Just over a year ago a group of twelve men were arrested as part of a long-term investigation led by British intelligence agency MI5 into a network of cells of British Muslims suspected of plotting acts of terrorism. Last week, just as the jury trial was about to get underway, the nine defendants eventually charged in the case chose to plead guilty in the hope of getting reduced sentences. Codenamed Operation Guava and featuring British radical groups, the Internet, Inspire magazine, training camps in Pakistan, prison radicalization and a mysterious character known as "the Bengali," this case brings together a number of different strands in British jihadist terrorism.

The accused plotters were rounded up in four different locations: Birmingham, Cardiff, East London and Stoke-on-Trent, though charges against the Birmingham group were dropped. Four of the men have now admitted to planning on leaving a bomb inside the restroom of the London Stock Exchange (LSE), while the other five pled guilty to various charges of terrorist fundraising, attending terrorist attack planning meetings, or possessing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) Inspire magazine. In summing up, the prosecutor highlighted that the group had not actually planned to kill anyone; "their intention was to cause terror and economic harm and disruption." However, "their chosen method meant there was a risk people would be maimed or killed."

The various cells of the plot met independently in their various locations before connecting nationally through radical networks, Dawah (proselytization) stalls run by extremist groups in cities like Cardiff and webforums like PalTalk. They had all met together in person just a couple of times. The prosecution characterized Mohammed Chowdhury of London as the "ring leader" of the network, though it seems to have been less structured than that. The Stoke group in particular developed plans on its own to carry out a bombing campaign in Stoke, and were eager to recruit more members and train in Kashmir. Stories in the media indicated that members of the Cardiff and Stoke groups had been seen at meetings and protests organized by successor groups of al Muhajiroun (the infamous group established in the late 1990s by a cleric now-banned from Britain, Omar Bakri Mohammed). And a picture has emerged of central plotter Mohammed Chowdury holding an Islam4UK placard at one of the organization's events (Islam4UK was a name adopted by al Muhajiroun after a former appellation was added to the list of proscribed terror groups by British authorities). While the role of al Muhajiroun -- or whatever the name of the successor group may be; at other times they have used the names Saved Sect, al Ghurabaa, Muslims Against Crusades, and the one in vogue currently, Ummah United -- as a radicalizer in networks that have produced terrorists has somewhat receded from that of its heyday, this plot showed the potential risks that still linger from the network.

Neighbors of the men detained in Cardiff reported that some members of the group had apparently served time in prison, where it seemed they had picked up radical ideas. A longstanding concern of Western authorities, the potential for prison radicalization had already reared its head this year in the U.K. when it was revealed last month that a British man who had been converted while serving in Feltham Young Offenders Institution was a key figure in an alleged terrorist plot that was disrupted in December in Mombasa, Kenya. He was not the first terrorist to have done time in Feltham; both ‘shoe bomber' Richard Reid and leader of the July 21, 2005 follow-up attempt to attack London's underground system, Muktar Said Ibrahim, passed through their gates.

But the element that has caught the most media attention is the group's use of AQAP's English-language jihadi manual Inspire. The group had downloaded copies of the magazine and were apparently following its advice in trying to plan a terrorist plot. They discussed the idea of copying the parcel bombs sent by the group in October 2010 and using the Royal Mail or DHL to send bombs within the United Kingdom. Where they were planning on sending them was hinted at in a list they had compiled of the addresses of London Mayor Boris Johnson and at least two prominent British rabbis. Members of the group were also trailed as they reconnoitered a number of locations in London, including the London Stock Exchange, the London Eye, Westminster Abbey, the Palace of Westminster, Houses of Parliament, Blackfriars Bridge and the Church of Scientology. The Stoke group discussed leaving bombs in local pubs and clubs. They seemed to have taken Anwar al-Awlaki's injunctions (of which they had collected substantial amounts) to heart, and were eager to strike in the West at any targets that they could find.

But the group also appears to have maintained some connections with more classic aspects of the British jihadi story, and sought to train abroad in Kashmir. Initially, they claimed that their meetings were to find ways of raising money for Kashmir. Indeed, the Stoke group (predominantly made up of Pakistani-Britons, unlike the London and Cardiff groups, which were made up of Bangladeshi-Britons) had decided to travel abroad to obtain training and had already funded the construction of a madrassa in Kashmir that they spoke of using as a training camp for British radicals. Furthermore, they made connections to a mysterious figure named in court only as "the Bengali," after which they had moved forward with putting their ideas into practice, scoping out targets and trying out making bombs.

This plot is not the only one currently making its way through British courts. Late last year, police in Birmingham arrested a group they claimed had discussed suicide bombs and had allegedly made connections with groups in Pakistan. Operation Guava's significance lies in the fact that it brings together a number of different strands in current counter-terrorism concerns in the UK, creating a complex hybrid plot that seems to have been hatched and conceived entirely at home. A textbook example of Leaderless Jihad.

 

Raffaello Pantucci is an Associate Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), and his writing can be found: http://www.raffaellopantucci.com.

The title of Ken Ballen's recently released book, Terrorists in Love: The Real Lives of Islamic Radicals, is misleading. I put off buying it for some time because of the title, which implied it would provide a sympathetic view of terrorism and constitute yet another rant against "failed" U.S. counterterrorism policies since 9/11.

However, I have always been impressed with the nonprofit organization run by Ken Ballen, Terror Free Tomorrow, and its solid polling work in Pakistan and other Muslim-majority countries. This compelled me to take a closer look at the book, which I ended up reading on a flight to South Asia last fall.

Terrorists in Love is more than a captivating read. It provides fresh insight into how al-Qaeda and its jihadist allies have manipulated young Muslim men into following a hateful and destructive ideology that kills countless innocents -- mostly other Muslims. We have heard a great deal about al-Qaeda's recruitment and training process from U.S. experts, but Ballen describes the terrorism phenomenon in the jihadists' own words, bringing deeper understanding to the issue.

Through interviews and extensive research, Ballen profiles six jihadists, some of whom eventually renounced al-Qaeda. It is the stories of those who become disillusioned with al-Qaeda and its aimless violence that are the most interesting and that need to be publicized more widely. Indeed, exposing first-hand personal accounts of the contradictions and corruption within the terrorist movement likely will hasten its demise -- a process already underway thanks to the elimination of Osama bin Laden and an aggressive drone-missile campaign in Pakistan's tribal border areas.

Ballen acknowledges in his introduction that there are many different paths to becoming a jihadist and that the individual stories in the book should not be viewed as representative of all radical Islamists. The first chapter is a telling eyewitness account of al-Qaeda deceiving a young man into taking his own life and others. Ahmad al-Shayea is a Saudi who at the age of 19 goes to Iraq to fight Americans, after seeing photos of tortured prisoners at Abu Ghraib. It is a story of disillusionment -- one that many other Muslim men would surely have expressed, had they lived to tell about it.

Ahmad al-Shayea is tricked by two Iraqi fighters into driving a truck loaded with explosives, from which the two Iraqis suddenly jump, just before the bombs go off. Ahmad miraculously survives the explosion, and the rest of the chapter recounts his recuperation at an American hospital in Iraq.

After the ordeal, Ahmad retains his steadfast belief in Islam, but he has awoken to the al-Qaeda lie. He proclaims his desire to go on television to tell other young Saudis that "Al-Qaeda was not for Islam; it was not for humanity." And that, "I am a living example of al-Qaeda's hellfire...I want them to see how al-Qaeda tricked me into killing innocent people."

Terrorists in Love pulls no punches in its depiction of the close relationship of the Pakistan military with jihadist terrorism. In one chapter, Malik -- an Afghan refugee who grows up in Pakistan, joins the Taliban, and has personal encounters with Mullah Omar -- becomes disillusioned with the Afghan Taliban when he discovers its reliance on Pakistan's intelligence agency (run by the Army) for training, weapons and funding. Malik feels ashamed that his organization must rely on an army that also receives support from the Americans. However, instead of abandoning jihad, Malik joins the Pakistani Taliban to attack what he views as the double-dealing Pakistani military.

In the fifth chapter, we become acquainted with a Pakistani jihadist whose father is a colonel in the Pakistan Army. The colonel is disdainful toward Islamist extremists and works for the Strategic Plans Division, which controls Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. His responsibilities include keeping Pakistan's nuclear assets out of the hands of extremists, like his own son. The irony of this complex father-son relationship story brings home the reality of the dangers in Pakistan, where the institution in charge of protecting the country's nuclear weapons also arms and trains the Afghan Taliban.

Ballen concludes from his research and interviews that Muslim communities themselves must develop ways to counter extremism, while also acknowledging that the U.S. cannot afford to be complacent against extremists dedicated to killing Americans. His overall recommendation for the U.S. to simply lead by example is unrealistic, however, especially in light of the democratic revolutions sweeping the Middle East, where U.S. silence could contribute to more bloodshed. America should not retreat from actively promoting democratic ideals in the Middle East, as Ballen suggests, particularly since the principles of liberal democratic governance are a powerful antidote to Islamist extremists' message of intolerance, hatred, and repression.

Ballen's work is well worth a read by anyone seeking to understand more fully the complex and multiple factors that drive terrorism. The reader will have to judge whether Ballen was brave or merely naïve in agreeing to meet with extremists at hotels in Islamabad. But the conversations he recorded from those probably ill-advised meetings are eye-opening, and should help U.S. policymakers develop more finely-tuned messages and policies to fight the ideological battle laid bare in Terrorists in Love.

Lisa Curtis is a Senior Research Fellow on South Asia at the Heritage Foundation. 

Though the embattled Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government breathed a sigh of relief after passing what may be called a "pro-democracy" resolution in parliament on the evening of January 16, hours later the country's Supreme Court issued a contempt of court notice to the Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani for his refusal to reinstate corruption charges filed against President Asif Ali Zardari in a Swiss court. 

Many analysts see the political crisis currently wracking Pakistan as a do-or-die moment for its civilian government. However, the country's all-powerful army is also feeling the heat of events this time, mainly due to the visible shift in public opinion against an explicit military intervention in the country's politics.

Despite provocative, albeit well-placed, ‘state-within-the-state' comments by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani about the army and its powerful intelligence arm the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), or Prime Minister Gilani's decision to sack the well-respected Defense Secretary Naeem Khalid Lodhi, the military leadership so far opted to keep its hands off direct intervention, instead opting to voice its displeasure in the media.

Instead, analysts believe, the generals are using their mighty arm behind the scene, by pushing an interventionist Supreme Court not to let the civilian government off the hook.

The first case in question is the murky memo addressed to former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen allegedly asking for help stopping the Pakistani generals from carrying out a coup following the May 2 raid in Abbottabad. The second is the controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) introduced by former dictator Pervez Musharraf, which grants amnesty to all political leaders, workers and bureaucrats accused of corruption, embezzlement and misuse of authority between January 1, 1986 and October 12, 1999.

Notwithstanding the media criticism of the civilian government over a host of issues including good governance, the country's poor economic situation, law and order problems in places like Karachi, Pakistan's seething energy crisis and apologetic approach towards militancy, the majority of leading analysts, newspapers and television commentators have come out clearly against extra-constitutional measures and an overt seizure of power.

In his commentary in the U.K.-based Guardian newspaper, journalist Muhammad Hanif says the Pakistan army is at least partially responsible for the troubles afflicting the nuclear-armed country and its 180 million people: "Pakistan's army is as corrupt as the politicians from whom it wants to save the country. It's just better at paperwork."

During the past three major coups in 1958 (Gen. Ayub Khan), 1977 (Gen. Zia) and 1999 (Gen. Musharraf), political leaders, civil society and even the majority of media outlets welcomed the change, hoping for a better future for the country. However, there are no such feelings visible this time, not even from the staunchest opponents of the government among politicians, civil society and the media.

Following the Army's prediction of "grievous consequences" in response to Prime Minister Gilani's interview with a Chinese newspaper, one of Pakistan's leading newspapers, Express Tribune, put a key question before its readers about the army's role in the country's politics: "The first question that comes to mind as one reads this is, did the military's actions in 1958, 1977 and 1999 also reflect an "allegiance to State and the Constitution"? Is not a former army chief on record as having said that the Constitution was a mere piece of paper?"

Discussing the same subject, another leading newspaper, Dawn writes: "One thing in particular bears stating: if Pakistan had been a more developed democracy, the authors of the ISPR [Inter-Services Public Relations] statement this week would have been summarily sacked." 

Additionally, many journalists in Pakistan seem to be more aware of their critical role in saving democratic institutions this time. In her article in Express Tribune, analyst Nasim Zehra writes: "Had there been an independent electronic media in October 1999 there would have been no coup."

What is different now, though, more than three years after Pakistan's return to democracy, is the role played by the Supreme Court as a perceived advocate of the armed forces. Discussing the recent decision of the Supreme Court questioning the ‘honesty' of Prime Minister Gilani on the basis of Quranic injunctions against being deceitful, a Daily Times columnist Dr. Muhammad Taqi writes: "In a country reeling under the effects of radicalization, the last thing needed is the industrial-strength moral certitude and virtual proselytizing from the bench." In his article entitled "Judicial Hubris," Dr. Taqi states that "it is most unfortunate that the honorable judges have repeatedly resorted to religious rhetoric to establish the case against the NRO beneficiaries."

Another columnist, Kamran Shafi, writing in Express Tribune on the same subject, asks the Supreme Court as why the judicial commissions are silent over the role of intelligence agencies in their failure to track down bin Ladin in garrison town of Abbottabad or the culprits behind the tragic murder of journalist Saleem Shahzad. Shafi continues: "What is of utmost import today; what is a matter of life or death for many Pakistanis; what will determine whether we are a civilized people or a horde of wild brutes is the shamefully non-conclusive report on the brutal and savage beating to death of journalist Saleem Shahzad."

Like several other analysts, Ilyas Khan of the BBC believes that the army is supporting the Supreme Court behind the scene to push the government to the corner. "Instead, the military are thought to prefer to let the Supreme Court use "constitutional" methods to go after the government."

Meanwhile, the Urdu-language newspapers, mostly known for their anti-American and anti-government comments, have generally continued to criticize the government's inefficiency, but have still asked for an end to the crisis in accordance with the tenets laid out in the Constitution of Pakistan.

In its editorial on January 15, just a day after the government introduced a pro-democracy resolution in the parliament the Urdu-language Daily Express praised Pakistan's political parties for struggling to resolve the crisis through democratic means.

Another Urdu-language newspaper, the Daily Mashriq, criticizes the government for its ‘inefficiency' and ‘non-implementation' of the court decisions regarding the NRO, but also opposes the tussle among the state institutions (i.e. the parliament, army and judiciary), arguing that this infighting will have negative effects on the future of democracy.

Commentator and analyst Ayaz Amir, in his article entitle "double standards and hypocrisy" in the Urdu daily Jang, says no one can deny the fact that the present government is inefficient. But, he says, it is time for the opposition to let it complete the remaining one year on its term for the sake of democracy.

***

The rapid pace of movement on the political front makes predictions impossible, though the most likely scenario will be the government's agreement with the opposition parties, both inside and outside the parliament, to an early election following the voting for Senate, due to take place in March of this year.

While the military is in no position to stage a direct coup for a number of reasons, including opposition from both pro- and anti-government parties alike, it is the Supreme Court of Pakistan that poses the most direct threat to the existing government serving out its current term.

The opposition parties have their own axes to grind. The main opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) is apparently resisting an overt army action, but will not weep if the government is sacked by the Supreme Court with behind-the-scenes approval from the army.

The reason for allowing this to happen is clear: To stop the PPP from getting a majority in the Senate election due in March and do not allow more time to cricketer turned politician Imran Khan, whose previously downtrodden Tehrik-e-Insaaf is unexpectedly making headway in many cities. Khan's critics believe he enjoys secret support from "the establishment," which means the army and its intelligence agencies. 

The people of Pakistan, suffering under price hikes for energy and gasoline, high unemployment, and numerous other problems, would shed no tears if the government were sent packing under pressure from the Supreme Court. However, a direct army intervention is likely to be resisted, mainly because of the army's shattered image following the Musharraf era.

Some sources in the pro-PPP camp say the government would rather to be removed through direct army intervention than by the Supreme Court, just to become a ‘Siasee Shaheed' (political martyr) and garner public sympathy before the next general elections. Hence, political circles close to the PPP leadership may not rule out steps provoking the army -- including seeking the resignation or sacking of the Army and ISI chiefs -- once the party sees clear chances of removal from government through the Supreme Court. One last option for the government, in a bid to avoid the Supreme Court action, is the resignation of Prime Minister Gilani, which could postpone, if not fully avert, the existing crisis -- until the crucial Senate election at least. Prime Minister Gilani is due to appear before the Supreme Court on Thursday, January 19 with regard to the NRO case.

With nothing clear about the future, the only solid element seen on Pakistan's political horizon is the strong resolve shown by the people, media, civil society and the political parties to say "no" to a possible military intervention and ‘yes' to democracy and to the supremacy of the Constitution. What that will mean in reality, though, is anyone's guess.

Daud Khattak is a journalist currently working for the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Pashto-language station Radio Mashaal.

In this month's issue of FHM India, an international men's magazine, Pakistani actress Veena Malik made worldwide headlines with a risqué nude photo shoot. While much of the attention has been on what Malik wasn't wearing, one of the most powerful elements of her photo shoot was what she was sporting: a big, bold tattoo on her left arm, stating very simply, "ISI," for Pakistani's secretive Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate.

The cover headline: "Pakistani W.M.D. Veena Malik Shows You How to Throw a Grenade!" 

Indeed, the cover has been explosive; PakAlertPress.com, for instance splashed a headline on its blog: "India and Pakistan Are Going Nuclear Over Provocative Political Tattoo." And the photo has elicited a furious reaction in Pakistan's media and in its living rooms.[[Break]]

In one fell swoop, the enormous tattoo on a bare woman's body managed to demystify, emasculate and parody the ISI -- something most people have been afraid to do in public since the inception of the agency a year after the birth of the nation in 1947. Founded with a mission of coordinating intelligence in the country after Pakistan's loss to India in the 1947 war in Kashmir, the agency has become a feared, though privately mocked, enterprise, its hands allegedly in every back-room Pakistani deal; rigging elections, training militants for battle in India and Afghanistan, and monitoring its own citizens. The tattoo's location on Malik's body takes on special meaning in light of retired Adm. Mike Mullen's statement in September that the militant Haqqani Network, considered by most Western analysts and experts to be based in the tribal areas of Pakistan, is a "veritable arm" of the ISI. 

All the while, the ISI works in the cloak of darkness. In 2002, when I was trying to find my kidnapped Wall Street Journal colleague Daniel Pearl, I met an ISI officer in my living room in Karachi who acknowledged his employer, but introduced himself as "Major." "Major what?" I asked. "Major Major," he said. Nice. Really helpful.

***

To scholars on Pakistan, the ISI tattoo is emblematic of an important new civil discourse occurring in Pakistan over issues that were formerly taboo, such as the role of the ISI in society. Hassan Abbas, the author of Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, about growing militancy in Pakistan, said new media freedoms are eliciting rich debate in the country on deep, contested issues "such as the role of religion in society and the interference of the military in political arena." He adds, "These issues are being openly debated in Pakistan, and that is, overall, a healthy development."

Kabeer Sharma, editor of FHM India, says the ISI tattoo was meant to be a sardonic reflection of India's own conspiracy theories about the intelligence agency. "In India, you say, 'The milk has gone bad. The ISI did it,' They blame all of their problems on ISI," says Sharma.

Sharma, the son of an Indian satirist and New Delhi bookstore owner, says that a dilemma on the subcontinent is that folks don't laugh enough over the absurdities of politics. "The problem," he says, "is that we all blame our problems on this imaginary force. Who is this ISI?" Meanwhile, on the Pakistan side, everything is blamed on RAW. "We collectively have no sense of humor. We have no sense of irony," he says.

As a media image, the Malik photo was a genius expression of a real counterculture movement taking root in Pakistan, taking a dig at the secretive "Major Major" culture of the ISI, by literally exposing the agency -- and by extension, the government -- to the light of day, if just in a simple tattoo. (Malik says that the photo was altered, and both Malik and FHM are engaged in a legal battle over the issue.)

While a Pakistani newspaper said the country "yawns"at the Malik photo, it chronicled columns, commentaries and jokes circulating in the nation, including one that goes like this: "Her arm says ISI but the picture is RAW," a reference to India's intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing.

But this isn't just a conspiracy hatched in India (though the magazine was produced there), feeding the siege mentality behind so much of the rhetoric in Pakistan. In a country where the "ghairat brigade," or honor squad, of talking heads takes regularly to the airwaves to defend Pakistan's honor against enemies -- perceived and imagined -- the photo shoot was a victory for a new movement that is emerging in Pakistan: the beghairat brigade, or the squad "without honor," or more aptly the "shameless brigade." 

To many, the beghairat brigade offers a counter to the conspiracy theories that so permeate debates in Pakistan. Josh White, a scholar on Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, says, "I think the significance of the small but interesting beghairat movement is that it is trying to forge a way of being genuinely nationalistic without accepting the narrative that all of Pakistan's problems are the result of someone else's meddling."

Malik and her generation in Pakistani society illustrate a deeper battle that is playing out in Pakistan and Muslim communities on issues of honor, or ghairat, and shame, called sharam. Flagging this evolution, the acerbic Pakistani columnist Nadeem Paracha wrote earlier this year, "Goodbye ghairat."

With a sense of wit, irony and humor, the beghairat brigade offers the nation an opportunity to expunge itself of the corrosive relationship with traditional honor-shame culture, by challenging the warped sense of honor and dishonor that has defined much of the country's ethos on issues from corruption to nuclear non-proliferation, "honor killings" of women and men, homegrown militant networks, and the ISI. And the beghairat's work is rooted in Pakistani tradition with sardonic 20^th century writers such as Saadat Hasan Manto, the author of the must-read book, Letters to Uncle Sam, and a favorite of Malik's.

The Pakistani military's public relations office reportedly sent a text message to local journalists from the Pakistani grousing that the photo was "the height of humiliation for Pakistan, done by a Pakistani on Indian soil." In a Pakistani socialists' listserv, one Pakistani writer, giving the ISI acronym new meaning, wrote, tongue-in-cheek,"Is this part of a grand conspiracy to implicate the great International Soldiers of Islam (ISI) in a controversy by the enemies of Islam...." If so, he joked, "every soldier of Islam would be eyeing to be part of the investigation team."

What is ironic is that while there have been calls to revoke Malik's Pakistani citizenship (rejected, fortunately, by the courts), there are some less-than-exemplary characters who have been lauded in the country by the "ghairat brigade." For instance, Faisal Shahzad, the would-be Times Square bomber, is considered a victim by many in Pakistan, despite having confessed to the crime for which he has been imprisoned, the attempted murder of a number of innocents.

Then there is A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who signed a confession in 2004 that he gave nuclear secrets to the North Koreans, Iran and Libya, in violation of international nonproliferation agreements; he was pardoned, and today he is a hero in the country. Years ago, Pakistanis took to the streets when American agents caught and extradited Mir Amal Kansi, a Pakistani who shot and killed CIA employees in 1993 as they sat in their cars at a traffic light in Langley, Va. And, then, lest we forget, there is the serious homegrown militancy problem of a Punjabi Taliban and a Pakistani Taliban that includes tens of thousands of militant soldiers, based on many estimates, freely living in the country without much harassment.

Finally, there is Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani MIT graduate known as "Lady al-Qaeda." She was convicted last year in a U.S. court for attempting to shoot a U.S. soldier in Afghanistan, but, in a country where the average income is about $450 a year, the government of Pakistan allocated some $2 million for her defense, and Pakistanis in the "Free Aafia" movement march regularly on the streets. 

Deborah Scroggins, a journalist and author of the provocative forthcoming book, Wanted Women: Faith, Lies and the War on Terror: The Lives of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Aafia Siddiqui, says, "If Aafia Siddiqui is Pakistan's 'daughter of the nation,' Veena Malik is her perfect alter ego. The 'ghairat brigade' holds up Aafia as the symbol of Pakistan victimized by the West. Veena mocks their pretentions to purity and challenges their obsession with sex."

Scroggins lays out the contrast that is symbolic of the divide that has engulfed Pakistan: Born in 1972, Siddiqui comes from the rigid, puritantical, Deobandi interpretation of Islam, and came of age during the 1980s, when jihad was celebrated in Pakistan as the source of the great defeat over the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. "She's revered by the 'ghairat brigade' because although she went to the U.S. to study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Brandeis University, she never 'went over to the other side,' so to speak" Scroggins adds. "She never stopped raising money for jihad. She continued to view the U.S. as the enemy of Pakistan and of Muslims. When she was captured in Afghanistan, Pakistan's right-wing pundits and politicians rushed to accuse the country's democratically elected government of selling her to the U.S. in exchange for money, even though there was no evidence that the government had anything to do with it."  

Born in 1984, "Veena is a symbol of another Pakistan, one that has existed since the founding of the state, but that we've seen less and less of with the rise of Islamization," says Scroggins. "It's an irreverrant, mocking, creative, secular Pakistan -- the voice of writers and poets like Ahmed Faiz," a biting 20th century intellectual. "Unfortunately it tends to be confined to the upper classes and is very much under threat these days," she says. 

Both Malik and Siddiqui "broke the rules about the way Pakistani women are supposed to behave," Scroggins says. Siddiqui was divorced from her doctor husband and remarried a younger man, 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad's nephew, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, another 9/11 facilitator. Her activities endangered her children; she was caught shooting at a U.S. soldier. "But she is forgiven for all of that because Pakistanis believe she did it for Pakistan and Islam," says Scroggins. "It's assumed that Veena, on the other hand, is only having her nude picture taken for money. And that's the way the ‘ghairat brigade' always portrays the motives of Pakistan's secularists."  

Aisha Chowdhry, a 24-year-old Pakistani-American journalist who produced a documentary, "Inside the Tinder Box," about Pakistan, says the Malik cover, whether nude as it appeared or topless, as Malik insists the photo was originally, "should not come as a surprise" to those watching the counterculture movement in Pakistan. "Art always has been a way for Pakistanis to showcase how they feel," she says. "Today, there are songs criticizing the government, paintings depicting terrorism in Pakistan, and now a racy photo of one of the country's most famous models with an ISI tattoo."

Chowdhry says, "In a country where journalists get killed if they dare to investigate sensitive issues, music videos and plays are one of the few ways to connect the young generation with what is going on in their country, and maybe even make a positive change someday."

In a piece on al-Jazeera before the Malik controversy, Syed Ali Abbas Zaida, founder of the Pakistan Youth Alliance, asked, "Can the youth of Pakistan inspire change and turn into pro-active citizens who agree to disagree peacefully?" The next month, the aptly-named band "Beghairat Brigade," uploaded its catchy new tune, "Aalu Anday" (or "Eggs and Potatoes"), calling out the politicians and military for their ineptitude in running the country. 

Pakistani singer Ali Azmat just put out a new song, "Bomb Phata," ("Bomb Exploded"), that chronicles the major actors that play a part in Pakistan's instability, from President Asif Ali Zardari to army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. It speaks to the daily worries about electricity and food shortages that vex Pakistanis while bombs explode in Lahore, Karachi, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

And people regularly slam the government's inability to contain the domestic terrorism that is striking the country. This year, Pakistani artist Imran Qureshi won a prestigious award for his art installation, "Blessings upon the land of my love," describing his work as showing "the bloody aftermath of a bombing."

Malik's photo is a little more subtle, but in its nuance, it's likely to become an iconic symbol of a moment when one Pakistani decided to, quite literally and shamelessly, strip bare the truth of how institutions in Pakistan, are focused on the wrong priorities. "My dear patriots, there are far graver issues than this which need your serious consideration," wrote Pakistani economist and writer Raza Habib Raja, after the photo spread earned the rancor of the honor brigade. "The biggest issue is perhaps your screwed up mind set which gets riled up on these trivialities while completely ignoring much serious problems like rising extremism, sectarian killings and massive inequality."

Raja concluded: "...I loved that ISI tattoo. Now that was really liberating and bold!!!"

Asra Q. Nomani, a former reporter at the Wall Street Journal, is the author of Standing Alone: An American Woman's Struggle for the Soul of Islam. She teaches journalism at Georgetown University.

Pakistan's immediate reaction to the tragic November 26 airattacks on two check posts located barely 400 meters from the Afghan border inMohmand tribal agency, which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, was to declare thatthe attacks were "unprovokedaggression" and convey impressions to the local media that the attackwas a premeditated assault by U.S and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Thisaroused a nationwide furor, further roiling an already tense relationship andleading to immediateretribution against American military and political interests in Pakistanand Afghanistan.

Soon after the incident, Pakistani army officials reportedlychangedthe rules of engagement for forward-based units on the country's westernborder, authorizing them to fire on any such air intrusions without having toseek permission from senior commanders or headquarters, and indicated that airdefenses would be beefed up in that sector. But amid the hue and cry withinPakistan, somealso questioned why Pakistan's large and expensive military forces had notresponded with air defenses to protect the posts, especially since the armyclaimed the supposedly "unprovoked" NATO aircraft attacks had lasted up to 2hours. Why were Pakistani Air Force (PAF) fighter aircraft notscrambled and dispatched to the scene? Did the PAF prudently stay out of anarmy screw-up (if, as U.S. officials insist, Pakistani forces fired first), ordid they just not get the word? It would have been an acute irony if Pakistan hadsent up its American-built F-16 fighters against American helicopters orslow-flying AC-130 gunships being used against the Taliban insurgency inAfghanistan.

In fact, the furor masks the fact that Pakistan's close-in airdefenses along the border with Afghanistan are thin, and long-range radarsfacing Afghanistan are notalways on , as they were hardly needed in the past, except against Soviet airforces during the Afghan occupation of the 1980s. Ground-based radars'line-of-sight detection provides virtually no early warning against low-flyingaircraft coming through gaps in the mountains, either, although triangulationof their beams coupled with GPS coordinates of mapped border locations mayallow them to judge whether an aircraft has crossed into Pakistani air space. Whetherthey did on November 26 is not yet clear, since the firing on the posts couldeasily have been at standoff range, behind the Afghan side of the Durand Line.

The bulk of Pakistan's fixed site and other long-range groundradar constituting the national air defense system (ADGES) are orientedprimarily to detecting threats from India, along the Line of Control dividingKashmir to the north, or coming across the main Indian border along the east, andprovide, from southern locations surveillance of potential threats from theArabian Sea. They also provide general surveillance of high-altitude trafficfrom Afghanistan but are not oriented to close-in mountain border surveillance.Most of Pakistan's large numbers of low-altitude radar, anti-aircraft artilleryand surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers travel with armored and mechanizeddivisions and independent brigades deployed to counter a possible Indianinvasion. Pakistan has a large inventory (about 1,900 as of 2010) of transportableanti-aircraft guns of various types and calibers, and also has concentrationsof such AA guns and SAM defenses around air bases and sensitive facilities inthe interior. The PAF operates the national air defense system from a commandcenter in Chaklala (on the outskirts of Rawalpindi) through a network thatcontains high-and low-level ground radars.

RecentPAF acquisitions also include three Swedish (Saab 2000 Erieye) and two Chinese-madeZDK-03 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, which have360-degree vision and look-down radars that can detect aircraft at any altitude,as long as they are not hidden in ground clutter. Their primary missions areregarded as strategic, i.e., early warning, air defense and close-in,ground-based missile surveillance. And the PAF also deploys Pakistan's mainstayair defense weapons, namely fighter aircraft with air-to-air interceptormissiles.

The vast majority of Pakistan's estimated 3,150 ground-basedair defense missile systems in 2010 were in the low-altitude MANPADS (man-portableair defense systems) category, though some heat-seeking, low altitude types (suchas the Crotale)are mounted on vehicles. The shoulder-fired missiles are in the same general categoryas the American-made Stinger missiles that the Afghan mujahideen used to bringdown Soviet aircraft in the 1980s. The Pakistani army deploys a contemporaryassortment of these types of infra-red, or heat-seeking, short-rangemissile systems, including some 2,500 Chinese Mk1/Mk2 (an adaptation of theRussian SA-7) and HN-5A, 230 French Mistral,200 Swedish RBS-70, as well as 60 up-to-date Stingers (Raytheon FIM-92A).

It would be very easy for Pakistan to shift additionalanti-aircraft machine guns and to introduce these shoulder-fired missiles to itswestern region, and reportssuggest that the army is actually doing that now. However, if Pakistanifront line border posts are equipped with these systems and expected to use themagainst any air intrusion -- accidental, pre-notified, or otherwise -- thereare almost certain to be further accidental collisions and disruptions of U.S.-Pakistanicooperation. If U.S. aircraft accidentally stray into Pakistani territory andtake ground fire from anti-aircraft guns or missiles, they will almostcertainly retaliate as a standard operational procedure. Second, Pakistan wouldface the threat that some of these advanced missiles could get into militanthands, which would put not only U.S./NATO aircraft, but also Pakistani aircraft,at serious risk, and also broaden suspicions in the West of Pakistanicomplicity with militants. Stinger proliferation to militants might further deterthe Pakistani military from establishing control over its tribal territory, andwould, in effect, provide insurgents with yet additional cover in safe havensin Pakistan. Third, Pakistani firing of Stinger-type missiles against U.S.aircraft operating in Afghanistan may be seen as acts of war against the UnitedStates. While the Pakistani public increasingly views America's war on terroroperations in Afghanistan as "not Pakistan's war," they may be locked byescalation into owning "Pakistan's war on American forces." It should takelittle imagination to grasp where that would lead.

The westward deployment of these MANPADS or low-altitudeanti-aircraft guns would probably not be able to threaten U.S. drones, because bilateralprotocols for U.S. drone activity along the Afghan-Pakistan border alreadyexist and are followed. Normally drones fly at altitudes above the ceiling of shoulder-firedmissiles, and their infra-red signatures, even at low altitude, are much moredifficult for infra-red sensors to detect than those of manned aircraft. Dronesmay not even be readily detectable by Pakistan's existing ground radars in theregion. By diverting AEW&C aircraft with advanced radar to that region, however,Pakistan probably could detect and shoot down drones with fighter aircraft and,possibly, in the unlikely event they were relocated to the tribal region, targetthem with its small number of high altitude SA-2 missiles. But thesecontingencies, which would disturb Pakistan's preferred strategies and airdefense deployments against India, seem far less likely than the prospect offurther (accidental or not) air-to-ground or ground-to-ground clashes betweenNATO and Pakistani troops. Risking the loss of Pakistan's scarce 4^thgeneration fighter aircraft and pilots in cross-border shoot-outs with U.S. forceswould be a recipe for further disaster.

Although the U.S. Central Command's assessment of theMohmand incident is still a week away, the findings will likely blame communicationsbreakdowns and fog of war confusion, exploited by deceptive firing frommilitants close by Pakistan's border posts, for the tragic case offriendly-fire. This was after all the most lethal, but not the first,cross-border incident of its kind. This may turn out to be one case where theextremist tail did wag the dog.

Lessons will be gleaned from this incident, but the crucialones concern the vital importance of transparent military-to-military communicationand information-sharing on the activities of militants, and dedicated measuresof mutual support for efforts to run them to ground. Neither side can afford tobe responsible by inconsistent strategy for taking the lives of the other. Technicalmeasures for avoiding collisions that have not yet been exploited include theuse of reprogrammable, identification-friend-or foe (IFF) transponders. Whenplaced with personnel at Pakistan's forward check posts and supportinstallations, these should serve to ward off inadvertent fire by US forces,supplementing existing communications protocols. Frequently updating codesshould protect these instruments from theft and successful spoofing use bymilitants.

Beyond that, both sides must get back to basics onharmonizing policies on the future of Afghanistan. This would include pursuing asfar as they prove viable the so-called "reconciliation" negotiations with thoseinsurgents who might be induced to withdraw from combat in favor ofparticipation in the Afghan political process. Secretary Hillary Clinton'srecent visit to Islamabad warmlyinvited Pakistan to be a central player at the front end of this process, aprocess and role which Pakistan itself has long urged. Moving forward withrelevant bilateral working groups developing road maps and strategies couldhelp calm ruffled feathers while, importantly, working together for peaceful,internationally-supported outcomes in Afghanistan that will also satisfyPakistan's legitimate long-term interests.                   

Dr. Rodney W. Jones isPresident of Policy Architects International in Reston, VA, and an expert onsecurity in South Asia.

Relations between the United States and Pakistan continue tospiral downwards following the cross-border incident that resulted in the deathof 24 Pakistani troops along the border with Afghanistan last month. In fact, overthe past several months, Pakistan has, according to some accounts, engaged in aseries of actions that ought to worry U.S. decision makers. Far from shiftingits policy on providing support and sanctuary for externally focused militantgroups, Pakistani officials have potentially sought to strengthen their tieswith militants and have reportedly started negotiations with a key militantcommander Wali ur-Rehman,a Waziristan-based commander on the U.S. State Department's list of foreignterrorists, and MaulviFaqir Mohammad, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban in Bajaur Agency. Apeace deal with Rehman and other Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) would be atroublesome development, and was noted with some concern by White Housespokesperson Caitlin Hayden over the weekend, although TTPspokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan and Pakistan'spolitical leadership have both issued denials.

In November, reporting indicated that militants havedeclared a nation-wide ceasefirewith the Pakistani government while both sides talked, though again, the TTPand government both deniedthese claims. In past peace deals, the Pakistani government has allowedmilitant commanders to control Taliban "mini-states" in exchange forshifting their jihad across the border into Afghanistan. For Pakistan's seniorleadership, turning anti-state or "bad Taliban" into Afghanistan-focused or"good Taliban" would be a major achievement. For U.S. and coalition forces fightingto stabilize Afghanistan and rid the region of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, itcould be a nightmare.

It is widely believed that influential elements within Pakistan'ssecurity apparatus have unsuccessfully tried to convince the TTPto shift their focus to the fight in Afghanistan -- but their fortunes may be changing.These reported peace talks were a product of the All Parties Conference hostedby Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gailani earlier this fall, which wasconvened to address Pakistan's national security situation following recentU.S. allegations of direct, state-sponsored support for Afghan-focusedterrorist groups, such as the Haqqani network. The conference produced adeclaration seeking peace with militants throughout the tribal areas, evenreferring to militants as "ourown people" -- the same people that are largely responsible for over 200suicide attacks, killing at least 3,600 people since the beginningof 2008. Privately, the declaration reflects the military's long-heldbelief that even anti-state militants, such as the TTP, can be turned into proxies,a key component in the military's policy of state-sponsored exportation ofterror in neighboring territories, such as Afghanistan.

The TTP is a loose confederation of militant organizations primarilyfocused on targeting the Pakistani state, with the shared goal of overthrowingthe government and imposing sharialaw. Anti-state activities in Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areasregion have a long history, and as early as 2004, some militant groups begandescribing themselves as "PakistaniTaliban." In late 2007, several anti-state militant commanders formallyorganized themselves as the TTP under the leadership of South Waziristan-basedBaitullah Mehsud, launching a series of attacks and suicide bombings throughoutthe country. Rather than a single, unified entity, the TTP is a movementcomposed of independent commanders and their allied fighters. Consequently,factions within the TTP sometimes compete for resources and differ in theirprioritization of jihad against the Pakistani state or combating U.S. andcoalition forces in Afghanistan. In the ongoing peace talks, TTP militants aredemanding the cessation of Pakistani military operations against the TTP, therelease of jailed militants and compensation for civilian hardships duringmilitary operations in exchangefor their pledge to cease attacks against the Pakistani state.

The most troubling figure in the reported talks between thePakistani government and the TTP is Wali ur-Rehman -- who is much morecommitted to the ongoingfight against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan than the fight againstthe Pakistani state. After the death of his cousin and former TTP leaderBaitullah Mehsud by a CIA drone strike in August 2009, Rehman remarked that the TTP and hisfighters in particular werecommitted to helping the fight in Afghanistan and consider U.S. President BarackObama their "No. 1 enemy." Rehman is a Mehsudtribesman leading the TTP in South Waziristan, a role he assumed afterBaitullah was killed. Unlike numerous other TTP commanders in Pakistan's tribalregions, such as current TTP head Hakimullah Mehsud, Rehman is said to have wanted to end the TTP's warwith the Pakistani government, saying it has destroyed the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan. At onepoint, Rehman was reportedly in secret negotiations with elements ofthe Pakistani government in Peshawar or Khyber. Rehman is reported to be afavorite of the reclusive Afghan Taliban chiefMullahMohammad Omar. For years, both Omar and thesenior leadership of the Afghanistan-focused Haqqaninetwork have urged the TTP to abandon their waragainst the Pakistani state and instead throw their weight behind the AfghanTaliban.

Even more troubling than Rehman's links tothe Afghan Taliban is his relationship with al-Qaeda and his support for theirinternational agenda. In a September 2010 interview, Rehman explained how his TTPis in complete agreement with the ideology and agenda of al-Qaeda, claimingthat the TTP would expand their war effort during the nextdecade, presumably in close partnership with al-Qaeda. The following month, theUnited Nations placed Rehman on aninternational sanctions list, for "participating in the financing, planning,facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating activities of Al-Qaida. According tothe State Department, who has issued a five million dollar reward forinformation leading to Rehman's capture, Rehman is directly linked to the suicide bombing thatkilled seven CIA employees at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost,Afghanistan in December 2009, and Faisal Shahzad's failed bombing of TimesSquare by on May 1, 2010. None of this has discouraged Rehman from his agendaor support for al-Qaeda. After the death of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011,Rehman threatened the West, saying, "soon youwill see attacks against America and NATO countries, and our first prioritiesin Europe will be France and Britain."

Should talks move forward, any eventual peace deal and thesubsequent reorientation of TTP fighters towards the fight against U.S. andcoalition forces in Afghanistan could prove problematic. The TTP has manytrained, hardened fighters which the Afghan Taliban would certainly welcome asforce multipliers -- making the campaign to weaken them all the more difficult,especially as U.S. and coalition forces seek to draw down and transition thefight to the Afghans. Perhaps even more troubling than a growing partnershipbetween Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban would be a newly established sanctuaryfor al-Qaeda and affiliated movements under the protection of Waliur Rehman inSouth Waziristan and other TTP commanders throughout Pakistan's tribal areas. Ifthe Pakistani government continues to pursue peace with international al-Qaedaaffiliated jihadists such as Rehman, it could potentially negate or evenreverse much of the progress the United States has made against al-Qaeda overthe past several years in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Greater sanctuary andthe ability to communicate and transit the tribal areas under the protection oflocal enablers will allow the continued spread of al-Qaeda and its affiliatedmovements that will be difficult to contain.

Jeffrey Dressler is a senior analyst at the Institute forthe Study of War, where he studies security dynamics in Afghanistan andPakistan.

You would think that, after ten long and bloody years, there would be little new the Afghan war could offer in terms of brutality. But Tuesday's twin suicide strikes on Shi'a Muslim processions in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, leaving 58 dead and more than a hundred wounded, marks an unprecedented insurgent assault on civilians. Never before in the current war have Afghanistan's Shi'a been deliberately targeted, and rarely has an attack been so completely devoid of a military target.

After a week of delay, as anger against the United Statesmounted inside Pakistan over the November 26 attack by U.S. forces that killedtwo officers and 22 soldiers of the Pakistani army at border posts Volcano andBoulder in Mohmand agency, the President of the United States finally enteredthe picture directly. He called Pakistan on Sunday to express his sorrow atthis incident that is threatening to take the teetering Pakistan-U.S. allianceoff the precipice. According to the White House:

Earlier today the President placed a phone call to Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to personally express his condolences on the tragic loss of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers this past week along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President made clear that this regrettable incident was not a deliberate attack on Pakistan and reiterated the United States' strong commitment to a full investigation. The two Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship, which is critical to the security of both nations, and they agreed to stay in close touch.

About time, many would say, that the President got involvedin saving this relationship. The signaling effect of his personal interventionis huge, especially since it follows a "business as usual" approach to thepromised investigation up until now. The U.S. Central Command had said it wouldtake threeweeks to produce a report on this incendiary incident that has led to theformal closing of the ground line of communication into Afghanistan and theremoval of U.S. personnel from Shamsi air base in Balochistan -- a delay thatallowed the wounds to festerinside Pakistan.

But why did President Obama call President Asif Ali Zardariand not Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani? Pakistan has had a parliamentarysystem of government since April 8, 2010, when President Zardari was reducedto a mere constitutional figurehead. Prime Minister Gilani now heads thegovernment, and indeed has been the point-man in denouncing the United Statesin the days following the Mohmand attack. He should have been the one thatPresident Obama called. By calling President Zardari, President Obama may havebeen led to the source of political power in the Pakistan Peoples Party towhich both Zardari and Gilani belong. A pragmatic move perhaps in light ofZardari's tight hold over the party he took over from his murdered wife BenazirBhutto, but also one that downgrades the prime minister. This call will likelybe seen in the eyes of many Pakistanis as a snub of their constitutionalsystem.  By this logic, they might ask,would President Obama call President Pratibha Patil or Mrs. Sonia Gandhi inIndia rather than Prime Minister Manmohan Singh?

The United States has been trying to forge a long-term andconsistent relationship with Pakistan during the Obama administration. But 2011has been the annus horribilis betweenthese two estranged allies. The Pakistani government has used the recent attackto stoke public anger and garner support for its tough stance against theUnited States, partly to counter the power and prestige of the military in thepublic's eyes. The feedback loop created by government and the army's own toughlanguage against the United States will make it difficult for either to resilefrom its position. The signaling effect of President Obama's call to thePresident of Pakistan and not to the Prime Minister may well magnify thatdivide and be felt in Pakistani politics and on the street, where every nuanceof words coming out of the White House is parsed and debated.

Recall that President Zardari's personal popularity has beensinking, and with it his ability to affect public opinion in Pakistan. The PewGlobal Survey of June 2011 had his popularity at 11 percent. A later GallupPakistan poll of July 2011 had his negative rating 39 percent. Gilani cameout better, with 29 percent negativity rating overall, but also in the red. Inthe same Gallup survey, the Pakistan army got an approval rating of 15 percentin fighting terrorism. But the people of Pakistan also gave it a negativerating of 12 percent in running the country and a 3 percent negative rating inits political activities. Yet the military seems to be calling the shots onforeign policy, especially after its recent losses at the hands of U.S. forces.

If the United States is to mend its relations with Pakistan,it must recognize the need to heed the wishes of the people of Pakistan and toconnect with them more than the political leaders who appear to have lost theconfidence of their citizens. Turning back the clock to the Musharraf regime,when the President of Pakistan was the be-all end-all of decision making, isnot the best move. President Obama can retrieve the situation by acceleratingthe investigation into the November 26 attack and sharing credible evidencewith Pakistan of what happened and why. And, if it turns out that it was amistake on the part of the coalition and U.S. forces that caused the tragedy atVolcano and Boulder, an apology would be in order. Better that than having toput together a new policy for the troubled South Asian region without Pakistan.

Shuja Nawaz isdirector of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington DC

Pakistan's knee-jerk reaction to the fatal NATO airstrikes in Mohmand that resulted in the killing of 24 (some accounts suggest 26) soldiers is being seen in Pakistani government and diplomatic circles, behind the scenes, as a face-saving bluff on the part of the country's security establishment. This "bluff" allows the military to dictate its terms to the United States while maintaining the appearance of a strong stance against the Americans by avoiding the Bonn conference on Afghanistan set to open Monday.

Apart from the early days of the anti-terror war in the aftermath of the 9/11, Pakistan and the United States have never been completely on the same page in their fight against Taliban and al-Qaeda militants and restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan. Despite being allies in fighting al-Qaeda-linked militants, the two uneasy bed fellows never miss a chance to let the other down and squeeze the other, especially as their interests have increasingly clashed in neighboring Afghanistan.

Indeed, the United States has pushed for action against the Haqqani Network and Quetta Shura Taliban and demanded cooperation in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, while no one has paid heed to even some of the genuine demands and reservations of the Pakistani state with regards to Afghanistan, be they concern over Pashtun nationalism or India's role across the Durand Line.

The November 26 incident, though tragic, has provided an opportunity for Pakistan's army to muzzle the chattering mouths accusing them of willful neglect in missing bin Laden's presence in the garrison town of Abbottabad and pursuing a double game in fighting some militants in the tribal region of the country while giving others safe haven. The incident has proved ideal in averting international pressure and restoring, to some extent, the army's image at home, allowing them to line up the Pakistani masses, whose anti-Americanism is well known, in the name of patriotism.

The government's decision to boycott Monday's Bonn conference in Germany, as well as the halting of NATO supply convoys and the eviction of American personnel from the Shamsi Airbase have served this purpose quite well.

A senior official in the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)-led government said on the condition of anonymity that the security decisions are made by the army leadership, but when it comes to problems with the United States or the international community, the civilian government tends to be pushed out in front, forcing the government -- and not the army -- to bear the brunt of public protest against the United States and its allies.

The same time, the official said, it is the military leadership and not the civilian government that has a major say in key decisions like the Shamsi Airbase or the silent approval or public disapproval of drone strikes. His comments carry some weight, as a senior Pakistan military officer briefing journalists on the Mohmand attack said, "the rules of engagement have to be formulated by the [civilian] government" when asked about why the Pakistan Air Force did not respond while the attack in Mohmand continued for four hours. However, reports last week indicated that Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani had changed the rules to allow Pakistani forces to respond to incursions into Pakistani territory without seeking approval.

The Shamsi airbase decision and the border closing are changes that make for catchy headlines in the Pakistani Urdu media, easy choices that appeal to the patriotism of common Pakistanis attracted to every slogan that goes against the United States.

As for the third decision -- to boycott the Bonn Conference -- a number of key Pakistani politicians and analysts are of the view that Pakistan had nothing to offer at the summit being held to discuss the future of Afghanistan.

When discussing the three major decisions following the November 26 incident, female parliamentarian Bushra Gohar says Pakistan's foreign and security policies are always controlled by the army command. "Why did they [the army] did not show such reaction following the May 2 raid in Abbottabad?" she asked.

In comments to this author, Gohar said some matters have been given undue importance, and it seems that Pakistan is at war with its own self. By this, she was referring to the widening gap between the army and the civilian government where the former is controlling the key policies but shifting the responsibility to the civilian authorities.

Amidst the furor from jingoistic television anchors and panelists of the private television channels in Pakistan, some others raise a genuine question as why the single incident in Mohmand forced the Pakistani policy makers to a point of almost no return despite the fact that over 30,000 Pakistanis have been killed in incidents of terrorism and military operations in the past 10 years.

The answer is simple: Facing humiliation both at home and on the international scene following the May 2 incident, the November 26 raid has provided an opportunity to the Pakistani security establishment to dictate its terms to the U.S. and NATO, who are struggling hard to get out of Afghanistan by announcing victory.

To stage a comeback in the anti-terror alliance and become part of the peace efforts in Afghanistan once again, Pakistan is already working on a list of its future requirements as part of its relationship with the United States, said one government official.

Some of the key demands are likely to be placed on the table by the Pakistani side before re-entering the partnership, including a written agreement with the United States on Pakistan's cooperation in the war against militancy, an end to drone strikes (which have been the most lethal weapon against Taliban and al-Qaeda militants) and a bigger say for Pakistan and the pro-Pakistan Haqqani Network in any future set-up in Afghanistan.

Pakistan is also asking for guarantees that attacks like the one on November 26 would not recur, and that India's role in Afghanistan be restricted. All of those have long been the key demands and concerns of Pakistan, but the country was not in a position to explicitly push for them because of the widespread suspicions about its duplicitous role in the fight against terrorism.

However, the November 26 raid has presented itself as an opportunity for Pakistan to press for its demands and concerns before re-joining the United States' 10-year-old counterterrorism alliance.

Daud Khattak is a journalist currently working for the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Pashto-language station Radio Mashaal.

On December 5, an international conference on Afghanistan will open in Bonn, Germany, 10 years after the first Bonn conference set up the political system that would help govern Afghanistan for the next decade. The AfPak Channel asked a group of experts and practitioners what should have been done at Bonn 10 years ago, what might happen at this conference, and what Afghanistan needs in the future.

-- Peter Bergen and Andrew Lebovich

• Eklil Hakimi, Building on the past, securing the future
• Karl F. Inderfurth and Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, No more proxy wars in Afghanistan
• Omar Samad, The problems and promise of Bonn II
• Scott Worden, The elephants in the room at Bonn
• Francesc Vendrell, A decade of mistakes
• Caroline Wadhams and Brian Katulis, The big loser at Bonn will be Pakistan
• Barbara J. Stapleton, Afghanistan's bleak horizon
• Daud Khattak, Calling Pakistan's boycott bluff
• Khalid Mafton, Much ado about nothing

In response to a NATO airstrike on a Pakistani border outpost last week in which 24 Pakistani soldiers troops were killed, the Pakistani government announced that it would boycott Monday's conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, Germany. This announcement set off a flurry of diplomacy aimed at bringing Pakistan back to the table -- and at the time this article is published, it remains unclear whether Pakistan will change its mind. 

Pakistan has a clear interest in demonstrating its powerful role in determining Afghanistan's future and publicly signaling the costs it can exact on the United States if continued unilateral military action -- intentional or otherwise -- continues on its territory. But its decision to disengage from the multilateral effort carries risks for Pakistani interests in Afghanistan and worldwide, beyond the confines of Bonn. 

The conference, which aims to bring together more than 100 countries, is being held approximately ten years after the first major post-conflict conference in Bonn in 2002, which laid the groundwork for the current Afghan state. The odds of any breakthrough at the conference, with or without Pakistani participation, were already slim, and its agenda and objectives remain unclear. A series of recent diplomatic and political initiatives at various levels -- inside Afghanistan, in the region, and at the international level, are not as interlinked as they could be to produce tangible results. 

Conference planners have hoped to provide a forum for countries to demonstrate their long-term commitment to Afghanistan, to coordinate a regional economic integration plan -- the so-called "New Silk Road strategy" -- and to discuss a political settlement for Afghanistan. Taliban representation at the meeting was vetoed early on by President Karzai, however, and the conference now appears to be largely about countries making statements in support of Afghanistan, but without ponying up concrete pledges. 

The absence of Pakistan will further diminish the chance of meaningful outcomes at Bonn.  While Pakistan's ability to deliver insurgent groups to a peace process remains untested, it possesses significant spoiler powers both for a political settlement and regional economic integration through its ongoing support for Taliban insurgents and ability to curtail significant trade with Afghanistan. With the exception of Afghanistan itself (whose current political system remains highly centralized and not amenable to reforms that could entice insurgent reconciliation), Pakistan, more than any other country, has an ability to determine whether Afghanistan can experience long-term peace or war.

Pakistan is playing a risky game by sitting out the Bonn talks, however. First, it fuels an increasingly strong impression among leaders in the United States, Afghanistan and other countries that Pakistan is not a constructive player in Afghanistan and that it should be confronted directly rather than accommodated. While the deaths of the soldiers in Mohmand is a tragedy, the deaths of American and Afghan soldiers fighting Pakistan's proxies is no less so, and mistrust of Pakistan is already high in both the U.S. Congress and Afghan public opinion. If Pakistan chooses to remove itself from constructive discussions about how to fashion a political settlement in Afghanistan, it may find those discussions dominated by arguments for a containment and isolation strategy of Pakistan worldwide.  

Moreover, the breakdown of Bonn would strengthen the argument for rapid disengagement from the mission in Afghanistan, which is increasingly seen as a futile and expensive endeavor with little hope of progress. Publics around the world, especially in Europe and the United States, are increasingly opposed to pouring more money and lives into an endless quagmire. Because most analysts and policymakers see Pakistan as being essential for long-term peace in Afghanistan, Pakistan's rejection of Bonn makes prospects of failure appear even more likely, and thus the patience for engagement less. 

For Pakistanis, a complete breakdown of the Afghan state and all-out civil war may be more dangerous than the status quo; rapid international withdrawal and dramatic funding cuts will increase the risk of both. Afghanistan's instability has long-term security implications for Pakistan, including large refugee flows and growing security vacuums where militant groups can operate. The Pakistanis have already complained that Pakistani insurgent groups are using Afghan territory to increase their attacks on Pakistani soil; this would only increase if chaos were to ensue on Pakistan's border following the international withdrawal. 

The Pakistani absence from an international forum also prevents them from presenting a set of demands or engagingin a constructive dialogue on Afghanistan. Pakistan has real concerns about the coordination of military operations in Afghanistan, that military operations are not synched with a diplomatic strategy, that Pashtuns are not sufficiently represented within the current power structure in Afghanistan, and that India is utilizing Afghan territory to advance their strategic interests. But ceding the debate to other actors, most of whom have less at stake in Afghanistan than the Pakistanis, will be to the detriment of Pakistani interests in the region.   

It is also not clear that their leverage is advanced by such a maneuver. The Obama administration has already elevated Pakistan's centrality in its strategy toward Afghanistan. It has argued that Pakistan is one of the main players in Afghanistan, reducing its pressure on the Pakistanis to mount direct military operations against insurgents based in the frontier areas while asking for their assistance in bringing them to the negotiating table. It has pushed back against Congressional calls to isolate Pakistan further and made the case for engagement, not isolation. But the administration's strategic patience with Pakistan, already strained by mutual mistrust, is not unlimited.

While the Pakistanis have legitimate concerns about the Mohmand attack, taking the ball and walking off the field does not assist them in advancing their desired future in Afghanistan and the region. Rather than presenting a strategy in opposition to NATO, the United States and the 100 countries that are attending, the Pakistanis would be wise to clarify their demands and outline concrete steps that would assuage their fears and advance their interests. Bonn could have been an opportunity for such a presentation; instead it has been used as another way to obstruct. 

Caroline Wadhams and Brian Katulis are Senior Fellows at the Center for American Progress.

1. While the upcoming Bonn conference on Afghanistan coincides with the ten-year anniversary of the Bonn Agreement that formally ended the Afghan conflict and formed the basis for a new Afghan government in 2001, its sponsors have spent the past several months stressing that it is neither an assessment of the past ten years, nor a forum for a "Bonn II Agreement" to end the current insurgency. This downplaying of expectations is appropriate, given the recent setbacks to the peace process. But this changed set of goals does not diminish the need for both an honest assessment of how the Bonn Agreement has fared for Afghanistan and a path toward a political settlement that would address its deficiencies.

   Read on

Starting Monday, 85 countries and 15 international organizations will gather in Bonn, Germany, to mark the 10^th anniversary of the international conference that convened after the overthrow of the Taliban government. This convening provides an important opportunity to remove Afghanistan as a pawn from the region's chess board.

When it comes to women's rights, Pakistan has been in the news for all the wrong reasons. The list of wrongs perpetrated against women, which includes honor killings, domestic violence, sexual assault and acid attacks, is disturbingly lengthy. What is unfortunate is that the current state owes as much to the lawmaking agencies of the country who have been unable to enforce justice for women as those who perpetrate the actual violence.

But tangible progress is underway. The Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Act 2011, a twice-snubbed landmark bill demanding greater social protection for women, passed this November by the Pakistan National Assembly, is a major move in the right direction. Framed and amended by Dr. Donya Aziz, the bill was unanimously passed by the lower house, which is headed by speaker Dr. Fehmida Mirza -- the first female parliamentary speaker in the Muslim world. The bill is currently awaiting approval by the Senate, but civil society, women's rights activists and NGOs are optimistic that this bill will become law.

Outside of Pakistan, the bill is being hailed as a show of collective resolve by Pakistani political parties to counter societal taboos against women, dealing with issues such as forced marriages, physical violence against women, or depriving women of their inheritance. The bill deems all of the above as crimes that can lead to three to ten years' imprisonment or a fine of up to up to RS1 million (approximately $11,400). The bill also criminalizes the practice of ‘Haq Bakhshish' -- forcing women into giving up their right to marriage by marrying them to the Quran. While not a mainstream custom and mostly practiced in the rural areas of the country to prevent the loss of property if a woman marries someone who is not a relative, Haq Bakhshish has been an eyesore for women's rights and human rights activists in Pakistan for decades.

But things aren't all that straightforward. While supporters of women's rights in Pakistan revel in the recent development, 2011 also saw a notable setback for their cause. The Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Bill, passed earlier in the year and signed by President Asif Ali Zardari before becoming the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act 2011, reversed the right of women to bail. That right was granted under the Women's Protection Act 2006 and signed into law by then-President Pervez Musharraf. But come 2011 and bail can only be granted by the court, putting women again at the mercy of the criminal justice system.  

Under the Women Protection Act 2006, bail became the right of a woman accused of any crime except involvement in terrorism, financial corruption and murder or a crime punishable with death, or a minimum of ten years imprisonment. More simply, they were given the right to bail without going to the courts. Mostly meant to decrease the number of women in jail, especially those accused of zina, or adultery, the WPA 2006 made it harder for the police to hold women in custody. However, with President Zardari's recent amendments, that right has been taken away.

Women's rights activists are raking President Zardari's government over the coals at the hushed, sudden, revision. According to Farzana Bari, a civil rights activist in Pakistan, women may be detained on minor offences and even as a result of family disputes, and women will need to go through court hearings before being able to be bailed out of prison, thanks to the amendment. Speaking to a local English newspaper, Bari called the move a "dangerous reversal, as more than 80 percent of the gains achieved through the Women Protection Act 2006 have been lost."

The WPA 2006 was an attempt by the then-government to amend the heavily-criticized Hudood Ordinance laws in Pakistan enacted by military dictator Zia ul-Haq in 1979, which governed the punishment for rape and adultery in the country for decades.

Take "adultery" and non-marital consensual sex as a case in point -- both criminalized by the Hudood Ordinances. For many years in Pakistan, the laws made female rape victims liable to prosecution for adultery if they could not produce four male witnesses to the assault; however, the WPA 2006 brought rape under the Pakistan Penal Code, which is based on civil law and not Sharia (Islamic law). What that did was take away the right of law-enforcement agencies to detain people suspected of having non-marital consensual sex. Instead they were to require a ‘formal accusation' in court. Even though the amendments still treated adultery and sex outside of marriage as an offence, the judges could now deal with rape cases in criminal rather than Islamic courts. That did away with the practically impossible ‘four witnesses' requirement and allowed convictions to be made on the basis of proper circumstantial and forensic evidence.

Unfortunately, however, the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act 2011 is a giant step back, almost to the Hudood Ordinances themselves. President Zardari's government believes getting custody of the accused is critical to investigations, especially in the scenario where it becomes easier for criminals to engage women in offences, as the WPA 2006 made it easier for female criminals and their co-conspirators or those who trapped them to get out of jail quickly.  However, the civil rights activists in the country remain perplexed as to why bail laws had to be reversed almost completely, especially when amendments could have been introduced to check potential misuse without ‘robbing' women of their previously hard-earned concessions.

Thus, for every step forward with women's rights in Pakistan, we take a giant step back. On the one hand, bills are signed to protect women in Pakistan from early marriages and physical abuse, while on the other, juvenile convicts detained for committing zina are exempted from being granted special remission, a standard practice around the Eid al-Fitr holiday where the President of Pakistan lessens the sentences of juvenile prisoners and others. Exempting those convicted of zina from these remittances puts them on the same level as terrorists, in the eyes of Pakistani law.

While Pakistanis both in Pakistan and in the United States appreciate the role of the Pakistan National Assembly in making this landmark legislation see the light of day, they are also skeptical over the future status of the bill and its implementation by local law enforcement agencies. Pakistani civil society groups have vowed to stage a sit-in demonstration outside the Parliament if the bill is blocked by the Senate. And while activists remain optimistic about this legislation, the fact remains that the gap between the theory of law in Pakistan and its practice has always been enormous. For now, one can only hope that the Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Act lives up to its name.

Rabail Baig is a Pakistani journalist based in Boston.