There's no checklist for counterinsurgency

By Joshua Rovner and Tim Hoyt

The debate over Afghanistan strategy since Obama's troop increase last year may not have produced any solutions yet, but it has produced plenty of think tank reports purporting to have them. One of the most recent is a new RAND Corporation study that makes bold claims about victory in counterinsurgency. The authors of the study argue that debates over COIN are usually "based on common sense, a general sense of history, or but one or two detailed historical cases." Policymakers and military officers are desperate for solid research that can help them evaluate the menu of strategic options, but the best they can expect is advice based on analogies or selective readings of history. To remedy this situation, the authors set out to perform a thorough analysis based on "extensive data collection, rigorous analysis, and empirical testing."

It's a laudable enough goal -- but for all their claims to superior rigor, the authors fail to live up to it. They make a series of basic methodological mistakes that throw doubt on their conclusions. Most importantly, they confuse cause and effect.

The authors identify fifteen "good" practices and twelve "bad" ones and conclude that success will occur as long as COIN forces implement more good practices than bad. In other words, there is a universally applicable checklist for victory. The authors are unequivocal about the meaning of their analysis of 30 past conflicts: "These data show that, regardless of distinctiveness in the narrative and without exception, COIN forces that realize preponderantly more good than bad practices win, and those that do not lose."

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Keeping Karzai's feet to the fire

By Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman, July 21, 2010

On Tuesday, the Afghan government convened an international conference, bringing together more than 70 countries to discuss the way forward in Afghanistan. As in previous conferences, the Karzai government outlined an ambitious agenda to enhance aid coordination, reduce corruption, strengthen the justice system, support job creation and economic growth and more.

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Daily brief: Taliban behead Afghan police

By Andrew Lebovich, July 21, 2010

Organized chaos
A wave of violence swept through Karachi yesterday, and at least 11 people have been killed by targeted gunfire in different parts of the city (Geo, Dawn, Dawn, ET). Police believe the killings, which touched off a series of riots, were linked to fighting between two political parties, the Punjabi-Pashtun Ittehad (PPI) and the Awami National Party (ET).

The Lahore High Court yesterday took responsibility for the investigation of the shooting deaths of two Christian brothers in the city of Faisalabad Monday, ordering the regional chief of police to appear before the court today with an update on the case (ET, Daily Times, Dawn). The killings occurred while the men were in police custody for allegedly writing a "blasphemous pamphlet" and sparked riots in Christian neighborhoods Faisalabad.

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Is Operation Moshtarak a fool’s mission?

By Norine MacDonald

We should be asking some critical questions about the now, much-publicized NATO and Afghan forces operation to take Marjah district in Helmand. For starters: How does this operation fit into the overall strategy for Afghanistan -- why Marjah and why now?

One can argue that U.S. and NATO forces have not had significant military success in Afghanistan since the initial invasion, despite the expansion of ISAF's mandate across the country between 2004 and 2006. And one can argue further that the reverse is true: The Taliban's military strategy has been successful and their territorial influence has in fact increased dramatically in recent years, as they now dominate the south and east, and are rapidly increasing their presence in the north. Taliban forces have also closed in on Kabul, as evidenced by the most recent major attacks within the capital itself.

That the world's "most powerful military" hasn't yet prevailed in Afghanistan is a problem to be sure, but one that should be addressed by its political architects, not its military actors. From the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, Western politicians and their domestic bases have failed to provide adequate military resources, failed to coordinate the NATO effort, and failed to tackle effectively Afghan "hearts and minds" with the necessary political, developmental and counter-narcotics policies.

The Obama administration's troop surge -- which was sorely needed and should have been matched by additional troops from other NATO countries -- must be used to ensure not just military victories, but military victories which are of high-profile and also high-value in the overall conflict.

We are at a moment when the West has decided to focus its strategy on a "political solution". The troop surge should be used in a way that would have the most impressive impact on the overall political dynamics and take back some of the military initiative from the Taliban forces, which is a necessary backdrop to the any discussion about a political settlement. The military objectives should support the political objectives.

So why, of all the Taliban-controlled areas, is NATO using the recent influx of U.S. troops to seize Marjah? Clearing Marjah will be a minor symbolic military move without much of a political rationale. Although the district is considered to be a heroin trade hub, the absence of a counter-narcotics strategy means that it is not clear what actions will be taken against the area's opium economy once it is cleared. If no alternative livelihoods are created once the district has been re-taken, resentment towards the Afghan government and international forces will only increase.

The build-up to the operation has not been encouraging. Although the political decision to provide advance warning of Operation Moshtarak has allowed civilians to leave the conflict zone, steps to resettle these people temporarily are nonexistent. Thousands of Afghans are fleeing to Lashkar Gah and the ungoverned refugee camp outside it.

This camp does not have sufficient food, medical supplies, or accommodations for the families who have already fled there -- a shocking state of affairs which has persisted since March 2006 -- and is already far beyond any original holding capacity, full of unemployed and angry men unable to provide for their families. Creating a situation which will lead to thousands more to take refuge at this camp is not only disastrous from a humanitarian point of view; it is a very poorly conceived plan from a counter-insurgency viewpoint.

Instead of using the military to create Taliban recruitment opportunities -- which this overcrowded refugee camp will surely do -- why doesn't the United States use its military power to concentrate its effort on achievable objectives with real strategic value to the West and that will have a positive impact on Afghan lives?

For example, a far more impactful use of the troop surge would be to take back control of the ring road from Kabul to Lashkar Gah from the Taliban -- a strategic artery which is vital for control of the south of Afghanistan and would have an immediate and beneficial impact on the entire conflict. Currently, travel on these roads is Taliban dominated and highly dangerous, restricting local life immensely and increasing the sense of isolation of the people of the south. Further, NATO and Afghan forces should also focus on regaining control of the whole of Kandahar province. This area has much greater geographic and political significance to the Taliban than Helmand. Holding the territory -- not just seizing, and then withdrawing from it -- is critical for enabling vital development and infrastructure projects, boosting the local economy within the Afghan civilian community, and draw support away from the Taliban.

This U.S. "troop surge" has cost the Obama administration a good deal of political currency on the domestic front already. Using these new military resources to take the Marjah district, whether entirely misconceived or purposefully misdirected for an "easy win," could be catastrophic and drain away the military power that has just been gained at serious political cost. Any U.S./NATO effort from this point onward should be used on the ground to create critical and strategic military supremacy, bring the Taliban to the table ready to make some concessions -- and improve, not degrade our relationship with the Afghan people.

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The election hurdles in Afghanistan

By Norine MacDonald

By Norine MacDonald

With the Afghan election run-off just sixteen days away, much hangs in the balance. The good news is a resolution to the Afghan election standoff has been reached -- a true success story for the domestic political agendas of the West. Whether or not the international community and the Afghan government can, in just two weeks, pull off a clean and legitimate election is another matter.

The fact of the matter is that holding any election in Afghanistan is an incredibly difficult task. Huge efforts were made to tackle the many challenges posed by operating thousands of polling stations in a rural and unstable country for the first presidential vote, held on Aug. 20, and still the election was marked by poor turnout, hundreds of Taliban attacks, and extensive fraud. Now, with winter fast approaching in many parts of the country, it is difficult to see how the required ballot papers, a new system to prevent a repeat of election fraud, and a new security response to allow more polling stations to open can all be brought together in the time provided.

But before votes can be counted, there must be voters. Assuring an acceptable level of voter turnout, especially in the turbulent Pashtun south, where Taliban activity led to low turnout in the first round, will be a formidable task. Presently, the security situation in the south -- and now as well in the north in Kunduz and Baghlan -- is grim. Many Afghans will be unwilling to risk their safety again, especially if they doubt whether the election will make much of a difference to their daily lives.

In addition to concerns over security, there are concerns about voter morale. During recent research interviews in Kandahar and Helmand, I found the cynicism of many ordinary Afghans clear. Afghans are threatening to boycott the poll. There are "no good Afghan political leaders to lead us out of this situation," one local stated, indicating he would not vote in a run-off. Some of those who supported President Karzai, in particular, are unwilling to vote again, disenchanted with what they saw as his complicity in the fraud.

This disenchantment among Karzai's supporters must be acknowledged, since it indicates the serious possibility that he may not, contrary to expectations, triumph in a run-off.

After the recount, Karzai had an estimated 48 percent of the vote, while his leading challenger Dr. Abdullah Abdullah took 35 percent.

It's possible that Abdullah could pick up the votes of the other candidates, including Ramazan Bashardost and Ashraf Ghani, who came in third and fourth, respectively. Their vote shares, along with the other 29 candidates, came to 15.3 percent of the total ballots. If Abdullah collects the majority of these votes, perhaps two-thirds, he will have to gain less than 10 percent elsewhere to claim victory. This gap could easily be closed by the drop in Karzai's support -- allowing Abdullah to overtake Karzai.

But before any new votes can be counted, the Afghan elections system and international partners must cope with the logistical challenges of delivering seventeen million ballots - by helicopter, truck, and donkey -- to thousands of remote and increasingly snowbound polling stations.

In just sixteen days, a new system must be developed to prevent a replay of the first round's fraud, and then deployed across the countryside. In just sixteen days, new approaches to security, which will allow more polling stations (especially in the south) to open, motivating the Afghan people to get out and vote without fear for their lives, must be put in place.

At this stage, delivering a credible second round of voting seems to be more an aspiration than a reality and will require a nearly Herculean effort by systems and infrastructures not operating at optimum levels. We in the West were keen on a second round to deliver the credible Afghan partner necessary for our domestic and security agendas. But we might just have walked into that space delineated by the saying: "Be careful what you wish for -- you might just get it."

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Holbrooke's drug war

By Gretchen Peters

By Gretchen Peters

In June, I met with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to discuss how the drug trade benefits the Afghan Taliban. I urged him to pay close attention to the two history chapters of my book, Seeds of Terror, warning that Washington has a habit of making the same mistakes over and over in Afghanistan.

He assured me the Obama team had consulted with a raft of experts and historians, adding with a laugh: "We plan to make new mistakes."

I am not entirely sure, however.

Broadly speaking, the Obama administration's counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan is a huge step in the right direction. Thousands more western troops have poured into the Taliban-dominated southern poppy belt to provide security, and to train local security forces or replace those who were themselves tied to the drug trade. Efforts have intensified to interdict drug traffickers, destroy opium stockpiles and confiscate precursor chemicals. The Good Performance Initiative, co-funded with the UK, provides development assistance to communities that eliminate or significantly reduce narcotics cultivation. And there is greater focus on helping farmers find viable alternative crops to poppy and cannabis.

There is no doubt the Bush administration's proposal to launch a wide-scale aerial spraying campaign to wipe out Afghanistan's poppy fields was wildly misguided. It would have not only created a humanitarian disaster, and sent tens of thousands of poor villagers running to the arms of the insurgents, it would have actually benefitted the Taliban, drug traffickers and corrupt officials by driving up the farm-gate price of opium poppy.

Recent ground eradication efforts also were a costly flop. As Ambassador Holbrooke himself explained, they were wildly expensive -- estimated to cost as much as $44,000 a hectare -- and dangerous for the local eradicators, who died by the dozens in attacks by the Taliban and traffickers. Meanwhile, wealthy landowners and the politically well connected were able to bribe eradication teams not to cut down their poppy fields, meaning poor farmers became the predominant targets.

Ambassador Holbrooke is wise to phase out the misguided Bush-era eradication policy, however stopping eradication entirely would also be a mistake.

Counternarcotics strategy is like a four-legged table, supported by interdiction, alternative livelihoods, public education and eradication. Just as a table will wobble if its legs are uneven, there must be balance between the four pillars for a counternarcotics strategy to succeed.

It's the basic carrot and stick approach: Raise incentives for people to function within the law, while simultaneously raising the risks of operating outside of it.

If you remove the threat of the stick, the strategy fails. It's not a matter of being tough, but persistent.

I don't expect a need for wide-scale eradication in Afghanistan. According to my research and a separate survey by the Asia Foundation, more than 80 percent of Afghans oppose poppy cultivation, meaning that the majority of poppy farmers will switch to other crops without complaint once security, trade and market conditions allow it.

Ironically, it will probably be large landowners who will be most resistant to change. Those who earn hundreds of thousands of dollars each year off this lucrative cash crop will likely respond only when the level of risk for doing so is elevated.

The British funded a carrot-only approach in 2002, offering to pay farmers not to harvest opium. It was hastily cancelled a year later, after drug cultivation spread to new regions and thousands more Afghan farmers planted poppy just to get their hands on the easy cash. Now that failed policy is again being promoted in some Washington circles.

U.S. policy has typically swung like a pendulum with regards to the opium trade in Afghanistan, ranging from ignore it, to destroy it, to throw money at it.

But just as there are a variety of circumstances that induce Afghan farmers to plant opium poppy, it will take a blend of policies to get them to stop.

The Obama administration and Ambassador Holbrooke have taken important steps towards a coherent counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan. But if they want to avoid the mistakes of history, they should seek a balanced approach, and avoid the pitfalls of simply doing the opposite of those who came before them.

Gretchen Peters is the author of Seeds of Terror, How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda.

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