We should be asking some critical questions about the now, much-publicized NATO and Afghan forces operation to take Marjah district in Helmand. For starters: How does this operation fit into the overall strategy for Afghanistan -- why Marjah and why now?

One can argue that U.S. and NATO forces have not had significant military success in Afghanistan since the initial invasion, despite the expansion of ISAF's mandate across the country between 2004 and 2006. And one can argue further that the reverse is true: The Taliban's military strategy has been successful and their territorial influence has in fact increased dramatically in recent years, as they now dominate the south and east, and are rapidly increasing their presence in the north. Taliban forces have also closed in on Kabul, as evidenced by the most recent major attacks within the capital itself.

That the world's "most powerful military" hasn't yet prevailed in Afghanistan is a problem to be sure, but one that should be addressed by its political architects, not its military actors. From the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, Western politicians and their domestic bases have failed to provide adequate military resources, failed to coordinate the NATO effort, and failed to tackle effectively Afghan "hearts and minds" with the necessary political, developmental and counter-narcotics policies.

The Obama administration's troop surge -- which was sorely needed and should have been matched by additional troops from other NATO countries -- must be used to ensure not just military victories, but military victories which are of high-profile and also high-value in the overall conflict.

We are at a moment when the West has decided to focus its strategy on a "political solution". The troop surge should be used in a way that would have the most impressive impact on the overall political dynamics and take back some of the military initiative from the Taliban forces, which is a necessary backdrop to the any discussion about a political settlement.  The military objectives should support the political objectives.

So why, of all the Taliban-controlled areas, is NATO using the recent influx of U.S. troops to seize Marjah? Clearing Marjah will be a minor symbolic military move without much of a political rationale. Although the district is considered to be a heroin trade hub, the absence of a counter-narcotics strategy means that it is not clear what actions will be taken against the area's opium economy once it is cleared. If no alternative livelihoods are created once the district has been re-taken, resentment towards the Afghan government and international forces will only increase.

The build-up to the operation has not been encouraging. Although the political decision to provide advance warning of Operation Moshtarak has allowed civilians to leave the conflict zone, steps to resettle these people temporarily are nonexistent. Thousands of Afghans are fleeing to Lashkar Gah and the ungoverned refugee camp outside it.

This camp does not have sufficient food, medical supplies, or accommodations for the families who have already fled there -- a shocking state of affairs which has persisted since March 2006 -- and is already far beyond any original holding capacity, full of unemployed and angry men unable to provide for their families. Creating a situation which will lead to thousands more to take refuge at this camp is not only disastrous from a humanitarian point of view; it is a very poorly conceived plan from a counter-insurgency viewpoint.

Instead of using the military to create Taliban recruitment opportunities -- which this overcrowded refugee camp will surely do -- why doesn't the United States use its military power to  concentrate its effort on achievable objectives with real strategic value to the West and that will have a positive impact on Afghan lives?

For example, a far more impactful use of the troop surge would be to take back control of the ring road from Kabul to Lashkar Gah from the Taliban -- a strategic artery which is vital for control of the south of Afghanistan and would have an immediate and beneficial impact on the entire conflict. Currently, travel on these roads is Taliban dominated and highly dangerous, restricting local life immensely and increasing the sense of isolation of the people of the south. Further, NATO and Afghan forces should also focus on regaining control of the whole of Kandahar province. This area has much greater geographic and political significance to the Taliban than Helmand. Holding the territory -- not just seizing, and then withdrawing from it -- is critical for enabling vital development and infrastructure projects, boosting the local economy within the Afghan civilian community, and draw support away from the Taliban.

This U.S. "troop surge" has cost the Obama administration a good deal of political currency on the domestic front already. Using these new military resources to take the Marjah district, whether entirely misconceived or purposefully misdirected for an "easy win," could be catastrophic and drain away the military power that has just been gained at serious political cost. Any U.S./NATO effort from this point onward should be used on the ground to create critical and strategic military supremacy, bring the Taliban to the table ready to make some concessions -- and improve, not degrade our relationship with the Afghan people.

What really happened at the London Conference on Afghanistan? Sadly, not much. There was a real sense of déjà vu -- much the same has been said in Bonn, Tokyo, Kabul, Berlin, London, Rome, Paris, and the Hague -- and these conferences all seem divorced from the real facts on the ground.

These events are, of necessity, political pep rallies for Western domestic audiences who are anxious to see their governments "doing something" about Afghanistan and addressing their concerns about the Karzai "government."

During the conference, President Karzai unveiled a six-point "Action Plan" designed to turn around the situation in Afghanistan. But how much "action" is really behind the political façade of his six-point plan?

1. Peace and Reconciliation

President Karzai announced the Taliban Reintegration Plan, with the stated aim to "offer an honorable place in society" to those insurgents willing to renounce al-Qaeda, abandon violence and pursue their political goals peacefully and in accordance with the Afghan Constitution.

This plan seems hastily pulled together to attempt to give the London Conference a focal point. There was mechanical support for the initiative and very little genuine political enthusiasm from Western leaders: just $140 million has been pledged for the first year.

This is surely a case of "the devil is in the details." There have been mentions of paying Taliban a flat fee to switch sides (later denied by Interior Minister Mohammed Atmar), or offering socio-economic opportunities such as jobs or training. There is no clarity and so far only confusion.

What jobs are these reformist Taliban to be offered? Unemployment levels in Afghanistan run at around 40 percent. Since neither the Afghan government nor the international community have yet been capable of providing enough jobs for law-abiding young men in Afghanistan, how can a Reintegration Fund suddenly create sustainable employment for tens of thousands of former insurgents? Or would they be welcomed where there are job opportunities: in the Afghan National Police or Afghan National Army? Surely, this would be a formula for infiltration of the ANA and ANP by the Taliban, especially given the existing problems with vetting recruits.

As for paying the Taliban to switch, the figures provided so far are not significant: $140 million for the first year will not achieve much. Current U.S. military intelligence estimates indicate that there are around 30,000 Taliban fighters across Afghanistan. Even if the Reintegration Fund was only able to reach half of these insurgents, there would be at most $1,000 paid to each Taliban member who switched. Once administrative costs, are factored in, this figure will drop even further. What is to stop a Taliban fighter from taking the money and then "relapsing," and returning to violence?

2. Security

Another expected, but still largely aspirational, goal was President Karzai's insistence that Afghan security forces would "lead security of our country within the next five years all over Afghanistan." Unaddressed were the significant desertion and drug addiction rates in the security forces, which are still alarmingly high. In late 2009, it was estimated that 10,000 out of the 94,000 Afghan soldiers who had been trained so far -- 10.6 percent -- had simply disappeared. Fifteen percent of the Afghan army, and up to 60 percent of the Afghan police in Helmand province, are estimated to be drug addicts.

3. Good Governance

Expanding the reach of the central government while reforming its institutions to be accountable and effective is another worthy aim set out in Karzai's speech. However, there is no indication how this will come about. Significant portions of the country have a limited or non-existent government presence, and some areas are completely controlled and governed by the Taliban. The government's reputation for bribery and inefficiency has led many Afghans, and members of the international community, to simply bypass it.

In Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, the Shinwari tribe has agreed to fight against the Taliban but will be paid $1 million, directly from the U.S. government. The aid will avoid the local government, with whom the Shinwari are also furious for their corruption and inability to provide basic services. One of the tribe's elders declared that: "We have absolutely no faith in the Afghan government to do anything for us. We don't trust them at all."

Karzai also stated in his speech that the parliamentary elections now scheduled for September will be "free and fair," calling for the international community's assistance to be "impartial, technical and constructive," a back-handed complaint against the role of Western allies in responding to the fraud in last August's presidential election. Given that the Karzai-appointed head of the Independent Election Commission remains in charge of the election process, we should mark the notion that the parliamentary elections would be of a different sort as aspirational, at best.

Inside Kabul itself we see the dysfunction of the political process. Karzai has not been able to complete his government, as the Parliament has failed to confirm his proposed Cabinet members. Yet the Speaker of the Parliament, Mohammed Qanooni (a member of an opposition political party and a Tajik) was not invited to the London Conference, despite the need for the Karzai Government and the international community to build a functioning political relationship with the Afghan Parliament and opposition party members.

4. Corruption

Tackling graft will be the "key focus of my second term in office," according to  Karzai. Much has been made of his supposed commitment to fighting corruption, which the UNODC estimates at comprising 25 percent of Afghanistan's GDP. Karzai continues to talk of corruption as if it is being undertaken by someone other than his own government and his own appointees.

Additionally, in an interview with the BBC's John Simpson just a few days before the London Conference, President Karzai insisted that the UNODC report on corruption level was "simply fabricated."

In London, Karzai called for an "end to the culture of impunity" -- again as if this was being carried out by actors outside his government. Yet last July it was Karzai himself who pardoned five senior drug traffickers, one of whom was related to his election manager, and he has supported the mayor of Kabul despite his conviction on corruption charges.

All of this makes his bold declarations on corruption and the rule of law sound incredibly hollow, and merely part of a stage production for the international community.

5: Regional Co-operation

The need for a regional solution to Afghanistan's crisis is another lofty, aspiration. In reality, the interests and the capabilities of Afghanistan's neighbors are too divided to make this a meaningful solution. Iran's last-minute absence from the London conference underlines this point, as does the continuing hostility between Pakistan and India. And are we including Russia and China? What exactly does this " regional co-operation" point mean, how will these regional players be brought in?

6: Economic Development

Pledges to build Afghanistan's private sector and improve the country's infrastructure have been heard again and again over the past eight years. However, Karzai's speech did not mention one of the most central economic issues to Afghanistan -- opium trafficking.

The absence of a new approach to opium production underlines the fundamental problem with the London Conference. The event produced a lot of bold promises and fine words, but there is a concerning lack of detail on all of these points. The Karzai "government" continues to dismiss the problem of corruption as a Western invention; the "international community" insists on the need for reconciliation with the Taliban and then fails to provide the necessary funds.

And what of the grinding poverty of the Afghan people themselves, the lack of food aid in the South, the growing camps of displaced families, and civilian casualties at their highest level ever last year?

This type of "hold hands and hope for the best" conference has happened before, at all of the 10 international conferences on Afghanistan held over the past 9 years. In which capital will we meet next year to re-affirm, once again, our "commitment to Afghanistan"?

By Norine MacDonald

With the Afghan election run-off just sixteen days away, much hangs in the balance. The good news is a resolution to the Afghan election standoff has been reached -- a true success story for the domestic political agendas of the West. Whether or not the international community and the Afghan government can, in just two weeks, pull off a clean and legitimate election is another matter.

The fact of the matter is that holding any election in Afghanistan is an incredibly difficult task. Huge efforts were made to tackle the many challenges posed by operating thousands of polling stations in a rural and unstable country for the first presidential vote, held on Aug. 20, and still the election was marked by poor turnout, hundreds of Taliban attacks, and extensive fraud. Now, with winter fast approaching in many parts of the country, it is difficult to see how the required ballot papers, a new system to prevent a repeat of election fraud, and a new security response to allow more polling stations to open can all be brought together in the time provided.

But before votes can be counted, there must be voters. Assuring an acceptable level of voter turnout, especially in the turbulent Pashtun south, where Taliban activity led to low turnout in the first round, will be a formidable task. Presently, the security situation in the south -- and now as well in the north in Kunduz and Baghlan -- is grim. Many Afghans will be unwilling to risk their safety again, especially if they doubt whether the election will make much of a difference to their daily lives.

In addition to concerns over security, there are concerns about voter morale. During recent research interviews in Kandahar and Helmand, I found the cynicism of many ordinary Afghans clear. Afghans are threatening to boycott the poll. There are "no good Afghan political leaders to lead us out of this situation," one local stated, indicating he would not vote in a run-off. Some of those who supported President Karzai, in particular, are unwilling to vote again, disenchanted with what they saw as his complicity in the fraud.

This disenchantment among Karzai's supporters must be acknowledged, since it indicates the serious possibility that he may not, contrary to expectations, triumph in a run-off.

After the recount, Karzai had an estimated 48 percent of the vote, while his leading challenger Dr. Abdullah Abdullah took 35 percent.

It's possible that Abdullah could pick up the votes of the other candidates, including Ramazan Bashardost and Ashraf Ghani, who came in third and fourth, respectively. Their vote shares, along with the other 29 candidates, came to 15.3 percent of the total ballots. If Abdullah collects the majority of these votes, perhaps two-thirds, he will have to gain less than 10 percent elsewhere to claim victory. This gap could easily be closed by the drop in Karzai's support -- allowing Abdullah to overtake Karzai.

But before any new votes can be counted, the Afghan elections system and international partners must cope with the logistical challenges of delivering seventeen million ballots - by helicopter, truck, and donkey -- to thousands of remote and increasingly snowbound polling stations.

In just sixteen days, a new system must be developed to prevent a replay of the first round's fraud, and then deployed across the countryside. In just sixteen days, new approaches to security, which will allow more polling stations (especially in the south) to open, motivating the Afghan people to get out and vote without fear for their lives, must be put in place.

At this stage, delivering a credible second round of voting seems to be more an aspiration than a reality and will require a nearly Herculean effort by systems and infrastructures not operating at optimum levels. We in the West were keen on a second round to deliver the credible Afghan partner necessary for our domestic and security agendas. But we might just have walked into that space delineated by the saying: "Be careful what you wish for -- you might just get it."

Shah Marai/AFP/Getty Images

By Norine MacDonald

6:40am A short update: Contacts in Mazar report rumours of a large demonstration in favour of Dr. Abduallah planned for tomorrow.

Additionally there are reports of dramatically high numbers of Karzai votes coming out of Kandahar, despite that voter turnout was low.

I note I am passing on unconfirmed information. Elections Commission having a press conference just now.

5:54am From my conversations with our staff in the southern provinces voter turn out was indeed very low.

Despite not so many Taliban attacks yesterday the Taliban in the end managed to keep Afghans away from the polls.

This could be characterized as psychological and political success story for them -- and unfortunately not a success story for the NATO/U.S. security initiative in the south, nor the international community's attempt to convince Afghans to go out and vote.

As we noted before the election, how much of the Pashtun population will have been disenfranchised by the security situation, and how does that affect the perceived legitimacy of the voting?

Last "election" the alleged turnout was 70%...

3:12am Karzai's campaign said on Tolo TV they have won the first round. Abdullah responded that he had received 61% of the vote.

On another interesting rumor is that Bashardost was Number 2 in Kabul polls.

Elections Commission has in fact not released any results.

From reports from our staff voter turnout in Helmand exceptionally low, but maybe overall ten percent of the polling stations actually didn't open.

It's interesting not how many Taliban attacks there were yesterday but how few compared to their threats.

It's quiet today in Kabul so far -- it's Friday, and the first day of Ramadan which helps.

Norine MacDonald is the president and founder of the International Council On Security and Development.

By Norine MacDonald

The good news from Afghanistan is the seeds of democracy have clearly taken root and there has been vigorous public discussion in the build-up to the August 20 election. The bad news is that election dynamics and poor election management could exacerbate historic ethnic and North-South tensions, leading to a potentially explosive mix.

There is still a great lack of clarity on vote counting systems, when voting results will be declared, how complaints will be dealt with, and the mechanics of maintaining domestic stability during a run-off period.

To prevent repeat voting in the presidential elections, voters will have their fingers dipped in indelible ink. Reports have been received of Taliban "night letters" issued in southern Afghanistan threatening reprisals against Afghans marked by indelible election ink, which is specially manufactured to resist removal and can remain visible for up to a week.

Potential scenarios

Firstly, incumbent president Hamid Karzai -- once seen by some as an easy first-round winner -- could have his legitimacy questioned by allegations of fraud which are already circulating widely and have been commented upon by international observers. This could further destabilize the country and raise the possibility of politically motivated violence. Elements of the Tajik community may respond dramatically if they perceive that President Karzai improperly influenced a victory over Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who shares his Pashtun roots but whose support is primarily in the Tajik north.

Secondly, in the final days before August 20, Taliban insurgents could mount a successful campaign of voter intimidation and attacks on polling stations. These security fears in Afghanistan's south and east could lead to a low voter turnout in the Pashtun heartland of President Karzai's support. This, combined with high turnout in the Tajik north of the country in support of  Dr. Abdullah, the president's main challenger, would result in  President Karzai not winning the more than 50 percent of votes necessary to secure a first-round victory.

Should the elections be marked by a substantial abstention by the Pashtuns -- the country's largest ethnic group -- due to insecurity in the south, and Dr. Abdullah declared victory, he might have difficulty claiming a legitimate mandate and political protests and violence could occur.

There is also the possibility of unrest during the first round of voting and run-off period. The run-off period stipulated by the Constitution is supposed to take place within two weeks of the first vote but it is now understood the second round of voting will not take place until the beginning of October. This is due to time needed to tabulate the first round, deal with complaints and set up for the second round of voting. Additionally, the holy period of Ramadan begins immediately after the first vote and ends on about September 17th.

Based on latest polling numbers, President Karzai does not have the support necessary to take the first round and we could see a potential alliance between Dr. Abdullah, Dr. Ramazan Bashardost and/or Dr. Ashraf Ghani to unseat President Karzai in the second round.

Contingency plans needed

More clarity and management of the period between the initial voting, the release of voting results, management of the complaints process and the run-off period is needed, along with clearly developed contingency plans to deal with and minimize any election-related instability.

Norine MacDonald is the president of the International Council on Security and Development.

Photo by Paula Bronstein/Getty Images