AfPak Behind the Lines: Pakistani TV through the years

By Luv Puri, April 25, 2011

This installment of AfPak Behind the Lines looks at Pakistani television and the Pakistan-U.S. relationship with Luv Puri.

1) USAID recently announced that it is funding a remake of Sesame Street for Pakistan. How unique is this effort to bring American television to Pakistan, historically?

Sesame Street was first aired in Pakistan in English in the late 1980s and early 1990s, though it was far from the only exposure Pakistanis got to American television and culture. Interestingly, Pakistan Television (PTV) became one of the key instruments through which the U.S.-Pakistan civil alliance during the Afghan jihad gained a popular acceptance at the civil society level in Pakistan. In the 1980's, television viewers in Pakistan were also exposed to the saga of African Americans' arrival to the United States of America through the broadcast of televised version of the famous novel of Alex Haley, "Roots: The Saga of an American Family", which gave Pakistani viewers an interesting and vivid exposure to the brutal history of the slave trade and struggles of the African American community in the United States, from the 18^th-century until the present.

On a lighter note, Pakistani viewers were also treated to episodes of Star Trek, as well as Full House, which for many gave a sense into the complex aspects of parenting in the West. This heavy dose of American entertainment was going on simultaneously with and at the end of then-dictator Gen. Zia ul-Haq's government-sponsored Islamization drive in Pakistan, which ended with Zia's mysterious death in 1988. Every evening, PTV news displayed the shots of the mujahideen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. In fact, Zia's Islamization drive and American entertainment often had their own followers even within the same family, as it was mostly urban, English-speaking families who had access to and could understand shows like Full House (which went on the air at the tail end of the Islamization drive). There was no contradiction between the two parallel trends at the time, because of the political alignment between America and Pakistan and even with the Muslim world at large. There was instead a kind of acceptance of both, a feeling that the American value system and Islamic worlds view could live side by side.

The two strands began to diverge as political alignments and coalitions began to fracture in the 1990s, after the anti-Soviet jihad was finished and the U.S. moved on to other issues, such as nuclear non-proliferation and a post-Soviet Europe. This change in focus put the United States at odds with Pakistan, whose interests and concerns remained firmly rooted in South Asian politics, namely India and the emerging chaos in Afghanistan.

2) How does Pakistan's English-language entertainment media compare with the Urdu options, both in the past and today?

In the 1990's, after the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear program, there was a sudden transformation even with respect to the content of the media, as American programming became minimal. However, the short-lived democratic government of Benazir Bhutto (who was Pakistan's prime minister from 1988 until 1990 and again from 1993 until 1996) brought about a golden age of Pakistani Urdu theater broadcast on PTV.

This theater engaged with the societal problems of the day. Urdu dramas such as 1989's Neelay Haath (literally "Blue Hands," meant to represent the appearance of hands after torture or abuse) raised the issue of injustices perpetrated against Pakistani women by both the state and society during Zia's regime. There were also programs which accommodated the ethnic diversity of Pakistan, such as televised theater productions that educated the audience about various aspects of Baluch and Pashtun history and culture, with a heavy emphasis on the historic Pashtun resistance to British occupation (though unsurprisingly no concurrent focus on Baluch nationalism or separatism). The progressive spirit of theater was lost as democracy became more and more tenuous in the country with every passing day, and Pakistani society became more and more disappointed in the failure of Benazir Bhutto's government to bring about the change and improvements that many thought were sure to come from her leadership.

By the time Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over, Pakistan had been infected by the crass commercialism of TV programming, something that had already taken place in neighboring India. This goldgen age of Urdu drama was over. PTV had to compete with other private satellite channels, and the market dictated the agenda, leaving little space or even resources available to socially relevant or educational entertainment.

3) Then-Pakistani president Musharraf oversaw a dramatic expansion of electronic media in Pakistan beginning in the early 2000s. What has the impact of the spread of an independent media been for Pakistan?

Musharraf made the decision to open up electronic media in 2002; a total of 83 licenses for satellite TV channels were issued during the Musharraf era, including about 38 for news and current affairs channels. Around 47 percent of the Pakistani population watches television, and over 60 percent of the total population lives in rural areas. But in the absence of strong civil society institutions, the Pakistani airwaves have become a platform for forming public opinion on geo-strategic issues. Unfortunately, there is little socially relevant content on some of the critical domestic challenges facing the country.

Pakistan in many ways fits the typical pattern seen in the democratization process of many developing countries, as discussed in in the seminal work of American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. The political and civil society institutions in Pakistan are too few and too weak to provide space to politicized sections of the society to vigorously participate in debate on everyday issues. TV in Pakistan is a rare medium where politicians and civil society actors can reach out to the masses and engage with the issues; however, the structure of popular TV debates, with the exception of a few cases, is such that they have to simplify complex political and social problems, leading to increased populism that results in some of the relevant details being missed or distorted. In such an environment, developments are seen through a simpler, but more starkly divisive, lens.

Luv Puri is a political analyst, who has written two books on South Asian political and security issues. He recently published Across the Line of Control based on field work in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

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AfPak Behind the Lines: night raids

This installment of AfPak Behind the Lines looks at Afghan President Hamid Karzai's calls to end night raids in Afghanistan with Thomas Ruttig.

1) This past weekend, Afghan President Hamid Karzai called for an end to Special Operations "night raids" in Afghanistan, as well as a drawdown of combat forces from Afghanistan's countryside, roads, and daily life. This public dispute over a key element of ISAF Commander Gen. David Petraeus' strategy has made a considerable splash in the American press, but how has it been viewed and reported in Afghanistan? Do Afghans consider it an important move, or simply another in a growing line of public disagreements between Karzai and American officials?

The discussion about night raids, "culturally insensitive behavior" and civilian casualties - the Los Angeles Times, referring to "internal U.S. military statistics," just reported about another increase of those by U.S. forces - has two sides, as often in Afghanistan. On one hand, many Afghans are concerned and - when personally affected - often extremely angry about such cases, more so because they are often repeated. What you often hear then is: "Why do they always come afterwards and apologize? Can't they have proper intelligence in the first place?"

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AfPak Behind the Lines: Afghanistan's elections

This installment of AfPak Behind the Lines looks at Afghanistan's parliamentary elections with Scott Worden.

1) You were an election monitor during Afghanistan's parliamentary voting nearly two weeks ago. What were your major observations from your time there? What overall impressions did you receive from Afghans regarding their perceptions of the vote?

My own observation of the election was limited to 10 polling centers in Kabul, where the process went well. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) staff were well organized and knew the procedures, voters and observers were orderly, and there was a general air of enthusiasm about the process. One thing that stood out about the voting in Kabul was the sheer number of candidate agents that were on hand to observe the process -- perhaps not surprising given more than 600 candidates on the ballot there. This was good because having that many eyes on the process reduced the opportunity for fraud or bias on the part of IEC officials. The other encouraging sign was the high percentage of young people that were involved in the polling. Many of the voters, IEC workers, observers, and agents we saw appeared to be under 35, which indicates that the next generation of Afghan leaders may be familiar with and supportive of democracy.

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AfPak Behind the Lines: Pakistan's political scene

This week's AfPak Behind the Lines looks at Pakistan's complicated political landscape with Joshua T. White.

1) Both Pakistani and Indian papers carried news last month that Pakistan's former president and military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf would be announcing his return date to Pakistan in September, as well as the manifesto for his party, the All Pakistan Muslim League (APML). Why the long buildup? And what kind of support does Musharraf's party (and the man himself) still have within Pakistan?

Pervez Musharraf has a well-deserved reputation for chronically overestimating his own popularity. With 281,987 Facebook friends ostensibly clamoring for him to step back into the limelight, he seems confident that his moment is approaching. It isn't. The formation of the APML is gaining traction as a news story only because the current Pakistan People's Party (PPP)-led government is seen as faltering in the wake of the flood crisis; because Musharraf is (wrongly) believed to have residual political backing from the U.S. and U.K.; and because the Pakistani press, driven by a glut of cable news channels, is eager for political gossip.

Nearly everything about Musharraf's new venture is quixotic. While he clearly has lingering support both inside and outside of Pakistan, he has no semblance of a political constituency. His last electoral venture, the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (PML-Q), was not a mass party so much as an instrument designed to court political opportunists. While the former general may possibly recruit a few prominent regional politicians, such as the elderly Pir Pagara, he is unlikely to gain backing from power brokers, or from the military, which has given no indication of welcoming his return to politics. (On the contrary, they act nervous at the prospect.) As if this weren't enough of a hurdle, Musharraf faces a complex and inhospitable legal environment back in Pakistan -- one which has delayed his return, and from which the judiciary is not likely to grant him reprieve. All this suggests that the APML is unlikely to become more than a bit player in Pakistan's chaotic political scene.

2) How has the flooding affected Pakistan's political landscape? Will the widespread perception that the government has not performed well on aid distribution cause an electoral shakeup? And how has it affected the relationship between Pakistan's civilian government and the military?

While it seems almost crass to talk about politics in the wake of such human tragedy, the reality remains that Pakistan's floods have produced clear political winners and losers. The civilian government, with its somewhat halting response, has reinforced a public perception that it is ineffective, and ill-equipped for the task of governing. The military, by contrast, has projected an image of competence. In fairness to the Zardari administration, no civilian government could possibly have been prepared for what unfolded; the army was naturally better equipped to deal with the immediate rescue and relief efforts, just as the civilians will be indispensable in the reconstruction phase that follows.

Still, politics is often less about facts than expectations. Since both the civilian government and the military have thus far played to type, the political impact of the floods may well be limited. With the next national elections slated for 2013, it would take more than sheer unpopularity to dislodge the government: it would take an unexpected breakdown of the coalition, or intervention by an increasingly activist Supreme Court, or a decision by the army to cut short the government's term. This being Pakistan, the latter option is always a possibility. But for now, General Kiyani and the military establishment seem quite content to let the PPP-led government run its course, faltering as it may, and absorb public frustration about what will certainly be an agonizing road to recovery.

3) Given the killings in Karachi of both Awami National Party (ANP) and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) leaders and members in Karachi, and the continued targeting of ANP leaders and relatives in Peshawar and its surroundings, how stable is the governing coalition in Pakistan? Are the local disturbances creating tension on the national level or in parliament?

The Pashtun nationalist ANP has had a rough year. On policy issues, it has a lot to crow about: it spearheaded the renaming of the North-West Frontier Province as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (though it accepted the "Khyber" prefix only reluctantly), and it saw the ruling PPP government meet many of its fiscal and legal demands for provincial autonomy by way of the revised National Finance Commission award and the historic 18th amendment to the constitution. But it has endured a spate of targeted killings by Taliban groups, slumping popularity in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, blame for an inadequate response to the floods, and an upsurge in violence against the Pashtun community in Karachi.

This latter conflict has raised particular concern that the national PPP-led governing coalition -- of which both the ANP and MQM are critical members -- may founder over the growing turf war in Pakistan's largest city, which has taken on electoral, ethnic, and sectarian religious dimensions. Violence in Karachi has long been a feature of Pakistan's urban scene, and in the latest spate of killings no side is blameless. In recent days, the MQM has also hit hard at the PPP (with whom it is competing more aggressively in Karachi), suggesting that an army coup would not be unwelcome. Much of this is simple grandstanding, as the ANP and MQM both have compelling patronage incentives to stay in the coalition. But the MQM's mercurial leader Altaf Hussain remains a wild card. He, and the activist Supreme Court, constitute perhaps the two most unpredictable players in Pakistani politics today, and deserve close attention as the Zardari government seeks to shore up its political standing in the wake of the nationwide floods.

Joshua T. White is a Ph.D. candidate in South Asia Studies at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and a Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Engagement.

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AfPak Behind the Lines: Pakistan's infrastructure

This week's AfPak Behind the Lines looks at Pakistan's natural disasters and infrastructure problems with Ahmad Rafay Alam.

1) Recent flooding across Pakistan has killed over 1,100 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. While seasonal flooding is standard in Pakistan, why is this particular flood season so bad? What infrastructure does Pakistan have in place to prevent or alleviate flooding?

Pakistan is already feeling the effects of climate change, and one of the effects climate change brings is unexpected precipitation events. Of course, it's not all climate change. Overdevelopment and the timber business, especially in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, have devastated watershed areas and make it much easier for water to flow down mountain and hillsides and create flash floods.

I don't know of Pakistan having any infrastructure to "prevent or alleviate" flooding. There are laws prohibiting the felling of trees for the timber industry, but they operate only within defined forest areas. We're not really doing anything about overdevelopment and the destruction of forest cover and watershed areas, so in the future we are going to see more of these tragic natural disasters.

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AfPak Behind the Lines: Kashmir

This week's AfPak Behind the Lines considers the current status of the Kashmir conflict and its impact on Afghanistan and Pakistan with Dr. Sumit Ganguly.

1. 17 Kashmiris have been killed in conflict with Indian authorities since early June, when police killed a 17 year old bystander at a protest. How does this summer's violence compare with previous years, and how has the nature of the conflict changed since the Muslim separatist movement began in the late 1980s?

This summer's violence is markedly reminiscent of the violence at the beginning of the insurgency in 1989. At that time there was a genuine outpouring of popular anger over Indian political malfeasances in Kashmir. (These are explored at some length in my 1997 Cambridge book, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace). Once again, young Kashmir men who are tired of the seeming callousness of the Indian state toward their plight have taken to the streets. They feel that much of the resources that the national government has poured into the state has not made a meaningful difference to their lives. They lack employment, infrastructure in the state if inadequate and the heavy hand of paramilitary forces deployed in the state adversely affect they everyday lives. They are subjected to petty harassment, periodic questioning and are occasionally roughed up. Given this milieu all that was needed was an unfortunate incident, namely the death of a hapless high school student was hit by a stray tear gas canister. His death provided the spark for the conflagration that ensued.

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AfPak Behind the Lines: al-Qaeda in Iraq

This week's AfPak Behind the Lines assesses the state of al-Qaeda in Iraq with analyst Brian Fishman.

1. What is the current status of al-Qaeda in Iraq, following the deaths of its leaders Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in a U.S. airstrike in Tikrit earlier this year? How has the group adapted to these losses, organizationally and ideologically?

Since the deaths of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi, AQI (operating as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)) has demonstrated that it can still cause death and destruction in Iraq. Nonetheless, since its dramatic decline in 2007, the ISI's operational profile has changed significantly, from attempting to control and dominate territory unilaterally toward more intermittent large-scale attacks. No doubt this shift was a concession to the reality of decreased influence and authority in Iraq, but by 2009 ISI was finding ways to use major attacks in Baghdad and elsewhere to discredit and undermine the Iraqi state. This trend has continued since the deaths of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi, though one might argue that the group has focused more on attacking Awakening Councils rather than the formal Iraqi state. It is too early to draw that conclusion, in my opinion, but it is interesting because it raises questions about ISI's sense of self and purpose. Little is known about the new Emir of the ISI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husayni al-Qurashi and his deputy Abu Abdullah al-Husayni al-Qurashi. They have given little indication of their strategic focus or background.

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AfPak Behind the Lines: southern Afghanistan

This week's installment of AfPak Behind the Lines covers southern Afghanistan's power brokers, border with Pakistan, and coalition operations with journalist Anand Gopal.

1. Ahmed Wali Karzai, Afghan president Hamid Karzai's half-brother, is a well-known and controversial power broker in southern Afghanistan. Aside from him, who are the other major players in the area? What are their relationships with the Afghan central government and the coalition, the insurgency, and each other?

Ahmed Wali gets most of the attention, and rightfully so, but there are in fact a host of other important figures in the southern Afghanistan scene. In the early years after 2001, the south was dominated by three formidable governors: Sher Ahmed Akhundzada of Helmand, Jan Muhammad Khan of Uruzgan and Gul Agha Sherzai of Kandahar. They were former mujahedeen commanders who were ousted when the Taliban came to power in the mid-nineties and subsequently reinstated following the U.S. invasion. All three had poor governance records and were repeatedly accused of human rights violations, exploiting tribal tensions, drug trafficking, running private militias, and more. In fact, many Afghans maintain that these men, and their associates, were partly responsible for fueling popular resentment towards the government and creating space for the Taliban's resurgence.

While the three were eventually removed from their positions by 2007, they continue to attempt to project their influence in southern affairs today.

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AfPak Behind the Lines: Iran in Afghanistan and Pakistan

This week's installment of Behind the Lines covers Iran's role in Afghanistan and Pakistan with Hillary Mann Leverett, a former National Security Council official and co-author of The Race for Iran.

1. In late May, then-top commander General Stanley McChrystal said there is "clear evidence of Iranian activity" in training and providing weaponry to the Taliban in Afghanistan. What are Iran's core interests in Afghanistan, and how have they evolved in the last nine years? How do those complement or work against what the U.S. and NATO are trying to achieve there?

Iran has a strategic stake in Afghanistan that has not changed in the last nine years. Tehran's overriding interest is to prevent Afghanistan (with its long and lawless border with Iran) from being used as a platform from which to attack or undermine the Islamic Republic or to weaken Iran's standing as a regional power.

To prevent Afghanistan from being used as an anti-Iranian platform, the Islamic Republic has worked, over many years, to form relationships with Afghan players who could keep Iran's Afghan enemies (principally the Taliban but also other anti-Shiite and anti-Persian groups) and their external supporters (principally Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, two of Iran's most important regional antagonists) in check. To this end, Iran has worked to strengthen and unite Afghanistan's Shiite Hazara and other Dari/Persian-speaking communities (which together comprise about 45 percent of the population) as a counterweight to anti-Iranian, pro-Saudi, and pro-Pakistani elements among Afghan Pashtuns (roughly 42 percent of the population). The Hazara and other Dari/Persian-speaking communities were, of course, the core of the Northern Alliance that fought the Taliban during the 1990s, and were supported by India and Russia as well as Iran.

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AfPak Behind the Lines: Karzai's connections

The AfPak Channel is pleased to continue a new weekly feature, AfPak Behind the Lines, where we interview an expert on a hot topic in Afghanistan and Pakistan circles. Today, we speak with Martine van Bijlert about Afghan President Hamid Karzai's relationships with players in the country and abroad. Van Bijlert is speaking with New America Foundation president Steve Coll tomorrow morning at 10:15am EST.

1. Karzai expressed his support for General McChrystal in the aftermath of the explosive Rolling Stone profile of the general. How does the general's resignation affect the campaign in Afghanistan, on a medium to long term basis? What do we know about Karzai's -- and his half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai's -- relationship with Gen. Petraeus?

The U.S. administration has gone out of its way to send the message that there will be no fundamental change in the military strategy and that the campaign will not be affected by the departure of McChrystal. The question is whether this "business as usual" message is the one you want to be giving. More importantly, it is not even clear what an unchanged strategy would look like on the ground. The surge, with at the forefront the operation in Marjah and the planned operation in Kandahar, has not succeeded in changing the mood, let alone the strategic realities. The military part of the Kandahar operation has been postponed. McChrystal is said to have been giving rather bleak briefings just before his removal. It is not clear how Petraeus will deal with this, whether he will push ahead with the Kandahar operation and what that will look like. How he will deal with the plunging mood and the growing consensus that, with these very tight timelines, all the different efforts are unlikely to bring enough visible change, soon enough. And how the shift towards a more political track will affect the military side of things.

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AfPak Behind the Lines: Punjab's growing militant problem

1. Your article in the CTC Sentinel last spring defined the conglomeration of militant groups known collectively as the ‘Punjabi Taliban.' We hear most often, however, about the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan militant groups based in the tribal regions. What are some similarities and differences between the two? How has the ‘Punjabi Taliban' developed since your CTC article?

First, I would prefer to tweak the title of the group to ‘Punjabi militants,' for there are many differences between the band of militants operating in Punjab and those based in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province (previously NWFP). Though this classification may sound purely academic, it has policy implications also. These Punjabi militants, who had drifted away from their parent organizations (such as Jaish-e-Mohammad and Sipah-e-Sahaba), had moved towards FATA after 2005 because they considered the area safer to live, train, and operate from. These were called ‘Punjabi' not because they were all ethnically from Punjab province -- in fact, a few Sindhi and Urdu speaking militants were also present in this group. Hence, all non-Pashtuns (with the exception of non-Pakistanis like Uzbeks) came to be called "Punjabi Taliban."

Relations between Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan -- TTP) and these Punjabi militants were complicated. They never merged and the nature of this collaboration remained restricted to distribution of tasks for a limited number of terrorist attacks in Punjab. Of course, they learned from each other, provided useful information and training to each other but their larger goals remained distinct. The Pakistani Taliban are partly a reaction to U.S. and Pakistani policy in Afghanistan and FATA, whereas Punjabi militants are frustrated from Pakistan's policies vis-à-vis Kashmir. Unacknowledged by India as well as the U.S., Pakistan achieved some success in stopping militants from going towards the Kashmir conflict zone in recent years. There are some exceptions here of course, but by and large, Punjabi militants started challenging the state after getting frustrated that they were abandoned.

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AfPak Behind the Lines: Taliban reconciliation

The AfPak Channel is pleased to announce a new weekly feature, AfPak Behind the Lines, where we interview an expert on a hot topic in Afghanistan and Pakistan circles. Today, we speak with Thomas Ruttig about the prospects for reconciling and reintegrating militants of all levels with the Afghan government, as the U.S.'s new strategy for reintegrating Taliban fighters into Afghan society continues.

1. Amrullah Saleh, the former head of Afghanistan's intelligence services who was either fired or let go earlier this month, has warned that Karzai's reconciliation plan is dangerous and that the Taliban appear not to be showing any willingness to compromise. In brief, what are the specifics of Karzai's plan? What aspects of it could be seen as "dangerous," and how does that affect the role the West can play in reconciliation efforts? What are the major sticking points between Karzai's plan and what the U.S. would like to see happen?

President Karzai's reconciliation plan has not been spelled out in detail yet. A draft of what had been called "Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program" had been presented to the donor countries at the London conference in January this year -- but not to the peace jirga delegates -- and got the green light. Interestingly, the word "reconciliation" -- which is a code for "talks with the Taliban" -- already had been dropped there. This indirectly reflects that there is incongruence between Karzai and the U.S. government about how to deal with the Taliban. Karzai probably wants to talk to the Taliban leadership, directly and rather soon -- at least, this is what some of his Afghan critics believe. They fear that major achievements of the post-Taliban period, mainly rights and freedoms, might be thrown overboard if a hasty deal is made between the two sides. The Karzai government already has shown that it is more sensitive about what conservative sectors in the clergy -- the so-called jihadi leaders -- demand than what civil society is concerned about - remember the "Shia Personnel Law." The U.S., as far as I can see it, prefers to weaken the Taliban militarily first, so that they won't negotiate from a position of strength. Operation Moshtarak in Marjah, however, did not really prove that this works.

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