At the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, Germanylast week, 85 countries affirmed their commitment to Afghanistan for the decadefollowing the 2014 transition, and highlighted gains over the past 10 years inthe areas of security, women's rights and the capacity of governmentinstitutions. They also acknowledged the reversible nature of this progress, aswell as the significant work left to be accomplished. Previousdiscussions on Afghanistanwithin the international community have exclusively addressed the transitionperiod between now and 2014. This conference introduced the concept of a muchneeded blueprint for the years following the transition: the "transformation decade"of 2015-2024. This blueprint details two initial milestones: the May 2012 NATOsummit in Chicago, where an announcement is anticipated regarding long-term AfghanNational Security Force funding (ANSF), and a July 2012 conference in Japan, wheremore details regarding international economic support will be announced. Thoughthe December 5 Bonn conference, eclipsed in part by Pakistan'slast minute withdrawal, fell short of announcing major breakthroughs in thepeace process (against high expectationscreated by Bonn 2001), it was an important first step in acknowledging themagnitude of the task that remains unfinished. Now that we have affirmed our longterm commitment in spirit, tangible demonstrations are essential in order tobuild momentum and avoid the perception of empty promises. The internationalcommunity and Afghanistanshould proceed to the next step of defining the first concrete details in theblueprint's foundation. 

As the 2011 Bonn conferenceconclusions stated, "this renewed partnership between Afghanistan and theInternational Community entails firm mutual commitments in the areas ofgovernance, security, the peace process, economic and social development andregional cooperation." The United States should demonstrate this long-termcommitment to Afghanistan in the form of a formal strategic partnershipendorsed by both nations and announced as soon as possible.  It should reflect planned troop reductions (33,000by the end of summer 2012), but maintain U.S. advisory and counterterrorismcapabilities beyond 2014, through the next Afghan political administration in2019. This force would sustain the tempo of counterterrorist operations andprovide professional advice and enablers to the Afghan army and police. Itshould number 10,000 to 25,000 personnel and could be reduced as the ANSFdemonstrate their post-transition competence through the 2014 elections andinto the next political administration. U.S. personnel numbers could alsobe reduced by coalition contributions. Counterterrorist operations should focuson al-Qaeda's attempts to relocate in remote areas of Afghanistan, aswell as target the leadership of insurgent groups who refuse to reconcile andcontinue to challenge the stability of the government. Advisory and enablingforces should focus on the professional development and training of the Afghanarmy and police, as well as their effective performance in the field. 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,in her openingremarks at Bonn stated: "...the United Statesis prepared to stand with the Afghan people, but Afghans themselves must alsomeet the commitments they have made, and we look forward to working with themto embrace reform, lead their own defense, and strengthen their democracy."Afghans should consider improving their government by empoweringprovincial-level authorities and reducing corruption. Both measures areessential to the condition-setting that must take place prior to seriousnegotiations with insurgents. Each province should be granted the right toselect its own governor and to employ independent fiscal, legislative, andconflict resolution powers. Provincial government employees should be hiredfrom within the province and should answer to provincial leaders. Internationalfinancial aid for projects like medical clinics, roads, schools and electricityshould be funneled directly to the provinces in order to create rapid publicsupport. These measures, over time, would bring the power and resources of thegovernment to parts of the country where Kabul'sleadership is viewed as corrupt and incompetent as a result of nepotism,cronyism and its management of funds.  Atthe same time, anti-corruption efforts from within the government must beintensified. Afghans should enact laws consistent with The Afghan NationalAnti-Corruption Strategy.  Continuedcoalition and international assistance through this decade in the form ofadvice, investigation, and prosecution is essential. More effective localgovernance and courts would also serve to undermine the appeal of localconflict resolution currently offered by insurgents.

Some reforms empowering provincialand district governance have already been planned. In the spring of 2010, theAfghan Government's Independent Directorate of Local Governance published its Sub-nationalGovernance Policy. This policy is comprehensive and, if resourced,supported, and given time, would significantly enhance the contribution oflocal government to Afghan quality of life. This will take time and require thecontinued commitment of the UnitedStates and the coalition to educate Afghancivil servants. This policy appropriately calls for and schedules elections ofprovincial, district, and village councils and should be modified toincorporate the election of provincial and district governors. Should Afghansdesire these measures, the constitution would have to be modified through theassembly of a constitutional loya jirga. This initiative could be a part of Afghanistan'snational dialogue in the run-up to the 2014 election and perhaps lead to apost-election loya jirga. 

Without U.S.and international commitment through the end of this decade, Afghanistan will likely fall backinto the civil war it experienced in the early 1990s. As fighting spreads, India and Pakistan will back their Afghanproxies and the conflict could intensify. This situation would not only createopportunities for safe haven for extremists, but also invite a confrontationbetween adversarial and nuclear-armed states. The potential for such an outcomeruns counter to U.S.and coalition interests.

Bonn 2001 began a journey toward Afghanistan'sstability and representative government that has demanded great sacrifice byAfghans, Americans, and other members of the coalition. Bonn 2011 continues thejourney and acknowledges the requirement for long term international commitmentand Afghan resolve. The journey has come far from its humble beginning, butrequires sustained international support and American leadership to remain oncourse.

COL Mark Fields is aMilitary Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, part of National DefenseUniversity's Institute for National Strategic Studies.  He has served in Afghanistan and is theauthor of "AReview of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead inAfghanistan." The views expressed are his alone, and do not necessarilyrepresent those of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, orthe U.S. Government.

As the dust settles from the daring U.S. raid on Osama Bin Laden's lair in Abbottabad, a cantonment town just a few hours from Islamabad, serious rifts are obvious between Pakistan and America. Both countries need each other for a host of different reasons, and, at the same time, resent this mutual dependency that has locked both in a deadly embrace.

In the aftermath of the bin Laden raid, U.S. officials and citizenry alike want to abandon Pakistan, and indeed, the bin Laden affair was the most recent in a string of revelations that cast doubt on Pakistan's reliability as a partner in the war on terror. Pakistan's government, armed forces and citizens are no less vexed with the United States after the raid for equally valid reasons. And it is well past time for both Americans and Pakistanis to consider each other's views and come to an accommodation.

Read on

The late Obama administration envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke sparked an uproar when he indicated in 2009 that U.S. development assistance would be channeled primarily through local Pakistani NGOs, instead of traditional partners: American contractors and the government of Pakistan. The Pakistani government -- one of a handful of governments receiving direct budgetary support from the U.S. government -- vehemently protested. American development contractors faced the cancellation of contracts and became concerned about losing business in Pakistan, and their jobs. Even a USAID official leaked a dissent memo to USA Today, stating that "very few Pakistani firms and NGOs can currently satisfy the stringent management financial management audit requirements for USAID project funding."

Lately, the dust seems to have settled. Recently, the USAID Inspector General released an oversight report, detailing 54 awards worth $269 million that have been made to Pakistani NGOs. Last week, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah indicated that the emphasis on NGOs is a general shift in the way that USAID does business -- not just in Pakistan, but around the world: "We are now at a point where nearly 40 percent of our funding goes to non-government organizations. And in each of our countries, through all of our missions, we're setting specific targets so that we can increase the percentage of support that we provide to local organizations and local entrepreneurs and local NGOs."

The push towards partnering directly with local NGOs makes sense, at least in theory: locals understand their needs, their context, and potential solutions better than foreign contractors, and do not have the high overhead and security costs associated with Americans working abroad, especially in hostile environments.

Read on

At a recent event on Pakistan co-sponsored by Brookings and the U.S. Institute of Peace, several panelists cogently stressed the need for greater transparency on the parts of Washington and Islamabad as a necessary step in forging better relations.

Inevitably, the sad story of Pakistan's F-16s emerged during a panel discussion. In the early 1980s, the United States agreed to sell Pakistan F-16 fighter jets. This decision was taken when the United States worked closely with Pakistan to repel the Soviets from Afghanistan. The F-16 was the most important air platform in Pakistan's air force and it was the most likely delivery vehicle of a nuclear weapon. When nuclear proliferation-related sanctions (under the Pressler Amendment) came into force in 1990, the U.S. government cancelled the sales of several F-16s. Pakistanis routinely cite this as hard evidence of American perfidy to underscore the point that Washington is not a trustworthy ally.

With the lapse of time, many American and Pakistani interlocutors alike rehearse redacted variants of this sordid affair for various purposes. But I was dismayed when a U.S. official (speaking in his personal capacity) did so at the U.S. Institute of Peace event. He stressed, with suitable outrage, that the United States unfairly deprived Pakistan of the F-16s it purchased, demurred from reimbursing Pakistan when sanctions precluded delivery, and even charged Pakistan for the storage fees while the United States sought a third-party buyer for the planes. This particular individual has a long-standing relationship with South Asia and extensive experience in the region, which made the stylized telling all the more troublesome.

Read on

One truism of counterinsurgency is that securing and winning over the population are the keys to success. So, what do the people of Afghanistan want? In December, ABC and the BBC conducted nationwide polling and discovered that one-third of Afghans said that poverty and unemployment were the biggest challenges confronting them. Another third named rising insecurity and violence. Meanwhile, relatively few Afghans were preoccupied by those issues that many Americans deem to be Afghanistan's greatest problems. Only 14 percent of respondents said corruption and feckless government were the leading concerns, while a mere 2 percent selected the drug trade and the influence of foreigners. When asked to name the biggest danger in the country, around 70 percent of respondents chose the Taliban. The lesson flowing from all of this is that the United States must provide the kind of stability and prosperity that it promised Afghans after the overthrow of the Taliban.

On April 17, 2002, President George W. Bush spoke at the Virginia Military Institute, where General George C. Marshall had studied a century earlier. In his speech, he seemed to pledge some kind of Marshall Plan for Afghanistan. But no such outpouring of assistance ever came. Per capita U.S. aid to Bosnians following the end of the Balkan war in the mid-'90s was nearly 30 times that received by Afghans in the two years after the fall of the Taliban. Between 2001 and 2009, U.S. reconstruction and humanitarian aid hovered around an average of $1.75 billion annually-about $58 per Afghan per year. Ambassador James Dobbins, the Bush administration's first envoy to the new Afghan government, has rightly observed that "the American administration's early aversion to nation building" meant there was "low input" and, therefore, "low output," which resulted in "low levels of security and economic growth."

Nor have Afghans seen much for the approximately $36 billion in reconstruction aid that has flowed to their country since 2001. Many of these funds have been consumed by the various international organizations whose four-wheel drives clog the streets of Kabul. A 2008 report by the British charity Oxfam found that around 40 percent of aid to Afghanistan was funneled to donor countries to maintain home offices in the West and pay for Western-style salaries, benefits, and vacations. Another study found that less than 20 percent of international aid ended up being spent on local Afghan projects. Afghanistan remains one of the world's poorest nations, on par with such basket cases as Somalia.

The United States could improve this state of affairs quite swiftly-certainly before the July 2011 deadline for some form of U.S. military drawdown. After years of war, there is no shortage of vital infrastructure in need of building or repairing. Focusing on several high-profile projects would provide much-needed jobs, establish the foundations needed for a functioning economy, and give Afghans a reason to resist the overtures of the insurgents. The most urgent, obvious task is to secure the Kabul-to-Kandahar highway, the most important road in the country, economically and politically. Under the Taliban, this route was pitted with giant potholes that could swallow cars whole. It was rebuilt as a blacktopped freeway by 2004, and, at that time, was the only large-scale reconstruction project to be completed since the U.S. invasion. Just two years later, the security situation had deteriorated so precipitously that to drive on the road without substantial security backup was a suicide mission. It remains so today.

To read the rest of this article, visit The New Republic, where this was originally published.

Peter Bergen, the editor of the AfPak Channel, is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation and at New York University's Center on Law and Security, and the author of The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader. He is a national security analyst for CNN.

Understanding the negative ratings that Pakistanis surveyed by a poll released today by Pew gave to the United States requires a careful study of the very recent history of Pakistan's relations with two leading NATO members -- the United States and the United Kingdom.

The survey finds that only 17 percent of Pakistanis view the U.S favorably. Roughly six-in-ten Pakistanis describe the U.S. as an enemy, while a paltry 11 percent accept the U.S. as a partner. And support for U.S. involvement in the fight against extremists in Pakistan's northwest has waned over the last year. Fewer Pakistanis now want the U.S. to provide financial and humanitarian aid to areas where extremist groups operate, or for the U.S. to provide intelligence and logistical support to Pakistani troops fighting extremists, although about half of those surveyed still favor these efforts.

Although the Pew survey was conducted several months ago, let's examine what happened within the week or so before the report was released.

Read on

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's trip to Pakistan, which culminated today in a full schedule of official meetings and town hall appearances, was the United States' best chance to hit the reset button with the Pakistani people. Clinton arrived with a long list of ‘deliverables' -- a total of $500 million in new development projects, aligned with the priorities of the Pakistani government. And she was clear on what that aid was intended to accomplish. At one town hall meeting today, she used the metaphor of a rocket to illustrate her mission: "We're trying to escape the bonds of gravity, leave behind an era of mistrust and launch a new period of cooperation."

But the United States is not loved in Pakistan, and even those Pakistanis who heard what Clinton had to say are likely to be skeptical. They can see clearly the pressure the United States is placing on the Pakistani government to do more to rein in the Haqqani network and other extremist groups. They may well doubt that the United States has the political and financial will to back its commitment to development support. Even the $7.5 billion of aid authorized over five years by the Kerry-Lugar legislation must be appropriated and spent one year at a time, after all. And the U.S. has a history of abandoning aid commitments to Pakistan when incoming governments violated nuclear norms, or when a bulwark against communism didn't seem to matter as much. As understandable as some of these decisions were at the time, they seem to make it clear that U.S. development aid was driven as much or more by diplomatic imperatives as by a long-run development vision for the Pakistani people.

Read on

A week ago I was in Kandahar, a city at the center of the conflict in Afghanistan. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the head of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, has said that Kandahar will follow the recent offensive in Marjah, Helmand, just next door, in June as the next stage of operations.  He has suggested that a "win" there would turn the tide in Afghanistan.

Such a message should be a relief to citizens in Kandahar, who have long been working and living on the frontlines, their city a daily battleground for control between insurgents, the internationally-backed Afghan government, and criminal militias. But for many of the civilians I spoke to, the prospect of further operations in Kandahar inspires terror.

Though the operations in Marjah were touted as a success, particularly to the extent that they limited civilian casualties, citizens in Kandahar have a different view. They saw the thousands of refugees from Helmand fleeing to Kandahar, the vast majority still living in squalid camps on the outskirts of Kandahar or Lashkar Gah with barely enough food and shelter to survive, and unable to return because their communities are heavily mined, and still infiltrated by Taliban engaged in retaliatory abuses against the population.

The sad thing is that such experiences are not foreign to Kandaharis. The focal point of the conflict for the last several years, Kandaharis have seen time and again that when conflict comes to their doors, they are largely left to their own devices to pick up the pieces. There are humanitarian agencies operating in Kandahar, but with limited access due to security, and a shortfall of resources given the scope of the humanitarian crisis in the south. Not only does Kandahar have its own victims of the conflict to deal with, but it also serves the millions of conflict-affected civilians across the volatile southern region seeking urgent medical care or refuge from fighting.

Kandaharis expect the situation will only get worse with promises of fresh coalition operations. If insurgents plant even a fraction of the IEDs that were planted in Marjah in the Kandahar City area, they will cause immediate harm to civilians and cut off what is for many in the south the last resort for humanitarian care.

Since General McChrystal took charge last July, there has been a renewed focus on protecting the Afghan population in conflict areas. The new counterinsurgency logic is that only by stabilizing communities can you deny the insurgents a safe haven. U.S. and NATO forces have implemented this 1) by restraining force activities likely to cause harm, and 2) by trying to support governance, rule of law, and other "stabilization" activities once operations have happened.

These are both important steps, but they are not enough to stabilize the south. First, protecting the population means not harming the population. It also means ensuring that no one else harms the population either. So far, the internationally-backed Afghan government has not been able to guarantee that: not in Marjah, not in Kandahar, not in other "focal" points for operations.

Second, good governance and rule of law can only go so far when the most basic humanitarian needs of a population are not met. Civilians who are struggling for basic shelter, food, and medical care for months at a time are not going to be "stabilized" by the announcement of new governors or the development of civilian control centers. Law and order is necessary for long term stability -- but in the short term, expecting civilians who have been on a race for basic survival for the last few years to pick themselves up and rebuild without any assistance simply will not happen.

Unless greater attention is given to the basic security and humanitarian dilemmas that civilians in Kandahar face daily, new operations there cannot succeed.

Erica Gaston is a human rights lawyer based in Kabul, Afghanistan, consulting on civilian casualties issues for the Open Society Institute.  

By Haider Ali Hussein Mullick

President Obama's new Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy is status-quo plus -- counterterrorism sprinkled with elements of nation building in Afghanistan. However, long-term U.S. interests in the region depend on a stable Pakistan deterred from nuclear proliferation and fomenting regional insurgencies. The real war in Pakistan, however, is not about military actions but about perceptions.

The United States has signed billions of dollars in aid over to Pakistan but sitting in Islamabad two weeks ago I could hardly find a happy Pakistani. The overriding narrative usually goes as follows: the U.S. sporadically uses Pakistan's military, colludes with local leaders, and leaves millions of Pakistanis to clean up the mess. Failing to explain or market its soft power -- aid for schools and hospitals -- Washington relies on Islamabad to highlight its goodwill and mistakes. While this ostensibly strengthens local governance and protects foreign aid workers, it has placed Pakistanis in a state of combustible ignorance. After eight years today most Pakistanis are equally anti-Taliban and anti-U.S. That spells failure for U.S. public diplomacy.

There are several concrete actions both U.S. and Pakistani officials could take to improve the situation.

First, make U.S.-Pakistan partnership clear to Pakistanis by launching a nation-wide media campaign that answers three basic questions in plain language: why should Pakistanis befriend Americans? Why are Americans helping Pakistanis? What will happen if they cut off support? A web portal should be formed (see, for example, my pilot project at www.usaidforme.com), with the help of independent international and national watchdogs that could track and break down U.S. development aid to ordinary Pakistanis. That most of them are rejecting the $7.5 billion Kerry-Lugar aid bill should be a wakeup call that selling -- and not just giving -- such aid is essential for any hope of creating American goodwill.

Islamabad has already engaged in a successful marketing campaign against the Taliban, which it should replicate in order to sell the U.S.'s goodwill to Pakistanis. The Taliban's brutality and their true intentions to create a parallel state were highlighted in private electronic media when Taliban beheaded four Pakistani Special Forces soldiers and lashed a young girl for alleged adultery. Similarly, Pakistanis must be persuaded that Americans are also against the Taliban -- not supporting them as some conspiracy theorists allege -- and want to build their country, but will not tolerate a nuclear-armed failed state.

By Ahsan Butt

If you've watched The Sopranos, then you've had the experience of being bemused at the insanity that was the relationship between Christopher and Adriana (culminating in one of the most memorable hits in the entire series, when Silvio shot Adriana in a forest after Christopher ratted her out for talking to the FBI).

Well, Pakistan and the U.S. make those two look like Abelard and Heloise. Consider the following facts:

1. Aid from the U.S., and other financial institutions such as the IMF at the behest of the U.S., have helped keep Pakistan's economy afloat at a time of great peril. To that end, the U.S. is promising seven and a half billion more dollars, and yet the reaction to that promised aid -- wrapped up in a maelstrom of nationalistic, ill-founded and uninformed outrage -- would suggest that the U.S. is stealing that amount of money from Pakistan's coffers, or worse.

2. Pakistan has paid enormous costs, both in treasure as well as in blood, in taking on militant outfits on its soil. And yet the near-constant refrain of "do more" from the U.S. continues unabated. Most recently, the visiting Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that she disbelieved that the government was doing all it could to eradicate the presence of al-Qaeda from Pakistani soil. "Al Qaeda has had safe haven in Pakistan since 2002. I find it hard to believe that nobody in your government knows where they are and couldn’t get them if they really wanted to." Such statements, especially two days after one of the most horrific terrorist attacks in Pakistan's history, smack of insensitivity from someone who is supposed to be the highest diplomat of her country.

3. On the one issue where both governments seem to agree -- that of drone attacks -- the Pakistani populace is angry, both at the civilian toll exacted in the attacks as well as the the perceived incursions on Pakistan's sovereignty the attacks represent. Depending on which poll you trust, between 75 and 90 percent of Pakistanis oppose the use of drones in the tribal areas. This anger was manifested in townhall-style meetings Secretary Clinton held with Pakistani students and professionals on her visit. The strange thing about this anger is that the Pakistani government has, in effect, signed off on the use of drones, and so the logical place for the populace to direct their ire is toward the leaders they democratically elected, not the foreign country those democratically elected leaders have found an agreement with. But that is clearly not the case.

I don't have any broad policy-specific recommendations here. I just wanted to highlight what I consider to be an extremely strange state of affairs. With the abnormally high levels of distrust present in this relationship, it has to be the most bizarre alliance I have ever come across in international politics. Secretary Clinton's visit has brought this vision into sharp focus; it is unclear, from this vantage point, what exactly the three-day tour accomplished, or was meant to accomplish.

It also begs a broader strategic question: if the U.S. and Pakistan cannot cooperate or see eye-to-eye when their security interests overlap for the most part (the dismantling of militant networks on Pakistani soil), when huge amounts of aid are transferred, when diplomats from both countries try to sweet-talk the other to considerable lengths (for every Holbrooke or Clinton reference to seekh kababs, there is a Husain Haqqani or Shah Mahmood Qureshi reference to a "long-term partnership"), is there any hope for this relationship?

Don't shake your head; it was a rhetorical question.

Ahsan Butt is a PhD student in political science at the University of Chicago and contributes to the blog Five Rupees, where this was originally published. 

A Majeed/AFP/Getty Images

By Timothy D. Hoyt

The Pakistani Army, according to reports last week, has written a strong "non-paper" to Pakistan's civilian leadership regarding unacceptable elements in the new Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB), which will provide $1.5 billion in economic assistance annually to Pakistan with some conditions regarding accountability. The military was joined, perhaps unsurprisingly, by the political opposition -- Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League -- in condemning terms that were described as "insulting and unacceptable." Anonymous U.S. sources responded by saying that we have to "understand Pakistan's sensitivities," and U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson has been quoted as saying that some of the conditions in the bill are "a big mistake."

The Pakistan Amy's corps commanders and leadership expressed concern, according to Pakistani reports, over the bill's "clauses about the country's nuclear program, suggestions of Pakistan's support for cross-border militancy and civilian government's role in military promotions and appointments." These are certainly important issues. They encompass the three key elements of Pakistani national security policy -- which is and has been utterly dominated by the Army since Pakistan's independence in 1947. They also represent genuine concerns for both the U.S. and the international community. Pakistan's appalling record on proliferation is well known: Pakistani nuclear secrets have been transferred to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, and possibly other states as well.

And the use of paramilitaries, proxy forces, and terrorists to carry out foreign policy dates to independence and the First Kashmir War of 1947. Pakistan's long history of support for militant groups includes providing sanctuary for the Quetta shura (the Afghan Taliban leadership), the Haqqani network, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, all of whom are actively engaged in killing American and coalition forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere, in addition to India-focused groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Finally, the Pakistani officer corps is deeply politicized, has ruled the country for over half of its existence, has never allowed an elected head of state to serve out a full term, and has contributed extensively to the country's economic dysfunction, endemic corruption, eroding civil society, and weak political traditions. Reducing the role of the Army in politics appears to be a mutual goal -- Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani shows no interest in re-inserting himself formally in the political system. Nevertheless, for an Army that traditionally sees itself as not only the protector of the nation, but as the actual embodiment of the nation (and therefore above all other institutions), accepting a bill that might constrain its political interference in the future may seem intolerable.

In addition, Section 205 of the Kerry-Lugar bill requires all direct cash payments for security assistance or non-assistance to be made directly to civilian political leadership, which can then be held accountable for how those funds are spent. This includes the much-criticized Coalition Support Funds, which have been provided in the past with minimal monitoring on either the U.S. or Pakistani side. According to recent Pakistani reports, the Army was stunned to find that billions of dollars provided through CSF had not gone to counterinsurgency or counterterrorist efforts. The Army claims it was denied access to those funds -- a claim which is quite disingenuous, since it has been revealed by retired Army generals that many of those resources went to acquiring equipment to defend against India. In reality, the Pakistani Army simply chose to apply those funds to the theater of higher perceived priority and greater bureaucratic and institutional preference. The fact that no one on the U.S. side has publicly challenged these contradictory claims indicates the level of complacency, or perhaps just exhaustion, in the relationship.

Kerry-Lugar makes Pakistan the recipient of $1.5 billion a year in economic aid -- putting Pakistan just slightly behind Egypt, and a bit behind Israel, in terms of government-to-government assistance. Add in the existing aid packages, which include programs for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and the Coalition Support Funds, and Pakistan certainly passes Egypt, and may even surpass Israel to become the #1 recipient of U.S. aid. This is hardly negligible -- and a Pakistan which has verged on nightmarish uncertainty at least twice in the past two years (the political crisis of 2007, and the economic and political crisis of 2008) really cannot afford to turn this offer down.

Moreover, the Army leadership knows quite well that money is fungible, and that U.S. economic assistance frees up money in the domestic economy that can then be used for military purposes if necessary. And yet Army leadership still launches a series of attacks, complaining about U.S. interference and misunderstanding, and implicitly accuses the civilian government of endangering national security (and, possibly, suggesting a military willingness to intervene if it doesn't get its way).

By Sumit Ganguly

Even as President Obama gets ready to sign the Kerry-Lugar bill, legislation designed to give Pakistan $7.5 billion in aid over the next five years that is formally called the "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act," outraged howls have emerged from a number of quarters in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Even those Pakistani political commentators not usually given to intemperate outbursts have joined in this shrill chorus of criticism of key provisions of the bill. But the loudest protests have come from the general headquarters of the Pakistan Army. Indeed, the New York Times reported that General Ashfaq Kiyani, the chief of the Pakistan Army, has expressed his profound misgivings about certain conditions embedded in the bill. The bulk of the criticisms deal with a handful of benchmarks that the Pakistani state is expected to meet, including that the Pakistan Army to desist from interfering in the political process, sever its support for various jihadi organizations, and not engage in renewed proliferation activities.

Despite these expressions of dismay and resentment, the provisions in Kerry-Lugar are really quite unexceptional and long overdue. For far too long, various U.S. administrations have uncritically accepted Pakistani promises to adhere to the law and the intent of American economic and military assistance. The subversion of U.S. goals and policies has a long lineage, harkening back to the days of the Eisenhower administration and the forging of the U.S.-Pakistan military nexus in 1954. Arms supplied under the aegis of this agreement designed to strengthen Pakistan's resolve against communist expansion were turned against India in 1965. Subsequently, in the 1980s, during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Gen. Zia ul-Haq's military regime siphoned off much of the American assistance intended for the Afghan resistance. Most recently, a good deal of the $11 billion of counterterrorism funds that the two Bush administrations lavished on Pakistan was diverted toward acquiring weaponry best used in a war against India.

Given this backdrop of routine skullduggery on the part of the Pakistani military establishment, the benchmarks spelled out in the Kerry-Lugar bill are necessary. Contrary to much perfervid commentary both within Pakistan and even in the American press, none of these provisions are especially onerous, do not fundamentally infringe on Pakistan's sovereignty, and have critical national security waivers which can be invoked if necessary. Instead the provisions seek to redress a long-standing imbalance within Pakistan; namely, the overweening prerogatives of the Pakistani military over the civilian government. Even during the brief periods of civilian rule, the military has not only zealously guarded its own privileges but has hobbled the functioning of civilian institutions, meddled in matters well beyond its purview, and even upended civilian regimes as it deemed necessary. To those ends, it has ensured that defense expenditures have not been subjected to any meaningful parliamentary scrutiny, sown discord within political parties, boosted preferred candidates, cultivated a range of jihadi organizations to pursue strategies of asymmetric warfare in Kashmir, and participated in proliferation networks.

Given this checkered past, it is hardly surprising that the military has taken such umbrage about provisions in the bill that seek to end their persistent propensity to undermine civilian regimes, end their dalliance with jihadi forces, and prevent the resurrection of proliferation rings.

The military's intransigence notwithstanding, the Obama administration needs to stand its ground on the question of conditions. Without a firm adherence mechanism attached to the stated expectations of Kerry-Lugar, there is every likelihood that the security establishment will revert to form. Following pious expressions of commitment to the stated U.S. goals, the military will exploit every possible means to subvert them.

Apologists for the Pakistani military in the U.S. have already started to trot out their timeworn arguments against the imposition of any benchmarks. They contend that such benchmarks could undermine the limited cooperation that the military has provided the United States in reining in jihadi organizations and allowing the use of Pakistani territory to support the war in Afghanistan. They also contend that a provision that seeks to enhance civilian oversight of the military is too intrusive.

These arguments are superficially appealing but flawed. The military continues to hedge its ties to such vicious jihadi organizations as Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (the latest political incarnation of Lashkar-e-Taiba) and shows little or no inclination to firmly suppress them. Admittedly, U.S. reliance on Pakistani supply routes to Afghanistan is not a trivial issue, but the U.S. pays Pakistan handsomely for the use of these supply chains and the Pakistani state, which is on financial life support -- having just received an infusion of $11.5 billion from the International Monetary Fund -- can ill afford to dispense with the rents that these earn. Finally, the provision of greater civilian control over the military is more anodyne that it appears: it simply seeks to strengthen the civilian leadership's control of legitimate subjects such as the rules of promotion of senior military officers and to exercise oversight over military budgets and operational plans. Such scrutiny is routine in most democratic states and Pakistan's pattern of civil-military relations has been the anomaly.

Diluting the monitoring provisions of the current bill would be tantamount to caving in to blackmail. Thanks to its feckless behavior over decades, the military has few viable external allies that it can rely on to readily replace American funding. Pakistan's two regional allies, Saudi Arabia and China, are unlikely to step into the breach. The PRC, though a self-professed ‘all weather friend' has expressed its misgivings about the military's ties to radical Islamist groups. The Saudis, though hardly unsympathetic to the Pakistani military, are unlikely to promptly address the financial shortfall out of concern of alienating the United States.

Past American indulgence has enabled the Pakistani military to distort the country's political and economic priorities, stultify the consolidation of democratic institutions, and provoke its far more powerful Western neighbor at will. The current bill correctly seeks to curb the behaviors that have caused much damage to the country, the region, and even the world. It is time to end their myopic propensities.

Sumit Ganguly is a professor of political science and the director of research of the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University, Bloomington.

FAROOQ NAEEM/AFP/Getty Images