The AFPAK Channel
Inside the war for central asia Twitter Facebook RSS
Daily Brief Latest from the Blog Latest from FP

As the Obama administration ponders the way forward in Afghanistan, the AfPak Channel reached out to experts who have lived in Afghanistan or researched and reported from the region for extended periods of time to ask, in about what a senior National Security Council staffer might have time to say to him in one of the meetings that is now going on in the White House, what they would tell Obama as he considers his options. These are their answers.

Graeme Smith, More talking, not more troops

J Alexander Thier, Prioritize in Afghanistan

Michael Innes, Nearly Anywhere Terrorists Operate

Gretchen Peters, It's not about the number of troops

Asma Nemati, An articulate plan for security

Peter Bergen, Time for the heavy lifting

Pete Souza/White House via Getty Images

By Graeme Smith

More foreign troops will not help Afghanistan. As the United States considers another surge, it's worth remembering that the number of international forces in Afghanistan has already increased dramatically. Every year I spent in the country, from 2005 to 2009, saw major troop surges -- and terrible surges of violence. With every fighting season, more women and children were killed. I saw their faces, I smelled the death. What did we buy with so much blood?

Nothing worth the price, sadly. We tried to make it safer for the United Nations and aid agencies to help the people, but instead it became more dangerous. We tried to set up a democratic government -- but it's not democratic, and it doesn't govern much territory.

Building a country at gunpoint has failed.

We need to acknowledge this failure if we're going to think clearly about what's next. Those who argue for a grand vision of Afghanistan usually list the accomplishments since 2001 -- roads, health clinics, polio vaccinations -- and it's true, these are important. But how many roads are built in rural Afghanistan these days without paying bribes to local insurgents? How many Pashtun villagers would get polio vaccinations without permission from the Taliban? Making the country better doesn't necessarily require fighting the insurgents; in many cases, it requires working with them.

You're not going to force Kabul's rulers into deals with the insurgents unless they feel it's necessary. The communist regime of the 1980s did not reach that point until the Soviet withdrawal. A mythology has emerged that Afghanistan was abandoned and immediately fell to pieces; in fact, the Najibullah government survived as long as money flowed from Moscow. Without foreign troops to support the regime, Najibullah bribed his opponents and gave up territory to local tribes. That's not a great model, but it's better than escalating war.

A Georgetown University study reached two conclusions about that period of history: 1) the Afghan rebels were good at resisting invaders, but poorly organized for conventional war; and 2) the insurgents squabbled among themselves after the common enemy departed. Both lessons now apply. The United States and its allies should declare they will execute a phased withdrawal, pushing Kabul into meaningful peace talks with the insurgents. A small fraction of the money you save from reduced troop commitments would be enough to supply the cash and other support needed to give the Kabul regime a credible place at the bargaining table.

Would such deal-making prevent the United States from tracking global jihadists in the tribal areas? Not likely. The Kabul government's ability to monitor those zones is already minimal, and dwindling. The organizations that could deliver the best intelligence about al Qaeda are the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and the Hekmatyar group. Fighting terrorism doesn't necessarily require killing insurgents; in many cases, it requires working with them.

You can earn your Peace Prize without sacrificing national security, Mr. Obama, but it will require a strong dose of humility.

Graeme Smith is a foreign correspondent for Canada's Globe and Mail who was based in Kandahar for three years.

By J Alexander Thier

Mr. President, be practical, but do not abandon hope.

Is the continuation, or even expansion, of the American engagement in Afghanistan worth the investment?

I believe that answer is yes. The Afghan people, and those who have lived and worked among the Afghans, have not given up hope for a peaceful Afghanistan. In every part of the country there are Afghans risking their lives to educate and vaccinate children, to monitor elections and investigate war crimes, to grow food for their communities. They are not helpless without us, but they rely on us for the promise of a better future - a promise we have made repeatedly over the last eight years.

I understand that remaining committed to the stabilization of Afghanistan is not easy. It will be costly, in lives and taxpayer dollars. It is a challenging mission, in every way. Yet the alternatives, when examined honestly, are unbearably bleak. It is hard for me to imagine watching the Taliban's triumphant return to Kandahar, or Kabul - sending Afghanistan back to the dark days of forced illiteracy for girls and public stonings. Are we prepared to witness Afghanistan's women parliamentarians fleeing the country and thousands of our colleagues going into exile or face the consequences of having collaborated with the Americans? Will we stand by and observe the abandonment of hope as the next phase of the civil war begins and all our effort is swept away? And if future terror attacks are traced back to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, or Pakistan collapses or its nuclear materials are stolen, how will we respond if asked: did we do everything we could to prevent it?

The Afghan government has not fulfilled its promise. No government that is unable to provide security to its population, and which is seen as corrupt and unjust, will be legitimate in the eyes of the population. It is this illegitimacy that has driven Afghans away from the government, and emboldened the insurgency.

Thus, the focus of our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan should not be exclusively, or even primarily, military. Instead, the real key to success in Afghanistan will be to reinvigorate critical efforts to promote Afghan leadership and capacity at all levels of society while combating the culture of impunity that is undermining the entire effort.

To overcome these challenges, and our own limitations, in addition to improving security we must do three things with our Afghan partners to rebalance our efforts: 1) radically prioritize what we want to accomplish; 2) address the culture of impunity and improve governance; 3) decentralize our efforts to reach the Afghan people; and 4) improve international coordination and effectiveness.

Prioritize. For too long we have been doing many things poorly instead of a few things well. In this critical year, it is essential to simultaneously scale back our objectives and intensify our resources. The U.S. and its partners should focus on security, governance and the rule of law, and delivery of basic economic development with a strong emphasis on agriculture.

Address Impunity and Improve Governance. The U.S. must act aggressively with its Afghan partners in the lead to break the cycle of impunity and corruption that is dragging all sides down and providing a hospitable environment for the insurgency. First, the Afghan President must demonstrate leadership on this issue, accompanied by the empowerment of an anti-corruption and serious crimes task force, independent of the government agencies it may be investigating. The international community must devote intelligence and investigative support, as well as the manpower to support dangerous raids. In the first few months, several high profile cases including the removal and/or prosecution of officials engaged in criminality, including government officials, should be highly publicized. The U.S. should approach this mission with the same vigor as other key elements of the counter-insurgency campaign.

Decentralize. A top-down, Kabul-centric strategy to address governance and economic development is mismatched for Afghanistan, one of the most highly decentralized societies in the world. The international community and the Afghan government must engage the capacity of the broader Afghan society, making them the engine of progress rather than unwilling subjects of rapid change. The new formula is one where the central government continues to ensure security and justice on the national level and uses its position to channel international assistance to promote good governance and development at the community level.

If international commitment to Afghanistan and the region can be sustained and local leadership empowered, the prospects for Afghanistan and its people carry with them the hopes of us all for a better, safer future.

J Alexander Thier, writing from Islamabad, is the Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the US Institute of Peace. He is co-author and editor of "The Future of Afghanistan" (USIP, 2009). He lived in Afghanistan for about 7 of the last 16 years, and travels there frequently.

By Michael Innes

If the Obama Administration is serious about Afghanistan, it should leave NATO out of the equation. The organization has survived a Cold War, genocide in the Balkans, piracy off the horn of Africa, cigarette smuggling, human trafficking, WMD proliferation, transnational terrorism, and cyberwar. It has been called the "most successful Alliance in history," though that success has been achieved through a combination of dogged persistence and bureaucratic dysfunction -- a form of longevity and presence earned not through glorious battlefield victories, but rather arrived at on the cusp of consensus. Its lowest-common denominator politics have meant that the organization has been well positioned to withstand the tests of time, though they have been honoured in the breach more often than in the observance. Until Afghanistan.

NATO staff officers sometimes joke of its involvement in out-of-area operations, suggesting that the erstwhile "North Atlantic Treaty Organization" might as well be rebranded "Nearly Anywhere Terrorists Operate"; standing in the way of operational effectiveness, others quip, is the fact that in the absence of a diplomatic and military hive-mind, its (now) 28 member states are "Not Able To Organize". In the nearly two decades since the end of the Cold War, it has embraced, through its Strategic Concept, a veritable smorgasbord of threats. Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer memorably spoke to problems of "global security" in the post-911 world -- an opportunity not lost on some empire-building bureaucrats within NATO's convoluted chain of command to shore up fiefdoms and justify bloated budgets dedicated to short-term deliverables, measurable successes, and career-enhancing outcomes.

Many of those same staff officers, bequeathed with limited resources, equipped with even less patience, and facing innumerable obstacles to internal cooperation, have only too readily rolled their eyes at such chicanery. They mutter "ahhhh, NATO..." knowingly to one another, shrug, and continue on their merry way... all the while failing to acknowledge that the organization's dysfunctions are nothing if not a composite of their own national and individual shortcomings. The most potent threat to the Alliance has more often than not been the national interests of its own member states and their representatives. The greatest evidence of this is the fact that there are very few individuals who ever actually work for NATO. Most are simply assigned to it for a few short months or years, and the national flags pinned to their uniformed shoulders or tailored lapels remain firmly affixed for the duration.

NATO's own civil servants, however -- ensconced in protected, well-paid, tax-exempt posts -- hardly compensate for those divided loyalties. The trench-level view is that the REMFs and Fobbits in Brussels and The Hague are out of touch with the realities of the Afghan war. People sitting in offices argue that the gunfighters couldn't plan their way out of a wet paper bag. And so it is with NATO: a schismatic, schizophrenic beast torn between national and institutional interests, between the NATO of soldiers and civilians, of diplomacy and battle, of bankers' hours and IED strikes, of the immediacy of Afghanistan and the more ponderous bureaucratic requirements of future security cooperation. NATO is what its member states want it to be and allow it to become. They rightly demand value-added for their commitments of cash, materiel, and personnel -- but only insofar as what in turn emerges from the NATO machine does not interfere with or supersede state interests.

This is both the promise and the price of a regional security organization that has endured for sixty years. The Alliance, however, has also shifted increasingly from a political-military club convened in the interest of collective self-defense, to an all-purpose surrogate for other organizations -- including its own member states -- unwilling to deal with or incapable of resolving the problems that are their remit. NATO was not meant for either the peacekeeping of the 1990s or the counterinsurgency dilemmas of Afghanistan. It is capable of awesome might, a war-fighting machine in the traditional sense of the term, and excels as a diplomatically empowered platform for destroying threats to the collective good. It is, however, ill-suited to the vicissitudes of nation building, with all the long-term occupation, reconstruction, development, and policing projects that that entails.

Gone are the days when NATO had the luxury to indulge in extracurriculars, as it did and continues to do in the post-war Balkans. In Afghanistan, where troops fight and die as a matter of course, there is neither patience nor justification for such experiments. The member states have never been unified on the country's strategic significance, and very few of them believe Afghan soil and stability is worth the blood and treasure expended on it. That is their right. Let the nations, whose prerogative it is to do what they will, play with the intricacies and challenges of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. They can do this on the basis of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral cooperation -- forms of which, indeed, have already been exercised among NATO's Scandinavian and English-speaking countries and their non-NATO allies.

The U.S. in particular, as NATO's largest contributor, should exercise greater caution and restraint in the demands it places on the organization and its members. Leveraging the institution for the patina of multilateralism that it affords its members comes at a cost in good relations between them, erodes their capacity to live up to their original obligations, promotes unrealistic expectations of NATO's capacity for irregular warfare, and frays the bonds that have held the Alliance together for so long. Failure in Afghanistan, should it come to that, will be treated as NATO's failure. Surely the Alliance, for all its limitations, is worth more than that; surely it is more than just a whipping post or scapegoat for the shortcomings of its national parts. If Afghanistan is NATO's undoing, its member states ultimately will have only themselves to blame.

Michael A. Innes is a PhD Candidate at University College London and a Visiting Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds. He edited Making Sense of Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates and the Use of Force (Potomac Books, 2010), and is the author of The Sanctuary Complex (Hurst Publishers, 2010). From 2003 to 2009 he was a civilian staff officer with NATO, and spent the months of April and May this year as a staff liaison to ISAF HQ in Kabul.

By Gretchen Peters

July 13, 2008

July 13, 2008

There has been too much focus on troop numbers. Debating whether to send 20,000 troops to Afghanistan, or 40,000, or to bring some home, misses the point entirely: The key is deciding the strategy and then determining what resources will be needed to support that strategy. The U.S. could deploy five million soldiers to Afghanistan, but they will fail if the end goal is not clearly defined, if they are not trained to support the strategy necessary to reach that goal, and if the numerous government agencies taking part in the mission are not unified in how to reach it. That, unfortunately, is the current state of affairs.

The two main strategies being bandied about now -- counterinsurgency and counterterrorism -- are quite distinct, both in terms of the end goal, and how you go about reaching it. One is about state building, the other about containing a problem. What won't work is trying to split the two strategies down the middle.

I support the idea of a properly resourced COIN strategy, but I am pessimistic about the chances of success in Afghanistan unless certain key factors start changing.

One. The military effort must be supported by an intensive diplomatic effort to ease regional tensions that contribute, in a variety of ways, to violence, corruption and instability inside Afghanistan. These include the India/Pakistan divide and the ongoing tensions between the U.S. and Iran. Obama could set an example for India and Pakistan by sitting down with Iranian leaders.

Two. Washington must clean up its own house before it can expect the Afghans and Pakistanis to weed out corruption. That means not keeping alleged drug smugglers on the CIA payroll. It means not allowing U.S. contractors to skim off huge percentages of the contracts they win by subcontracting (depending on whom you ask, somewhere between 40 and 90 percent of the aid US taxpayers send to Afghanistan never reaches the Afghan people). It means stopping contracts with firms who pay off the insurgents for protection (Coalition troops, working with local communities, should protect projects that the communities themselves have requested).

Three. Define how the various factions of the enemy, as well as corrupt state actors, victimize the local population, and start protecting them against those activities. Across the battle space, insurgents engage in drug smuggling, kidnapping, extortion, banditry, and the central victims are the villagers who live in the places they operate. U.S. officials (and the Taliban) claim the insurgents get money from donations, but last time I checked, it's not called a donation when someone has got a gun to your head. I am fairly sure the Marines currently deployed to Helmand did not join the Marines because they wanted to be a policeman in Helmand, but there are basic law enforcement strategies that could help them clean up the communities where they are deployed, where factions of the Taliban behave more like criminal gangs than a military force.

I'm not suggesting any of this will be simple, and it won't happen fast. But eventually Obama -- or someone else -- is going to have to get serious about cleaning up this region.

Gretchen Peters is the author of Seeds of Terror, How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda.

By Asma Nemati

It's about time the Obama administration focused on what's necessary for Afghanistan: security. With Hamid Karzai's presidency renewed, the U.S. has another chance to show the world community, and -- more importantly -- U.S. citizens, that there's still hope for Afghanistan and that the Obama administration is serious about tackling down major problems. But, what are these problems? What's the reality on the ground?

As someone who talks to many Afghans -- from government officials to shopkeepers, students and others -- and the international community on a daily basis, the answer is very clear: Afghans need security and stability before anything else can be put forth. In the past, there have been several problems with providing an adequate strategy to tackle this problem, most of which have led to the Taliban winning back major parts of the country. However, this cannot be tolerated anymore, neither by the Afghans nor the international community that's here to help.

In terms of security, more troops are fundamental. But this has to be spelled out clearly by the Obama administration. When speaking to Afghans here, they agree that more troops are needed, but an entire plan is also needed to know when the troops will arrive, where they will be deployed, what will they carry out, and -- this is what concerns Afghans a lot -- when they will be leaving. The what part is the most important one; Afghans here agree that more troops are necessary to support Afghanistan's own security forces, the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

Among the increased number of troops, Afghanistan needs many experts to train and coach Afghans in security-related issues. Not only will this involve Afghans in rebuilding their own country, but it will also enable them to see results coming from their work. This will also allow a realistic timetable for U.S. forces to leave: as soon as effective and transparent outcomes are seen.

Moreover, focus needs to be placed on clearing out Taliban strongholds in the border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Taliban are gaining numbers and sympathizers in what has become a recurring nightmare that Afghanistan and the world community only woke up from nine years ago. We cannot afford to wait any longer and let the area be run by thugs who have absolutely no respect for humanity, let alone themselves and their countrymen.

Asma Nemati, a researcher from Kabul, is an instructor at the American University of Afghanistan.

By Peter Bergen

It's time to table fancy counterinsurgency doctrines about "connecting the Afghan people to the government" -- Afghans have never had, and don't expect much, in the way of services from their government, and it's time now to focus on something much more basic: security. The last government to provide Afghans with real security was... the Taliban. When they ruled the country before 9/11, security came at a tremendous price: a brutal, theocratic regime that bankrupted the country and was a pariah on the world stage.

But in the context of Afghan history, the Taliban bringing security was decisively important, since what had immediately preceded their iron rule was a nightmarish civil war during which you could be robbed or killed at will by gangs of roving ethnic and tribal militias.

The United States learned the lesson of the paramounce of security in Iraq with some success starting in 2007. But the U.S. seems to have developed instant amnesia about this issue in Afghanistan. A glaring symbol of the collapse of security in the country is the 300-mile Kabul-to-Kandahar highway, economically and politically the most important road in the country, which is now too dangerous to drive on.

Who will then provide security? The Afghan army is relatively small and generally ineffective. The police are worse. The plans to ramp up the size and efficacy of those forces are, of course, a key part of the American exit strategy from the country. But that training mission is going to take years. Nor are NATO allies going to add significantly more troops. Indeed, a number of NATO countries are already heading to the exits.

That means that it now falls to the United States to do the heavy lifting in Afghanistan, and if the United States is serious about securing the country and rolling back the Taliban, the President really doesn't have much choice but to put significant numbers of more troops on the ground. That way, he can start winning the war: win back the American public, roll back the Taliban -- who at the leadership level have melded ideologically and tactically with al Qaeda -- and provide real security to the Afghan people.

Peter Bergen, the editor of the AfPak Channel, is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation and at New York University's Center on Law and Security, and the author of The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader. He is CNN's national security analyst.