The market has recently been flooded with books about Pakistan by academics, policymakers, and journalists. Many of these have sought to explain - and to some extent apologize for - contemporary Pakistani society to the western world. Pamela Constable's Playing with Fire: Pakistan at War with Itself is the rare exception that acknowledges this goal, and then lives up to its appointed task. Western readers could hope for no better guide to present-day Pakistan than Constable, a veteran journalist who has reported extensively from Pakistan for over a decade with The Washington Post. Her new book is a sound introduction to Pakistan's contradictions, inequalities, tumultuous politics, and every fluctuating national identity. 

As newspaper headlines about Pakistan policy choices become increasingly shrill, readers seeking context will find much of use in Playing with Fire. The book traces political and security developments across the country, primarily since 2007, that fateful year when former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated and the army's poor handling of a siege at the radical Red Mosque in Islamabad led to a spate of nationwide suicide bombings. In addition to political upheaval and terrorist attacks, Constable documents new laws, corruption scandals, media trends, civil society movements, and more, making her book one of the few holistic backgrounders on Pakistan.

Indeed, Playing with Fire benefits immensely from its author's journalistic background. The book covers those aspects of Pakistan that are rarely examined in works by political scientists or retired diplomats focused on Pakistan's security issues or regional geopolitics. Constable includes chapters on women and their divergent experiences in different social classes, upper-class Pakistanis, religious minorities, and life in rural Pakistan (in the interests of disclosure, I read an early draft of one of these chapters while Constable and I overlapped as fellows at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC).

Like good journalism, the book also combines faithful documentation with sharp analysis: Constable bookends extensive quotes from Pakistanis - whether brick kiln workers or land-owning politicians - with her own insights into Pakistan's problems. These insights are inevitably the best nuggets in the book; for example, Constable observes that the dynamics of landed feudalism have trickled down into the contemporary industrial sector, where factor workers remain indebted to their employers.

Constable's most profound insight into Pakistan is stated at the outset, in the book's introduction. She argues that Pakistanis are essentially powerless: "they see the trappings of representative democracy around them but little tangible evidence of it working in their lives." The various chapters of Playing with Fire then show how this powerlessness is manifest: in the vestiges of the feudal system, in the failings of the judicial system, in the endless paperwork of a bloated bureaucracy, in the limited circles of dynastic politics, and in the ‘honor' codes of a patriarchal society. Through characters, narratives, statistics, and direct quotes, Constable shows how Pakistanis are denied rights and opportunities in a way that perpetuates the status quo. One only wishes that with each example of a powerless Pakistani she offers, Constable reiterated the theme more explicitly for emphasis. 

Interestingly, while acknowledging their powerlessness, Constable allows Pakistanis to speak for themselves in her book. The liberal use of direct quotes provides an insight into Pakistani perceptions of global trends and political issues. Numerous excerpts from newspaper editorials and columns (including one of mine) also give a taste of public discourse within Pakistan. The country is frequently faulted for its head-in-the-sand attitude towards internal security developments, particularly the long-term fallout of cultivating militant groups. But Constable's regular nods to Pakistani opinion-makers show that a spirited, if convoluted debate about Pakistan's future and identity is currently underway in the country.

The most interesting chapter in Playing with Fire documents the slow ‘Talibanization' of Pakistani society. Constable points to the diverse elements that have led many Pakistanis to equate patriotism and religiosity: the content of government-issue textbooks, the successful campaigns of religious political parties, the moralizing rhetoric of student politics, the vitriol of television talk show hosts, and the state's foreign policy. Moreover, she uncovers how Pakistani society has evolved in a matter of years from wearing its religion loosely to developing extremist sympathies. Constable shows how Islam became "hip" among university students who embraced their religious identity as a way to participate in global trends. She also notes that "poor yet pious" Pakistanis use religious fervor as a way to push back against "errant Muslims of a higher class," introducing equality in what is otherwise a highly stratified society.

This nuanced chapter is bolstered by Constable's overview of the origins and ideologies of Pakistan's various militant and sectarian groups. The book also documents major security-related events such as the formation of the anti-state Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the takeover of the Swat Valley in 2009 by TNSM, another extremist organization. With these snapshots of militancy, Playing with Fire becomes a handy user's guide to terrorism and security for those who have not followed regional developments at a granular level.

One argumentative disconnect does however emerge in the book. Constable's chapters on the ‘Talibanization' of society and Pakistan's use of militant groups as ‘strategic assets' emphasize that extremism is a top-down phenomenon in Pakistan, perpetuated as a result of state policies. But in other sections of the book, she suggests that extremist tendencies are organic-the expected fallout of widespread poverty, joblessness, and frustration. For example, Constable quotes the bitter complaint of a young man from Peshawar who graduated from a prestigious engineering school but was unable to find a job. He suggests that the lack of opportunity creates terrorists. Similarly, in a chapter about sectarian tensions and violent discrimination against religious minorities, Constable includes a rant by a butcher who denounces rampant corruption, crime, and poor leadership. The decision to include his viewpoint implies that the failure of state institutions is fostering religious intolerance.

There is an ongoing debate about whether extremism in Pakistan is a product of years of state-sponsored militancy and General Ziaul Haq's Islamization policies in the 1980s, or whether it is a contemporary response to flawed Pakistani and American policies. Given Constable's intimate knowledge of the region, a direct summary of her perceptions on this matter would have given the book even more substance.

Throughout her book, Constable draws out the clashing ideological and political stances of Pakistan's liberals and conservatives. She will be aware then that some liberals may find her book too soft on the Pakistan Army. No doubt, the book maps the fallout of the army's many dalliances with militant groups. But the chapter on the ‘murder of democracy' focuses on corrupt politicians such as President Asif Ali Zardari, dynastic politics, and the inefficient bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Constable's analysis of the Pakistan Army delves into the choices made by military dictators Ziaul Haq and Pervez Musharraf as well as the shenanigans of the intelligence agent Khalid Khawaja. This focus on controversial characters (though compelling to read) makes the army's flaws seem individual rather than institutional. A concise assessment of the impact of military interference in Pakistan's political and economic spheres over the decades would have served the book well.

Ultimately, though, Playing with Fire is an accessible yet comprehensive guide to a country that is constantly evolving and much written about, but little understood by westerners.  

Huma Yusuf is a columnist for Pakistan's Dawn Newspaper, and was the 2010-11 Pakistan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Following the incident in January of this year where CIA contractorRaymond Davis shot two Pakistanis in shadowy circumstances, U.S.-Pakistanrelations have remained perched at a critical but precarious impasse. Bilateralengagement surrounding Davis' arrest and controversial release highlighted themany reasons why the relationship remains fractious; the divergent strategicinterests these cautious allies have for the region, the Pakistaniestablishment's ambivalent attitude towards militancy, the public's adamantanti-Americanism, and the civilian government's inability to manage all of theabove issues.

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Long-distance arrest

News agencies reported yesterday that earlier this month a senior figure in the al Qaeda-linked Indonesian militant group Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI), Umar Patek, was arrested in Pakistan, though his location, conditions of his detention, and reasons for being in Pakistan remain unknown (WSJ, BBC, AP, AJE, AFP, Reuters). Indonesia has sent officials to identify and possibly take home Patek, who allegedly spent time in training camps in Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s, and is believed to have played an important role in the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings that left 202 dead, including seven Americans (NYT, AP).

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The ongoing Cricket World Cup being played out in the Indian Subcontinent has had its share of interesting matches and story lines (for a primer on cricket rules and terms, look here). But none has been more gripping and fascinating than the very unlikely march of Pakistan, who just trounced the West Indies by a record margin, to become the first team to reach the semifinals. They have gotten to this stage in considerable style, having previously beaten the reigning world-champions, Australia, and one of the tournament favorites, Sri Lanka, in the group stages. Pakistan won their quarterfinal without losing a single player out of eleven in what commentators are describing as the most resounding drubbing ever delivered in the World Cup knockout stage.

And yet, as ominous as Pakistan's progress in this World Cup has been, this is a team that emulates its country's ability to generate controversy. In just the last four years alone, Pakistan has lost its best players to a match-fixing scandal last summer, faced an international ban on domestic games that started after the armed terrorist assault on the visiting Sri Lankan team in 2009, suffered the mysterious death of their coach during the previous World Cup in 2007, lost a budding player to death threats from a country-wide gambling mafia, suffered the ignominy during the recent Middle East crises of having their largest stadium named after a certain Libyan despot, and had their best players resort to constant infighting, faking injuries and getting caught for using opium, marijuana and anabolic steroids.  With a squad short on superstars, confidence and credibility, Pakistan's cricket team entered this tournament as a freak show of sorts. And yet, as is historically true of the Pakistani cricket team, "the most interesting team in the history of sport" in the words of Guardian writer Rob Smyth, their raw talent has overcome all controversy and surpassed just about every opponent so far.

Pakistan's date with destiny has set up what could be one of the most highly anticipated matches in recent history. If India beats Australia in their quarterfinal tomorrow, which they are favored to do, then these two archrivals will face each other in the semifinals to be played on Mar. 30 in Mohali, India. Pakistan last played on Indian soil in 2007; however, following the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008, India's team cancelled their tour of Pakistan, and Pakistani players have been barred from participating in the lucrative Indian Premier League.

Even in the event that Australia defeats India and this potentially epic match does not take place, concerns about Pakistan's semifinal appearance have already been raised. In previous tours, Hindu fundamentalists have dug up pitches where Pakistan was scheduled to play, and threatened to disrupt matches involving Pakistan in India before this tournament even began. Reflective of these concerns, in a press conference held immediately after Pakistan's victory, the chief executive of the International Cricket Committee assured journalists that the venue would not be changed and confirmed Pakistan's match in Mohali.

For a country where cricketers enjoy incredible celebrity status, the current Pakistani cricket team is devoid of many superstars. However, losing a few to match-fixing and a great one to age might well have been a blessing in disguise. Led by a man who embodies all of Pakistan in his boisterous, inconsistent, emotional, and occasionally self-destructive persona - Shahid Khan Afridi - adversity has brought this erratic band together in a way that reminds the nation of the last time this team won the World Cup in 1992.  While his brash and haughty celebrations have put off some of the old guard, like Australian Ian Chappel, Afridi brings a rare honesty to play that is devoid of the regimental professionalism of modern cricket.

Cricket is more than a trivial pursuit in Pakistan. It unites Pakistanis in a way that nothing else does. With a mix of players from all provinces, Punjabi, Pashto and Urdu, come together in a way they do at few other forums. With an identity split on religious, lingual, geographical, cultural, political and ideological lines, cricket is the only thing that truly brings out  a national identity in Pakistanis.

The story of the 11 players that will take to the coliseum in Mohali on March the 30^th mirrors that of the 180 million who await the next twist on their plate. In Pakistan, the absurd and tragic events appearing in the sports pages reflect a grotesque caricature of the problems Pakistan experiences every day. But this evening, by the millions, Pakistanis are hoping that the fortunes of Pakistan, the country, will follow the blossoming ‘taqdeer', of Pakistan - the team.

Haider Warraich, MD, is a research fellow at Harvard Medical School. He is a graduate of the Aga Khan University in Karachi, Pakistan, and the author of the forthcoming novel, Auras of the Jinn.

Editor's note: This is Part II of a two-part seriesfocusing on aid provision in conflict zones. The first installment can be foundhere.

Ehsan Entezar's Afghanistan101, dryly academic though its language tends to be, is nevertheless anilluminating guide to the Afghanistantoday. As a scholar born, raised, and educated in Afghanistanbefore obtaining his doctorate in the UnitedStates, Entezar lends the insight of a native son inilluminating the realities of Afghan culture and society, and by doing so,providing some sharp clues as to the likely efficacy of the aid programs thatare allegedly "building" Afghanistan.

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Last Tuesday afternoon, I spoke to a Dawn reporter who hadn't been able to eat breakfast that day because there is no wood-fired stove in his house. He hadn't had a cup of tea or been able to take a shower, and had no heating in below-freezing temperatures. That night he was only able to e-mail in part of his newspaper story because of a severe power outage, eventually giving up and relaying it on the phone after midnight.

He wasn't reporting from a small village in a remote part of Pakistan. He lives in Quetta, a provincial capital and a rare oasis of some development in a largely barren, forgotten Baluchistan. And almost a week later, large sections of his gas-rich province still don't have enough of the fuel to cook properly or heat water and are facing several hours without electricity every day.

Those sections of Baluchistan, that is, that had access to either of these luxuries before a series of attacks on gas and electricity infrastructure brought the province to a standstill. From January 9 through February 13, nearly 25 gas pipelines have been blown up, largely in the eastern districts that are criss-crossed by a network transporting gas found in Baluchistan to other parts of the province and the country. About 7 other gas facilities, mostly wells, 9 electricity pylons and a power plant have also been attacked successfully. The Baluch Republican Army, an ethnic separatist group, has claimed responsibility for a number of these incidents.

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ISLAMABAD -- Advocates of the current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan deploy false choices and flawed assumptions to defend the status quo. Proponents of "staying the course" delegitimize the pursuit of better options for ending this deadly nine-year war by reducing the debate to a dubious binary: maintain a long-term counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign against the Taliban or leave Afghanistan after ignominiously "cutting and running." It is time to reframe this public discourse over the costly status quo and consider a new way forward.

Vice President Joe Biden, who is currently in Afghanistan and headed to Pakistan shortly, has argued, among others, that a policy of "Counterterrorism Plus" will more effectively secure genuine U.S. security objectives. He's right.

This approach calls for a much smaller deployment of forces that would focus upon al-Qaeda, including continued drone attacks on al-Qaeda and international militants both in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas. Proponents of such a plan argue for continuing the training mission of Afghan National Security Forces with a dedicated focus upon sustainability as well as continued and long-term initiatives to develop civilian capacity in the Afghan government. Obviously, this implies a sustained -- albeit a different and perhaps smaller -- U.S. presence in Afghanistan. This is not "cut and run."

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Afghan President Hamid Karzai has come under considerable criticism in the U.S. for his emotional outbursts and cantankerousness. Foreign Policy managing editor Blake Hounshell mocked Karzai recently for crying over the prospect that his son, Mirwais, might leave the country to live a better life. Bob Woodward’s newest book alleges that Karzai has received treatment for manic depression and smokes marijuana -- leading commentators to speculate that the Afghan president has lost the ability to lead. However, Hamid Karzai remains the only real option for crafting a political and institutional framework that will stabilize the country, and the sooner the U.S. realizes it, and stops wishing for a perfect leader to fix an imperfect war, the better off we’ll be.

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The AfPak Channel is pleased to continue a new weekly feature, AfPak Behind the Lines, where we interview an expert on a hot topic in Afghanistan and Pakistan circles. Today, we speak with Hassan Abbas about the growing threat from militancy in Punjab.

1. Your article in the CTC Sentinel last spring defined the conglomeration of militant groups known collectively as the ‘Punjabi Taliban.' We hear most often, however, about the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan militant groups based in the tribal regions. What are some similarities and differences between the two? How has the ‘Punjabi Taliban' developed since your CTC article?

First, I would prefer to tweak the title of the group to ‘Punjabi militants,' for there are many differences between the band of militants operating in Punjab and those based in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province (previously NWFP). Though this classification may sound purely academic, it has policy implications also. These Punjabi militants, who had drifted away from their parent organizations (such as Jaish-e-Mohammad and Sipah-e-Sahaba), had moved towards FATA after 2005 because they considered the area safer to live, train, and operate from. These were called ‘Punjabi' not because they were all ethnically from Punjab province -- in fact, a few Sindhi and Urdu speaking militants were also present in this group. Hence, all non-Pashtuns (with the exception of non-Pakistanis like Uzbeks) came to be called "Punjabi Taliban."

Relations between Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan -- TTP) and these Punjabi militants were complicated. They never merged and the nature of this collaboration remained restricted to distribution of tasks for a limited number of terrorist attacks in Punjab. Of course, they learned from each other, provided useful information and training to each other but their larger goals remained distinct. The Pakistani Taliban are partly a reaction to U.S. and Pakistani policy in Afghanistan and FATA, whereas Punjabi militants are frustrated from Pakistan's policies vis-à-vis Kashmir. Unacknowledged by India as well as the U.S., Pakistan achieved some success in stopping militants from going towards the Kashmir conflict zone in recent years. There are some exceptions here of course, but by and large, Punjabi militants started challenging the state after getting frustrated that they were abandoned.

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Faisal Shahzad was back in the headlines Tuesday afternoon. During a brief appearance in federal court, the man accused of trying to detonate a car bomb in Times Square was arraigned on five counts of terrorism-related charges. At the same time, more details were emerging about the roots of Shahzad's radicalization and his suspected connections to individuals in Pakistan, including an army major and members of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Nearly three weeks after Shahzad's failed car bomb, there are at least three important lessons about what it means for U.S. counterterrorism policy.

Law enforcement is a necessary and invaluable component of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. As policymakers sort out the case's international links -- in Pakistan, Yemen, and even Jamaica -- recall that federal, state, and local law-enforcement officials in the United States first defused the threat in Times Square (with help from a few alert New Yorkers) and later apprehended Shazhad, a man with no prior criminal record, within 54 hours of the incident. This sequence of events -- which included what NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly called "seamless" cooperation between his organization and the FBI's local Joint Terrorism Task Force -- demonstrated that the effective use of law enforcement tools is a critical component of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Furthermore, a frequent criticism of the government's response -- that the administration was wrong to charge Shahzad in civilian courts because doing so would hamper intelligence-gathering efforts -- ignores one key point: Shahzad has been cooperating with investigators. In doing so, he joins the numerous other alleged and convicted terrorists -- including Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, David Headley, and Bryant Neal Vinas -- who have provided U.S. officials valuable intelligence when charged in civilian courts.   

"Homegrown extremism" is a limited, but still serious, problem. Why would a 30-year-old American citizen, middle-class homeowner, and MBA seemingly abandon his life in the United States for the danger and violence of global terrorism? Last weekend, a lengthy New York Times report provided some clues. Shahzad reportedly disdained U.S. foreign policy, especially the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Shahzad had also apparently embraced the rhetoric of radical Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.

If true, these anecdotes support a thesis advanced in a March CSIS report: A small but significant number of typically young, predominantly male, Muslim U.S. legal residents and citizens seem to have become seduced by an al Qaeda-promulgated fringe narrative that the United States and West are at war with Islam. Some have used this narrative to justify traveling abroad to fight with foreign insurgencies or receive terrorist training. If well-trained, these individuals, especially those with overseas connections, may prove particularly dangerous because they possess a sort of "duality" that allows them to flow seamlessly between the United States and foreign countries.

Most of these individuals relied on some sort of intermediary -- like an extremist cleric or terrorist recruiter -- to catalyze their violent turn. Denying these connections requires timely intervention on several levels -- capturing or killing figures like Awlaki, or preventing Internet radicalization. Policymakers need to puncture the narrative by, for instance, highlighting the fact that al Qaeda's terrorism victims are overwhelmingly Muslim.

Pakistan, a central node of global terrorism, must remain a principal focus of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. In the past year, the Pakistani military launched separate campaigns in Swat Valley and South Waziristan against the TTP. After years of cajoling Islamabad to crack down on militancy, U.S. officials were quick to praise these efforts. But recent allegations that the TTP was behind Shahzad's alleged plot call into question the efficacy of Pakistan's military campaigns.

Indeed, as a recent New America Foundation report noted, some TTP elements fled from South to North Waziristan, where they have grown closer to that region's militant groups, including al Qaeda and the Haqqani Network. This unification of once-disparate groups spells trouble for U.S. and Pakistani officials; as terrorism expert Bruce Riedel remarked, traditionally local outfits like the TTP act as a "force multiplier for al Qaeda" if they come to embrace global terrorism.

Administration officials readily point out that U.S. and Pakistani military pressure has degraded certain terrorist capabilities in areas like North Waziristan. Still, these efforts have been insufficient in truly rolling back militancy in Pakistan's northwest. In addition to expanding military operations against these elements, Pakistan, with continued U.S. support, needs to undertake a more aggressive program of economic, political, and social development in its semigoverned tribal regions. As long as these areas remain outside the umbrella of the Pakistani state, they will continue to foster terrorism and pose a threat to Pakistan, the United States, and the rest of the world. 

Rick "Ozzie" Nelson is the director, and Ben Bodurian the research assistant, of the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

What really happened at the London Conference on Afghanistan? Sadly, not much. There was a real sense of déjà vu -- much the same has been said in Bonn, Tokyo, Kabul, Berlin, London, Rome, Paris, and the Hague -- and these conferences all seem divorced from the real facts on the ground.

These events are, of necessity, political pep rallies for Western domestic audiences who are anxious to see their governments "doing something" about Afghanistan and addressing their concerns about the Karzai "government."

During the conference, President Karzai unveiled a six-point "Action Plan" designed to turn around the situation in Afghanistan. But how much "action" is really behind the political façade of his six-point plan?

1. Peace and Reconciliation

President Karzai announced the Taliban Reintegration Plan, with the stated aim to "offer an honorable place in society" to those insurgents willing to renounce al-Qaeda, abandon violence and pursue their political goals peacefully and in accordance with the Afghan Constitution.

This plan seems hastily pulled together to attempt to give the London Conference a focal point. There was mechanical support for the initiative and very little genuine political enthusiasm from Western leaders: just $140 million has been pledged for the first year.

This is surely a case of "the devil is in the details." There have been mentions of paying Taliban a flat fee to switch sides (later denied by Interior Minister Mohammed Atmar), or offering socio-economic opportunities such as jobs or training. There is no clarity and so far only confusion.

What jobs are these reformist Taliban to be offered? Unemployment levels in Afghanistan run at around 40 percent. Since neither the Afghan government nor the international community have yet been capable of providing enough jobs for law-abiding young men in Afghanistan, how can a Reintegration Fund suddenly create sustainable employment for tens of thousands of former insurgents? Or would they be welcomed where there are job opportunities: in the Afghan National Police or Afghan National Army? Surely, this would be a formula for infiltration of the ANA and ANP by the Taliban, especially given the existing problems with vetting recruits.

As for paying the Taliban to switch, the figures provided so far are not significant: $140 million for the first year will not achieve much. Current U.S. military intelligence estimates indicate that there are around 30,000 Taliban fighters across Afghanistan. Even if the Reintegration Fund was only able to reach half of these insurgents, there would be at most $1,000 paid to each Taliban member who switched. Once administrative costs, are factored in, this figure will drop even further. What is to stop a Taliban fighter from taking the money and then "relapsing," and returning to violence?

2. Security

Another expected, but still largely aspirational, goal was President Karzai's insistence that Afghan security forces would "lead security of our country within the next five years all over Afghanistan." Unaddressed were the significant desertion and drug addiction rates in the security forces, which are still alarmingly high. In late 2009, it was estimated that 10,000 out of the 94,000 Afghan soldiers who had been trained so far -- 10.6 percent -- had simply disappeared. Fifteen percent of the Afghan army, and up to 60 percent of the Afghan police in Helmand province, are estimated to be drug addicts.

3. Good Governance

Expanding the reach of the central government while reforming its institutions to be accountable and effective is another worthy aim set out in Karzai's speech. However, there is no indication how this will come about. Significant portions of the country have a limited or non-existent government presence, and some areas are completely controlled and governed by the Taliban. The government's reputation for bribery and inefficiency has led many Afghans, and members of the international community, to simply bypass it.

In Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, the Shinwari tribe has agreed to fight against the Taliban but will be paid $1 million, directly from the U.S. government. The aid will avoid the local government, with whom the Shinwari are also furious for their corruption and inability to provide basic services. One of the tribe's elders declared that: "We have absolutely no faith in the Afghan government to do anything for us. We don't trust them at all."

Karzai also stated in his speech that the parliamentary elections now scheduled for September will be "free and fair," calling for the international community's assistance to be "impartial, technical and constructive," a back-handed complaint against the role of Western allies in responding to the fraud in last August's presidential election. Given that the Karzai-appointed head of the Independent Election Commission remains in charge of the election process, we should mark the notion that the parliamentary elections would be of a different sort as aspirational, at best.

Inside Kabul itself we see the dysfunction of the political process. Karzai has not been able to complete his government, as the Parliament has failed to confirm his proposed Cabinet members. Yet the Speaker of the Parliament, Mohammed Qanooni (a member of an opposition political party and a Tajik) was not invited to the London Conference, despite the need for the Karzai Government and the international community to build a functioning political relationship with the Afghan Parliament and opposition party members.

4. Corruption

Tackling graft will be the "key focus of my second term in office," according to  Karzai. Much has been made of his supposed commitment to fighting corruption, which the UNODC estimates at comprising 25 percent of Afghanistan's GDP. Karzai continues to talk of corruption as if it is being undertaken by someone other than his own government and his own appointees.

Additionally, in an interview with the BBC's John Simpson just a few days before the London Conference, President Karzai insisted that the UNODC report on corruption level was "simply fabricated."

In London, Karzai called for an "end to the culture of impunity" -- again as if this was being carried out by actors outside his government. Yet last July it was Karzai himself who pardoned five senior drug traffickers, one of whom was related to his election manager, and he has supported the mayor of Kabul despite his conviction on corruption charges.

All of this makes his bold declarations on corruption and the rule of law sound incredibly hollow, and merely part of a stage production for the international community.

5: Regional Co-operation

The need for a regional solution to Afghanistan's crisis is another lofty, aspiration. In reality, the interests and the capabilities of Afghanistan's neighbors are too divided to make this a meaningful solution. Iran's last-minute absence from the London conference underlines this point, as does the continuing hostility between Pakistan and India. And are we including Russia and China? What exactly does this " regional co-operation" point mean, how will these regional players be brought in?

6: Economic Development

Pledges to build Afghanistan's private sector and improve the country's infrastructure have been heard again and again over the past eight years. However, Karzai's speech did not mention one of the most central economic issues to Afghanistan -- opium trafficking.

The absence of a new approach to opium production underlines the fundamental problem with the London Conference. The event produced a lot of bold promises and fine words, but there is a concerning lack of detail on all of these points. The Karzai "government" continues to dismiss the problem of corruption as a Western invention; the "international community" insists on the need for reconciliation with the Taliban and then fails to provide the necessary funds.

And what of the grinding poverty of the Afghan people themselves, the lack of food aid in the South, the growing camps of displaced families, and civilian casualties at their highest level ever last year?

This type of "hold hands and hope for the best" conference has happened before, at all of the 10 international conferences on Afghanistan held over the past 9 years. In which capital will we meet next year to re-affirm, once again, our "commitment to Afghanistan"?

By Gretchen Peters

A new report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gives a concise breakdown of the dramatic change, both in terms of U.S. military strategy and counternarcotics policy, toward Afghanistan since the Obama administration took office.

It's worth a read, since it zeroes in on the "fruits of neglect" and the culture of impunity that created the problem, and because it pieces together various new intelligence and policy initiatives taking place to fight it. It also argues, correctly, for a new metric for measuring success in the counternarcotics fight and encourages the kind of rigorous debate the United States needs to be having about Afghanistan:

How much can any amount of effort by the United States and its allies transform the politics and society of Afghanistan? Why is the United States becoming more deeply involved in Afghanistan nearly eight years after the invasion? Does the American public understand and support the sacrifices that will be required to finish the job? Even defining success remains elusive: Is it to build a nation or just to keep the jihadists from using a nation as a sanctuary?

The report examines critical weak points in the new strategy, asking important questions:

Is it possible to slow the flow of drug money to the insurgency, particularly in a country where most transactions are conducted in cash and hidden behind an ancient and secretive money transfer system? Does the U.S. Government have the capacity and the will to provide the hundreds more civilians required to carry out the second step in the counter-narcotics program and transform a poppy-dominated economy into one where legitimate agriculture can thrive?

Can our NATO allies be counted on to step up their contributions on the military and civilian sides at a time when support for the war is waning in most European countries and Canada?

However on one critical issue, the report falls short.

It fails to answer -- nor does it provide policy recommendations to suggest -- how the Obama administration will counter high-level drug corruption among state actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There's no doubt the narco-insurgency link must be severed, but the flip side of the COIN, not to make a pun, will be cleaning up government on both sides of the Durand Line. Insurgencies exist where good governance does not.

Noting that the vast majority of drug-related arrests in AfPak have been low-level smugglers or drug users, the Senate report says that senior officials at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul have declared that there is "no red line" for going after senior officials proven to be earning off narcotics.

"Our long-term approach," the report quotes an American military officer as saying, "is to identify the regional drug figures and corrupt government officials and persuade them to choose legitimacy or remove them from the battlefield."

But the Senate report doesn't say how the Obama administration plans to deal with those who resist going clean. Classified rules of engagement (ROE) have been modified to put "drug traffickers with proven links to the insurgency on a kill list," which is now said to include 50 traffickers.

Corrupt state actors won't be targeted by the military under the new ROE, the Senate report says. And the ongoing wrangle over an extradition treaty between Kabul and Washington means senior Afghan officials could face little more threat than having to go through the country's court system, which is itself riddled by graft.

Just this week, the German Magazine Stern reported that elite British troops seized tons of opium on land belonging to Hamid Karzai's half-brother Ahmed Wali Karzai. He told Reuters that the timing of the story was meant to hurt his brother, coming as it did just a week ahead of the elections. No doubt the timing of the report is politically explosive. But British and American officials have remained curiously circumspect about the alleged drug bust, neither confirming nor denying it.

The Senate report offers no advice for how Congress can support anticorruption efforts and there has been little evidence thus far of political will in Washington to go after the big fish. Unfortunately, until that attitude changes, not much will change in Kabul either.

Gretchen Peters is the author of Seeds of Terror, How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda.