By Brian Katulis

One striking thing about the president's speech last night was how little he actually said about Pakistan, especially in comparison to his speech last March outlining the initial strategy.

He didn't ignore Pakistan last night -- the country got around 25 mentions, but that's down from more than 40 references in the March speech, which was actually shorter in length compared to last night's speech. But beyond the simple metric of how many mentions Pakistan received, the speech was particularly empty on the substance of what we are doing and planning to do about Pakistan in our policy approach, and actually offered fewer details than were presented in March.

President Obama reiterated many of the main points about why Pakistan is important to Afghanistan and the broader region, and then slipped into vague generalities about what the U.S. is actually doing or trying to do with Pakistan -- "a partnership with Pakistan that is built on mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust." He also went on to mention resources going to support Pakistan's democracy and development, and he highlighted the fact the United States is the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting.

But anyone looking for the "way forward" in Pakistan -- that part of the speech was missing in action.

On the one hand, this may be understandable -- his main audience last night was the American public, and adding more details on the complex situation in Pakistan may have just served to further confuse what was already a complicated, overly triangulated speech trying to please multiple audiences. He was trying to pack a lot of information into one speech, and quite frankly all of the troops and nearly most of the additional money he's going to be asking for is going to Afghanistan - rather than to Pakistan. So speaking less about Pakistan may make some sense. In addition, from a strategic communications perspective, he was also trying to send messages to the Pakistani people and leadership, and the flurry of diplomatic activity and military and intelligence coordination we've seen between the United States and Pakistan -- hardly a week goes by without a senior U.S. official traveling to Islamabad -- demonstrates that there are many aspects of our bilateral relationship that won't be discussed publicly.

Yet on the other hand, the dearth of information about the next steps in Pakistan in a speech that was billed as the way forward in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is troublesome on its own merits -- because the global security interests are much greater in Pakistan than they are in Afghanistan. We've all heard the list of interests in play in Pakistan -- it has nuclear weapons, plays host to multiple terror networks, and it has more than five times as many people as Afghanistan.

Having more clarity and delivering more on the way forward in Pakistan is particularly important given something Gen. Stanley McChrystal wrote in his assessment three months ago: "Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan."

Last night, President Obama actually confused this very important issue -- and conflated the various elements of the Afghan Taliban, which often receive support from Pakistani authorities, with the Pakistani Taliban, which have been attacking the Pakistani state and core interests. This is what Obama said last night:

Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani people.

The United States has accused Pakistan of maintaining ties and offering support to groups such as the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin -- which all play roles in the insurgency in Afghanistan. These groups are different from extremist groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, which have been behind the increased violence targeting civilians and military installations alike inside of Pakistan.

In the murky world of northwest Pakistan, the dividing line between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban isn't always clear, but the main point is that one set of groups has received support from the Pakistani security establishment, and another set is at war with the Pakistani security establishment.

Understanding that distinction is important to answering tough questions such as whether a surge of additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan could actually further undermine Pakistan's stability.

In the Congressional testimonies and any additional speeches President Obama may do -- and I think he needs to do a better job than he did last night -- this point about more clarity on the way forward in Pakistan needs greater attention.

Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. 

By Brian Katulis

On Thursday, the United Nations mission in Afghanistan announced that it would relocate hundreds of foreign staff out of the country in response to an attack targeting a U.N. guest house in Kabul last week. U.N. spokesman Dan McNortan told reporters that out of a total of 1,100 expatriate workers, 600 will be temporarily relocated for security reasons.

The United Nations has a presence of about 5,600 personnel in Afghanistan, the vast majority of whom are Afghan nationals. Kai Eide, the Norwegian diplomat who heads the UN mission in Afghanistan said, "We will do what we can to avoid disruption of work."

What exactly does the United Nations do in Afghanistan? It conducts the sort of work that top U.S. and NATO commander in the country Gen. Stanley McChrystal and key U.S. policy leaders on Afghanistan have identified as essential to the effort of stabilizing the country -- carrying out reconstruction and relief efforts, and provides advice on internal political processes, among other things. (See more details on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan here.)

The timing of this decision to pull out personnel comes at a sensitive juncture for the Obama administration, as it gropes for an updated strategy to replace the one it announced in March. And it comes at a time when the United States has started to implement a "civilian surge" aimed at getting more personnel to work some of the very same issues -- reconstruction, development, and building governance structures -- that the U.N. staff now set to leave the country were doing.

The 600 U.N. staffers who are being relocated is about the same number of people the Obama administration is set to send as part of the civilian surge in 2009. Deputy Secretary of State Jack Lew late last month briefed reporters and told them that the Obama administration plans to have just under 1,000 civilians with the State Department and USAID in Afghanistan by the end of the year, up from 320 at the start, meaning that the civilian surge by the United States is about 600. So just from a numbers perspective, depending on where the U.N. staffers are relocated and for how long, the U.S. civilian surge to Afghanistan -- if it indeed goes through as planned -- may simply just cancel out the loss of U.N. workers being pulled out.

Now that's just an interesting note about the simple numbers game -- there are more complex dynamics involving specific tasks and projects. U.N. agencies have certain tasks that they conduct, and the United States and other countries engaged in Afghanistan on development and governance have their own efforts. There are some coordination mechanisms between these efforts, but many observers have noted that the coordination between the development and governance efforts in different parts of Afghanistan is weak.

Which raises a broader question -- what is the comprehensive strategy for making sure that all of the efforts planned by international agencies and individual countries on the development and governance fronts are coordinated? Since weak governance and corruption have been identified in both the strategy reviews and strategic communications of the Obama administration on Afghanistan, it makes sense that some sort of action plan -- coordinated among all of the countries and international organizations in Afghanistan -- should be developed to address these threats to Afghanistan's stability. But where is that plan?

As I mentioned in an article earlier this week, the draft metrics floating around Washington, DC earlier this fall shouldn't leave anyone optimistic about how well advanced the strategy for development and governance efforts in Afghanistan is, which is a major problem. In many ways, the simpler policy question is whether or not to send more troops -- the more difficult questions are those related to these other components of a possible integrated strategy in Afghanistan, because of a lack of resources and capacity in U.S. civilian agencies. Additionally, the simple fact of the matter is that governance and economic development have a direct impact on internal power dynamics in Afghanistan -- who we choose to partner with impacts the internal fights among Afghans for power, for better or worse.

Another issue is the question of leverage and how to best shape the calculations and actions of Afghan leaders to align with the interests of global security. The U.N. decision on Thursday seems mostly about security concerns, but Eide curiously sent an interesting "don't take us for granted" message to Afghan leaders: "There is a belief among some, that the international community (presence) will continue whatever happens because of the strategic importance of Afghanistan," Eide said. "I would like to emphasize that that's not true." Whether this "tough love" message matters remains to be seen.

But the overall point here is that if there is one positive thing about the messy election process in Afghanistan, it is that it has brought governance and anti-corruption more closely to the center of the policy debate on national security, which is quite amazing. The experts knew for years that these issues were problems, but now these problems have helped to some small degree reframe the national security debate on Afghanistan to something beyond just how many boots on the ground there are. Now the challenge for the Obama administration is to come up with concrete policy actions that can effectively deal with these problems of weak governance and corruption, and whether we have a coordinated international strategy to do so.

Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

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By Brian Katulis and Hardin Lang

As members of an international election observation delegation to last month's presidential election and provincial elections, we were impressed that the courage of millions Afghan voters who showed up at the polls despite widespread violence and intimidation. Holding an election in a time of war is never an easy thing, and many Afghans faced the tough choice of going to cast their ballots in a combat zone.

Although the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced this week that President Hamid Karzai passed the 50 percent threshold to avoid a runoff with more than 90 percent of the vote counted, the electoral process is far from complete. The country's IEC needs to finish tabulating the results, and the Electoral Complaints Commission, a separate body consisting of both Afghan and international commissioners, will need to credibly adjudicate mounting charges of electoral fraud, which now number in the thousands. For the next Afghan president to gain the legitimacy to govern, these bodies must complete their tasks transparently and efficiently. 

Holding an imperfect election was the easy part. Yet, no matter who emerges as the ballot's victor, the vote did not magically transform the country. Like Iraq's 2005 elections, the voting process in Afghanistan merely provided some indication of the internal balance of power between those who chose to participate, as well as those who did not, including affiliates of the Taliban. Unfortunately, that balance appears to increasingly favor the latter.

Perhaps more crucial to Afghanistan's immediate future, the next president will have to come to grips with the insurgency and the forces that drive it. America and its allies can help, but simply sending more troops will not win the day. Afghanistan's next leader must take two key steps to build a more stable foundation for any increased U.S. support to be effective.

First, Afghanistan's next leader need to find a way to either defeat, co-opt, or share power with those who violently oppose the government. As in Iraq, it will also be necessary to find common ground with some elements of the insurgency. Senior Afghan officials acknowledge that they have been talking to the Taliban for some time. But, like the Sunnis in Iraq in 2005, the Taliban shunned the polls. Other avenues must now be found to bring those willing to talk to the table.   

Second, Afghanistan's next president must get serious about improving governance, justice, and the rule of law. Improved security alone will not arrest the slide towards chaos. It must be accompanied by a real effort to help Afghan institutions deliver basic services to the population. Only tangible improvements in daily life will close the growing "confidence gap" between the Afghan state and its citizens.  

In the coming weeks, the Obama administration will face some decisions about its course in Afghanistan. And while the United States is trying to do its part, the strategy put forth has come up short. President Obama's team announced a "civilian surge" in March, but five months later it has filled only a third of the State Department positions it set for Afghanistan.

And even if the Obama administration does deliver on its "smart power" rhetoric -- more  development and better diplomacy -- it won't matter if Afghanistan's leaders fail to step up to plate. So, regardless of who wins, the Obama administration must make clear to the victor its expectation for real progress: The next government in Kabul must get serious about fighting both corruption and narco trafficking. And it must make a real effort to build state institutions.

To be sure the United States can no longer afford to foster a dangerous and dysfunctional culture of dependency among Afghanistan's leadership. President Hamid Karzai's pardoning of five senior drug traffickers last month did not advance stability. (Transparency International now ranks Afghanistan as the fifth most corrupt country in the world.) It should come as no surprise that more Afghans are turning to the Taliban for rough, but decisive, justice.

Many observers will expect requests for additional U.S. troops for Afghanistan later this year. But it would be foolish for the United States to send more troops and continue spending billions more in Afghanistan without stronger commitments on governance and rule of law from the country's next president. The United States can help, but only if it has a serious partner in Afghanistan. 

Brian Katulis and Hardin Lang are senior fellows at the Center for American Progress and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, respectively. Both were election observers in Afghanistan last week as part of a U.S.-sponsored delegation organized by Democracy International.

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By Brian Katulis, Kabul, Afghanistan

In the 48-hour period after the polls closed here in Afghanistan, there has been a quick rush to judge on the elections here, long before the votes are tabulated and the process for dealing with complaints has even gotten underway. 

As a member of an international observer delegation organized by Democracy International, I've been asked questions that simply can't be answered at this point, because no one has enough information to know what actually transpired in Thursday's elections.  Different groups have a collection of anecdotes and observations from around the country.  But that's all they are -- anecdotes and qualitative observations.  Will that stop groups from holding press conferences this weekend or analysts from penning opinion editorials drawing grand conclusions for U.S. strategy as a result of the elections?  Don't bet on it -- the mad rush is spin the elections is already happening. 

No one can definitively answer some of the questions put to election observers by the media -- what was voter turnout, whether Afghanistan's presidential elections are heading to a second round, broader questions like whether the Afghan people will see these elections as legitimate or "free and fair," or what this means for the Obama administration's strategy to stabilize Afghanistan.  It is too early in the process.

The Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced on Friday that the presidential vote count was completed in all provinces, which means that the numbers from each of the polling sites around the country would be posted in those areas but not officially tabulated.  This is just the first step in the process - the full tally will take place over the weekend, and the IEC said that it plans to have preliminary results by Tuesday, August 25.  The results won't be finalized for weeks, until the Election Complaints Commission deals with at least hundreds and quite likely thousands of complaints that are likely to be filed in the coming weeks.

Yet there's been a quick push to frame the post-election debate coming from two main groups -- the competitors in the elections here and the United States government.  The two camps of the presumed frontrunners in the presidential race -- Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah -- did what every political group of any worth does in an election -- they claimed their candidate was in the lead early.  Like the "spin room" after a presidential debate in my own country, the candidates or their surrogates have been fast out of the gate to frame the post-election debate. 

That's understandable, and the longer it takes the IEC to announce even preliminary results, the more we're likely to see additional claims and counterclaims.  Afghanistan's tension-filled and uncertain political environment -- leaders have hinted at taking their supporters to the streets if there are questions about the results -- means that the IEC should release its results as quickly as possible to cut off the spin and conspiracies that are starting to grow.

The United States government has also been quick to frame how these elections are interpreted. U.S. President Barack Obama was quick to offer his judgment, saying on Election Day that, "We had what appears to be a successful election in Afghanistan, despite the Taliban's efforts to disrupt it."  The day after the elections, Obama made another statement concluding that the elections were an "important step forward in the Afghan people's effort to take control of their future, even as the violent extremists stand in their way." 

Both statements were aimed at putting the best face on an election that appears to have had mixed results at best -- that Obama did this is understandable given that the American public appears to be increasingly skeptical about additional investments in Afghanistan.  President Obama needs to do a better job at convincing the American public that Afghanistan is a "war of necessity," and an election that leaves the country's political leaders divided wouldn't boost Americans' confidence. 

The danger President Obama faces is that an election that he called the "most important event of the year" in Afghanistan and now has quickly judged as a step forward might not be viewed by Afghan political actors and the public in the same light, and the U.S. government might find itself in an awkward position in the coming weeks trying to adjust its position on these elections.

Various observer delegations are still trying to understand what they actually know at this early stage of the process.  I participated in a debriefing with many of the observers that were part of the Democracy International team, and I've been calling colleagues who were placed in various areas of the country to try to get a sense of what we saw collectively as a group.  Democracy International has a core team processing reports from all around the country and coordinating with other groups, particularly Afghan election monitors, in an effort to collect as much information as possible. 

At this early stage, there are some safe preliminary conclusions one can make about the 2009 presidential and provincial elections in Afghanistan.  First, it is clear that a significant number of Afghan voters were disenfranchised by the violence and intimidation. Organizing an election in a time of war presents serious challenges.  Some of our observers were actually holed up because of the fighting, and Afghan voters faced the difficult choice of going to the polls in a combat zone, if the polls were open in their area. 

How many were disenfranchised, we won't know until more data is available, but it looks like the turnout was considerably lower than the 2004 and 2005 elections. Some might argue that it wasn't just violence and intimidation, but also voter apathy about the candidates that has contributed to lower turnout. That's an empirical question that could be answered by survey research, assuming one can conduct accurate survey research with the security challenges and cultural constraints that Afghanistan has. 

Second, it appears that there were several instances of voter irregularities and fraud in certain parts of the country, particularly with voter identification cards and the voter registry. Whether these irregularities amount to the type of problems that could tip the balance in the presidential election is anyone's guess right now, and that's just a guess.  (The provincial elections are another matter, since the number of votes required to win is much smaller, and worth more attention in a separate analysis.) 

If voter turnout is low -- say something like 5 million voters out of 15 million registered, then it would take 50,000 fraudulent votes to move the presidential election results by 1 percent. That's a lot of fraud, and it's quite likely that any fraud of that magnitude would be detected by election commission officials, observers, and the media. It's not impossible to move the results in that fashion, but it would require a degree of coordination and effort that might be difficult to execute in a country with considerable infrastructure and security challenges.

But we won't really know much more until the data comes in from the Independent Election Commission and it is measured up against the information collected by election monitors and observers, who are still trying to put all of their pieces together. In the meantime, we'll all engage in sharing our anecdotes, which may be interesting but won't really tell us anything about the quality of the election process.  Eric Bjornlund of Democracy International, the man who literally wrote the book on international election observation noted today, the election process is ongoing and it will take some time before we can judge what really happened.

Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

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By Brian Katulis, Kabul, Afghanistan

With three days until ballots are cast in presidential and provincial elections here, an air of uncertainty hangs over a process that U.S. President Barack Obama has called the most important event of the year in Afghanistan.  Threats of violence along with worries about the potential for electoral fraud and possible post-election political violence loom, and no one knows what quite to expect in the coming days and weeks here. 

I'm here in the country as part of one of the international delegations to observe the elections, with Democracy International, an organization that has gathered together a group of election specialists and Afghanistan experts and sent them around the country, including Kandahar, Helmand, Herat, and Paktika, among other places (check out the special DI election website here).  DI has had some long-term observers in the country and plans to stay through the entire process, a process that could continue into the fall.  We're getting a steady stream of reports from the observers posted around the country.

Although it's early to draw any definitive conclusions, here are five things to watch for in Afghanistan in the coming weeks:

1.  Violence and threats from the Taliban.  Security is the top concern, and this election is taking place in one of the most complicated security environments the world has ever seen in an election, according to several of the seasoned election specialists I've spoken with on this trip.  "It's an extraordinary thing to hold an election in the middle of a war," Ambassador Richard Holbrooke said at a State Department press briefing last month.  July was the most violent month in Afghanistan since the war started in 2001.

The Taliban issued new threats to voters over the weekend, saying that they would target polling centers on Election Day.  "You should not participate in the elections because you might be a victim of our operations," one letter distributed in Kandahar said.  One of the DI election observers reported to us that an election official in Kapisa, in the northeast part of the country, had started to carry a pistol because of threats and concerns about violence.  Commanders with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan say that their forces will provide perimeter security for the elections, with Afghan forces and police taking responsibility for security at polling stations.  How much the Taliban will disrupt this election remains to be seen, but a suicide bomber who killed seven and injured dozens more on Saturday near ISAF headquarters in Kabul further heightened security worries.

2.  The last days of campaigning.  Despite the serious security concerns, the election campaign continues.  Election observers in Kandahar reported to us over the weekend that just as the Taliban step up their anti-election campaign, they witnessed candidates increasing their own campaigns, with more posters appearing on the streets.  Just last night, President Hamid Karzai participated in a national televised debate with two of his rivals; a previous presidential debate on Tolo television last month that Karzai skipped was reportedly watched by more than 10 million Afghans, about a third of the public here.  The media has given the campaign a lot of play.  There is a "Daily Show" style program poking fun at politicians and a reality show called "The Candidate" that pits young Afghans in a mock election. 

In addition to nearly 40 presidential candidates (the number has decreased with recent dropouts), there are more than 3,100 candidates running for four-year terms in 420 seats in 34 provincial councils. 

The level of campaign activity has varied according to the area, but the main point is that the Taliban threats and violence haven't shut down the campaign nationwide.  A joint report released earlier this month by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan found some challenges resulting from the insecurity, with severe limitations on freedom of movement, assembly, and association in some parts of the country. 

Yet the election goes on, and the real test will come Thursday, when we see how many of the 17 million Afghans registered to vote show up at the polls.  Many observers expect a light turnout in the morning, as voters wait and see what the situation looks like.

3.  Concerns about electoral fraud, irregularities and mismanagement.  These elections will be the first elections post-2001 administered by Afghan authorities -- the Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC) is managing the process.  The 2004 presidential election and 2005 parliamentary and provincial council elections were joint efforts by the United Nations and Afghan authorities, so these elections are a test case of Afghan institutions.

Media reports have already highlighted some concerns about possible irregularities in the registration process.  For example, there are signs of a high number of women registered to vote compared to men in certain parts of the country, raising questions about possible improprieties.  DI observers in Herat spoke with some voters who were unable to register because they did not have a national identity card.  And there are worries about possible vote tabulation problems in remote polling centers.

But at this early stage, it is way too early to draw any conclusions about these potential problems and what impact they will have on the overall electoral process.  The expectation among most election observers -- Afghan and international alike -- is that the elections won't be a perfect, given the challenges. Different monitoring groups like the one I am with will produce statements and reports, but the real test is whether the Afghan people accept the results as legitimate and sees the leaders selected for presidential and positions on the provincial councils as reflecting their will. And only time will tell whether these elections advance or undermine stability.

4.  Post-election uncertainty.  In addition to the potential for more pre-election attacks by the Taliban, speculation abounds about the possibility for post-election political violence between different factions. The presidential elections would go to a second round if no candidate receives more than 50 percent of votes cast. If a second round happens, the top two candidates would face off in early October. Some observers worry that if there are signs of widespread fraud or voter intimidation; a losing candidate may not accept the legitimacy of the results and might turn to violence to settle scores. 

Some worries exist about possible post-election violence over provincial election results too. In meetings DI election observers had in Jalalabad over the last few days, for example, residents expressed worries about possible post-election violence between three main tribal families running different candidates. 

5.  Getting on with the real business of governing.  Finally, one of the most important things to watch closely is what actually happens after these elections -- what the new president and leaders at the provincial councils actually do with the power they obtain through the elections. It is a basic point, but ironically all too often overlooked.  It has happened before in Afghanistan and in other countries -- a lot of energy and effort goes into an election process -- but then getting on with the real business of governing is overlooked and insufficient investments are made in helping build institutions.  The challenge of actually linking the efforts of provincial councils -- which have vaguely defined advisory roles -- with the other levels of governance are considerable, and are probably just as difficult as building the Afghan National Army and police.

Hopefully, the new interagency team that Ambassador Holbrooke has assembled at the State Department, will work with international organizations and other countries to help provide Afghanistan with the much-needed post-election assistance in strengthening governance and institutions throughout the country.  An opportunity was missed to follow through on the last elections and make some serious gains in advancing stability in Afghanistan, in large because of the distraction of the Iraq war. 

The debate over U.S. policy in Afghanistan is heating up again in Washington, with people asking serious questions about the end goals and metrics for progress both here and in Pakistan.  The next few days of campaigning and the post-election period in Afghanistan will likely have a major impact on that policy debate, and no one can predict how things will go out here.  Watch this space for more reports from Afghanistan -- it is shaping up to be an interesting few weeks here.

Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a member of an election-observing delegation with Democracy International. You can find him on Twitter @Katulis.

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