Editor's note: This is Part I of a two-part seriesfocusing on aid provision in conflict zones, with tomorrow's edition to focuson Afghanistan.

Although the White House was cautiously optimistic in itsrecent strategy review on Afghanistan, even for seasoned AfPak watchers, itcan be difficult to discern exactly what the U.S. strategy istowards Afghanistan. The sound bite summary "clear, hold, build" may besimplistic, but it still offers a useful starting place to evaluate U.S. andNATO efforts. The "clear" and "hold" represent the straightforward ideas (intheory if not execution) of taking and holding ground, operations with whichmilitaries are well-acquainted. The real issue, and the key to success orfailure, is defining what "build" really means, and examining how the United States andNATO are "building" in Afghanistan.

While many factors in Afghanistan (and Pakistan, for thatmatter) are unique, in a larger sense, the challenges faced there are the sameissues, with new faces, that the United States has been long been struggling with inother countries. The U.S. government clearly hopes to "build" the Afghangovernment and military up to the point that it will take the lead in battlingthe Taliban. For decades now, in countries around the world, the tool mostfrequently called on to "build" countries is aid. Sometimes aid comes in theform of humanitarian, short-term assistance, i.e. emergency food, medicine,water, and shelter, aimed at stabilizing crisis situations. In other cases, aidcomes in the form of "official development assistance" or ODA, most often adirect cash transfer from a donor government or donor institution to arecipient country, usually in the form of grants or low-interest loans, andaimed at promoting long-term growth by developing infrastructure, education,and more. In the case of Afghanistan (and Pakistan), aid to the region hasconsisted of a mixture of both humanitarian and strategic (ODA) aid.

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Salmaan Taseer's alleged murderer is a twenty-six-year-old security guard, named Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri. Qadri was hired by the Punjab Constabulary in 2003 as an 18-year-old recruit. In 2008, he joined the "Elite Force," where Punjab's best cops end up, and was working for this elite force on the security detail for the governor of Punjab when he killed Taseer. His motivation was allegedly Taseer's vocal opposition to the provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code that deal with blasphemy.

Given the infamy of these legal provisions, the discussion about Taseer's assassination is going to be dominated by an examination of how Pakistan treats blasphemy. That is a long-needed national discussion, and in his death, it may be that Taseer will have stimulated an honest and serious national introspection about how the country treats its minorities.

Unfortunately, what is more likely is that Taseer's death will not only not stimulate a more serious examination of how the Pakistani state deals with the highly toxic issues of blasphemy, but it may help mute the already nervous voices within the thin sliver of Pakistani society that seek to amend these kinds of legal provisions.

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If there was a protagonist in the WikiLeaks cables released last week, it would be a petite, blond, Arkansas-born career diplomat, Anne Patterson, who until recently had been the U.S ambassador to Pakistan.

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Today at Friday prayers, a bomb detonated in a mosque in Darra Adam Khel, killing more than 66 worshippers. It was the work of, by most accounts, a suicide bomber. In the Pakistani press and on the two dozen news channels that feed us a constant and unrelenting stream of what is happening in the country, the total number of people in the mosque at the time of the attack was anywhere between 100 and 500. The roof either collapsed, or did not collapse. There were anywhere between 50 and 200 injured. Pakistani officials use the figure of 30,000 Pakistani victims of terrorism routinely. Three years since the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) launched this war into a different, much bloodier dimension, the official response to this mayhem seems only to show Pakistan still has no counter-terrorism strategy. As always, the only certainties in the aftermath of terror in Pakistan were two things. First, Pakistani leaders would fall over themselves to repeat platitudes about terrorism in Pakistan and how very strongly they condemn this kind of thing. Second, this will all happen again, very soon.

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Even as the recently released tell-all Obama's Wars by Bob Woodward raises fresh doubts about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and will likely stoke mistrust in the United States about Pakistan as a partner against the Afghan Taliban, a series of stories that paint the Pakistani army in a negative light will undoubtedly contribute to the tensions. These events occur against the backdrop of heightened U.S. drone activity inside Pakistan's border region and at least two reported NATO helicopter attacks on Pakistani soil. How the Pakistani army sees these events and addresses the ensuing challenges will have enormous impacts on the future trajectory of South Asia, as well as the direction of Pakistan's fragile democracy.

First, there was the reported kidnapping of The News journalist Umar Cheema and the standard operating procedures of Pakistani intelligence agencies used to humiliate and torture him, according to his detailed account of the incident. Other than denials, there does not appear to be a clear or detailed explanation from the government or the Inter Services Intelligence directorate, Pakistan's top spy agency, of who did this, nor any indication from the government that a rapid and credible public inquiry is underway. In the absence of such actions, rumors will fly and allegations will be made that will undermine the state and its agencies.

Second, there has been a new viral video released on the Internet purporting to be a record of extrajudicial killing of blindfolded Pashtun captives in civilian clothes by Urdu-speaking (that is, non-Pashtun) soldiers in army uniforms and carrying standard army weapons. The presence of a senior person identified in the soundtrack as "Tanveer Sahib" may implicate an officer in this incident. According to the New York Times, the Pakistani military initially dismissed the video as a forgery. The Times later reported that the army had investigated the incident, found it to be genuine, and promised to act against the perpetrators.

Fairly or not, this video and other negative stories about the army's operations and its behind-the-scenes role in Pakistani politics will likely be seen within Pakistan as coordinated and hostile actions from outside Pakistan to put pressure on the Pakistan army to bend to U.S. demands on a number of fronts. The army's readiness to move against the elements involved in these killings speaks to its new and informed leadership. Similar reports of extrajudicial killings in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, in 1971 were brushed aside by the army at that time. They lost the hearts and minds of the local population, fuelled an insurgency, and created a refugee stream into India that drew that country into invading East Pakistan to help create Bangladesh. By contrast, in June 1992, an incident in Sindh province earlier described by the army in Sindh as an "encounter" with local robbers was openly investigated by the army high command, following a BBC report of killings by an army major as a favor to a local landlord. The major was court-martialed and sentenced to death. Senior officers who failed to investigate the incident adequately and participated in covering it up were removed or dismissed to much public acclaim. The army's stock went up in the public eye.

The current army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, will need to confront this latest allegation head-on and quickly rather than let it simmer and adversely affect public support for the military as well as morale inside the institution. If a "rogue officer" was at work giving his troops an unlawful command to murder civilian prisoners, then the army needs to clear it up in a manner that will identify and bring to court the culprits and help educate the rest of its officers and troops against similar actions. At a time when the civilian government is under stress and economic and political problems have besieged it, it is important that the army is seen as a stable entity working with the government for the common good.

General Kayani also faces a challenge on the border from the U.S. and NATO. A first incursion into Pakistan seemed to have been handled quickly by him and Adm. Mike Mullen to reduce unhappiness on the Pakistan side. They spoke and decided not to add to the public rhetoric. But now an additional incident in Kurram involving a NATO helicopter attack that reportedly killed three soldiers of the Frontier Corps, the paramilitary force that patrols the tribal areas, has led to the closing of the border to NATO supplies for Afghanistan and a public rebuke from the government of Pakistan.

This situation could easily careen out of control. The Obama administration, which is unhappy with what it perceives as Pakistan's lack of action against anti-American militants, is seriously miscalculating if it is using such tactics to pressure Pakistan to launch operations against its will. Better to argue your case behind closed doors, as allies should -- or risk a public split. Similarly, Pakistan risks overestimating its leverage over the United States and NATO by shutting down the coalition's supply routes across the Durand Line. If anything, this embargo will accelerate the U.S. drive to diversify its logistics chain -- while taking money out of Pakistanis' pockets.

There is some positive news. On Thursday, Kayani announced a fresh list of newly promoted three-star generals, completing his team of senior officers who will outlast his own new three-year term at the helm of the army. By all accounts, he has chosen tried and tested professionals and superseded some Musharraf loyalists. As with the lieutenant generals promoted in April, he has by and large selected apolitical and professional soldiers with a broad, mature view of the world and of Pakistan's place in it. Many of them have topped their classes at the military academy, winning the Sword of Honour, or have attended advanced military courses abroad, as has Kayani. Here's hoping they get their chance to prove that Pakistani's military can be a force for stability in South Asia, and a voice for the rule of law at home.

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within and Pakistan in the Danger Zone: A Tenuous U.S.-Pakistan Relationship.

SUKKUR, SINDH PROVINCE -- In the ad-hoc child malnutrition facility at the Railway Hospital in Sukkur, mothers cradle and nurse their toddlers, all emaciated and weakened. A row of beds runs either side of the ward in the brown and gray-painted Raj-era hospital.

Three year-old Zamina was malnourished before the floods hit, but the flight from the family farm in Thulla to this heaving city in northern Sindh worsened the tiny girl's condition considerably, says Dr Sakina Jafri, pausing to speak as she moved from bed to bed.

"With the threat of disease all around, young children are most prone," she said. "And when they are so young and are malnourished, it only adds to that level of vulnerability."

UNICEF Director Anthony Lake says that almost 9 million children are at risk of disease, an alarm call rung out in tandem with World Food Program head Josette Sheeran's warning of a second wave of disaster looming even as flood waters slowly recede.

Authorities have also struggled to cope with a growing number of cases of severe diarrhea and malaria caused by dirty water that offers a perfect breeding ground for insects and disease. More than 500,000 cases of acute diarrhea and nearly 95,000 cases of suspected malaria have been treated since the floods first hit, the U.N.'s World Health Organization said Tuesday.

The big fear is a cholera outbreak, given that little or no capacity is in place to deal with what could be a devastating epidemic. Cases have been reported in Sindh province in recent days, but the Pakistani government has not yet officially announced anything. Cholera can kill within 48 hours if not treated, and is highly contagious. Once identified it can be treated quickly, usually with basic rehydration treatments.

Over 6 million people have been displaced by the floods, with over 3.5 million of these in Sindh alone. 1.2 million homes have been damaged or destroyed -- five times as many as the Haiti earthquake. While some of the homeless are in camps set up by the military and NGOs, the majority are pitching down wherever possible, constructing ad-hoc shelters and often sheltering under beds or blankets in the baking heat.

The Sindh Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) said that there were almost 900,000 people in camps and spontaneous settlements in the province as of 28 August, figures that may not be inclusive of more recent displacement. In any case, sanitation facilities and clean water are absent from most camps, compounding an already parlous public health environment and laying the ground for the spread of disease. Even as the waters in Punjab and the north of Pakistan, towns and cities in Sindh remain at risk, with evacuation orders issued for 400,000 people in Mehar and surrounding areas.

Hunger is a problem now and emergency rations are needed for adults and children, as well as therapeutic feeding needed for severely affected young children such as Zamina.

It is a problem for the government as well, with implications for the country's economy. After briefing the country's cabinet, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani last week worried aloud about food insecurity due to the damage to agriculture, and follow-on impact on social welfare.

"The floods have inflicted damage to the economy which may, by some estimates, reach $43 billion (£27.9 billion), while affecting 30 percent of all agricultural land," he said. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, with cotton the main cash crop. Textiles, which are cotton-dependent, are the country's biggest export. The next wheat harvest is at risk after the floods destroyed more than 500,000 tons of seed stocks in Asia's third-largest wheat producer.

Hunger and malnutrition are major issues now, but food shortages will be a problem in the near future as well. With millions of acres of cultivable land under water, it is uncertain to what extent such terrain can be readied for the next planting season, which should start in October, or if people will be able to return home in time. With so many draught animals drowned in the river, it will be difficult for farmers to prepare the ground, which will be covered in heavy silt.

Zamina's mother Zeina knows this, her head bowed and her words translated through Dr Sakina. She nurses her youngest, an eight-month old boy, while a nurse feeds Zamina.

Life will be immensely-difficult for her and millions more families in the same position from now on. "I have nine children", she says. "My husband and the other children are in a camp. What will we do now? We just don't know," she laments.

Simon Simon Roughneen is an Irish journalist currently based in southeast Asia; he has previously reported from conflict zones in the Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. His website is www.simonroughneen.com.

What might campaigning and election preparation look like in this province about 34 days before parliamentary election?, I asked myself when I was about to travel to Paktika's provincial capital Sharana. The short answer is: grim - and that despite many actors - international, electoral or candidates - trying their best to make this undertaking somehow workable and less fraudulent then past year.

The large dilemma in Paktika - as in many places in the Afghan south and south east - is the question on whether to open a larger number of polling centers on election day, which cannot be observed and thereby are highly prone for fraud, or whether to keep a considerable number of polling centers closed, creating less accessibility for voters and admitting that insecurity is widespread. In the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections there were 265 polling centers (for an estimated population of 400,000). The number has this year been reduced to 190 due to insecurity (and the linked level of fraud). Any considerable lesser number would be seen as loss of face for governmental authorities.

According to the provincial head of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), after the 2009 election, 1555 of its staff members were blacklisted in Paktika alone due to allegations of fraud. Hence, hiring around 3000 qualified and trustable electoral staff, with the goal to have at least 10 per cent females, over the next weeks in districts heavily marked by the insurgency is possibly the worst job one can imagine. Some staff do not want to work in their own district because they fear to become known and hence more vulnerable to attacks by the Taleban. By consequence, in some districts staff has to be hired from the bordering provinces of Khost or Logar.

Meeting candidates is quite difficult in Sharana, not because they are all busy campaigning in the districts - no, because most of them are simply not there. Out of 22 candidates (one of lowest numbers in the country), six were in the province during my visit, the rest staying in Kabul mainly due to security concerns. Only two of them were said to be campaigning in the safer districts. This already tells you loads about the possible (and in certain cases wanted) presence of MPs in their constituency once they are actually in parliament.

Out of the five female candidates, one is said to be campaigning in Paktika, taking high risks. The others are in Kabul - which does not mean that they are inactive or unpopular. Their campaigns in the provinces are run by males and all their candidate's agents are male, since finding female campaign staff is almost impossible. As is finding female FEFA observers for the provinces: as the FEFA provincial representatives stated, having one or two female FEFA observers on election day for the whole province is probably realistic. So, one asks oneself what will happen in the 42 per cent of the polling stations that are meant to serve female voters. As during the last elections, many of the female votes are going to be handed in by male heads of the family anyhow.

As for the other present candidates, there is the mix of powerful incumbents likely to succeed, of sons of current MPs, of those with strong power basis in Paktika and/or Kabul and of unknowns (a deeper analysis of the Paktika candidates will follow on this blog) for the four Paktika seats in the Wolesi Jirga, one of them female. The anti-international, especially anti-US and anti-UK, rhetoric and mistrust rings high. One of the candidates I spoke to,says he is going to build ‘bridges between the Taleban and the Government' - having had a post in provincial government under the Taliban regime, he is of course perfectly fitted to do so. The slogan on his visiting card is ‘Serving weak families and bringing back prisoners who did not commit a crime -- which makes you think on how current reintegration efforts are aiding his campaign. In general, the level of acute or perceived threats by the Taleban to candidates seems high -- and it remains to be seen what general level of intimidation this creates on election day.

Being in a place for three days (with limited chances to move around), it is of course hard to get a sense of the general motivation to vote in these elections. But my feeling is that it is very low. And if this is coupled with a high risk: who is willing to go out and vote? Rumors and stories of empty polling centers, bought voter cards and stuffed ballot boxes last year do not make for a good incentive either.

So who will observe these elections in Paktika - giving you at least a sense of what happens on election day and in the crucial days thereafter? In Sharana, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, through local partners, organizes observation training for candidate agents these days, who on election day can go into polling centers and observe the process for their candidate. There is no limit to the number of agents a candidate can register, making it again easier for those with power and money to enlist high numbers of them and increase their influence inside the polling centers. In the different sessions held, there was a total of 55 agents - and the IEC did not estimate a much higher number to be registered. However, some candidates at least claimed that they will have over 100 agents.

FEFA stated it would try to find one national observer for every polling center. As for international observers, there were a handful in 2009, being limited to the provincial capital. For the presence of national and international observers to make sense this time, the question of movement beyond the provincial capital is central - and in case of the internationals this is unrealistic. Also, it would be important that observers stay days after polling day observing the transfer of sensitive material and salaries for electoral staff as well (it took some ballot boxes ten days to be transferred last year, and the lack of payment due to corruption and difficulties of transportation has been a huge issue last year).

And let us not forget about the Electoral Complains Commission: the three ECC commissioners for Paktika were sitting in one room with toshaks but no desks, no computers and no internet. They said they air radio messages about their role and presence and people come to them with complaints. But since they do not have any means to note, file and transmit them properly to Kabul, they currently do not do so. Once a week they can check their mails at the IEC but beyond that, there is no exchange with that body.

In general, many people I spoke to saw weak and corrupt governance alongside the mistrust of NATOs efforts as the main reason for the growing support of the insurgency. Flying out, there was the nagging question of what sense it makes to hold parliamentary elections in Paktika on 18 September - and what they will actually change in the lives of people. While there is an inclination to give a pessimistic answer, I still tell myself that it is too early to judge - if not at least out of deep respect for those voting, supporting and running in Paktika.

Tina Blohm is head of the Kabul office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a German political foundation. All views expressed in this blog are her own. This article was originally published by the Afghan Analysts Network.

Pakistan's super flood is unparalleled with any other the country has seen in the last 120 years, claiming the lives of nearly 1,500 Pakistanis and destroying over half of the country's cash crops, wiping out about half a million small farmers financially. The Indus river torrents continue to maroon hundreds of villages in the south of the country, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee from their homes, displacing several million within the last three weeks alone. It is a crisis far greater than the one Pakistan faced last year after its army moved against Taliban militants, which resulted in the displacement of over two million in the Swat region.

Ironically, people here in the north had been praying for extra rains until about three weeks ago. Today, most are praying for an end to rain in the north and a safe passage through the next deluge expected in the coming days.

Before the devastation in southern towns, flood waters were already wreaking havoc in the north along the Indus and Kabul River. The unusually heavy monsoon rains and the westerly winds submerged entire villages in water, affecting the major thorough fairs such as the M1, the expressway that connects the capital Islamabad with Peshawar. Today the median of the highway is home to hundreds, if not thousands, of impoverished families who have set up tents after fleeing from the floods.

The Kabul River delta, once famous for its fertility, is now beset by flooding. The vast swathes of villages in Peshawar's vicinity are at the mercy of the swollen Kabul River is overflowing with flood waters.

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Since it was established over a week ago, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani's Emergency Fund has attracted less than 50,000 dollars in donations. The same goes for a similar fund created a few days ago by chief minister of the northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province Ameer Haider Hoti. Flood waters are not the only bitter reality currently sweeping across Pakistan; mistrust in political leaders is spreading just as rapidly. President Asif Zardari's decision to commence a ten-day foreign tour -- despite solid warnings of an impending disaster and despite reports of hundreds of deaths -- has dealt yet another severe blow to the credibility and commitment of the head of the state.

While private television channels kept flashing ever-mounting casualty figures and destruction stories, the state-run Pakistan TV obediently followed Zardari to Paris and London, sending home images that poured salt in Pakistan's wounds. Pakistanis were in agony while their leaders were airlifted to a chateau outside Paris. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Gilani, though in Pakistan, only deigned to glance at the plight of the poor masses from a helicopter. Gilani endured much criticism for staging such photo ops.

The KPK chief minister also faced similar public anger and resentment for disappearing for days as the floods marooned hundreds of thousands in the Malakand region. And the sense one gets from the province is that the government machinery in most of the affected areas -- KPK, Punjab and Sind -- was slow in responding to the crisis. According to reports, many public officials appear utterly clueless, unable to even coordinate the aid that local and foreign NGOs have been bringing in.

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Closing Guantanamo and deciding what to do with future international terrorism suspects has been harder than expected. According to the LA Times, some U.S. officials are considering expanding U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan and creating a prison similar to Guantanamo to hold terrorism suspects in order to avoid trying them in U.S. courts due to lack of evidence. This is a bad idea -- a very bad idea.

Although it may be tempting to suggest Afghanistan as an alternative holding site for suspected terrorist from places like Yemen and Somalia, I can say with certainty that establishing mini Gitmos in other countries is not a solution. If we go that route it would undoubtedly lead to a public relations disaster for the U.S. military still trying to mend relations with the Afghan people, and put a strain on diplomatic relations with the Afghan government. Not to mention such a move is legally impermissible. 

I went to Guantanamo in 2007, 2008, and 2009. I have also been to Afghanistan and looked at U.S. detention operations closely. Many former detainees I interviewed in 2009, who were from the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, were captured in their homes during night raids U.S. forces that terrorized extended families and often involving destruction of property. Some detainees I interviewed had been held for 2 years and some up to 5 years without any opportunity to review the evidence against them or to produce tribal elders or other witnesses who could vouch for their innocence and character.

From what I've observed these actions have undermined U.S. efforts, both military and political, in Afghanistan. In my conversations with Afghans and Afghan officials in 2009, the anger over night raids and arbitrary detention by international military forces are second to that of civilian casualties and has alienated the Afghan people. In 2009, however, top commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal unveiled a new strategy that prioritizes protection of civilians, reforming U.S. detention practices, and winning back the support of the Afghans. To establish a "Gitmo" in Afghanistan could potentially undo all of this. Which might explain why Gen. McChrystal, is against establishing U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan.  

Presently, the United States military in Afghanistan is already dealing with close to 800 detainees being held at the newly built Detention Facility in Parwan, including the small number of detainees captured outside Afghanistan and rendered to Bagram, during the Bush administration, some of whom are litigating their right to habeas in U.S. courts. (The previous Bagram Theater Internment Facility, which was the site of detainee deaths in 2002 and 2003 and abuse is no longer being used).

In September 2009 the Obama administration announced new detention reforms that include a new Detainee Review Board mechanism which for the first time allows detainees to bring in witnesses to rebut the military's allegations, although detainees don't have access to counsel. Detainees are eventually released, transferred to tribal elders under a reconciliation program, or tried in Afghan courts under Afghan law. (See Hidden justice: Do Obama's detention reforms in Afghanistan go far enough?). In 2009 Gen. McChrystal stated that the end goal is for the United States to transfer all detention operations to the Afghan government provided they have the capacity to process and try detainees fairly and in accordance with Afghan and international law. Task Force 435, which is responsible for U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan, plans to transfer the Parwan detention facility to the Afghan government in 2011, although the U.S. will still be involved in detention operations in some capacity. These plans, at least publicly, do not include expanding U.S. detentions in Afghanistan for future captures of terrorism suspects from Somalia, Yemen or elsewhere. But as the LA Times reported some White House officials are considering this as an option.

The business of capturing and transporting individuals from different countries to Afghanistan, which is an area of conflict, for warehousing beyond the rule of law and access to courts in laymen's term is kidnapping -- something that the United States should not be promoting as a matter of policy and constitutes a crime. Forcefully removing an individual from the territory of a state without an extradition process or judicial oversight violates that individual's right against arbitrary detention and as demonstrated in the post 9-11 rendition cases led to abuse and secret detentions. (Khaled al-Masri, a German national was transferred to CIA custody and held in Afghanistan where he alleged he was abused until U.S. officials realized that his capture was a mistake and released him in Albania. Abu Omar was captured from the streets of Italy and sent to Egypt where he alleged he was tortured. CIA agents responsible for his abduction were convicted for kidnapping in abstentia in Italy in 2009).

The debate about what to do with terrorism suspects not captured in a theater of combat is not new, but international law provides guidance. The international law of armed conflict, involving two or more states, allows the detaining authority to detain an individual with minimum legal processes until hostilities end. The Geneva Conventions does obligate the detaining authority not to remove civilians from occupied territory, to protect Prisoners of War, or, under Common Article 3, to provide certain protections to all prisoners detained in armed conflict. Whereas under the law of non-international armed conflict, which is not a war between two states, international human rights law imposes substantive and procedural constraints on a state's authority to detain and allows detention only if it is grounded in law, is not arbitrary, and subject to judicial review. Transfer of individuals from one country to another must be done through judicial oversight.

Putting aside the legality of authorizing future transfers to indefinite detention in Afghanistan, from a policy perspective such a decision would be an affront to the Afghan people and government whose sovereignty the United States recognizes and has been supporting, and would further damage U.S. counterinsurgency strategy of wining support of the Afghans against the Taliban.

Individuals captured anywhere outside Afghanistan should be lawfully transferred if evidence exists for either trial in U.S. federal courts, released or repatriated. They should not be rendered to a country where they are not citizens for indefinite detention and beyond the rule of law. Afghanistan should not be used as America's playground to warehouse alleged unsavory characters because the U.S. government chose not to gather the necessary evidence for fair prosecutions in U.S. courts or just needs these alleged bad guys off the streets. The United States should not be in the business of kidnapping and promoting global lawless enclaves.

Sahr Muhammedally is a humanrights lawyer based in London.

The Arabian and Indo-Australian tectonic plates meet near Karachi, the Pakistani port city inhabited by at least 15 million people.  But in recent weeks, Karachi has been reeling from violent seismic activity along its ethnic and political fault lines -- not the collision of geological plates nearby.

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