Watching your mentor fall from grace is never easy. This month, many have questioned and saluted David H. Petraeus, who resigned from his post as director of the CIA because of an extramarital affair. Critics chide his judgment, and friends remind us of his brilliance and victories in Iraq. Most acknowledge his indelible mark on how America must fight wars amongst the peoples: creating local partners through peaceful interaction, rather than enemies through the sole use of lethal force. But Petraeus left another mark on a war to prevent future 9/11s, by fighting without troops but with trainers, spies and drones in Pakistan.

The war in Iraq was self-inflicted, the war in Afghanistan was necessary, but the war in Pakistan always carried the nightmare scenario: religious fanatics capturing nuclear weapons and setting them off in American cities. As the commander of U.S. Central Command and then as the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Petraeus pushed the Pakistani military to go after the Pakistani Taliban and the Haqqani network, enticing them with weapons and trainers, and reprimanding with unilateral action. Despite Pakistani military's duplicity - interdicting some insurgents while continuing to harbor the virulent Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis -with a mix of diplomatic and military acumen Petraeus was able to help stabilize a nuclear-armed country that seemed bent on imploding in the spring of 2009.

The question then was not how Pakistan can help us in Afghanistan, but how can nuclear-armed Pakistan stop self-destructing?

It was during that period that I met Petraeus, and after he read my Foreign Affairs article on ways to stem the tide of instability in Pakistan, he asked me to advise him. That year was the most difficult time in U.S.-Pakistan relations since 9/11. The Pakistani Taliban had routed the Pakistani military out of one third of the country.  Taliban flags flew high in the tribal areas abutting Afghanistan's northeast, and the Swat valley, just sixty miles from the country's capital, was stained with the blood of many women and children. A year prior, India and Pakistan had come close to nuclear war after the Pakistani intelligence-backed militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorized Mumbai, and Osama bin Laden was still on the run.

Yet there was a glimmer of hope. Since 2007, U.S. Special Forces trainers and weapons had slowly improved Pakistan's Special Services Group, Frontier Corps and 11^th Corps troops. They began fighting harder and gaining public support against the Pakistani Taliban's nationwide suicide bombing campaign.

In late 2008, Operation Lionheart in the Bajaur tribal agency was led by junior officers that pushed their general to experiment with Petraeus' counterinsurgency principles: clear, hold and build. For years, clearing was easy for Pakistani troops, while holding was ignored and building was nonexistent. In 2009, they began to hold after clearing. Petraeus and former Admiral Mike Mullen - then Joint Chiefs of Staff - encouraged this slow improvement as the Pakistani troops pushed the insurgents out of the Swat Valley and South Waziristan by the winter of 2009. Not only did this stem the tide of suicide attacks, but also temporarily decreased cross- border attacks into Afghanistan. Pakistan did not self-implode in 2009.

During these years I frequently visited South Asia exploring questions about transnational insurgencies, India-Pakistan rivalry, and Afghanistan's future. I briefed Petraeus after every trip and authored a report and several memos for him. He was always encouraging, endorsing contrarian thinking, debating history and never judging my analysis on the basis of my age or religion.

Like many generals and diplomats, Petraeus understood the delicate dance of getting things done in Pakistan: feed the military beast but protect the nascent democracy. But he went one step further: he understood the negotiations culture and the contradiction between what Pakistani military and civilian leaders were willing to promise publicly and deliver privately. When I argued for the creation of institutional mechanisms to exchange lessons learned, he agreed but correctly pointed to challenges: the radioactive nature of American military instructors in Pakistan, and depleting patience of U.S. legislators with Pakistan's reluctance to target the Haqqani Network and Taliban leaders in exile.

When Pakistanis showed progress, Petraeus was willing to acknowledge their contributions. After the success in Swat and South Waziristan he cheered General Ashfaq Kayani, highlighting the sacrifices of the Pakistani military in his congressional testimonies, and he chided him in private when Kayani equivocated on expanding operations against the Haqqanis.

Petraeus understood the importance of personal relationships and changing the insurgents' master narrative: Pakistani soldiers were America's mercenaries. When the Indus River swelled up in July 2010, causing the worst floods in Pakistan's history, and leaving 20 million homeless and one-fifth of the country under water, Petraeus immediately sent help.  Scores of U.S. troops and helicopters rescued thousands of Pakistanis and provided food and medicine.

But the U.S.-Pakistan goodwill didn't stick after Osama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan in May 2011, and Pakistan closed NATO's supply lines for seven months after a NATO airstrike killed 24 of its soldiers, prompting the White House and Congress to cut aid.

Still, Petraeus showed guarded optimism about Pakistan as he made his transition to the CIA. He had helped stopPakistan from becoming a failed states, but he couldn't change its policy of fomenting insurgency in Afghanistan. In my book that's pretty darn good. 

Haider Ali Hussein Mullick is a Provost Fellow at Tufts University, and the author of "Pakistan's Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies." (www.haidermullick.com @haidermullick)

Members of the international community met this past week in Bonn, Germany to discuss Afghanistan's future in the shadow of a NATO withdrawal oftroops. At the conference, key policymakers, from the United States to Afghan PresidentHamid Karzai, expressed the consensus that corruption is one of the biggest stumbling blocks to efforts at rebuilding and stabilizingthe country.

In a time of belt-tightening in aid budgets in the United States and Europe, andweariness at a lack of significant progress in Afghanistan's corruption outlook,donors may prove less and less willing to provide development assistance thatis then lost to graft. Similar to post-conflict and poor countries elsewhere,Afghanistan's government agencies lack accountability. Service delivery can beseverely compromised because of graft, in turn fueling mistrust of thegovernment.

Another example of malfeasance is the widespreadelection fraud perpetrated during the 2010 election for the Wolesi Jirga,Afghanistan's lower house of parliament. The voting itself and the subsequent dubious adjudication process provide a stark illustration of howcorruption can destabilize political institutions. The Afghan Electoral ComplaintsCommittee (ECC) had to delay the induction of parliament after adjudicatingnearly 6,000 allegations of malfeasance. Nine members have lost their seats evenafter serving for nearly a year.

With an eye towards understanding howinstitutions like the Wolesi Jirga could be strengthened through cleanerelections, we developed and evaluated a new approach to policing electoralcorruption for the 2010 races. It involves the implementation of a photo "quickcount" of election results. Specifically, we took photographs of tally sheetsfrom polling stations right after voting concluded, and compared them to whatshould be carbon copies of tallies from the same polling stations later in theaggregation process. We then took differences in results for specificcandidates as evidence of rigging. We implemented our project with funding fromthe newly established Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) at the United States Agency forInternational Development (USAID), a unit that embodies the organization'srenewed enthusiasm for improving development through rigorousevaluation procedures.We partnered with Democracy International (DI), the largest internationalorganization monitoring elections in Afghanistan.

To evaluate the effectiveness of thistechnology, we randomly announced monitoring in about half of a sample of 471polling centers. This sample spanned 19 of the 34 provincial centers in allregions of Afghanistan and was drawn from a universe of 5,897 polling centersscheduled to open on election day. We deployed a team of Afghan researchersthat delivered letters to polling center managers during voting on election day,announcing that the team would return the following day to photograph thetallies; teams visited the other polling centers without providing any priorwarning.

Through a comparison of these"treatment" polling centers and the "control" centers that were unaware thatour researchers would photograph results, we found that our program worked insignificant ways to decrease electoral corruption. Specifically, the monitoringprogram reduced vote counts by 25 percent for the candidate our team deemed mostlikely to rig the vote (generally the candidate with strongest links toofficials in the Election Commission or President Karzai, and those with ahistory of working in the government) and reduced the theft of vote tallies andother election materials by about 60 percent. In the study,we also found that candidates react to undermine the effort, and that they doso in a way that is predictable based on their connections to officials in theelection commission.  Specifically,candidates with a connection to the Provincial Elections Officer moved theirfraudulent activity in the direction of manipulating the returns form inpolling centers that did not receive a letter. By contrast, candidates lackingthis connection committed fraud by altering the count before the form wasposted.

We assessed the effect of the programusing a Randomized Control Trial (RCT), the most robust form of programevaluation. In a RCT, researchers estimate the effect of a program on keyoutcomes of interest (in our case, election fraud) by first identifying apopulation of potential beneficiaries and then randomly assigning the programto a subset (usually half). The half receiving the program are "treatments" andthe remaining half are "controls."  Themethod is therefore a straightforward adaptation of the approach used inmedical drug trials, only applied to questions of governance and institutions.A comparison of outcomes in the "treatments" and "controls" metes outeverything else that was going on in parallel with the program. For example,because we randomly assigned "treatments," we did not need to worry aboutwhether international monitors might be creating the change that we attributedto photo quick count. Additionally, one might worry that the effect we documentedis due to a selection of polling centers where fraud was less likely. But oneof the core strengths of RCTs is the ability to remove such a "selection bias"from our estimates of program effect. Because polling centers were selected bya random number generator, we can summarily rule out this concern.

We draw three important lessons from ourstudy. First, these results provide a convincing proof of concept that theapplication of new technologies can improve the fairness of elections and helpbattle corruption. In Afghanistan, we implemented the program using simpledigital cameras. In February of 2011 we replicated the experiment in Ugandausing smart phones and an application developed by Qualcomm to similar effect. Ultimately, webelieve this approach can be implemented via crowd-sourcing (essentiallyencouraging average people to document the process, as cell phones and evensmart phones become more accessible in the developing world), which woulddramatically reduce costs and increase coverage as citizens mobilize to policeelections.  

Second, while corrupt candidates surely willdevelop their own innovations to undermine fair electoral processes, making theaggregation process impermeable will greatly increase the difficulty of theirtask. If the election returns form posted at the polling center must match thereturns form that enters the official count in the capital, a major avenue offraud is shut off to candidates. More generally, we need to worry more aboutconnections between candidates and officials at the lower and middle echelonsof election commissions. Such officials can use their position and influenceover the aggregation and vote-counting process to dramatic effect. Reflectingthis, known affiliates of candidates should not be allowed to staff thecommission. Similarly, punishments for using such positions to favor a givencandidate should be serious, and these officials should be monitored. While a variety of evidence demonstrates corruption in Afghanistan'selectoral commission, the country is not unique in this regard -- mostdemocratizing countries fail to establish truly independent election managementbodies and suffer fraud as a result.

Last, and most importantly, we only havescientific evidence of the effectiveness of a small numberof democracy assistance strategies. This is an area ripefor experimentation,which we encourage the international policy community to take seriously becauseof its clear importance for stability and welfare in fragile states likeAfghanistan. While clean elections will not solve all of the country's problems,helping to reduce corruption and strengthen confidence in institutions like theWolesi Jirga will pay important dividends as foreign donors exert less and lessinfluence over Afghanistan's future, and Afghanistan must take moreresponsibility for its own future.

MichaelCallen is a post-doctoralresearcher at the Institute on Global Conflict andCooperation at the University of California, San Diego.  James Long is a doctoral candidate in political scienceat the Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego. Mohammad Isaqzadeh is an assistant professor of politicalscience at the American University Afghanistan, and provided researchassistance for the study.

Afghan women have long fought for a say in their country's future, but that fight has grown more urgent in the run-up to the Bonn Conference, a gathering charged with laying out a plan for Afghanistan for 2014 and beyond.

So far, women's battle to win a substantive role at Bonn - and any other peace talks that may come to the capital - has gained little traction either at home or abroad.  And in the US, those backing women say they face an uphill fight convincing the Obama Administration to speak out more about the need for women's participation.

Afghan women leaders have issued press releases and formal position papers in the run-up to December's meeting demanding that civil society makes up 30 percent of Afghanistan's delegation to the Bonn Conference, with women accounting for half of that group.  

The Afghan government has not yet announced its official delegation, but so far one man and one woman from civil society have been invited to Bonn, with the woman getting three minutes to address the plenary.  Of the sixteen women attending a separate civil society forum, only one will have access to the official conference, according to the Institute for Inclusive Security, which recently brought Afghan women leaders to Washington to press their case on the Hill and with the Obama Administration.

"We would like to have strong participation in these processes, we would like to know what is being discussed, what is put on the table," says Orzala Ashraf, a peace activist and founder of an Afghan NGO for women and children. "We would like to ensure that these bargaining chips (in any peace process) are not women's rights or our achievements of the past ten years."

With the U.S. and its NATO allies focused on extricating themselves from Afghanistan, the task of laying out the path ahead has assumed extreme urgency for Afghans. "It is of high importance for women's groups and civil society to make sure their voices are included in any road map," says Ashraf, "in any direction that Afghanistan is going to take." 

But whether those voices will be heard remains an open question.

As Human Rights Watch noted, "The Afghan government and its international backers say that women's rights are one of their ‘red lines' as they plan for the withdrawal of international forces. If this is the case, why are Afghan women struggling to get a seat at the table in Bonn?"

Those in Washington attribute part of the reason to a White House inner circle that sees the role of women as far removed from the issue of Afghan security.  As the Washington Post famously noted earlier this year, women are seen as "pet rocks in our rucksack" that are "taking us down."

"These guys don't get it," said a senior administration official who has argued that women's participation is crucial for Afghanistan's stability, as then-Secretary of State Colin Powell did in 2002. "Ten years on we still have to make the case that women are additive."

As I've written in these pages, it is far from the situation of a decade ago when leaders across Washington fanned out before the cameras to speak about the importance of supporting Afghan women. After five years of Taliban rule, in which women were denied the rights to work and education and to leave their homes, the international community offered its arrival in 2001 as a new start.  

Secretary of State Clinton helped women leaders win a speaking role at last year's Kabul Conference and has promised women that "we will not abandon you," but with her departure imminent and 2014 looming, talk of a Taliban return is surging.

Fears of what the Taliban's ascendance would mean for women have only grown stronger with news of the stoning death of a woman and her daughter in Ghazni Province.  Assassinations of leading human rights supporters and police officials and attacks on girls schools have skyrocketed in recent years - even as talk of a peace deal with the Taliban has come to be viewed in NATO capitals as the best option for ending the war.

Some American advocates for women say any talk of Taliban negotiations is misplaced, especially given the recent assassination of former President and head of the High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani.

"We don't think anybody should be negotiating with the Taliban," says Esther Hyneman of Women for Afghan Women, which runs family centers and safe homes for abused women across Afghanistan.  "If the Taliban wanted a role in the government, why don't they run for parliament in a democratic election? They don't want a role in the Afghan government -- they want the Afghan government."

Women's group leaders say that just like in the 1990s, when they lobbied to stop the Clinton Administration from recognizing the Taliban government, they will not stand by quietly while women half a world away are denied their constitutionally guaranteed rights to work and education. They note that Afghan women are making progress for themselves, pointing to the rising number of girls attending school, as well as female midwives, police officers, lawyers, entrepreneurs, civil society activists, parliamentarians and educators as evidence.

"We will keep the pressure on and support women in any way we can," says Eleanor Smeal of the Feminist Majority Foundation, which helped to lead the fight against Washington's recognition of the Taliban in 1996.  "There is now a huge network of non-profit organizations within Afghanistan and we are talking to them and they are taking the lead.  What we can do is continue to put pressure on the U.S. government not to agree to anything that omits half the population."

Yet some wonder just how committed the White House is to supporting women's participation in their country. The President has not spoken often about Afghanistan - and far less about the country's women.

"Perhaps the tremendous unpopularity of the war puts [President Obama] in an awkward position," says activist Mavis Leno, wife of talk show host Jay Leno and one of the women who put the issue on America's map -- and in PEOPLE Magazine in 1998 -- after the Taliban came to power in 1996. "I don't think he is doing as much as he could."

Hyneman goes further:

"I am at my wit's end at the lack of discussion by the media, by our government, by our president on the issue of women's rights in Afghanistan." Of Obama, Hyneman says, "I am appalled that he has not mentioned Afghan women's rights since his speech on withdrawing US troops."

Women's activists say they are watching closely to see exactly what the Afghan government -- with support from the United States -- agrees to in any peace deal.

"I just don't understand why the fate of these women has to be considered as special pleading," Leno says.  "Are we just going to stand back and see this happen again? Women were making it a little way up the hill; can we at least make sure that they don't slide back down again?"

They say they share Americans' desire to end the country's longest war, but that a peace that leaves women out will not last.

"We are in favor of peace, but this is not the road to peace, it is the road to bloodshed and subjugation and civil war, a repeat of the years past," Hyneman says. "Everyone will be sitting in front of their TV sets wringing their hands as we see women brutalized."

Those who argue about the Afghan war on bumper stickers and in sound bites would do well to pay extended attention to the Asia Foundation's annual survey of Afghan public opinion. The results cut both ways, demonstrating more progress than is admitted by the "Afghanistan is hopeless" crowd, while simultaneously calling into question the more extravagant declarations of those who claim a clear path to success. The survey is one of the most careful periodic studies of Afghan opinion. Conducted annually since 2006, this year's survey interviewed 6348 respondents in all 34 of the country's provinces, with sophisticated oversight and training of the pollsters. No survey can wholly correct for the tendency of some people, especially in countries like Afghanistan where the security situation is tenuous, to give the answers they think an outsider wants. The fact that 95 villages originally chosen (out of 876 villages and urban points originally selected for interviewing with a total of 166 later switched for various reasons) had to be replaced by others because of poor security in sampled areas probably slants the results somewhat more toward positive responses. However, it is fair to note that fewer villages were switched for security reasons in 2011 than in 2010 (95 compared to 138 in 2010). Despite these caveats, though, this survey is brim full of important results.

On the positive side, and at a time when many Americans have an undifferentiated view that everything Afghan is sliding downwards, nearly half the Afghans surveyed believe their country is moving in the right direction, a trend that has held up since 2008. The numbers who are optimistic about the country's economic future has risen since last year's survey. The survey also shows continued high esteem for the Afghan Army, the most highly respected institution in Afghanistan by a sizable margin (though those wanting to replicate the Iraq "awakening" example should note that the least respected institution are local militias). Confidence in local government shows improvement, particularly at provincial and district levels, although in this as in every aspect there are wide ethnic and regional differences that merit close attention. 

There is strong support for a negotiated peace, although the regional differences evident in the survey results suggest great concern that a badly designed peace might bring the Taliban back to power. This fear of civil war if the Taliban returns to power is one I heard much about when I visited Afghanistan in March. The survey indicates that such fears are particularly wide spread among ethnic minorities, so the kind of peace we pursue matters, in order to prevent a move toward armed conflict from populations who are most concerned about a Taliban return. Support for the Taliban has declined, and there is clearly an increased revulsion among Afghans against the civilian casualties caused by the insurgents. Afghan respondents also show increasing awareness of improvements in health and education.  In short, there is progress.  But there is also a great deal about which to be concerned.

Afghan fears about security are growing, and now overshadow complaints about corruption (still a major problem). Afghans in the areas of heavy combat in the southwest, south and east show much lower levels of confidence in security than their counterparts in other parts of the country.  Suicide bombers are increasingly rattling the confidence of city dwellers, who have more negative views of security than do villagers. More than half of the respondents say they fear for the safety of themselves and their families, a statistic that would presumably be higher if some of the excluded sample points had been included. More worrisome still, the number of respondents showing such fear has not declined from 2010 to 2011, and in eastern Afghanistan, where the Haqqani Network is predominant, such fear is rising.

There are also growing concerns about freedom of expression in the country -- a concern that reflects somewhat negatively on the Afghan government and warlords, but is specifically linked by many respondents to poor security and fears of the Taliban. The survey lays bare the great deal of doubt that Afghans see about the Taliban being rolled back, even in the areas where direct confrontations with U.S. and international forces have diminished substantially. Concerns about and resentment of the behavior of foreign troops are also a growing problem. There are wide variations on these views even in different districts within provinces, so it is a mistake to say the survey flatly challenges NATO views of success -- but counterinsurgency is as much about psychology as about statistics. These perceptions are a cause for concern that military analysts need to consider.

Ultimately, for all of the negatives in this survey, there are many areas of optimism as well.  America has twice ignored Afghanistan, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and after our initial success in 2001. And twice we have paid substantially in blood for our loss of attention.  Before we give up and declare everything hopeless, we need to look closely at how much has been achieved in the eyes of Afghans, and what that means in terms of the possibilities that still exist to succeed. But we need to look equally clearly at the negatives, the places where Afghans remain or have grown more skeptical, and think of corrective actions, even as international forces redeploy within Afghanistan and eventually withdraw. In doing so, the Asia Foundation survey is an important document, but only if we are willing to think in terms more complicated than slogans.

Ronald Neumann was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan 2005-07 and is the author of The Other War: winning and losing in Afghanistan. He is president of the American Academy of Diplomacy, but the views expressed here are his own.

When the mainstream media begins to compare Pakistani politicians to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it's time to take notice. And after drawing over 70,000 people (with some claiming as many as 100,000) to a rally in Lahore on Sunday, Imran Khan, the cricketer-turned-politician and chairman of the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) party, is being likened to the former prime minister and father of Benazir Bhutto. The parallel is meant to highlight Khan's populist appeal and ability to mobilize the masses at a grassroots level. Such comparisons may be premature: political rallies where so-called supporters are bused in at the party's expense are rarely good indicators of electoral prospects. But the unforeseen turnout -- almost double the number expected -- makes it worth considering what Khan's growing appeal may mean in the run up to Pakistan's general elections, scheduled for 2013.

Until now, Khan's political trajectory has been viewed with cynicism. His opponents argue that he is being funded and facilitated by Pakistan's intelligence agencies in order to erode the vote bank of the center-right Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), which dominates politics in the populous Punjab province and leads the opposition at the federal level. This theory is fueled by soaring tensions between the PML-N and the Pakistani army. Former prime minister and PML-N president Nawaz Sharif continues to resent his dismissal from office in 1999 through a military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf. His party has therefore called for increased accountability for army generals and defense expenditures as well as improved ties with India, issues that run counter to the army's security policies. Owing to this context, few paid heed to a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in June that found Khan to be the most popular political figure in Pakistan. 

However, the attendance at Sunday's rally complicates this theory. While Khan may enjoy the support of some in the security establishment, he was able to attract droves of young men, women, students, children and representatives of minority communities to the Lahore rally to echo his "save the country" mantra. Moreover, the Lahore rally was not a one-off: a gathering in the Punjabi city of Gujranwala on September 25 also drew a significant number of attendees. Together, these rallies suggest that Khan has made significant inroads in Punjab. 

Khan's appeal is not surprising. He is best known as the captain who brought back the Cricket World Cup to Pakistan in 1992. Pakistanis also appreciate his philanthropic instincts: in 1994, he founded the Shaukat Khanum Memorial Cancer Hospital and Research Center, which offers free care for cancer patients. As such, Khan is a departure from leaders who hail from political dynasties, such as the Bhuttos or the Sharifs, and boast immense rural landholdings. Since the PTI boycotted the 2008 general elections and has no representation in parliament, the party's record is also clean. Khan is thus better positioned than the PML-N to denounce the corrupt practices of "Mr. Ten Percent," as Pakistan's President and co-chairman of the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Asif Ali Zardari is widely known.  

But the real key to Khan's popularity lies in his public stance against U.S. foreign policy, and what he describes as Washington's interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. He has consistently condemned drone strikes against militants in Pakistan's tribal belt, and argued that Pakistan's alliance with the United States is the main reason why the country is now facing a Taliban insurgency. Khan was careful on Sunday to indicate that he would be open to continued ties with the United States if he came to office, but only on Pakistan's terms. This is a heartening message for millions of Pakistanis who are still reeling from the audacity of the unilateral U.S. raid against Osama bin Laden's compound in May, which many saw as a brash violation of Pakistan's national sovereignty and an act of betrayal by a so-called ally. If this tactic succeeds, Khan will not be the first Pakistani politician to convert anti-Americanism into votes. In 2002, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a conglomeration of religious parties, was able to form the provincial government in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province by campaigning against the American use of force in Afghanistan and Washington's coercive policies that led Pakistan to join the fight against global terrorism.  

Despite his populist appeal, it remains unclear what impact Khan will have on election day. The PTI's ability to win the support of district-level politicians and draw voters to the ballot box remains untested, owing to the party's boycott of the last elections. Moreover, Khan's popularity seems to be confined to the urban areas of the Punjab province and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Urban voters in Pakistan are historically less likely than their rural counterparts to cast votes, and unless Khan can drum up support in the Punjabi countryside -- traditionally the stronghold of the PML-N -- the PTI is likely to fall short. One possible scenario is the PML-N and PTI could split the votes in the Punjab province, a situation that would strengthen the PPP's overall position and lead the incumbents to form the government in a second term.

In light of Pakistan's recent shift towards a culture of coalition politics, some analysts have also floated the possibility of a political divide along ideological lines, with center-right parties such as the PTI, PML-N and various religious political parties closing ranks against the more liberal PPP, Karachi-based Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), and Punjab-based Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) faction. Given the fierce competition and animosity between Khan's PTI and Sharif's PML-N, a center-right coalition seemed difficult to imagine. But on Monday, Khan announced that he would be willing to consider reconciling with the PML-N if Sharif declared his real assets, in a step towards promoting taxation and eradicating corruption. In Pakistani politics, stranger things have been known to happen.

Huma Yusuf is a columnist for Pakistan's Dawn Newspaper, and was the 2010-11 Pakistan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Intolerant, fundamentalist and extremist. This is the general impression of Pakistani society in the world outside Pakistan, though a deeper look would lead the observer to discover another layer - altogether different than the one visible from Europe and America. Following the Urdu-language Pakistani media, one is easily brought to the conclusion that there exists widespread radicalism and fundamentalism among Pakistanis. The television anchors and their repetition of ‘national interests' aside, the key question is: Is the Pakistani society really extremist? A cursory look at the events of the past few years can tell the answer.

Following the highly-rigged general elections in 2002 in favor of the now defunct religious alliance, Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), Pakistan's religious parties looked poised to assert their newfound power in the country. But just six years later, in the February 2008 general election, Pakistanis overwhelmingly supported secular political parties such as the ruling Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Awami National Party (ANP), while the religious parties managed to retain only seven seats in the country's National Assembly. The religious parties and their affiliates also failed on several occasions to start a political movement by using issues such as the jailing of Pakistani doctor Aafia Siddiqui, the US drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal northwest, the Raymond Davis episode, or the U.S. Special Forces raid in Abbottabad and killing of al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden.

Pakistan's security establishment also contributes to the West's fundamentalist and extremist image of Pakistani society. Over the years, the Pakistani state has supported the armies of Kashmir-focused jihadists in order to gain leverage over its more powerful and several-times-larger rival India, as well maintain a Pakistan-friendly government in neighboring Afghanistan. To achieve these goals, the establishment willfully encouraged a number of elements within its own borders, ranging from pro-jihadist religious parties to extremist literature in schools, colleges and universities, in order to generate support for the jihadist cause.

Within Pakistan, the armed forces are often presented as heroes and the true custodians of Pakistan's ideological and geographical frontiers, while the liberal political forces are labeled (albeit with some truth) as vested interests, too corrupt and inefficient to run the country and ensure its defense. Pakistani youth are flooded with hardliner propaganda and find attraction in extremist views because of the stance of the esteemed military, the jihadist literature in classrooms, government-controlled electronic media, and a state policy of encouraging certain jihadist organizations.

This policy approach, although it dates back to the creation of Pakistan, was institutionalized during the 10 years of military rule under the dictator General Zia ul-Haq, who championed jihad and the Islamization of society. The majority of the secular leaders at that time were either  won over one way or another, forced to keep silent, or pushed into exile, thus leaving room for the fundamentalists to come forward and "purify" the society by holding mass gatherings in cities, speaking on the official electronic media, becoming involved in educational institutions and spreading jihadist literature. Zia and his rightist support base thus maneuvered hard, and the ultimate result was the emergence of a hardliner approach among the upper layer of the Pakistani society to Muslim causes - be it Kashmir, Afghanistan, Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo or any other place in the world. The support for extremists and jihadists did not end with the death of Gen. Zia. Elements in The state security apparatus continued the same policies, eventually resulting in the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan who converted areas of the country into a safe haven for extremists and jihadists all over the world.

However, this is only one side of the picture. A few thousand miscreants fighting in the tribal areas, or some baton-wielding madressa students marching a street in Punjab, in no way represent the majority of the 180 million-strong Pakistani populace, who disapprove of the Taliban's terrorism and vandalism. Today, the tribal areas are being presented to the world as a tinderbox where everyone is a radical fighter or suicide bomber, only to convince the western world to shower more money on the Pakistani elites in order to avert this purported threat to global peace. In fact, this is a well-orchestrated plan in which the tribal people are the real victims. Victims in the sense that they are presented to the world as the trouble-maker while in fact, they are hostages at the hands of the Pakistani security agencies (and the militant groups), who over the years have supported or ignored the presence of jihadist and terrorist groups on Pakistani soil.

To understand the state's approach to the tribal areas, one must look at a few simple but thought-provoking questions: Why have the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) been discriminated against over the past 60 years? Why are they being run under the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) laws, and why were political parties banned from the area until very recently? How many schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, roads, canals, dams, power projects, and agriculture projects have been launched in FATA over the years? There are many other such unanswered questions, and the motive is clear: Keep FATA residents in the dark and mold their image as and when needed.

Despite all of this, a vast majority of FATA residents are still in favor of education, development, political reforms and (no doubt) peace. We are hearing more and more accounts of tribal Pakistanis spending their hard-earned money to send their sons and daughters to colleges and universities to become doctors, engineers, teachers and scholars. Would a person sending his son or daughter to university support the Taliban's jihadist agenda?

In Pakistan's cities meanwhile, despite the fact that the secular political leadership is often rendered useless by criminal elements and their supporters, the vast majority of people disapprove of militancy and extremism. The once popular religious political parties are usually not able to gather more than a few hundred people at rallies, even for flashpoint issues such as price hikes, power outages, fuel shortages or foreigners' alleged disrespect of Islam. Anti-Americanism exists in many countries and Pakistan is no exception. But being anti-American does not necessarily mean being a jihadist or a Talib. Protests in the United States and around the world against the U.S. military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are non-violent examples of this sentiment.

Now is the time for the western world to understand the situation by looking deep into Pakistani society instead of judging things on the basis of protest demonstrations by a few hundred bearded young men, or some gun-wielding men in videos from FATA. The key point to understand is that the real Pakistani society lies under the superficial layer of radicalism being presented as a serious threat to Pakistan and the peace of the world at large. 

We need to know that despite security threats, hundreds of thousands of students are attending schools, colleges and universities; new private sector educational institutions are being opened; new think-tanks are being launched; the NGO network is spreading; and music, art and culture are flourishing. These developments are even occurring in areas presented as the most conservative to the outside world. It is high time for the world to look beyond the surface and see the vast majority of Pakistanis, who have been taken hostage by the few armed thugs who are propped up by the state to achieve the foreign policy goals.

Extremism is without a doubt a serious issue confronting the state of Pakistan and the region. But the approach should be to take it head on with the support of the bulk of Pakistanis who disapprove of terrorism and believe in political dialogue as a resolution to issues both inside and outside the country.

Daud Khattak is a journalist currently working for the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Pashto-language station Radio Mashaal.

On October 4, 2011, the day that India and Afghanistan signed an agreement on strategic partnership, I traveled from Kabul to Kandahar, getting what was for me a rare glimpse of the average Afghan's perception of Indian developmental activity in his country. What was striking was the widespread support I saw in the Pashtun heartland for an even greater Indian role in rebuilding the Afghan economy and society. There is demand in Kandahar for India to add to the lone refrigeration facility it built, as Afghan goods are otherwise sold to the Pakistanis, who keep them in their own refrigeration facilities and then sell them back to the Afghans at much higher prices.

In the Arghandab Valley, traditionally known for its pomegranates, locals seek help in establishing storage, processing and transit facilities. The airport manager at the Kandahar International airport, Ahmedullah Faizi, highlighted the need for more cargo flights to export pomegranates and dry fruits. On direct flights from Kandahar to Delhi, there has been a notable increase in the number of visitors to India for health care, tourism and education. Women who had been queuing up with their young children since 5 o'clock in the morning at an Indian medical facility in Kandahar expressed appreciation for India's assistance. In discussions with Shah Wali Karzai, Qayoom Karzai and Mehmood Karzai in Kandaharthe day after the agreement was signed, the Karzai brothers were clear on their desire for India to invest in cement factories, irrigation and power projects, road and canal building, and an increase the number of scholarships for Afghan students to study professional courses like management and public administration in India.

The agreement came on the heels of the killing of former President Burhanuddin Rabbani and the subsequent suspension of reconciliation talks with the Taliban, leading many to conclude that it was signed in order to isolate Pakistan. What these critics have missed is that the agreement was more than five months in the making, designed to address the long-standing demands of the Afghan people. A series of official visits and private deliberations since January of this year culminated in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's announcement in May of the two countries' plans for a strategic partnership. During an interview in Kabul in the days following the establishment of the pact, former Interior Minister Ali Jalali said he "recognizes the agreement as a document officializing [sic] the close ties that already exist between the two countries." Shah Mahmood Miakhel, former Deputy Minister of Interior, strongly supported the agreement as "useful for reconstruction and stability of Afghanistan to prevent civil war or proxy war."

This development should silence the critics of India's aid-only policy. Some senior Indian officials and former diplomats I have spoken to warned that India could get caught in a "reputation trap," where it is overstretched economically in a country of "negative security interests." The agreement is an affirmation of India's maturing foreign policy in the region. It is also a natural corollary of the constructive role India has played in Afghan development efforts thus far. In the last ten years, India has contributed close to $2 billion in aid, making it Afghanistan's fifth largest bilateral donor, and garnering much appreciation from the local population. The success of development efforts in Afghanistan is clearly a key aspect of achieving stability there. Thus, the Afghan-Indian strategic agreement may be seen as the consolidation of gains made by India's soft power approach, as well as an expansion of India's plans to secure its national security interests. A strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan would reduce the dangers of the return of extremist forces to the seats of power, and the potential spillover of radicalism and violence that would destabilize the entire region.

The agreement is important in that it touches on a wide range of issues that are critical to sustaining progress in Afghanistan. India's decision to expand the training of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), particularly the Afghan National Police (ANP), is a significant step toward building local capacity for providing security. The trade and economic agreements in the pact are a reiteration of India's commitment to Afghanistan's economic growth, and its role as a "bridge" between South Asia and Central Asia. The emphasis on "regional economic cooperation" in the ASP indicates India's vision of binding the countries in the region through a mutually beneficial cooperative framework. Finally, the agreement's capacity building and educational initiatives are a pledge from India to invest in the future leadership of Afghanistan.

India is indeed looking beyond merely engaging the Karzai government, or indulging one ethnic or political faction. The strategic agreement ensures the continuity of India's initiatives by making them free from the politics, whims and personal fancies of future leaders. Assertions that India's foreign policy does not usually have a long-term vision no longer apply in the case of Afghanistan. An institutional mechanism for continued engagement in Afghanistan in the form of this agreement is bound to cultivate a broad range of stakeholders in that country, preventing a complete reversal later of the gains it makes in the short term.

New Delhi and Kabul have insisted on multiple occasions that they are willing to accommodate Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. President Karzai said after the signing of the agreement that the new partnership with India was not meant as a form of aggression toward Pakistan. One hopes that in spite of the criticisms the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued of the strategic pact, the country will see reason in adopting a mature and rational Afghan policy. As one Afghan political leader in Kandahar said to me, "if Pakistan has to compete with India in gaining good will among the Afghans, it has to be on the plank of reconstruction and development, and not acts of subversion and selective assassinations or providing sanctuaries [to militants]."

No commentary on Indian-Afghan relations would be complete without addressing the most pressing question: Can India sustain or even expand its activities in Afghanistan beyond the NATO withdrawal date in 2014? The strategic agreement has provided a much-needed mechanism for a continued relationship beyond this deadline, without being subjected to the vagaries of future governments in Kabul or New Delhi, or to the prevailing regional security environment. For Afghans it is surely a sign that India is a reliable partner who has stepped in firmly when the West seems to be in a hurry to quit.

Dr. Shanthie Mariet D'Souza is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). She can be reached at isassmd@nus.edu.sg. The views reflected in the paper are those of the author and not of the Institute.

This is the second installment in a series contributed by researchers from the World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) as they traveled throughout Pakistan to explore how civil society is countering extremism at the grassroots level.

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In a pristine, remote valley in Kashmir, far from the theaters of war, some families are abandoning their religious and cultural traditions in favor of extremist ideologies. The trend began after the 2005 earthquake, when several Islamist organizations - notably Jamaat ud-Dawa (JuD) - came to the forefront, providing food, shelter and health supplies to devastated communities. A village elder lamented, "Many of us were impressed by their sophisticated ambulance services, and families willingly joined in their relief efforts." Most of these families had no idea that JuD was in fact a front for the banned militant organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Pakistanis, particularly in such remote areas, require tools to recognize extremist ideologies and terrorist organizations so that they can create counter-movements within their own communities. We travelled throughout Northern Punjab and the Hazara region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to learn how certain grassroots organizations have designed effective awareness campaigns within a religious paradigm that are palatable even to the at-risk population.

We began with the leaders of Pakistan's moderate religious networks. Since 9/11, dozens of religious scholars have issued public statements and fatwas against terrorism.  Dr. Raghib Naeemi -- son of Dr. Sarfraz Naeemi who was killed in 2009 after he publically denounced terrorist activities as un-Islamic -- appears regularly on TV to promote peace and social cohesion.

Traditional Muslim networks have organized nation-wide anti-Taliban public rallies from "Save Pakistan" to "Ulema and Mashaikh" conventions, bringing together religious scholars and community leaders. Last November, a "Long March" was organized from Islamabad to Lahore to protest the increasing number of suicide attacks on Pakistan's cultural and spiritual landmarks. Over 20 major shrines across Pakistan were bombed last year alone. One of the core organizers of the Long March explained, "As we proceeded, the participation grew by the thousands, and in every city, we gave speeches and handed out fliers teaching people how to recognize extremism."

Religious leaders have also developed rapid response mechanisms to denounce terrorism following major suicide attacks. Last year when the soup kitchen at the shrine of Lahore's patron saint was bombed, the imam Mufti Mohammad Sialvi invited the media and mobilized leaders from different mosques to condemn terrorism. When we visited the shrine a year later, we found that students groups had maintained the campaign with freshly painted banners.

To form a stronger unified voice against the Taliban, religious scholars have also created a number of new NGOs. In the rural outskirts of Rawalpindi, Pir Mudassir Shah, a dynamic young leader versed in 14 languages, established the think tank Center for Innovative Research, Collaboration and Learning (CIRCLe). Pir Mudassir was a prominent organizer in a 25,000 man National Flag Day march to demonstrate support for the military counterinsurgency operations in the Swat Valley. The march brought together various elements of civil society, from conservative Muslim groups to the Christian Progressive Movement of Pakistan. CIRCLe will soon launch a poster campaign, for which they are seeking international support. One of the posters features a girl crying with a caption: "The Taliban Took my Father."

Schools are another critical channel through which Pakistanis generate awareness. Our journey took us to Bhera, an ancient village known for its classic Mughal mosques, Hindu temples, and carved wooden balconies. Deep in the heart of Punjab, Bhera's Dar ul-Uloom Muhammadia Ghousia is the hub of a network of educational and social welfare institutions providing free education grounded in the Sufi ethos to over 25,000 women and men. Pir Amin al-Hasanat, who leads the school, explained, "We teach all of our students that it is not their duty to fight jihad, but to look after the wellbeing of their community - regardless of one's faith or ethnicity." Just last year, the school and its affiliate philanthropic and social welfare organizations distributed hundreds of hygiene kits, established medical facilities for over 7,000 people and rebuilt homes for flood victims. They targeted remote areas at risk of falling under the influence of radical groups who use relief as a means to win recruits.

We encountered other successful models. The Pak Turk International School system has campuses throughout Pakistan, including volatile regions like Quetta and Peshawar. Their teachers challenge radical narratives by providing students and their families the necessary tools for interfaith dialogue and mutual understanding, which allow them to deconstruct the tribal, cultural, and religious stereotypes that feed militancy. Successful counter radicalization, we were told, is not taught in a specific class or manual but rather by example. In the Pak Turk schools, teachers are available at all times for guidance, and visit students in their homes. Through these civil society efforts, Pakistanis are becoming aware of the dangers of violent extremism. According to recent public opinion polls, a greater number of Pakistanis have a negative view of al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban than before. "At first people were hesitant to speak out against the Taliban," explained Pir Mudassir Shah, "but now they are becoming more comfortable challenging extremism because the issue is mainstreamed." Today, while barriers and police checkpoints can be seen lining the streets of Pakistan's capital, and the army mobilizes in the tribal belt, a parallel war is being waged in Pakistan's heartland by local communities.

In one instance in rural Abbottabad, not far from the compound in which slain al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was living,  a group of radical mullahs offered to build a mosque on the condition that the clerics could provide their own teachers. Not long after, families were alarmed to see that their children were being radicalized in classes taught at the new mosque. When parents learned that their children were being taught that "J" stands for "jihad" and "K" for "kalashnikov" the community held the mosque under siege until the mullahs were forced out.

150 miles south, in a village near Bhera, a father learned that his son was being brainwashed by a fundamentalist community member to believe that he would enter paradise if he became a suicide bomber. The father, supported by the Dar ul-Uloom community, rescued the children by publically exposing the radical mullah. He challenged the mullah: "After sending my child to paradise, why don't you send your own son to join him so that mine won't be lonely?" 

Even some segments of the population that had been involved in militancy are now condemning extremism. Irfan, a former "toll collector" for a militant outfit along the Pakistan-Afghanistan Durand Line explained, "After the Taliban bombed the shrine of the Rahman Baba, the great Pashtun poet-saint, I realized that militants are destroying our country." Now as a taxi driver, Irfan makes it a point to lambast the Taliban in conversations with all of his passengers.

Waleed Ziad and Mehreen Farooq are leading a project to analyze the role of Pakistan's civil society in countering extremism for the Washington DC-based World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE).

With U.S. relations in Pakistan at a low point and the two countries' strategic disagreement over priorities in Afghanistan on full display, it is time to review U.S. strategic options. One that deserves a close look is a grand bargain: give Pakistan what it wants in Afghanistan - but on two conditions: Pakistan assumes responsibility for preventing terrorism out of Afghanistan, and Pakistan agrees to settle Kashmir along the present geographic lines. This is not a panacea, nor would it be easy to execute. But it addresses the principal stumbling block to the current U.S. strategy, and provides an incentive to settle the region's longest-running dispute.

For the past decade, U.S. policy has been based on the assumption that the United States and Pakistan shared the strategic goal of extirpating from the leadership of Afghanistan the Taliban and allied terrorist forces. This objective was at the heart of the partnership struck after 9/11. As with the two previous major U.S.-Pakistan partnerships, in the 1950s/60s and in the 1980s, the assumption of strategic agreement was at best only half true, and the differences between the two countries' goals have become increasingly difficult to paper over. This time, Pakistan's desire to ensure what its army chief has referred to as "a friendly government" in Kabul - meaning a government deferential to Pakistan and impervious to Indian influence - has intensified, especially since the beginning of 2011. During that time, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was devastated by the aftereffects of the shooting of two Pakistanis by CIA contractor Raymond Davis and his subsequent arrest, by the raid that killed Osama bin Ladin, and by the harsh public criticism of Pakistan by retiring U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen.

The two governments have been trying to salvage some working elements of partnership. However, their ability to work together toward a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan, badly strained by conflicting goals, was for practical purposes ended by the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Karzai government's designated representative for peace initiatives toward the Afghan Taliban. This was not the first time Pakistan's insistence on controlling negotiations inside Afghanistan had trumped its stated policy of supporting the Afghan government's negotiating role, but this incident has brought tentative peace feelers, already rickety, to a virtual halt.

Washington's response to this situation has been to seek a stronger basis for working with Pakistan. This reflects U.S. recognition of Pakistan's critical importance to peace in the region and to Afghanistan's future - as well as the major U.S. stake in nuclear-armed Pakistan's own political and economic health. These are indeed important considerations - but it does not follow that the U.S. should continue on essentially the same path that has repeatedly come up short.

There are two other strategic options: treat Pakistan as a hostile power, and try to impose an acceptable solution in Afghanistan in the teeth of Pakistani efforts to control the process; or build a strategy that allows Pakistan to have the major say in Afghanistan, but on conditions that protect U.S. strategic interests and give Pakistan a strong incentive to respect them. We believe that forcing an acceptable solution is almost certain to fail. It would depend, unrealistically, on the effectiveness of an intra-Afghan negotiating process and of the government that would follow. It would also presuppose, equally implausibly, that Afghanistan would remain able to withstand the Pakistani effort to upset the settlement that would surely follow.  

The strategic alternative that remains is a grand bargain, initially between Pakistan and the United States, but eventually involving India. The major elements would be:

• Concede Pakistani primacy in Afghanistan: The United States would tell Pakistan's leaders that it is up to them to work with the various Afghan leaders - the government and whatever elements of the Taliban - toward a postwar accommodation that can keep Afghanistan free of terrorism and at peace. Pakistan would insist on eliminating or minimizing India's involvement in Afghanistan (a modest economic relationship, for example), and would assume the major place in Afghanistan's external environment.
• Hold Pakistan responsible for terrorism from Afghanistan: At the same time, the U.S. would warn Pakistan that we would hold it responsible for any act of terrorism originating in Afghanistan or Pakistan. This does not mean a policy of automatic retaliation - such decisions need to be made case by case - but it would put Pakistan on notice that winking at the forces in both countries that have spread terrorism within the region and beyond carries a tremendous risk.
• Settle Kashmir along the Line of Control: The United States would tell Pakistan that as part of this settlement, it will publicly call for negotiations to settle the Kashmir dispute by turning the existing Line of Control between the Indian and Pakistani-held portions into an international border. It would give India advance notice of this announcement. U.S. support for a settlement along the Line of Control would in all likelihood pull additional international support in that direction.
  
  The actual negotiations would be carried out by the two countries. These would cover not just the border but a whole host of other issues, including the ground rules for ensuring both countries' security, prevention of terrorism, encouragement of economic ties, and the rights of Kashmiris on both sides of the line to robust self-government. Many of these elements were included in the proposals Pakistan's former president, Pervez Musharraf, set forth before he fell from power, and a good number were at the heart of the proposals discussed in back channel negotiations between India and Pakistan in the last years of Musharraf's presidency. Whether the United States would have a role in the negotiating process would depend on the desires of India and Pakistan.
• Maintain a robust civilian and military partnership with Pakistan, including support as appropriate for its work toward a settlement in Afghanistan and generous funding for such Pakistani priorities as electric power generation. In the context of Kashmir negotiations, the U.S. could look at an updated security relationship. All this would of course be contingent on Pakistan holding to the overall bargain.

A deal along these lines would hand Pakistan one of its primary strategic objectives, but at a price Pakistanis would find very hard to swallow. Kashmir has a much tighter hold on the national heartstrings than Afghanistan. However, in practice Pakistan has lost its chance of gaining Kashmir, and many Pakistanis privately acknowledge this. They are well aware that for years, Pakistan's efforts have done nothing to remove India's hold on the state, and have succeeded only in deepening hostility and making the region less secure for everyone, including Pakistan.

Securing Pakistan against its military leaders' nightmare of an Indian threat from both east and west provides a strategic gain, especially when coupled with a possible Kashmir agreement that could lay the groundwork for transforming the hostile relationship with India into one that was merely chilly but improving. The bigger problem may be how to ensure that these gains are maintained. Afghanistan has never had sustained good relations with Pakistan, and may once again look to India as a balancer - an all too willing one - when it tires of being guided by Pakistan. And on the Kashmir side, even if the Pakistan government and its army agree to negotiate peace with India - by no means a sure bet - the militant movement in Pakistan includes many spoilers who will try to stir up trouble in Kashmir or elsewhere in India, providing acute temptation to the army to join in.

These difficulties make the grand bargain described here a long shot. Using military and economic aid as leverage might increase Pakistan's motivation to keep the bargain, though this is a tactic that has only worked for short periods in the past, and has never succeeded in dissuading Pakistan from following major strategic interests. To improve the odds, the United States would need to seek other international support, appealing to the desire of Pakistan's international friends to improve Pakistan's long term economic and security prospects. Bringing China at least tacitly on board would be the ideal. Other players would be the European aid donors, and some of Pakistan's Arab benefactors. The United States would also have to expend some diplomatic capital to dissuade India from trying to upset the balance in Afghanistan, noting that the U.S. had promoted a Kashmir settlement on terms quite favorable to India, and that reducing India's profile in Afghanistan had to be seen in that context.

But considering the results of ten years of engagement, and the tremendous risks flowing from a "hostile Pakistan" strategy, the long shot starts to look like the best available strategic bet.

Teresita Schaffer is a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; Howard Schaffer is Senior Counselor at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University. Both are retired U.S. ambassadors with long experience in South Asia. They are co-directors of http://southasiahand.com.  

It is a month since a man claiming to be a peace envoy from the Taleban leadership council (the Quetta Shura) managed to see and kill the former president of Afghanistan and head of the High Peace Council (HPC), Burhanuddin Rabbani. The killing has had major repercussions, with the most senior Afghan officials, including President Hamid Karzai, directly or indirectly accusing the Quetta Shura and Pakistan of being behind the attack, consequently halting talks with the Taleban and cooling bilateral relations. Yet the Afghan government has not produced any evidence to back up these claims. Indeed, the investigation into Rabbani's murder has resulted in no real clues as to the identity of the plotters, who ordered the killing or how leading members of the High Peace Council, as well as President Karzai, were so easily fooled.

The bare bones of the Rabbani assassination plot have now emerged, following the release by the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), of a tranche of documents and video testimony, including that of two key people who were arrested after the killing: HPC member and former Taleb, Rahmatullah Wahidyar (whom NDS has said is not suspected of being part of the conspiracy), and the go-between, Hamidullah Akhundzada, who introduced the killer to Wahidyar and Rabbani.

The tale began with Wahidyar, who is a former Taleban deputy minister and former minister in Rabbani's mujahedin government from the 1990s, being asked by the HPC leadership to drum up contacts in the Quetta Shura with a view to starting peace talks. He made contact with a man called Abdul Satar, whom Wahidyar described as "a former Taleban official" (no other details provided), who in turn introduced him to a "former Taleban commander" called Hamidullah Akhundzada. Both Abdul Satar and Hamidullah visited Kabul and met Wahidyar, Massum Stanekzai (the Secretary of the HPC) and Rabbani.

According to Wahidyar, over the next four months, Hamidullah actively reported back on the progress he was making in firming up contacts with the Quetta Shura (although Hamidullah himself makes no mention of any such reporting in his testimony). A week before the killing, he telephoned Wahidyar and said the Quetta Shura would be sending an envoy (although probably not himself) to Kabul in order to discuss opening direct talks with the Afghan government. The man who was sent, Esmatullah, came to Kabul with a letter and two audio messages, one for the HPC and one for Rabbani's ears only.

President Karzai was told about the envoy and saw the letter and heard one of the audio messages. The envoy's letter, a copy of which was released to Tolo TV, is weak. Afghans can negotiate peace, it says, but unless the international military fully leaves, the Afghan struggle against colonialism and for independence will continue (this is pretty well what the Taleban say publicly).  One of the audio messages has also been released by NDS and is even thinner on substance; it is basically a series of rhetorical questions for the "honoured teacher", Ustad Rabbani, on whether Afghanistan today is better than the Taleban-era. 

All sources say it was Karzai who ordered Rabbani back to Kabul (he was in Iran at a conference where, it was reported, an official Taleban delegation was present). Rabbani cut short his trip, returned to Kabul and within a few hours of landing, received Wahidyar, Stanekzai and the ‘envoy', Esmatullah in his home. He blew himself up in the very moment he greeted Rabbani, killing them both.

NDS arrested Wahidyar and Hamidullah and later handed out their videoed statements to journalists, along with the testimony of the manager of the HPC guesthouse where the killer had stayed and one of the audio messages he had brought.

In his confession, Hamidullah gives his name, father's name and tribe (Zadran) and says he is from Kandahar. He looks to be in his 50s. Wahidyar has said that Hamidullah was a "former Taleban commander" and a "resident of Kandahar". NDS spokesman Lutfullah Mashal has said he appeared to be "an ordinary Taleb, living in Quetta, with no known position during the Emirate and possibly, he is Achikzai." One man who met Hamidullah briefly on one of his earlier visits to Kabul, HPC member and former Taleban ambassador to Islamabad and Saudi Arabia, Habibullah Fowzi, described him as uneducated, not a mullah, and a "former mujahed," rather than an "original Taleb." Fawzi said that, although it is difficult to size a man up in 20 minutes, Hamidullah appeared to be "an ordinary man, not a special man to have for such a mission."

Indeed, in Hamidullah's videoed confession, he comes over as more feckless, than master conspirator. Despite saying he was told about the turban bombing plot in advance, after introducing the killer, Esmatullah, to Wahidyar, he not only accompanied him to Kabul, but also brought his own family along for the trip. Even after seeing news of the assassination on television, he stayed in Kabul. He was clearly not versed in phone security - the NDS arrested him almost immediately after it traced the assassin's final phone calls.

The bottom line of all this is that we are still no nearer to understanding who Hamidullah, the person who established the link to the HPC and Rabbani, ‘is' - his tribe, political background, what he and his family did during the jihad and Emirate, in other words, all the normal questions which everyone always asks in Afghanistan to identify and position an unknown person - and which should have been answered, one would have thought, when the HPC officials first made contact with him.

As to the identity of the killer, Esmatullah, even less is known. He appeared to have been allowed into Rabbani's home, un-vetted, not searched and with no-one even knowing for sure his father's name.

Such appears to have been the very thin thread on which hopes for peace talks with the Taleban were hung. From the evidence released, it remains unfathomable why Wahidyar, Stanekzai, Rabbani and the President himself trusted these men. After the debacle of the shopkeeper impersonating Mullah Mansur (the probable third in command in the Quetta Shura) who managed to get into the Presidential Palace in November 2010 and was given large sums of money, maybe it should not come as a surprise how easily everyone was gulled. However, is difficult to argue with the assessment of the former EU and UN envoy Fransesc Vendrell, that President Karzai set up a way of conducting peace talks which appears to have been inherently problematic and unprofessional, and left the participants vulnerable to trickery and attack.

None of the evidence released so far indicates who ordered the killing and when the Hamidullah-HPC conduit became toxic - was it a plot from the start or, as Hamidullah contends, infiltrated? And if so, by whom?

Nothing, apart from the assumption that the plot appears to have been hatched in Quetta on Pakistani soil, would appear to justify pointing the finger of blame at the Taleban leadership or the ISI - although there is no evidence, either, that they are innocent. However, Karzai's decision to blame Pakistan worked beautifully to dampen anger domestically, calming Rabbani's allies who were against talking to the Taleban in the first place and are ultra-hostile to Pakistan. Possibly Karzai's move also indicates that he himself was never too enamoured of talking to the Taleban either. There has been fall out, however, in the souring of bilateral relations with Pakistan and the shelving of the policy of talking to the Taleban.

The Taleban have hardly made things easier. This assassination was carried out by a man who was, or purported to be, a Taleban envoy. According to the movement's own rules, set out in their code of conduct, suicide bombings must be authorised. Yet spokesmen have neither accepted nor denied responsibility and have, in a gesture of unprecedented evasiveness, largely kept their phones switched off during the last four weeks.

If this assassination was authorised, it would be a clear message that the Taleban leadership does not want a negotiated end to the war. (And in this case, it would not matter whether anyone viewed the HPC or Rabbani as a viable means of negotiation). If it was a rogue operation, then the Taleban has severe command and control problems within its ranks. If it was carried out by a group other than the Taleban, the silence seems only explicable if the Taleban assumed (or knew) it was done with ISI assistance (bearing in mind that the leadership has covered up for the ISI in the past). Whatever the case, the likely aim of killing Rabbani - scuppering the very idea of peace talks - appears to have been very successfully carried out.

Kate Clark is a senior analyst with the Afghanistan Analysts Network.

Every night throughout Afghanistan, international forces launch kill/capture raids on Afghan homes. Over the past two years, the use of night raids, particularly by U.S. Special Operations Forces, has skyrocketed-increasing at least five-fold since February 2009, indicating an important tactical shift by U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan. With the withdrawal of international forces approaching, this shift likely foreshadows the future of military operations in Afghanistan. But these operations continue to be marred by weak accountability and transparency, secrecy in targeting, and substantial popular backlash, which will have significant long-term consequences should the United States and its allies remain so reliant on such raids.

My organization, Open Society Foundations (OSF), in partnership with the Afghan organization The Liaison Office (TLO), recently released a report that examines the impact night raids have had on Afghan civilians. We found that International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reforms, primarily through two tactical directives, have one the one hand resulted in significant improvements in how the raids are planned and executed, resulting in reduced risk of civilian casualties, greater accuracy in selecting targets, reduced property damage, increased use of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and more respectful treatment of women during operations.

But our report also found that despite these reforms, improvements have not won much support from Afghans, because they've been overshadowed by the dramatic surge in the number of night raids and perceptions among many Afghans that abuses go unpunished.

Speaking with victims of night raids, a major complaint continues to be accountability. Despite some improvements, ISAF responsiveness to claims of civilian harm from night raids remains weak. Because the vast majority of raids are carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces -- the least transparent forces operating in Afghanistan -- it's exceedingly difficult to follow up on specific cases of civilian casualties or wrongful detention. In many cases, a strong presumption on the part of ISAF and U.S. officials that night raids are accurate often means that allegations of civilian casualties and targeting mistakes are simply not trusted. Investigations are infrequent, findings are not typically made public, and compensation for victims is, based on our interviews with officials and Afghan civilians, uncommon.

What may in part explain the dismissal of such allegations of civilian harm in night raids is the definition of who can be targeted in such operations. Our report on night raids documents a substantial "widening of the net," which has resulted in the detention of significant numbers of civilians.

In a single three-month period earlier this year 1,900 individuals were detained, most of whom were eventually released, raising questions about whether they should have been detained in the first place. We also documented a number of large-scale detention or "clearance" operations in which multiple compounds or entire villages were cordoned off, and male civilians indiscriminately rounded up for screening and questioning. In October 2010, for example, U.S. Special Operations Forces raided Otmenzey village in Kunduz and detained 80-100 men and boys overnight in a mosque. According to witnesses, they used masked informants and indicators such as beards to pick out individuals for further questioning at a Special Operations detention facility. All were eventually released. To the Afghans we interviewed, this makes night raids look more like indiscriminate intimidation, not specifically targeted, intelligence-driven actions. While intelligence gathering is critical, using night raids to arrest and interrogate civilians without clear justification often causes unnecessary harm or trauma, provoking backlash and undermining international forces' legitimacy.

Targeting policies and practices have profound implications for civilians in Afghanistan. Throughout the country, militants can exercise significant control over people's lives. Many have little choice but to interact with militants, provide food, water or shelter to insurgents living in or passing through their villages. As one man from Kandahar told us, "Our entire district is controlled by the Taliban. There is no government or Americans here. We have to have contacts with the Taliban...they come to our homes and take lunch and dinner by force." But such incidental and often coerced contact with insurgents does not convert civilians into combatants or justify targeting and detaining them in military operations.

This blending no doubt presents international forces with an immense challenge in distinguishing civilians from fighters; yet this difficulty is precisely why a workable, clear, and legally sound definition of who is targetable in operations like night raids is so necessary. But secrecy continues to shroud how precisely targeting works in night raids -- and how individuals are ultimately singled out for detention or death.

There are also serious legal concerns raised by expanded use of night raids, particularly those that detain individuals for intelligence-gathering purposes. Given that night raids are military operations, not law enforcement actions, under international law such force should generally only be used against combatants-not against civilians who aren't members of the insurgency or directly participating in hostilities. Intelligence value alone is not generally sufficient grounds to detain individuals and certainly not justification for launching military attacks on their homes and endangering their lives. This does not mean that the U.S. military cannot detain people, or question those who may have valuable information. However, where those individuals are not clearly combatants, the kind of force used in military operations and applicable Rules of Engagement (ROE) are inappropriate. Instead, law enforcement-style operations and rules of force should apply.

There is also evidence that insufficient consideration is given to alternatives to night raids, such as conducting raids in daytime hours or simply requesting individuals to voluntarily submit to questioning. With Special Forces and intelligence personnel increasingly in the lead, night raids may be a strongly preferred tactic not because of a lack of feasible alternatives, but because it is what these forces are good at. The availability and particular expertise of Special Forces, as well as their relationship to intelligence officials, biases commanders in favor of this tool-leading to an over-reliance on such raids and underestimation of their true costs.

As targeting and detentions broaden, we also found that many view raids as increasingly indiscriminate, arbitrary, and unjust, contributing to popular backlash that is readily exploited by militant groups. Such blowback, especially as it accrues and is inevitably politicized over time, also imperils the legitimacy and credibility of U.S. and international forces, as well as longer-term peace building efforts. Among political leaders in Afghanistan, this blowback exacts an enormous toll on diplomatic relations, undermining progress on key issues like the U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership, which will govern U.S. forces' involvement beyond the 2014 pull-out date.

There is a disturbing parallel between these concerns and those surrounding drone strikes across the border in Pakistan, which have also increased dramatically in recent years. Like night raids, drone strikes are conducted largely in secret by intelligence forces, with little to no accountability and transparency, and making use of an ill-defined, potentially overbroad basis for targeting. Popular and political backlash, most evident in Pakistan, undermine U.S. development efforts and seriously diminish its legitimacy and political capital. As with night raids, recent short-term successes as well as the rapidly developed capacity of the CIA and U.S. military's drone programs may bias decision-makers and lead to systematic underestimation of these kinds of longer-term costs and consequences.

The dramatically expanded use of both night raids and drone strikes foreshadows a troubling, dangerous future for U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. These tactics bring the conflict directly into the homes of more and more civilians, and as our report on night raids documents, efforts to improve conduct are often overshadowed by the sheer increase in the number of operations as well as continued perceptions of impunity. Despite the fact that violence against civilians is still disproportionately carried out by the Taliban, expanded night raids will almost certainly have an outsized impact on Afghan feelings toward foreign forces. Without stronger accountability, less secrecy, and more creative thinking about how to effectively engage and protect civilians, the long-term impact of such operations will more likely than not undo any short-term tactical gains.

Chris Rogers is a human rights lawyer for the Open Society Foundations specializing in human rights and conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan.