removed, they will only re-emerge elsewhere in the justice system or government. Shuffling the problem around only sows the seeds for future abuse, and reinforces perceptions of impunity that are at the heart of the Afghan government's struggle for legitimacy.

An independent, external body should be empowered to monitor facilities, receive complaints, and investigate allegations of abuse, with findings and remedial actions made public. Full, unfettered access should also be granted to outside monitors, including Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, ICRC, and UNAMA. Those responsible for abuse should not only be removed from their positions, but also subject to criminal prosecution and civil liability.

The international community can play an important role in ensuring those responsible are truly held to account. Governments should not only apply conventional diplomatic pressure, but should think creatively and ambitiously about how to strengthen accountability. Funding, training, as well as military and intelligence relationships with the Afghan government and security forces should all be utilized to ensure those responsible for abuse are held accountable. The US is prohibited by the Leahy Law from supporting foreign security forces which engage in gross violations of human rights. 

The pervasive lack of due process also leaves detainees vulnerable to abuse. Detainees and defense lawyers we have interviewed consistently decry Afghan authorities' denial of legal counsel, in addition to preventing family notification or contact. In some cases we documented, defense lawyers have themselves been arrested or harassed simply for contacting their clients. The Afghan Government should implement measures to ensure detainees' access to legal counsel, and adopt strict rules regarding family notification (just as the Afghan government advocates for in ISAF detentions), while international donors should provide funding to Afghan legal aid organizations to represent conflict-related detainees. Ensuring detainees have their most basic due process rights respected while in detention provides an additional, necessary check on Afghan authorities' power and strengthens transparency and accountability.

For their part, international forces must acknowledge that there are no quick fixes for detainee abuse in Afghanistan. Detainee monitoring, for example, is too often posited as the solution to abuse, although it only focuses on detainees transferred by international forces, not the wider prison population. While monitoring is a potentially important part of protecting detainee rights, international forces must be honest about its practical limitations, and confront the fact that, in the current context, monitoring alone cannot satisfy their legal obligations to prevent torture.

Indeed, the fact that the UN has documented abuses despite the existence of various ISAF countries' monitoring mechanisms and oversight by organizations like the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) speaks to the insufficiency of such measures. Given the sheer number of facilities and detainees, logistical and security challenges, and detainees' fears of reprisals for disclosing abuse, even the most well-designed monitoring mechanisms may in practice be incapable of ensuring detainees are free from torture.

International forces must also grapple with the problem of torture beyond the narrow issue of transfers, not least because they have been working so closely with the Afghan intelligence authorities, including using intelligence that may very well have been extracted through the use of torture. Appropriate assessment of the risk of torture will also always have to take into account treatment of all detainees at a particular Afghan facility-not just those transferred from international custody. Conceiving of the problem as one of detainee transfer also biases policy solutions towards bureaucratic box checking in order to resume detainee transfers-not actually halting abuse.

To be sure, there are real dilemmas and constraints facing the Afghan government and ISAF. There is a lack of professional capacity at every level of the Afghan justice system, from guards to judges to prosecutors. The sheer number of persons detained in connection with the conflict means the system is under severe strain, burdened further by the military as opposed to law enforcement nature of operations. But the Afghan government and all ISAF nations have strict legal obligations to refrain from and prevent torture, and as the UN report lays bare, they have fallen well short.

The looming troop drawdown and transition only give greater urgency to this issue. With more and more responsibility for security being shifted to Afghans, the strategic risk and political liability posed by abusive detention practices will only grow. Right now the US and other ISAF nations have the most leverage to shape the Afghan justice system and leave behind institutions, laws, and mechanisms that uphold the rule of law and protect Afghans from torture. As the war in Afghanistan marks its tenth anniversary, time is not on the side of either ISAF or the Afghan government. The UN report marks a perhaps singular opportunity to marshal momentum behind detention reforms that will be long-lasting and effective at protecting the most basic of human rights.

Salmaan Taseer's alleged murderer is a twenty-six-year-old security guard, named Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri. Qadri was hired by the Punjab Constabulary in 2003 as an 18-year-old recruit. In 2008, he joined the "Elite Force," where Punjab's best cops end up, and was working for this elite force on the security detail for the governor of Punjab when he killed Taseer. His motivation was allegedly Taseer's vocal opposition to the provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code that deal with blasphemy.

Given the infamy of these legal provisions, the discussion about Taseer's assassination is going to be dominated by an examination of how Pakistan treats blasphemy. That is a long-needed national discussion, and in his death, it may be that Taseer will have stimulated an honest and serious national introspection about how the country treats its minorities.

Unfortunately, what is more likely is that Taseer's death will not only not stimulate a more serious examination of how the Pakistani state deals with the highly toxic issues of blasphemy, but it may help mute the already nervous voices within the thin sliver of Pakistani society that seek to amend these kinds of legal provisions.

Read on

Wearing army fatigues and a red cap, Zaid Hamid is perhaps Pakistan's best-known television personality. The strategic affairs expert, who coined the term 'Hindu Zionist' to describe the hypothetical Indian and Israeli nexus against Pakistan, has become a household name across the country for his conspiracy theories on economic terrorism and Indian-U.S.-Israeli plotting. His Facebook page currently has a following of 66,000, among them students of expensive schools and even pop singers and fashion designers. Whether it is explaining Taliban militancy, Pakistan's ever-present electricity crisis, Blackwater's involvement in planning terrorist attacks, or plans for the U.S. to take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, conspiracy theorists call the shots in Pakistan.

Pakistan's booming television industry, allowed to operate by ex-dictator Gen. Pervez Musharraf, helped lead to his downfall. The country's vibrant Urdu press, which outsells its English-language counterparts in most areas of the country, also helps shape public opinion, with its small army of retired military officers and civilian officials dominate the opinion pages to air their misgivings and concerns. It seems that anti-Americanism on the op-ed pages sells to Pakistanis, who are among the most anti-American people in the world.

Read on