Last month, Afghanistan's Chamber of Commerce, the ACCI, elected its new leadership. The process was not without controversy. A lively pre-election trade in ACCI membership* cards allowed large numbers of underage children and people who had nothing to do with running a business to participate in the vote at the provincial level. And at the national level there were allegations of deal-making, money transfers and ethnic politicking. The fact that highly powerful individuals and networks find these positions worth competing over illustrates their importance. The controversies surrounding the vote also underscore how deeply problematic elections - of any kind - have become, and how the involvement of the Independent Electoral Commission is no guarantee for a serious vote.

The ACCI's leadership elections, organized by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), took place between September 11 and October 14, 2011 in the 21 provinces that have their own ACCI departments. It was followed by the election of the national Executive Board on October 24, 2011. Most of the provincial-level elections went unreported, with the exception of Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif where there were at least some echoes of the tumult going on behind the scenes.

In Mazar the vote was postponed for weeks due to complaints over the irregular distribution of ACCI cards and the high number of candidates. Local traders hinted that they expected Governor Atta to step in and solve the problem (read: pre-select the members of the provincial ACCI board) and, indeed, by the time the Mazar election took place there were exactly the same number of candidates as there were seats. In Kabul the Chamber's CEO, Mohammad Qorban Haqju, assured the media that the electoral procedures had been fully transparent and that all allegations of fraud were baseless. A video obtained by AAN, however, suggests otherwise.

This video is a collection of short recordings, 15 minutes in total, taken in one of Kabul's polling centers in what appears to be a large tent.** It shows, among other things, considerable chaos, with multiple voters behind the cardboard voting booths (which can be partially explained by the complexity of the vote; in Kabul voters could mark up to 19 candidates).

More seriously, the footage also shows a large variety of obviously ineligible voters, who were nevertheless allowed to vote. This included men and women who indicated that they were not involved in any kind of business (in some cases whole groups of what appeared to be family members of candidates were brought to the polling center, receiving last-minute voting instructions) and large numbers of under-age voters. The video shows groups of students, some of them in identical uniforms, and interviews with boys and girls as young as 14 years old, all of them holding ACCI membership cards. There is a recording of a member of the ACCI leadership, who is shown a very young boy and asked whether the boy should be allowed to vote, telling the staff that it is alright as long as he holds a card.

The footage confirms allegations, including by businessmen who chose to boycott the vote for this reason, that there had been a lively and uncontrolled trade in ACCI cards in the run-up to the election (in an ironic parallel to the country's presidential and parliamentary elections, which have become increasingly impossible to control due to the massive over-registration of voters). This is also borne out by the figures, as described with an admirable lack of irony by the ACCI in their own report of the election:

‘During this period [i.e. during the weeks of the provincial level elections] membership in the Chamber increased from approximately 35,000 to an estimated 62,000 as individuals and enterprises sought to exercise their right to vote for the future of ACCI.'

A total of around 29,000 members are said to have voted countrywide.

There were also complaints of ethnic campaigning, for instance in Kabul (and during the national-level vote), alleging that separate lists with either Pashtun or non-Pashtun (Northern Alliance-linked) candidates had been created and distributed, and that candidates and their backers were encouraging voters to vote along these lines. The video footage does indeed show voters holding photocopied pieces of paper with selected candidates and using them while filling in the ballot (there were 57 candidates in Kabul and voters were allowed to mark up to 19 candidates, given that there were 19 seats).

The national-level election of the ACCI Board took place during the High Council Congress on October 23 and 24. It was not plagued by the same level of controversy, if only because the number of voters was fixed and limited to the 319 provincial representatives that had been voted in at the provincial level. There were, however, allegations of behind-the scenes deal-making, money transfers and a similar kind of ethnic politicking as took place on the provincial level (with candidates and their backers seeking to secure bloc votes along ethnic and factional lines). 

The ACCI in its current form is a relatively recent institution and was established after the merger of two initially competing bodies. The pre-existing body, the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) was a Soviet-era government institution, whose main function had been the valuing of imported goods against a fee to facilitate the government's collection of custom taxes. The second, much more recent body - the Afghan International Chamber of Commerce (AICC) - was an independent, market-oriented business association. It was established in 2004 by none other than Sher Khan Farnod and Mahmud Karzai, two protagonists in the Kabul Bank scandal. The two chambers were supported by competing donors with diverging agendas: GTZ, the government-owned German development agency (now renamed GIZ), and USAID.

The new ACCI that was established in 2008 represented a compromise: the old-style chamber was reformed rather than dissolved, but its character is much closer to what the U.S. had in mind than what the Germans and the Afghan government had initially been working toward (a government-led single point of contact for all businesses). When the new ACCI held its first leadership elections in 2009, Sher Khan Farnod and Mahmud Karzai were re-elected as chairman and first vice chairman, as they had been in the U.S.-supported association.

The ACCI's second leadership election in October resulted in a national board in which half of the members are newcomers. Sher Khan Farnod and Mahmud Karzai, the leaders of the first hour, have both gone (neither of them were candidates) and the new ACCI chairman is Hassin Fahim, another leading protagonist in the Kabul Bank saga and brother of Vice President Qasem Fahim. His main competitor for the seat of chairperson was Dr. Faridun Noorzad of the Maiwand Bank, who also has deep roots in the Kabul Bank network (originally a medical doctor, Noorzad started his banking career in the hawala businesses of Shaheen Exchange and Kabul Exchange, after which he became deputy CEO for Kabul Bank and Azizi Bank, before taking over Maiwand Bank. Shaheen Exchange was founded by Sher Khan Farnod and was instrumental to the irregular financial transactions of the Kabul Bank).

The backgrounds and business interests of the ACCI board members provide an overview of where money can currently be made and influence peddled: banking, construction, oil and gas, and trade (mainly import of consumer goods, fuel and construction materials). Much of this is related to the international presence, which has allowed newcomers to rise to prominence and in some cases outflank the more established businessmen. A case in point is the election of the head of the Transport Committee, Ajmal Rahmani, a young Bagram contractor and son of Parwan MP Rahman Rahmani.*** 

Many of Afghanistan's large businessmen run groups of companies, allowing them to be involved in multiple sectors at the same time, in an effort to maximize influence and profit. This is also the case for several of the ACCI board members, including most prominently the Zahed Walid Group (Hassin Fahim), the Ghazanfar Group (Ismail Ghazanfar), Kamgar Group, which includes Kam Air (Zmaray Kamgar), the Javid Jaihoon Group(headed by ‘Lala Javid' now also head of the Afghan United Bank), and the Zamindar Group (headed by Latif Khan Zhwanday, son of former Azizi Bank vice chairman, Ali Akbar Zhwanday). Some of these business groups have their roots in generations of cross-border trading, such as for instance Ghazanfar, while others, such as for instance Jaihoon, became well-established in the years of war and resistance. Others are newcomers and rose to prominence through their ties to government and international contracting, like Hassin Fahim or Ajmal Rahmani. Many of them have headquarters abroad.

The new board also has a few remarkable omissions, for instance Abdul Ghaffar Dawi of Dawi Oil, who used to be on the board as previously the Deputy for Services. But also some of the other big name companies are unrepresented, such the Azizi Hotak Group, known for its banks (Azizi and Bakhtar), fuel, import of cars and watches, and real estate investments; Habib Gulzar, known for its Coca Cola plant and cigarette imports; or the Alokozay Group, famous for its tea, but also cooking oil, fuel, cigarette imports, real estate, biscuits and tissues.**** None of them, incidentally, were candidates, at least not in the national election. There were no women elected to the board this time. Last time there was one: Hossay Andar, known to many as an unsuccessful, but very active and vocal parliamentary candidate. She was one of the three female candidates but failed to secure sufficient votes.

Serving on an ACCI board is clearly not just a matter of prestige. Although the Chamber of Commerce has no direct executive powers, it is an influential body that can help shape policies, legislation and business practices. It also provides its members with important opportunities to raise their profile. Several senior government officials, including former Ministers Rahimi, Qaderi and Eilaghi, are believed to have started their rise to prominence here.

It will be interesting to watch how the new ACCI board uses its influence. There is a great need, not just for an improved investment climate and better legislation, but also for greater self-regulation in the various sectors - as was rather dramatically illustrated by the Kabul Bank crisis (and the fact that many of Afghanistan's other banks remain shaky in their own ways). The controversies surrounding the ACCI election, however, seem to suggest that we should not be holding our breath just yet.

* Acquiring ACCI membership does not require much more than a copy of a valid business license and a yearly fee (and even that may have been recently ‘waived'). ‘Ordinary membership' costs 500 Afghanis (10 USD) per year according to the website - although this may also be an outdated figure, given that the membership form mentions 2000 Afs (40 USD) as the yearly ordinary fee. Silver, Gold, Platinum and VIP memberships cost 200, 500, 1000, and 5000 USD per year respectively and provide an increasing scale of privileges, including invitations to conferences and matchmaking events, visa recommendation letters, legal services, access to credit, VIP vehicle passes, and invitations to regular meetings with the President, donors and other high-level officials.

** The quality of the footage strongly suggests that it was recorded by a professional journalist, and there is evidence on the video of a considerable and active media presence during the Kabul vote. The lack of media reporting, despite the obvious and on-tape irregularities, can probably be explained by the ongoing parliamentary scuffle and hunger strike of Semin Barakzai at the time, which probably took precedence.

*** The company name given, Ahmad Rashed Rahmani Ltd, does not appear in an internet search, but his other companies do, including Ajmal Rahmani Construction and Road Building and Afghan International Transport and Logistics (the company briefly featured on what appears to be a blacklist - the EPLS; Excluded Parties List System - before it was apparently removed again). 

*** The Alokozay Group has also secured the exclusive bottling rights for Pepsi and the acquisition of Brac Bank. The group is not to be confused with Khan Jan Alkozay Ltd, the company of ACCI First Deputy Khan Jan Alkozay. Alikozai is a wide-spread tribal name (and the variations in spelling here follow the transcriptions used by the companies themselves).

The newly elected ACCI national board (with company names as given by ACCI, and * signifies that the person is a new member):

1. Hassin Fahim (Zahed Walid Construction Company); Chairman (previously ACCI Deputy for Industries and Mines)

2. Khan Jan Alkozay (Khan Jan Alkozay Ltd); First Vice Chairman (previously Deputy for Commerce)

3. Mohammad Ismail Ghazanfar (Ghazanfar Oil and Gas Trade Company); Deputy for Services

4. Mohammad Yunus Momand (Shadab Zafar Construction Company); Deputy for Commerce*

5. Baz Mohammad (Afsar Khan Ltd); Deputy for Industries and Mines*

6. Zamarai Kamgar (Kamgar Trade Company); Adviser International Affairs*

7. Ajmal Rahmani (Ahmad Rashed Rahmani Ltd); Head of the Transport Committee*

8. Mohammad Daud Yusufzai (Afghan Petrol Group Ltd.); Head of the Oil Committee*

9. Azarkhash Hafizi (Afghan-German Company and on the Board of Directors of Azizi Bank); re-elected as Head of the International Relations Committee

10. Sadullah Haqyar (Khalid Jaihoon Construction Company); re-elected as Head of the Secretariat

11. Javid Jaihoon (Afghan United Bank); re-elected as Treasurer

12. Gholam Nabi Eidizadah (Nabi Akbar Ltd); Member

13. Mohammad Ebrahim Zarif (Arif Zarif Ltd); Member

14. Esmatullah Wardak (Kabul Fulad); Member

15. Assadullah Faruqyar (Rahim Farid Ltd.); Member

16. Khairuldin Mayel (Bashir Nawid Group); Member

17. Latif Khan Zhwandai (Zamindar Group); Member*

18. Nezamuldin Tajzadah (Ettehad Aftab); Member*

19. Jamaludin Ishaq (IRAA Ishaq Construction Company); Member*

20. Mohammad Latif Ghanawizian [sic] (Super Cola); Member*

21. Faridun Nurzad (Maiwand Bank); Member*

A total of 46 candidates, including three women, competed for 21 seats. The electoral results can be found here.  

Martine van Bijlert is the co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, from which this piece was adapted. The original article can be found here. 

Ten years from now, the September 20th assassination of High Peace Council head and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani may be seen as a turning point in the Afghanistan conflict, comparable to the assassination of storied insurgent leader Ahmad Shah Massoud a decade ago. Massoud's death marked the end of the Taliban's reign and ushered in the Bonn Agreement -- followed as it was by the overwhelming force of the U.S. military to oust the Taliban government that sheltered al-Qaeda. Rabbani's assassination is poised to mark the beginning of the end of the Bonn era of Afghan politics, during which Afghanistan has engaged fitfully in an experiment in constitutional democracy.

Rabbani was no progressive democrat. However, by killing him in a brazen act of perfidy while he exercised his duties as the head of the High Peace Council, opponents of a Western-leaning, internationally supported Afghan government appear to be signaling their intention to disrupt, if not defeat, an orderly transition from international security control that preserves the status quo of Afghan political power. 

As a result, while the United States focuses on defeating the Taliban and improving Afghan governance by 2014, Afghans are increasingly looking beyond the 2014 horizon toward the political realities they anticipate once the international community departs. Rabbani's death only deepens the sense of foreboding in Kabul that the politics of the 1990s may be coming back, marked by warlord fiefdoms, fighting among ethnic factions, and an even more ineffective central government.

Afghanistan now faces three different political scenarios for the "transition" that will occur in 2014: If the country's Constitution is observed, then a newly elected Afghan President will replace Hamid Karzai. If a peace process progresses, a grand bargain between Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Afghanistan's neighbors could be ratified at a Loya Jirga that establishes a new governing order outside of the electoral process.  Or, if present trends of assassination and corruption continue, Afghanistan will face a deeper security crisis, leading to emergency rule.  

The Rabbani assassination and deteriorating relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the U.S. make the grand bargain outcome less likely. And while there is precedent throughout the Middle East for using security threats as a justification for authoritarian government, Afghanistan's history, terrain, and decentralized political power centers make that model unlikely to produce stability.

Therefore, Afghanistan and the international community face a stark choice between the Bonn Agreement's fundamental promise of a democratic transition of power (which has never occurred for a head of state in Afghanistan's history), or a return to the old ways of political bartering and unstable autocratic mandates. Indeed, a democratic transition to a more inclusive Afghan government may be the only way to avoid a civil war once most international troops withdraw. This means a democratic transition of power in 2014 should be the highest political priority in Afghanistan over the next three years.

Based on the past two elections, a legitimate democratic transition cannot occur in 2014 without significant electoral reforms. There are a number of technical fixes that are required, but the biggest obstacle to mending the serious flaws of past Afghan elections is political. The prevalence of electoral fraud has allowed Afghan political leaders from all factions to maintain fantasies about the size of their political base and the outsized portion of political power to which they feel they are entitled. Rather than building durable political bases that can reliably support them at the polls, Afghan political leaders have invested the most time and energy into ensuring friends are in charge of district polling centers, extra ballots are available for loyalists to stuff, and, if that fails, intervening at the highest levels to adjust the final results. 

None of this will change overnight. But many Afghans still agree with Churchill that choosing their leaders democratically is the worst process to follow -- except for the alternatives. Rabbani's death may cause a reflexive step backward toward the old political framework that predominated in the 90s. However, the dire consequences of missing an election in 2014 and having a power struggle for the presidency outside of the Constitutional order should afford a moment of clarity in which the advantages of reforming the electoral system outweigh the temptation to pursue the same fraud as before.

Given sufficient political will, the fundamental ways to fix the electoral system are already well known:

• First, there must be an accurate and comprehensive voter registry that identifies how many voters are in each constituency, and provides a way to verify voter identity at the polls. This could be high tech, using biometric tools, or low tech, using existing taskeras (individual identity documents), but the old voter registration system is so fraud-ridden that it must be replaced.
• Second, the Electoral Law that governs the country's elections must be revised to provide systemic incentives for political parties to form and promote candidates who can appeal to voters' interests. This would likely involve some form of proportional representation for political parties, or splitting political constituencies into single member districts. More party organization would also reduce the number of weak candidates in the elections, and increase scrutiny of the process.
• Third, the officials responsible for administering and adjudicating elections must be seen as credible and independent actors, which means that their authority must be unambiguous, and their selection must involve real buy-in from different political groups. Five of the seven IEC commissioners' terms for the Independent Election Commission (IEC) have expired along with the previous Electoral Complaints Commission's mandate. These positions should be filled with credible leaders that have Parliamentary approval.

For any of these changes to happen, however, there must be champions of reform who have significant political influence and a sufficient interest in improving the system. Civil society activism has not proved to be an agent of change so far on electoral issues, and with the high stakes on the table in 2014, it is unlikely that NGOs alone can affect power-brokers' political calculations. This means that the international community must engage with the Afghan political leadership in frank discussions about what their fundamental grievances are with the current electoral framework, how they plan to gain the popular legitimacy necessary to govern Afghanistan beyond 2014, and how to therefore design an electoral system that accommodates the core demands of multiple political and ethnic factions. 

The tendency in Washington is for discussions about Afghan elections to involve speculation about who the next leader of Afghanistan could be, and then lament the lack of obvious candidates. However, as many Afghans point out, Karzai was not an obvious leader when the Bonn process began; he became the consensus choice once it was clear he had U.S. support and was the least objectionable among the mix of factions with a seat at the table. In other words, political context and the process of selection matter more than individual merits.

Therefore, the immediate focus should be on re-calibrating the incentives and rewards of the electoral system to produce a more fair and predictable result rather than trying to pick a winner in advance.  This should start by making good on Afghanistan's commitment at the Kabul Conference last year to initiate "a strategy for long term electoral reform that addresses in

particular the sustainability of the electoral process," and gives advantages to political parties that organize slates of qualified candidates and protects against disenfranchisement of groups that, due to geographic or security reasons, will not have equal access to the polls.

The next three years present a last opportunity to correct the errors caused by backing individuals over institutions as a governance strategy.  By investing in political and electoral reforms that incentivize broader participation in the democratic process, there may be an opportunity to promote national reconciliation, even if the peace process led by Rabbani falters in the wake of his death. Otherwise, the chances that the democratic framework of the Bonn agreement will survive the 2014 transition are slim, and Afghans will be right to hedge now against emergency rule or, even worse, civil war.

Scott Worden is a Senior Rule of Law Advisor at the U.S. Institute of Peace.  He served as a Commissioner on the 2009 Afghanistan Electoral Complaints Commission and was an observer of the 2010 Parliamentary Elections. 

NEXT: Shamila Chaudhary, The Ideological Failings of the Afghan War

In January of this year, Afghan President Hamid Karzai yielded to domestic and international pressure and endorsed the seating of the new Afghan parliament against the recommendation of a Special Court he created to evaluate election fraud claims. Few would have predicted then that six months later Karzai's Court would bring the country to the brink of complete political collapse.

Afghanistan's 2010 parliamentary elections were yet another reminder of the extraordinary difficulty of administering elections in the midst of a wide scale counter-insurgency effort. Like the 2009 presidential elections, the September 2010 Wolesi Jirga, or lower house of parliament, elections, were marred by widespread fraud, with more than a million votes ultimately invalidated. Despite the pervasiveness of fraud, the process did offer some hope for the nascent democracy. Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC) showed strong signs that despite enormous external pressure, it could exercise the necessary independence and impartiality that observers felt was lacking in 2009.

The results of the election were not favorable to Karzai, who fought throughout the process for ways to advantage his political allies. In the pre-election period this included unsuccessfully advocating, against the recommendation of the IEC, for the opening of 87 additional polling stations in some of the country's most insecure districts. After election day, President Karzai expressed his dissatisfaction with the results from Ghazni province, where Hazara candidates swept the seats despite the presence of a Pashtun majority. The Special Court would become President Karzai's favorite instrument to remind the new members of parliament that it was he who truly controlled their political fate.

Last year, after Afghanistan's Electoral Complains Commission (ECC) referred hundreds of cases to the attorney general (AG) to review whether candidates had committed criminal offenses, the AG decided to submit 232 candidates to Afghanistan's Supreme Court for adjudication, despite no provision in the electoral law authorizing it to do so. In the weeks that followed, it became clear that the AG was not guided by a legal framework but motivated by a preferred political outcome. Indeed, the AG's office was outspoken in voicing its desire that the results of the elections should be invalidated entirely.

On the 21^st of December, the Supreme Court took the next step by recommending that President Karzai establish a Special Court to further investigate and adjudicate the claims of disaffected, defeated candidates. On the 26^th of December, President Karzai approved the creation of a Special Court through presidential decree and named Sadiqullah Haqiq, head of the Kabul Court of Appeals, to lead the court. According to the president and the Supreme Court, the Special Court would begin investigating results, and would have the authority to make changes to the results of the September elections.

Shortly after the creation of the court both the IEC and ECC disavowed the court and reaffirmed their position that the authority to administer elections and announce results was the sole duty of the IEC and adjudication of complaints was that of the ECC. The international community publicly supported the independence of the country's legitimate electoral institutions and called on all actors to respect their decisions.

Often, it is ambiguity in the Afghan legal framework that causes such political impasses. In this instance, however, the law is clear. The constitution, through Article 156, establishes the IEC as the sole authority for the administration of elections and grants it exclusive authority for the announcement and certification of election results. Neither the constitution nor the electoral law sanctions the creation of a special court to review election results. Nor does either document grant the Supreme Court or Attorney General the authority to engage in electoral affairs.

The idea for the creation of the court likely did not originate with the Supreme Court, but directly from within the president's office; rather, during Democracy International's observation of the process, many well-connected Afghans reported to us that the idea came from two of President Karzai's own legal advisors, who were seeking out ways to alter the results of the September elections that had strengthened opposition to Karzai in the parliament.

After months of the Special Court reportedly conducting re-counts and investigations throughout the provinces, it finally announced a ruling on June 22 in which it declared that 62 sitting members of the parliament should be replaced. The decision launched the country into a political crisis and elicited an immediate reaction from parliament, which voted for the removal of the attorney general and six members of the Supreme Court. The crisis reached new proportions last Wednesday, when the parliament began debating the impeachment of the president, who has reportedly proposed his own list of 17 candidates to the IEC who should be immediately certified as winners. The instability has, according to Afghan news sources, motivated members of parliament to begin carrying firearms into sessions of parliament, and has resulted in physical altercations between MPs.

The authority to arbitrate constitutionality lies with Afghanistan's Independent Commission for the Oversight of the Constitution. In this instance, however, the commission has only contributed to the confusion. In January, the commission reportedly met with a group of MPs and expressed its opinion that the establishment of the Special Court was illegal. This was reported widely at the time in Afghan newspapers. Just last week, in an apparent about face, the constitutional commission issued a decision stating that the IEC should cooperate with any bodies investigating election issues. To complicate matters further, a member of the constitutional commission appeared on TOLO television (the nation's most popular political news outlet) the next day and declared the Special Court illegal and explained that the decision of the commission had been misunderstood.

The implications of the Special Court's ruling are serious, and the willingness of the president to embrace its legitimacy threatens to undermine more than just the parliament. If the court's decision is ultimately respected and the makeup of the parliament is altered, the legitimacy and credibility of the IEC and future Afghan elections will forever be tainted. Candidates and their supporters are unlikely to respect the authority of an election commission whose decisions they know can be trumped by ad-hoc courts. In addition, if the Special Court brings criminal charges against sitting parliamentarians, it will also undermine the authority of Afghanistan's legitimate judicial bodies.  At a time when a country struggling to establish robust democratic institutions needs support from its executive, that executive seems all too willing to endorse the defanging of those institutions.

The political implications are even more serious. If Karzai's Court is successful at shaking up the composition of the lower house, the effects could be felt far beyond the body's votes on the president's initiatives. The president would then likely have a parliament more amenable to his call for a Loya Jirga, a powerful traditional body that has the authority to amend the constitution. The current parliament has called the president's plans for a Loya Jirga unconstitutional, on the basis that chairpersons of district councils, who are constitutionally mandated delegates to a Loya Jirga, have not yet been elected. Not only would President Karzai likely have the support in the lower house to move forward with his plans, he would also have 62 more votes in favor of whatever agenda he decides to pursue within the jirga, including a possible constitutional amendment to allow him to seek a third term.

With no clear ending in sight, the president, by supporting the actions of a Special Court with no legal authority, has brought the country to the brink of political collapse. What happens next is anyone's guess. The IEC has so far shown resolve against Karzai and has reportedly presented him a plan to solve the impasse. While details of the plan have yet to be released, there are rumors circulating that it would require President Karzai to declare the Special Court illegal and to honor the independence of the IEC and the credibility of its decisions. In return, the IEC would agree to review some previous decisions of the ECC, which it believes is allowed under Article 65 of Afghanistan's Electoral Law.

If the president disagrees with the IEC's plan, he could always attempt to replace the leadership of the IEC, which is within his constitutional rights, and thus pave the way for the implementation of the Special Court's decision. This would not, however, prevent the likely violent backlash from the 62 parliamentarians the Special Court is threatening to remove. Perhaps a more likely outcome is for the AG to circumvent the IEC altogether and begin implementing the Court's decisions himself, as he has promised recently to do. This would likely entail arrests of sitting MPs and would undoubtedly lead to political chaos and possibly violence.

The crisis created by Karzai's Court underscores the necessity for a genuine Afghan led dialogue on democratic reform. Options must be explored to strengthen the independence and resilience of Afghanistan's democratic institutions. To achieve any level of democratic sustainability, Afghan politicians must operate on a stronger democratic foundation, one developed with the support of civil society and the very institutions President Karzai is attempting to delegitimize (the IEC, the ECC, and the lower house of parliament). If the international community and the Government of Afghanistan do not begin to take democratic reform seriously, a strong democratic Afghanistan will become even more of a fantasy than it is now.

Jed Ober is Director of Programs at Democracy International. Throughout 2010, he served as Democracy International's Chief of Staff in Kabul where he oversaw the largest international election observation mission to Afghanistan's 2010 parliamentary elections. Democracy International's final observation report can be downloaded at www.democracyinternational.com.

Editor's note: This is Part II of a two-part seriesfocusing on aid provision in conflict zones. The first installment can be foundhere.

Ehsan Entezar's Afghanistan101, dryly academic though its language tends to be, is nevertheless anilluminating guide to the Afghanistantoday. As a scholar born, raised, and educated in Afghanistanbefore obtaining his doctorate in the UnitedStates, Entezar lends the insight of a native son inilluminating the realities of Afghan culture and society, and by doing so,providing some sharp clues as to the likely efficacy of the aid programs thatare allegedly "building" Afghanistan.

Read on

The current session of Afghanistan's lower parliament [Wolesi Jirga] has not gotten off to the most auspicious of starts. After a fraud-ravaged election and last month's showdown with President Hamid Karzai, the country's newly-seated parliament has already ground to a halt in its wrangling over who to elect as speaker. As the system lurches from one crisis to another, many observers have raised concerns that Afghanistan's democratic system is hemorrhaging legitimacy at an unsustainable rate. But how do Afghans describe what a "legitimate democracy" looks like to them?

Read on

The war in Afghanistan is not going well, and prospects for a quick turnaround are slim. The good news is that the announcement by NATO in Lisbon of a 2014 deadline for the transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces helps calm fears of a precipitous international withdrawal and will hopefully refocus attention on achieving a durable peace in Afghanistan. The bad news is that the international community currently lacks a coherent strategy for how to use the additional time to bring about sustainable reconciliation amongst warring parties and genuine political reform.

Over the next year, serious attention must be paid to developing a political strategy for Afghanistan that will clarify the minimum conditions necessary to prevent the return of al Qaeda and establish a stable Afghan state that can sustain itself without extensive international intervention. Accordingly, more work must be done to develop an inclusive political process that accounts for a range of legitimate political interests within Afghanistan beyond those of President Hamid Karzai.

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Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced the full preliminary results of the Afghanistan Parliamentary elections on October 20 after invalidating 1.3 million votes it found were fraudulent - roughly the same number of votes that were invalidated by the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) in last year's tainted Presidential vote. 

Three weeks later, however, the electoral process remains mired in uncertainty, as candidates and the government have questioned why votes were invalidated and why certain candidates have been removed from the race after Election Day.  Protests have become frequent occurrences in Jalalabad, Khost, Kabul and Herat.  Afghan media have aired a variety of audio and video recordings purporting to catch government and IEC officials in the act of committing fraud - the most sensational of which allegedly involves Minister of Energy and Water Ismail Khan seeking to have a candidate in his native Herat province pushed out of the winners circle.

Read on

 This installment of AfPak Behind the Lines looks at Afghanistan's parliamentary elections with Scott Worden.

1) You were an election monitor during Afghanistan's parliamentary voting nearly two weeks ago. What were your major observations from your time there? What overall impressions did you receive from Afghans regarding their perceptions of the vote?

My own observation of the election was limited to 10 polling centers in Kabul, where the process went well. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) staff were well organized and knew the procedures, voters and observers were orderly, and there was a general air of enthusiasm about the process. One thing that stood out about the voting in Kabul was the sheer number of candidate agents that were on hand to observe the process -- perhaps not surprising given more than 600 candidates on the ballot there. This was good because having that many eyes on the process reduced the opportunity for fraud or bias on the part of IEC officials. The other encouraging sign was the high percentage of young people that were involved in the polling. Many of the voters, IEC workers, observers, and agents we saw appeared to be under 35, which indicates that the next generation of Afghan leaders may be familiar with and supportive of democracy.

Read on

Afghanistan voted for its representatives in Parliament on Saturday. And what’s remarkable is, it’s not nearly as bad as everyone assumed. True, upwards of twenty people were abducted beforehand, and a few election workers got killed, and 63 polling stations were attacked with rockets, causing voters to run away from polling stations, and there was at least one suicide bomber. And there was, of course, widespread fraud. But it could have been a lot worse.

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As the country gets ready for the elections, the discussions -- as usual -- focus on security and fraud. There seem to be two worlds. One is the world of procedures, barcodes, scanners, and tamper-evident bags. Of recruitment criteria, complaints forms, female searchers, and police contingents. Of confident reassurances that everything is under control. The other is the world of rumors, threats, money, and power. Of disillusioned voters, scheming candidates, interfering government officials, and threats of targeted attacks. The two worlds don't seem to meet.

Diplomats, U.N. officials and electoral advisers have been genuinely impressed by the measures taken by the IEC. Staff has been moved around, in an attempt to disrupt the links and agreements needed to organize effective fraud, and many of those working in last year's elections were not re-employed (although this could mean many things). The list of polling centers has been released well ahead of the elections and the IEC has withstood pressures to add centers (the distribution of the centers has, however, not yet been properly analyzed). Procedures have been significantly tightened. This means that if they are followed it will be much more difficult to tamper with the vote -- and if they are not followed, it will be easier to track where things have gone wrong. So there is cautious -- and not so cautious -- optimism that this vote will not be as messy as last year's.

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Only five of Afghanistan's 110 political parties have finally had the chance to field candidates in the upcoming parliamentary election under their party logo. Another 31 parties had candidates on a preliminary candidates' list but later withdrew the party affiliation. Many political scientists would say parties are a key requirement for a functioning democracy, yet in Afghanistan, they play a minor role in both elections and politics in general. AAN Senior Analyst Thomas Ruttig tries to explain why the 2010 elections yet again pit myriad numbers of independents against each other (with material by Political Researcher Gran Hewad).

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While half of the world is on holiday and the other half is going through the Wikileaked documents or is wondering how to follow-up on the successes of the Kabul conference, the electoral campaign in Afghanistan for the September parliamentary elections is going ahead -- at least in parts of the country. The cities are covered in posters and banners, the newspapers carry campaign ads and the candidates in the provinces are trying to find ways around the limitations posed by security and powerful rivals. Listen to what some of the candidates and voters say, when talking about the elections.

I just resigned from my job to campaign. Because I don't have money to invite people to gatherings, I meet them individually. I am travelling to the villages and meeting the elders. And I am sure the youth will support me. I haven't printed any posters or banners yet because I can't afford it, but I hope to find a businessman or a donor who has the same political views as me and who will finance my campaign. I will also contact some of the TV stations where I have friends and ask them to invite me for interviews. I have learned this during the workshops that I attended; they taught us to use any source to achieve our goals. But the economic mafia won't support us, because they know that people like me won't work for their interests.... The competition in Kabul is between 98 women candidates, including famous parliamentarians, it is a challenging competition especially for those, like me, who are young and who are running for the first time.
Young female candidate from Kabul.

I am a candidate in Kabul -- not in my own province because I have not lived there for 20 years. I have the support of both my tribe and my party and I have 29 people campaigning for me. My program focuses on the rights of martyrs and disabled, the rights of refugees and IDPs, the rights of teachers and getting them insurance, telecommunication because many people complain that the mobile phone companies are stealing from them, the bombings by international forces, a fair distribution of scholarships among the groups and tribes, proper education requirements for senior officials, and the reinstatement of the old cadre that is sitting at home - they should be used because they are a force for good.... Many candidates only registered to see if they could make a deal; they bought the [copies of] voter cards that you need to register and they are now going around and offering to step down. I was called by one of the sitting MPs, he offered me $200,000 to step down in his favour, but I refused. It's a lot of money, but he made so much more while he was an MP.... Karzai and his people are working to get at least 140 MPs elected that will listen to them, because this Parliament bothered him a lot. There are people who are making lists for him, they are making deals with candidates who promise to be loyal and they are giving them money, at least $60,000. One of the government people asked to see me a few times, but I have not responded yet.... In Kabul there are more than 600 candidates, so normally you should be able to get elected with around 3,000 votes. That I can get easily. But I am worried about the fraud.
Kabul parliamentary candidate, originally from southwest Afghanistan

My sister is a candidate in the nation-wide kuchi constituency. She has already started her campaign: she has travelled to the north and visited Balkh, Samangan, Sarepol, those places. Later this week she will probably go to Jalalabad. Many people are coming to our house, they are looking for someone to represent them. The voters are disappointed with the MPs that got into Parliament last time; they just took the money and did nothing. The tribe is behind my sister, the people are behind her and the government is also looking favourably on her. They are not supporting her directly, but they are not against her candidacy.
Brother of a female kuchi candidate living in Kabul

One of the MPs asked me to work for him. I understood it was because of the elections and because I am close to one of the religious leaders in my area. He wanted me to arrange the support of this leader and he wanted me to travel to the province to convince people to vote for him again. I told him I could not leave my family, so he told me he no longer needed my services... When I was still with him I was present at some of the meetings. One day some elders came because their relatives had been detained and badly beaten. Two of the relatives had been sent to Pul-e Charkhi prison and they asked the MP to intervene. The MP told them he could get the prisoners released, but only if he was re-elected and that they should promise to vote for him. One of the elders promised, he said: "all of us will fill the boxes for you, even the Taliban will help." Another day a villager came who had no money. Three of his sons were detained and he asked the MP for help. But he didn't help him; without money or promises he doesn't help... There are other strategies as well: This MP encouraged ten people from other areas and other tribal groups to candidate themselves, so that the vote of his rivals would be split.
Voter in Kabul, originally from southern Afghanistan

Do you see that campaign poster? I know one of the relatives of that candidate. He told me that the candidate, who is a rich businessman, said that he will spend up to 3 million dollars, as long as he wins a seat in Parliament. Just imagine the amount of money you must be able to make as a Parliamentarian.
Voter from Kabul

I am a candidate in Kabul. My campaign has started -- mainly in the districts, because the city is so crowded with candidates that it is like a buzkashi field. It went well so far. I don't have much money and I don't have anyone promising that they will make me win, but many people said they would vote for me. I have learnt from watching the last two rounds of elections: When people promise me 1,000 votes, I count it as a hundred. People exaggerate and hope that you will promise them something in return, like building a school in their area. But for me every single vote is important.... I will register my candidate agents in the coming day, I already have the forms. Having observers is important, they can watch for fraud but they also represent votes. If they are your observer, they should also vote for you and encourage one or two others to do the same. So if you have 500 observers that could be 1,500 extra votes. I will mainly send them to the areas where I have a lot of support; it is a waste of someone's time to spend all day in a polling station where you get only 10 votes.... There will not be so much fraud in Kabul city, because there are too many candidates and observers. The worst will be Sorobi district, because of the security situation. It will be difficult to send observers there. So people can take the ballot boxes and stuff them, without anyone saying anything.
Female Kabul candidate, originally from northern Afghanistan

You need to have a lot of money to run for Parliament. Yesterday the going price was $10 per vote, but the price is already going up. In the provinces where there will be a lot of fraud, the candidates are watching each other. If one finds out that his rival has arranged 5,000 votes, he will try to get 6,000. When the first one finds out that the other is preparing for 6,000, he will raise his number as well. It will become more all the time.
Politician from Kabul

I can introduce you to some of the candidates, I know most of them, but I cannot vouch for them. They will probably not tell you the truth. You see, all the candidates are getting ready for fraud. Maybe one or two of the more interesting candidates will not participate in the fraud, but all the others are making the necessary preparations. The provincial council elections were still relatively okay, but I have no idea how we should analyze the next elections: they will probably be stuffing 1000 votes per box. Several of the candidates have made deals with the local Taliban who have agreed to help with the ballot stuffing. And in the areas where the Taliban has not agreed to help, there will be fighting. So there will be ballot stuffing there too, although not in the areas themselves. And the ECC has decided that they will try to make nobody upset this time around, so they will not say very much.
Voter from Baghlan

Every candidate has their own system of campaigning, one does it in this way, the other in that way. What my system is? I used to be a commander in a large private security company. I have a kind of a protocol with my former colleagues that they will vote for me. I think I can also make agreements with people in other security companies as well. Then there are many families in Kabul from my district. The other candidate from my district is very weak, so I am quite confident that I will get many votes from my tribe. All together I should be able to get enough votes to win a seat. My only concern is fraud; that others will buy votes or steal my votes.... I have handed out business cards with my picture and my details to everybody I know or meet. And I will be hanging big posters in the city, but not yet. I will wait until the end of the campaign, when the posters of others have been damaged or are no longer being noticed. Then I will put my posters up. I have an appointment at the studio later this afternoon to get my pictures taken. And I will have a page on Facebook. I will not do that myself but my friends will do it and they will write good things about me so that people will vote for me.... I know many foreigners, but those were work relations, not political relations. I don't know how to be in touch with the political foreigners. I am trying to find out if anyone is supporting the candidates with money.
Candidate in Kabul, originally from the Shomali

The head of the IEC in my province recruited two people from my district as civic educators, one man and one woman. He told them that they don't have to do anything, but that half their salary is his. So they earn half of $400 per month for three months for doing nothing.... During last year's election I was the DFC (district field coordinator) in my district. A representative of one of the candidates brought a big bag of voter cards and wanted to use all of them to vote for his candidate, but I didn't allow it. We worked with three people in my district. This year when we applied again, the provincial IEC head was changed and the new one told us he did not need us anymore. But it is our right. We worked very well and very cleanly.... One of my colleagues had to leave the district after the elections because the Taliban were threatening him, they detained his father and his brother and then he left. My other colleague also left, he is now in Kabul. He became afraid, because he is a head teacher. And I left the area a few years ago after the Taliban attack in my village. But still the three of us wanted to work in our district in the elections again.
Former DFC (electoral district field coordinator) from southern Afghanistan

There are 22 candidates in my district alone, including two big former commanders. Two or three of the candidates are not bad. The campaign manager of one of the commanders is also not a bad man. I know him from the past and he helped me a lot recently when I had problems with the security services. So when he asks me to come to the campaign meetings of the big commander I say "of course". I will go with him later this week to the campaign meeting in the mosque. But my vote is mine, I will give it to whom I want.
Voter from Paghman, Kabul province

For more reactions from the campaign trail, visit the Afghanistan Analysts Network, where Martine van Bijlert is co-director and where this was originally published.

What really happened at the London Conference on Afghanistan? Sadly, not much. There was a real sense of déjà vu -- much the same has been said in Bonn, Tokyo, Kabul, Berlin, London, Rome, Paris, and the Hague -- and these conferences all seem divorced from the real facts on the ground.

These events are, of necessity, political pep rallies for Western domestic audiences who are anxious to see their governments "doing something" about Afghanistan and addressing their concerns about the Karzai "government."

During the conference, President Karzai unveiled a six-point "Action Plan" designed to turn around the situation in Afghanistan. But how much "action" is really behind the political façade of his six-point plan?

1. Peace and Reconciliation

President Karzai announced the Taliban Reintegration Plan, with the stated aim to "offer an honorable place in society" to those insurgents willing to renounce al-Qaeda, abandon violence and pursue their political goals peacefully and in accordance with the Afghan Constitution.

This plan seems hastily pulled together to attempt to give the London Conference a focal point. There was mechanical support for the initiative and very little genuine political enthusiasm from Western leaders: just $140 million has been pledged for the first year.

This is surely a case of "the devil is in the details." There have been mentions of paying Taliban a flat fee to switch sides (later denied by Interior Minister Mohammed Atmar), or offering socio-economic opportunities such as jobs or training. There is no clarity and so far only confusion.

What jobs are these reformist Taliban to be offered? Unemployment levels in Afghanistan run at around 40 percent. Since neither the Afghan government nor the international community have yet been capable of providing enough jobs for law-abiding young men in Afghanistan, how can a Reintegration Fund suddenly create sustainable employment for tens of thousands of former insurgents? Or would they be welcomed where there are job opportunities: in the Afghan National Police or Afghan National Army? Surely, this would be a formula for infiltration of the ANA and ANP by the Taliban, especially given the existing problems with vetting recruits.

As for paying the Taliban to switch, the figures provided so far are not significant: $140 million for the first year will not achieve much. Current U.S. military intelligence estimates indicate that there are around 30,000 Taliban fighters across Afghanistan. Even if the Reintegration Fund was only able to reach half of these insurgents, there would be at most $1,000 paid to each Taliban member who switched. Once administrative costs, are factored in, this figure will drop even further. What is to stop a Taliban fighter from taking the money and then "relapsing," and returning to violence?

2. Security

Another expected, but still largely aspirational, goal was President Karzai's insistence that Afghan security forces would "lead security of our country within the next five years all over Afghanistan." Unaddressed were the significant desertion and drug addiction rates in the security forces, which are still alarmingly high. In late 2009, it was estimated that 10,000 out of the 94,000 Afghan soldiers who had been trained so far -- 10.6 percent -- had simply disappeared. Fifteen percent of the Afghan army, and up to 60 percent of the Afghan police in Helmand province, are estimated to be drug addicts.

3. Good Governance

Expanding the reach of the central government while reforming its institutions to be accountable and effective is another worthy aim set out in Karzai's speech. However, there is no indication how this will come about. Significant portions of the country have a limited or non-existent government presence, and some areas are completely controlled and governed by the Taliban. The government's reputation for bribery and inefficiency has led many Afghans, and members of the international community, to simply bypass it.

In Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, the Shinwari tribe has agreed to fight against the Taliban but will be paid $1 million, directly from the U.S. government. The aid will avoid the local government, with whom the Shinwari are also furious for their corruption and inability to provide basic services. One of the tribe's elders declared that: "We have absolutely no faith in the Afghan government to do anything for us. We don't trust them at all."

Karzai also stated in his speech that the parliamentary elections now scheduled for September will be "free and fair," calling for the international community's assistance to be "impartial, technical and constructive," a back-handed complaint against the role of Western allies in responding to the fraud in last August's presidential election. Given that the Karzai-appointed head of the Independent Election Commission remains in charge of the election process, we should mark the notion that the parliamentary elections would be of a different sort as aspirational, at best.

Inside Kabul itself we see the dysfunction of the political process. Karzai has not been able to complete his government, as the Parliament has failed to confirm his proposed Cabinet members. Yet the Speaker of the Parliament, Mohammed Qanooni (a member of an opposition political party and a Tajik) was not invited to the London Conference, despite the need for the Karzai Government and the international community to build a functioning political relationship with the Afghan Parliament and opposition party members.

4. Corruption

Tackling graft will be the "key focus of my second term in office," according to  Karzai. Much has been made of his supposed commitment to fighting corruption, which the UNODC estimates at comprising 25 percent of Afghanistan's GDP. Karzai continues to talk of corruption as if it is being undertaken by someone other than his own government and his own appointees.

Additionally, in an interview with the BBC's John Simpson just a few days before the London Conference, President Karzai insisted that the UNODC report on corruption level was "simply fabricated."

In London, Karzai called for an "end to the culture of impunity" -- again as if this was being carried out by actors outside his government. Yet last July it was Karzai himself who pardoned five senior drug traffickers, one of whom was related to his election manager, and he has supported the mayor of Kabul despite his conviction on corruption charges.

All of this makes his bold declarations on corruption and the rule of law sound incredibly hollow, and merely part of a stage production for the international community.

5: Regional Co-operation

The need for a regional solution to Afghanistan's crisis is another lofty, aspiration. In reality, the interests and the capabilities of Afghanistan's neighbors are too divided to make this a meaningful solution. Iran's last-minute absence from the London conference underlines this point, as does the continuing hostility between Pakistan and India. And are we including Russia and China? What exactly does this " regional co-operation" point mean, how will these regional players be brought in?

6: Economic Development

Pledges to build Afghanistan's private sector and improve the country's infrastructure have been heard again and again over the past eight years. However, Karzai's speech did not mention one of the most central economic issues to Afghanistan -- opium trafficking.

The absence of a new approach to opium production underlines the fundamental problem with the London Conference. The event produced a lot of bold promises and fine words, but there is a concerning lack of detail on all of these points. The Karzai "government" continues to dismiss the problem of corruption as a Western invention; the "international community" insists on the need for reconciliation with the Taliban and then fails to provide the necessary funds.

And what of the grinding poverty of the Afghan people themselves, the lack of food aid in the South, the growing camps of displaced families, and civilian casualties at their highest level ever last year?

This type of "hold hands and hope for the best" conference has happened before, at all of the 10 international conferences on Afghanistan held over the past 9 years. In which capital will we meet next year to re-affirm, once again, our "commitment to Afghanistan"?

By Asma Nemati

A day before President Hamid Karzai's inauguration on November 19, traffic -- incoming and outgoing -- on all major roads in Kabul was at a standstill. I left my house to get to a clinic via a route that normally takes twenty minutes, but due to the numerous presidents and other VIPs flying in, I had to take a long detour across and around Kabul, so the trip took nearly two and a half hours.

Security is tight; at least one fully equipped Afghan National Army soldier could be seen today every 100 meters on major roads out of the airport. From the airport, lines of SUVs with red government license plates filed into the city nearly every hour. On the actual inauguration day, two districts surrounding the presidential palace will be completely closed for security purposes.

The pre-inauguration mood in Kabul is tense. Television ads this week have been warning Afghans to stay home and limit movements on November 19. Threats of attacks are piling higher and higher as organizations scuttle to advise caution to Afghan and international workers alike.

Besides that, media access to the inauguration ceremony is quite limited as even major news agencies are struggling to sneak one or two of their reporters on the guest list, while the rest will be sent to a media center where they can watch the inauguration live on television. In fact, provincial governors are also not allowed to observe the inauguration ceremony; I was talking with a governor a few days ago and he was disappointed at not being able to meet with the honored guests, among them Hillary Clinton, Asif Ali Zardari, Bernard Kouchner, and David Miliband.

Regardless of who is watching, Karzai has a lot to address in his big inauguration speech. Pressure is mounting from all sides -- U.S., Afghan, international -- on the president to get a grip on corruption in order for the international community to continue aiding Afghanistan. Even as Karzai vows to stamp out corruption, he has yet to reveal how and whether the international community will play a big role in that effort. But, of course, this is also a critical point in Karzai's second term as he's still in the process of mapping out his political cabinet.

Most in Afghanistan today will be glued to TV screens or radio speakers. In general, Afghans would like the inauguration to be over with so that they can continue their lives. Let's just hope Karzai keeps at least some of his promises to improve security and combat corruption.

Asma Nemati, a researcher from Kabul, is an instructor at the American University of Afghanistan.

SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images